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The dissertation addresses a lacuna in current scholarship concerning the role and 
meaning of figurative language in Indian Buddhist Mahāyāna philosophical discourse. 
Attempting to fill part of it, the dissertation explicates and reconstructs an early Yogācāra 
Buddhist philosophical discourse on metaphor (upacāra, nye bar ‘dogs pa) and grounds 
it in a broader intellectual context, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. This analysis 
uncovers an Indian philosophical intertextual conversation about upacāra that reaches 
across sectarian lines, and since it takes place before the height of systematized 
alakāra-śāstra in India, stands to illuminate what may be described as one of the 
philosophical roots of Indian poetics. 
The dissertation proceeds by providing translations and analysis of key sections 
on upacāra from a variety of Indian philosophical sources. The first part (chapters I-II) 
examines the concept’s semantic and conceptual scope in the theories of meaning and 
fundamental works of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools, and in the school of grammatical 
analysis (focusing on Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya). The second part (chapters III-V) 
examines the understanding of the term in some Yogācāra śāstras and sūtras against the 
background of their broader Buddhist context. It looks at such texts as the 
Tattvārthapaala chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Viniścayasagrahaa#ī, both 
ascribed to Asa:ga; Vasubandhu’s Triṃśika and its commentary by Sthiramati; the  
Abhidharmako%abhā%ya and its commentary by Sthiramati; Dignāga’s  
Pramā#asamuccaya; and the La(kāvatārasūtra.  
This analysis reveals a Yogācāra account of upacāra that, because of its 
underlying referential mechanism, understands the term above all as diagnostic of a 
breach between language and reality and therefore as marking the demise of a 
correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, it is shown that some Yogācāra thinkers 
developed this theme into a sophisticated theory of meaning that enabled the school both 
to insist on this lack of grounding for language and, at the same time, to uphold a 
hierarchy of truth claims, as required by the school's philosophical soteriological 
discourse. It is argued that a common feature of all these accounts is their understanding 
of upacāras not just as content carriers (that is, as informative) but also as performative – 
actively manifesting and invoking the groundlessness of language through the fact of 
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The dissertation addresses a lacuna in current scholarship concerning the role and 
meaning of figurative language within Indian Buddhist Mahāyāna philosophical 
discourse. Attempting to fill part of it, I explicate and reconstruct an early Yogācāra1 
Buddhist philosophical discourse on metaphor and ground it in a broader intellectual 
context, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. My hope is that, apart from elucidating more 
generally the Yogācāra's understanding of language, the analysis of its discourse on 
metaphor, presented from within the school's own theoretical framework, will allow for a 
better understanding of the Yogācāra's own application of figurative language. My 
analysis focuses on the early Yogācāra understanding and usage of one particular 
concept, "upacāra" (nye bar ‘dogs pa), a term best translated as “figurative designation” 
or simply "metaphor." Though the term is not exclusive to the Yogācāra, it appears 
frequently in the school's writings and seems to carry a specialized meaning. Situated at 
the juncture of a discussion of associative language and a broadly understood theory of 
meaning, the term stands to provide valuable insights into the school’s understanding of 
figurative language.  
                                                 1 By this term I refer to the textual production of the treatises ascribed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (circa 360 CE) and their commentators up to Sthiramati (mid-sixth century CE), and to the Mahāyāna sūtras broadly associated with the school. For a list of sūtras, see Powers 1991: 14-19. Buescher (2008: 1-6) has argued for a sub-distinction between Yogācāra and later Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, taking the former to refer primarily to parts of the maulībhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi corpus and the latter to texts that show distinct doctrinal features such as the ālayavijñāna, the trisvabhāva, and vijñāptimātratā (Beuscher counts the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra among these). For a discussion of Bueshcer’s interpretation, see chapter III, part 1.1 and 1.2.    
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The systematic argumentation and lucid terminology that are the mark of early 
Mahāyāna philosophical treatises are strikingly counterbalanced by the ubiquitous use of 
figurative language in these works. The stock analogies, similes, and metaphors can 
usually be traced to a number of Buddhist root figures that, far from being merely 
ornamental, are highly important in developing argumentation and outlining its 
soteriological horizons. But given the overwhelming visibility of figurative language in 
Buddhist literature, its role and use has received relatively little attention in scholarship to 
date. While various scholarly works engage with figurative language as a sub-topic of 
Buddhist hermeneutics (on which more below), or with the philosophical work performed 
by particular Buddhist metaphors,2 only a handful consider its overall status or function 
as an independent topic.3 Furthermore, of those works that do address this issue, most 
                                                 2Regarding the Yogācāra philosophical use of several particular similes and metaphors, see for instance Wayman (1984), and Lusthaus (2002: 491-495 & 508-517) on the mirror simile; Wood (1991: 42-47), Garfield (2002: 147-151), and Gold 2006, on the illusory elephant analogy,   3 These include McMahan (2002), who deals with the role and meaning of ocular metaphors in the Mahāyāna visionary texts, drawing also on contemporary theories of conceptual metaphor; Steven Collins, who has written on the ways in which the Pāli imaginaire utilizes certain patterns of imagery concerning either personal identity or continuity (1982), and later the concept of nirvāṇa (1997); David Eckel (1992, and also 2005), whose study of Bhāvaviveka’s philosophical works draws attention to the metaphors framing the latter’s arguments. Other writers whose engagement with the topic is notable if more narrowly defined include Charles Goodman (2005), who has presented what he calls the Vaibhāṣika "metaphoricalist" approach to personal identity, and Ralph Flores (2008: 87-100), whose argument for a literary reading of Buddhist scripture suggests viewing Buddhist figurative language as strategies for opening up new and more spiritually meaningful possibilities of understanding. In the general field of Indian Studies, Laurie Patton’s work has dealt extensively with figurative language in the early Indian ritualistic and literary context. Most recently (2008), Patton explored the hermeneutical and conceptual role of figurative language in pre-alaṃkāraśāstra Indian literature, using Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacaritam as a case study. Her essay also provides a useful survey of the primary and secondary sources available for the study of figurative language in early Indian literature, including the Epics. Earlier (2004), Patton examined the relation between mantra and ritual action (primarily through the lens of viniyoga) in a shifting context of Vedic interpretation, arguing for the centrality of metonymical thinking as a vehicle for constructing ritualistic meaning through a creative association of various elements pertaining to the cognitive, emotional, and physical sphere of the ritual. While Patton discusses viniyoga mostly as a hermeneutical 
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approach it by employing contemporary theories of metaphor developed in Western 
disciplines. With few exceptions,4 there has been no sustained attempt to examine how 
Buddhist thinkers reflect on and theorize their own application of figurative language.  
What, then, does the Mahāhyāna philosophical discourse have to say about 
figurative language, and where does it do so (under which sub-discourses)? Two rather 
obvious places in which to search for answers do not yield them. First, the later Buddhist 
epistemological discourse (pramāavāda), despite its tendency toward comprehensive 
categorization, does not define or expressly delineate the rules and role of figurative 
language. Discussion of "examples" and analogies (dtānta) is usually limited to a 
consideration of their validity in the inferential procedure (anumāna). The same goes for 
"analogy" (upamāna), one of the possible valid means of knowledge, whose epistemic 
                                                                                                                                                 device, insofar as she shows it to be thoroughly underlined by metonymical association her account can perhaps be regarded as the first-of-its-kind scholarly description of ritualistic-qua-performative Indian theory of metaphor. Another noted work is by Michael Myers (1995), who, following the program initially proposed by Karl Potter (1988), examines the role of central metaphors in broadening and exceeding given conceptual spheres in Vedic and Advaita-Vednāntic literature.   4 A noted exception in the field of Buddhist studies and more specifically in the study of the Yogācāra is Jonathan Gold (2007), who has expounded on what he calls the Yogācāra “figurative theory of reference” (discussed in chapter V of this essay). Mario D’Amato (2003) reconstructs a Buddhist theory of signs presented in the eleventh chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, and provides a useful survey of secondary works on Buddhist and Indian semiotics. Regarding early pre-alaṃkāraśāstra Indian theory of figurative language, Jan Gonda (1949) provides a methodical and extensive study of similes in Indian literature (including a section on Buddhist similes), and in a later work (1975) also of some early notions of the term alaṃkāra. Kunjunni Raja (1969) deals extensively with the understanding of figurative language of the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Grammarians and elsewhere (1965) specifically with Pāṇini’s understanding of lakṣaṇā. Gerow (1977) provides notes on some limited early Indian engagement with poetics, and addresses the meanings and difference between the terms gauṇī, lakṣaṇā, and dhvani in classical and medieval Indian thought (1984), comparing them with Pierce’s tripartite classification of signs. Alexander Piatigorsky and David Zilberman (1976) deal with the range of meanings and use of the term lakṣaṇā mostly in the Upaniṣads, and Gren-Eklund (1986) compares certain features of both philosophical and later poetics understanding of figurative language with the Aristotelian conception of figurative transference.   
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function overshadows its linguistic one,5 and for āgama (scripture, tradition), which 
sometimes is accepted as a valid means of knowledge by the early Yogācāra6 but whose 
bearing on such specific speech particles as figures is never discussed in epistemic 
discourse. Figurative expressions, therefore, did not come under any formal category in 
the Buddhist epistemic discourse. Second, there is no early Buddhist theory of poetics 
(alakāraśāstra) – nor, for that matter, any extant systematized theory of poetics from 
that period 7 –dealing with these issues (though there are indications of links between 
later Buddhist thinkers and commentators to Sanskrit theory of poetics).8  
Nevertheless, early Mahāyāna Buddhist literature is keenly aware of the stakes 
involved in the deployment of figurative language as a liberative tool. This awareness is 
most conspicuous in two related contexts. The first is the Buddhist notion of "skillful 
means" (upāya), which counts figurative language as one among many pedagogical 
                                                 5 See, for instance, Śantarakṣita Tattvasaṃgraha discussion of upamāna, in Jha (1939a: 576). Zilberman, in his expansive but unfortunately unfinished work on analogy in Indian thought (2006), has suggested that this epistemic understanding of analogy was the predominant view between the second and eleventh centuries AD (p. 49).  6 Asaṅga lists āgama as one of the eight kinds of proofs (sādhana): “The acceptable tradition (aptāgama) is a teaching which is not contrary to the two which precede (i.e., not contrary to direct knowledge and inference).” Walpola 2000a: 250.  7 Discussing the “pre-history of Indian poetics,” Gerow (1977) notes that while the existence of an early tradition of theory of poetics is indicated by references in later texts, the literary production between 0-500 CE is lost. Such early writers on upamā as Yāska and Pāṇini did, he points out, theorize figures to a certain extent, but their engagement, while significant for subsequent theory of poetics, is far from uniform in its scope or concerns (p. 221). As for the Nāṭyaśāstra, Gerow questions Kane’s dating of it to 300 CE, leaving its date undetermined but indicating that only in the eighth century CE, with the commentary of Lollaṭa, does it become a truly “creative basis for the tradition” (225-226: n.34).   8 Bhāmaha (mid-eight century CE) is assumed to have been a Buddhist; see Gerow 1977: 224: n.28. The Ratnaśrī, a commentary on Daṇḍīn’s Kāvyādarśa, was written by Ratnaśrījñāna, most likely a Sinhalese  monk living in Vikramaśila in the tenth century CE; see Thakur 1957: 17-21. Dharmakīrti was known to compose poetry; see, for instance, Ingalls 1965: 445.   
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means applied by Buddhist teachers. The second context is discussions of hermeneutics, 
in which figurative language is seen as the textual expression of implicit intention 
(abhisadhi, abhiprāya) and interpretable meaning (neyārtha).9 Both these perspectives 
on figurative usage, however, reduce it either to its function (pedagogical) or to indirect 
intention ascriptions, telling us little about the semantics and pragmatics of figurative 
meaning, i.e., its enabling conditions, cognitive impact, and the referential mechanism 
involved in its employment. 
Where we do find these issues addressed is in the Yogācāra treatises, where the 
subject of figurative usage is taken up as part of a broader philosophical engagement with 
the relation between language and reality in which the concept of upacāra often features 
prominently. The dissertation therefore aims to present an account of the Yogācāra notion 
of upacāra, formulated as far as possible in the school’s own theoretical terms. At the 
same time, I propose a reading of the school's views that takes into account its broader 
pan-Indian context. Though some of what the Yogācārins had to say about upacāra was 
innovative, their reflections on this issue, I argue, should be understood against the 
background of and as conversing with specific theories of meaning put forward by such 
non-Buddhist schools as the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and the Grammarians (especially 
                                                 9 The issue of figurative usage as a sub-topic of a discussion about skillful means and hermeneutics is taken up in a variety of source; in the context of the Mahāyāna literature, these include Thurman (1978), Hamlin (1983), Lopez (1988 & 1993), Schroeder (2001), Pye (2003), Ganeri (2006), and Collier (1998). The latter is noteworthy insofar as his analysis of indirect intention and non-literal speech in a variety of Mahāyāna sources draws comparisons with accounts of Indian poetics, revealing interesting connections between the work of medieval Indian thinkers, such as Haribhadra, and the theory of poetics prevalent in his time. Regarding the Nikāya Buddhism, Hamilton (2000) has argued for a reading of the early Buddhist sources that emphasizes the intended figurative nature of many of the Buddha's assertions, above all the non-self claim; Hwang (2006) supplies a doctrinal history of the metaphor of nirvāṇa attuned to the various interpretative schemes provided by the suttas and early Abhidhamma.   
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Bhartṛhari), all of which set the tone for the philosophical and hermeneutical use of 
upacāra. I know of no existing work of scholarship devoted to an exploration of the 
Yogācāra theoretical understanding of figurative language that is set within this broader 
frame of reference.10 This sort of exploration will, I hope, provide us with both a 
contextualized understanding of the Yogācāra ideas about language and a fuller grasp of 
the role and meaning of the school's application of particular figures. For the general field 
of early India literature, reproducing this cross-sectarian conversation about upacāra, 
which took place before the height of systematized alakāra-śāstra in India, stands to 
illuminate what may be described as one of the philosophical roots of Indian poetics.   
  
1. Methodology and the Textual Field  
Upacāra has a broad range of meaning in non-Buddhist Sanskrit literature.11 This 
is attested by research conducted at the scriptorium of the Sanskrit Dictionary Project at 
Deccan College (Pune, Mahārāshtra), which involved  a review of hundreds of paper 
slips that in theory quote all appearances of upacāra in 1541 representative works of 
Sanskrit literature.12 This vast data base was invaluable to me at the stage of locating 
                                                 10 Nakamura (1972) and Unebe (2004) have compared Sthiramati's account of upacāra to that of Bhartṛhari’s third kanda. Kunjunni Raja (1969: 248-249) briefly remarks on some apparent similarities between Sthirmati’s view of metaphor and that of the Mīmāṃsā.   11 Monier Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary (1956 [1899]) lists the following meanings before its sense as figurative usage: approach, service, attendance, act of civility, reverence, proceedings, practice, behavior, attendance on a patient, ceremony, offering, solicitation, ornament, usage, etc. (p. 197).   12 Ghatage, Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute. Sanskrit Dictionary Dept., and University of Poona. Dept. of Linguistics. (1976). The project was inaugurated in 1948 by S. M. Katre. The first volume of the project’s dictionary was published 1978, and in 2003 the fifth volume appeared, with entries up to apn*. The process of cataloguing and sorting vocables from all selected Sanskrit sources is ongoing. Its information is stored in an archive of handwritten reference paper slips, each containing the Sanskrit 
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references to upacāra mostly in non-Buddhist but also in Buddhist Sanskrit sources, as 
well as in identifying patterns in the changes of meaning the term underwent across time 
periods and genres. Specifically, it demonstrated quite distinctly that the use of upacāra 
in the sense of metaphor is prominent in the philosophical śāstric literature – non-
Buddhist and Buddhist alike – from its earliest phases, and in the later alakārasastra 
literature, but relatively scarce or non-existent in other genres. While this observation 
needs to be qualified by the fact that it inevitably reflects the principles of selection 
applied by the dictionary's compliers as well as the historically constructed notion of a 
Sanskrit canon,13 it nonetheless enables us to outline a general working context in which 
upacāra was highly visible, and more importantly, suggests that this context reaches 
across sectarian lines. Both these observations came to form my working hypotheses, 
which I eventually show, through close readings in a variety of upacāra-related textual 
sources, to be well founded.  
Within such a broadly defined textual context, my lineup of sources was 
necessarily selective. The initial criterion guiding my selection was the presence in a 
given source of a substantial theoretical engagement with upacāra either as the main 
topic of discussion or in a philosophically significant manner, and in the case of sources 
other than the Yogācāra treatises, also the text's chronological availability to early 
Yogācāra thinkers. The selection of sources was also motivated by what I had initially 
                                                                                                                                                 headword, an approximate English translation, and a textual reference to the passage in which the word appears.   13 The front matter of Volume One includes a list of all texts catalogued, the selection criteria and the rationale for the classification into genres, the method of extraction of references, and so on. The totality of the works is said to represent the sixty-four traditional branches of Sanskrit literature (catuḥṣaṣṭi kalās) from the Ṛgveda to eighteenth-century commentarial literature, but the list reflects mostly mainstream Sanskrit classical works, and includes (for instance) a relatively small body of Buddhist and Jain works (the dictionary also excludes meanings that are unique to Buddhist sources, i.e., "hybrid" Sanskrit). See Ibid. 
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foreseen as a natural goal of the study: tracing, if not the textual origin of, then at least the 
main source of influence on the Yogācāra understanding of upacāra so as to come nearer 
to providing the term with an intellectual history of sorts. This entailed reading in ever-
widening contextual circles that moved chronologically from the obvious core of early 
Yogācāra treatesis, to their immediate Buddhist context (Mahāyāna sūtras, the 
Mādhyamika, Sanskrit Abhidharma, and the Nikāya Buddhism), and then to the less 
immediate non-Buddhist philosophical śāstric context. As I describe below, however, my 
findings were to overturn my early expectations, forcing me to revise the methodology 
and aim of my research. This researcher's tale of trial and error is worth recounting in this 
case not just in order to defend my methodological choices but also because it is telling of 
some of the unquestioned assumptions that pervade the field of Buddhist studies.   
While the use of upacāra in the sense of figurative application is ubiquitous in the 
Yogācāra treatesis ascribed to AsaEga, Vausbandhu (circa 360 CE),14 and their 
commentaries by Sthiramati (470-550),15 only some of these references appear in a 
textual context that displays the kind of breath and philosophical rigor I sought out. A 
convenient point of reference for such a discussion was provided me by Sthiramati’s 
explication of upacāra in his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Treatise in Thirty Verses 
(Triśika) – a particularly elaborate and systematic account of the term culminating in 
the claim that all language usage should in fact be considered figurative. Given 
Sthiramati's overall role in synthesizing various Yogācāra ideas and shaping the school as 
a unified textual tradition, as well as his tendency to incorporate elements from his 
                                                 14 For the dating of Vasubandhu, see chapter IV.   15  For the dating of Sthiramati, see chapter V.   
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predecessors’ writings, his account of upacāra may also be regarded as a summary of the 
Yogācāra understanding of this term. For both these reasons his work is arguably the 
apex of the early Yogācāra treatment of upacāra, and it therefore came to represent the 
upper limit – both chronologically (mid-sixth century CE) and thematically – of my 
exploration of the Yogācāra textual field.   
Receding chronologically, I then traced another fundamental early Yogācāra 
treatise in which upacāra figures prominently, namely the Tattvārthapa"ala chapter of 
the Bodhisattvabhūmi along with its commentarial sections in the Viniścayasagrahaī, 
both belonging to the vast Yogācārabhūmi corpus traditionally ascribed to AsaEga. Both 
texts offer a highly sophisticated philosophical account of the relation between language 
and reality, in which the concept of upacāra plays an important argumentative role. The 
Bodhisattvabhūmi, moreover, has recently been identified by scholarship as one of the 
early sources (if not the very earliest)16 of Yogācāra thought and its influence on 
subsequent Yogācāra works cannot be overstated.  
Proceeding next to examine the immediate Buddhist doctrinal context of the 
Yogācāra treatises, I turned to the various Mahāyāna sūtras associated (in the broad 
sense)17 with the Yogācāra. But here, against my early expectations, apart from a 
noteworthy philosophical engagement with upacāra in the tenth chapter of the 
La'kāvatārasūtra (composed between 433 and 513 CE),18 I found that the Yogācāra-
                                                 16 For a discussion of the dating of these texts, see chapter III, part 1.1.    17 That is, including both those Mahāyāna sūtras distinctly identified with the Yogācāra (such as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, or the Daśabhūmikasūtra) and sūtras that contain only some doctrines associated with the school, like the Laṅkāvatārasūtra or the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra. See Powers 1991: 2.   18 For more on the dating of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, see chapter III, part 3.  
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oriented sūtras included little or no reference to the term in its relevant sense.19 As for the 
philosophical works of other Buddhist schools of thought, the Mādhyamika treatises 
composed up to Sthiramati’s time contain, as far as I found, no significant references to 
upacāra,20 but the term is employed ubiquitously (mostly in a hermeneutical context) 
both in the works of Dignāga (480-540) and in the Sanskrit Abhidharma commentarial 
literature, most notably in the seminal Abhidharmakoabhāya by Vasubandhu. Any 
attempt to determine the textual origins and context of the Sanskrit Abhidharma use of 
the term leads naturally to the Pāli canon; but, again to my surprise, though the term is 
indeed used in the suttas with a variety of meanings, nowhere in them, as far as I found, 
does it appear in the sense of figurative application.21 By contrast, the use of upacāra in 
this sense is highly present in fundamental non-Buddhist philosophical texts of the early 
Mīmāṃsā (25 CE, 420 CE) and Nyāya (150 CE, 450 CE),22 and by the Grammarians 
                                                  19 For instance, as far as I was able to determine in the extant Sanskrit and Tibetan sources, there is only one relatively insignificant reference to upacāra in the fundamental Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (according to the Stog Palace edition of the canon, p. 143: dmigs pa la nye bar ’dogs pa’i dngos po. But in the sDe dge 99a1: dmigs pa la nye bar gtod pa’i dngos po. I am grateful to John Powers for bringing this difference to my attention). In the Daśabhūmikasūtra and the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra the term does appear but not in the sense of figurative usage (only as "activity" or "practice"), and it does not appear at all in the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra or in the Vajracchedikasūtra (the latter, though a Prajñāpāramitā text, is not distinctly identified with the Yogācāra but has commentaries ascribed to both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu).    20 The few sporadic references are mostly in the works of Bhāvaviveka, for instance in the Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma) P5253, vol. 95, 67a2; and in the Madhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti-tarkajvālā (dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba) P5256, vol. 96, 66a6, 241a5.   21 For a more detailed account of the Pāli canon use of the term upacāra  see chapter V, part 1.   22 Dates refer to the composition of the sūtra and bhāṣya, respectively, and are based on Potter (1983).   
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(especially Bhartṛhari, 450-510 CE),23 where it is mostly discussed in the context of 
theories of meaning.24 Moreover, as I show throughout the essay, there are instances of 
clear similarity and often plain identity between the Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
employments of the term (recurring formulaic phrases, stock examples, etc.). Finally, I 
found this similarity to be evident also in the Yogācāra philosophical accounts of 
upacāra, which, to varying degrees, derive their opponents' views from and respond to 
the non-Buddhist śāstras' arguments about upacāra.  
Where does all this leave the questions of the proper methodology and relevant 
textual field? The absence of references to upacāra in the Pāli canon and their scarcity in 
the Mahāyāna sutras and the Mādhyamika treatises, on the one hand, and certain parallels 
between the Yogācāra use of the term and that of non-Buddhist śāstric sources, on the 
other hand, underscore the cross-sectarian context in which the explanation of this term 
must be sought. In this respect, my own research findings confirm the initial impression 
provided by the database of the Sanskrit Dictionary Project, according to which the 
meaning of upacāra is defined mostly by a śāstric discourse that goes beyond sectarian 
lines.  
                                                 23 For more on the dating of Bhartṛhari, see chapter II.   24 As far as I found, there are no references to the term in this sense in the early literature of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools. As for the early Advaita, the Gauḍapāda- kārikā  offers the following reference in the context of an account of the manas in the state of waking, dream, and deep sleep: ajam anidram asvapnam anāmakam arūpakam ׀  sakṛdvibhātaṃ sarvajñānam na upacārāḥ kathaṃcana ׀׀  Karmarkar 1953: 3:36. Karmarkar translates na upacārāḥ kathaṃcana as “[There is in this description of Brahman] no figurative use in any way whatever.” See also his notes on this passage, ibid. 102-103. Richard King, on the other hand, proposes the following translation: “[It is] unborn, without sleep, without dream, nameless, formless, ever illuminated, omniscient, there is no practice in any way what so ever.” (1995: 250:35).     
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Broadly speaking, then, the deeply contextual investigation of an idea across 
primary textual sources and sectarian lines seems to demand a diachronic perspective, at 
least as a safeguard against anachronism and an a-historical, essentializing approach to 
the realm of ideas. This need is all the more pronounced in the case of Indian thought, 
displaying as it often does the tendency to be regarded as perennial. Ideally, this calls in 
the present case for something akin to a textual genealogy of upacāra. But the 
implementation of such an approach encounters substantial difficulties, which render the 
very idea of tracing the origin or supplying a linear narrative of intertextual borrowing all 
but impossible. First in line are the empirical difficulties associated with any attempt to 
arrange this textual field chronologically – a predicament shared by the scholarship of 
early and classical Indian thought alike, as both typically need to make do with 
indeterminate and approximate dates based mostly on philological analysis.25 Second, 
when brought under analysis, the texts at hand appear to challenge some of the most basic 
interpretative presuppositions heuristically applied to the field, such as the idea of clear-
cut sectarian identities within (at least) the Buddhist world,26 or the traditional and 
scholarly assumption regarding the chronological priority of sūtra over śāstra.27 Without 
the reliable benefit of such interpretative heuristics, and with little to go by in the way of 
hard chronological evidence, we are left with an intricate intertextual realm in which 
                                                 25 On the difficulties involved in dating early Indian thought, see Bronkhorst 2007: 175-258, and for their discussion in the context of inter-textual borrowing, see Patton 2008: 54. I discuss the dating of early Yogācāra texts in chapter III, part 1.1.     26 See Kritzer (2005) on the influence of early Yogācāra thought on the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya; I return to this in chapter IV.    27 See Schmithausens' arguments (1992) on the possibility of an exchange of ideas between Vasubandhu’s treatises and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, discussed in chapter IV, part 2.   
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questions of the origin of particular theories or the direction of intertextual borrowing 
cannot be conclusively resolved. 28  
This has its advantages. Recently, in an article exploring the hermeneutical and 
conceptual role of figurative language in pre-alakāraśāstra Indian literature, Laurie 
Patton has pointed out the interpretive gain in viewing cases of intertextual borrowing in 
terms of an imaginaire in the broad sense of the term, i.e., a common cultural and literary 
context.29 Patton’s proposal can be complemented with the poststructuralist 
understanding of the notion of intertextuality as designating not the mere context or the 
simple fact of "cross-citation," as the term is often and rather flatly employed, but an 
interpretive as well as a creative activity within a certain inter-relational semiotic and 
ideological field.30 In the case before us, one such possible intertextual realm is 
delineated by the general concerns and vocabulary of Indian śāstric theories of meaning 
(pre-alakāraśāstra, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist) and their engagement with 
upacāra. Within the confines of this realm, a synchronic interpretive approach seems not 
                                                 28 This is not to undermine the legitimacy of interpretation offered in the absence of hard extra-textual evidence (I am about to offer one myself). Instead, I wish to emphasize that, in the absence of such evidence, any diachronically organized scheme based on philological analysis is at one and the same time interpretation dependent and the very foundation that justifies the interpretation, resulting in a potentially vicious hermeneutical circularity. This is ultimately why the case at hand seems unsuited to a genealogical analysis; there is simply not enough conclusive chronological evidence to support (for instance) a Foucauldian critical genealogy – i.e., an "archeology" of knowledge in which meaning is never fixed abstractly to a discourse but is derived from its history and process of becoming. Foucault 1972: 138-140.  29 Patton 2008: 54-55. The remainder of her article is dedicated to the explication of this imaginaire at work in the background of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita. Drawing on recent theory of conceptual metaphor, Patton points out the literary and hermeneutical work performed by a set of metaphors in bridging differences, in this case between Buddhist and Brahminic world views.    30 In our case, the notion of linguistic “meaning” would therefore be considered something of an ideologeme (Kristeva 1980) already laden with certain cultural and conceptual tensions.   
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only justifiable but also capable, potentially, of supplying valuable insight on the 
fundamental presuppositions and tropes of the texts that fall within its domain.  
Hence, intertextual analysis, although something of a methodological constraint in 
our case,31 brings with it the richness of interpretative possibilities that comes from 
understanding a discourse as an open-ended conversation rather than a set of separate 
monologues. It carries the promise of seeing beyond the rhetoric of sectarian 
demarcations or accepted narratives of textual transmission – but also the danger of 
obscuring the distinct voices of the various interlocutors. The following methodological 
guidelines are designed to help me tread the delicate line of maximizing the advantages 
of intertextual analysis while avoiding its pitfalls.  
First, working synchronically within the boundaries of whatever diachronic 
framework is available, I will attempt as far as possible to engage each individual text as 
an autonomous entity advancing an independent argument. But this approach will be 
complemented, second, by a view of these texts as situated within and hence conversing 
with the broader context of Indian śāstric Sanskritic theories of meaning. Thus, attuned 
always to any recurrence of themes and to the possibilities of intertextual variation, 
reverberation, and cross-citation as marks of the texts’ awareness of their situatedness 
within a context, I attempt to offer a philosophical reconstruction of this conversation 
regarding upacāra; a conversation that, I hope to show, constitutes not just a plausible 
context but a necessary one for the proper understanding of the interlocutors’ distinct 
claims.  
                                                 31 For present purposes I bracket the debate about whether a history of ideas that is linear, chronological, and somewhat positivist in its aspirations is possible or adequate in the field of philology, understood here in the broad sense advocated by Pollock: “Philology is, or should be, the discipline of making sense of texts. It is not the theory of language – that’s linguistics – or the theory of meaning or truth – that’s philosophy – but the theory of textuality as well as the history of textualized meaning.” (2009: 934). 
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2. What is Upacāra?   
 
While some sort of definition is in order, the broad and varied context in which 
the present project is grounded does not seem to offer anything like a standardized and 
unified account of upacāra. Instead, we find certain common features and 
presuppositions underlying the various thinkers' understanding of the term (indeed, these 
commonalities allow the cross-sectarian conversation about upacāra to materialize).   
In his influential Indian Theories of Meaning, Kunjunni Raja offers the following 
definition of metaphor, the latter part of which is based on Mammaṭa’s Kāvyaprakāśa 
II.9:  
This function of the word, denoting a referent different from its normal and 
primary one, but somehow related to it, is called lakaā or upacāra; other terms 
like gauī vtti and bhakti are also used to refer to this secondary significative 
function of words…The three essential conditions generally accepted by the later 
Ālaṃkārika-s as necessary in lakaā or transfer are (a) the inapplicability or the 
unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (b) some relation between the 
primary and the actual referent of the word and (c) sanction for the transferred 
sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer.32 
                                                 32 Kunjunni Raja 1969: 231-232. Applied, for instance, to the figurative phrase “siṃho māṇvakaḥ” (the “boy (is a) lion”), a śāstric stock example of a metaphor based on qualitative similarity (gauṇī vṛtti), this formulation suggests that the primary referent of the word “lion” is a lion (which can be either a particular or a universal, etc.) while its actual referent, or its locus of reference – that which it refers to figuratively – is the boy. Since we are normally barred from assuming that there is literally a lion before us (the mukhyārthabādha), we may deduce that the boy and the lion have qualities that are similar (that is the relation, saṃbandha) and understand the phrase as implying that, in certain aspects, the boy is "like" a lion. It is important to note the difference in this formulation between the primary object (lion) and the secondary object that serves as the locus of reference (the boy): while the lion as an object is absent from the locus of reference, the boy is not. This may seem counterintuitive given that the Western discourse of metaphor refers to the “boy” as the tenor (topic) of the metaphor and the “lion” as its illustrative vehicle. This may be explained by the distinction proposed by Gren-Eklund (1986: 81-82, 92-93) between what he calls “metaphoric transference,” which is how figurative usage is conceived in the Western philosophical tradition following Aristotle, and “secondary attribution,” which describes its understanding in Indian philosophical and poetic discourse. According to Gren-Eklund, metaphoric transference occurs when a word that has one meaning is understood to mean something else; in the Indian context, however, figurative attribution marks cases in which a referent is denoted not by the "usual" word but – through semantic 
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Though it outlines the phenomenon of upacāra in the broad sense, this definition seems 
to be fully applicable only to the perspective of later alakāraśāstra. Indian theory of 
poetics and later philosophical treatises engage whole heartedly in the theorizing and 
classification of terms that stand for various kinds of metaphorical transference,33 but 
such concerns hardly characterize the śāstric discourse pertinent to our time frame. 
Furthermore, as we will see, there is no standardized or unified use of these terms among 
the various schools of thought (and sometimes even among early and later thinkers of the 
same tradition). So, for instance, while Sthiramati and Dignāga generally identify 
upacāra with qualitative metaphorical transference (gauī vtti), the Nyāyasūtra-bhāya 
understands it as incorporating all kinds of figurative transference (and Uddyotakara uses 
it to describe cases of what will later be classified as lakaā-type metonyms). The same 
is true also of the attempts (usually within Western scholarship) to identify parallels in 
Indian lore for the different senses of metaphor, metonym, and synecdoche:34 the texts 
show us that, in practice, these terms are often conflated under the rubric of upacāra,35 a 
                                                                                                                                                 imposition, etc. – by some other word. Thus, the emphasis in Indian discourse is not on the changed meaning of a word but on a difference in the referential relations between a word and its referent.  33 See, for instance, Kunjunni Raja 1965: 257. One basic classification distinguishes metaphors based on qualitative similarity (gauṇī vṛtti, as in the “boy-lion”) from lakṣaṇā-type metaphors, based on relations other than qualitative similarity (as in the phrase “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ" – a village on the Ganges; since the village cannot literally sit on the river, one resorts to a figurative understanding of the word “Ganges” as denoting the river’s bank due to their relation of proximity-sāmīpya.      34 See Gerow (1984) and Gren-Eklund (1986).  35 Patton suggests a point of more or less general agreement in the scholarly debate regarding the differences between metaphor and metonym: “"In metaphor two elements from different conceptual domains are related. In metonym, two elements from the same conceptual domain are related" (2004: 45). Even through the lens of this broad definition, however, the term upacāra appears to be applied to both cases. Thus, for instance, Sthiramati uses it to describe the expression the “boy (is) fire” (a metaphor), 
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concept whose centre of gravity for these thinkers (unlike for later Ālaṃkārikās) is found 
not in its classificatory or discursive impact but in its hermeneutical and mostly in its 
referential function within theories of meaning.    
This latter feature also explains why, while most of the accounts of upacāra 
discussed in this essay will likely comply with at least the first two conditions for 
figurative usage, their understanding of upacāra does not treat these conditions as central. 
We will find the authors giving these conditions different levels of attention, if at all. So 
for instance, while the inapplicability of the primary meaning plays an important role in 
Bhartṛhari's understanding of upacāra, it is of little consequence to the Nyāya and none 
to the Buddhists; and the nature of the relations between the primary and the actual 
(secondary) referent is key for the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, less significant for Sthiramati, 
and not at all important for AsaEga. The central concern that these highly varied accounts 
of upacāra do share – indeed, the factor that enables them to partake in a single debate – 
is the referential mechanism underlying figurative usage. Though they diverge in their 
respective explanations of this mechanism, each account according to the philosophical 
work it is required to perform, appearing as a sort of unifying leitmotif in all of them is an 
understanding of figurative usage in terms of the absence of the primary referent from the 
locus of reference.36  
                                                                                                                                                 while Vasuabdhu applies it to the phrase "the eye sees,” considered by him to be figurative (a metonym) as there is no real agentive element involved), and the sense faculty is conflated with its produced cognition.   36 In the words of the Nyāyasūtra: yadi na vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ kathaṃ tarhi vyaktāv upacāra iti? nimittād atadbhāve 'pi tadupacāraḥ/… NySBh_2,2.62 p 662. This understanding is at times also accompanied by a view of the primary referent as superimposed (adhyāropa) on the actual referent qua secondary referent. However, as we will see, this view is more typical of later commentarial works (by Uddyotakara, Helārāja, and Sthiramati who does not see it as significant for the understanding of upacāra).  
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This conception of upacāra should be considered against the background of a feature 
common to all Indian schools of thought, both Buddhists and non-Buddhist, namely their 
general adherence to strictly referential theories of meaning – i.e., theories that identify a 
word’s meaning with its designatum.37 This sort of scheme, in which, to quote Mark 
Siderits, “the name-bearer relation seems to reign supreme as the central metaphor of 
semantics,” has no place for an expression’s “sense” (akin to Frege’s Sinn) as a distinct 
element of meaning over and above the reference.38  
One can only speculate about the reasons for the strict adherence of Indian 
theories of meaning to the referential model. One such speculative reason may be found 
in the initial role allocated to śabda in Indian epistemic discourse (pramāa-vāda). 
Discussing this issue in the context of an analysis of linguistic comprehension 
(śabdabodha) of sentences, Mohanty points out that  
[N]either the Mimamsa nor the Nyaya is concerned, in the strict sense, with what 
one can call 'understanding the meaning of an expression'. One is rather concerned 
with how hearing a sentence, under appropriate conditions (e.g. when the speaker is 
honest and reliable and known to be so), serves as a means of acquiring valid 
knowledge, i.e. as a pramāa. When those appropriate conditions are fulfilled, 
                                                 37 See Siderits 1986 and Mohanty 1992: 60-67.  38 Siderits 1986: 81 and Mohanty 1992: 60-67. Both writers, however, also point to instances in which Indian theories of meaning, while not presenting a full-blown theory of sense, may still be said to present sense-like elements of meaning. Sidertis argues that such is the case both with the Buddhist Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas theory of Apoha (exclusion) and with some features of the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā school’s view of sentence comprehension. Mohanty adds to this list three more viable instances but points out that they display a use of the notion of "sense" only insofar as it is a mode of presentation of reference (a mode in which meaning is a function of denotation). In this respect these "sense-like" elements already operate within a theory of meaning that is overwhelmingly referential. As for Apoha, Mohanty argues that despite this theory’s avoidance of a referential conception of meaning, still, since it grounds meaning in the difference between either unique particulars (which are ineffable) or their mental representations (which are, in Sidertis’ words, “semantically invisible”), it cannot serve as a proper theory of semantics. He therefore concludes that “the apoha theory is not a theory of sense, it is a strategy to make sense of our talk about what is posited as intrinsically ineffable and unspeakable.”   
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understanding amounts to knowing, i.e. grasping, not the sense, but rather the 
ontological structure that obtains, e.g. the individual over there as possessing 
cowness, and as characterized by a color-particular which possesses the universal 
whiteness.39 
 
According to Mohanty, in Indian epistemic discourse the linguistic understanding of an 
expression (parallel to its "sense") was always conceived as dependent on and therefore 
subordinate to its epistemic function.40 Within this scheme, language usage had to 
maintain a relation to an actual or possible state of affairs if it was to fulfill its epistemic 
role, and hence was meaningful only insofar as it was referential.41 Under these 
assumptions, expressions with a sense but no reference (as in “the son of a barren 
woman”) were naturally seen as an anomaly that threatens śabda as pramāa. The 
Buddhists, who rejected the status accorded śabda in this model of language, and though 
operating with the same view of discourse as referential sought ultimately to undermine 
it, capitalized on this threat from the direction of figurative meaning.  
 Within the framework described above, the discourse of meaning is 
overwhelmingly semantics-oriented, since the meaning of a word is a function of the 
                                                 39 Mohanty 1992: 79.   40 Mohanty qualifies this claim, however, by pointing out that despite the overwhelming interest in the epistemic role of words, some theorization of the linguistic understanding of expressions is to be found in both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā explication of śābdabodha. He argues that the theoretical need for a perspective that allows śābdabodha to involve a sort of "quasi-sinn” in addition to being a mode of knowledge was recognized by the tradition – as exemplified, for instance, in the query whether there is śābdabodha even when there is doubt concerning semantic competence (i.e., can one comprehend an expression when it is referenceless or a sentence when it is false). Ibid. 61,83,89, 253-254.   41 An additional cause can perhaps be traced to another fundamental feature of Indian semantics, namely the denotative power (śakti) behind the denotative function (abhidhā-vṛtti) of words. Insofar as this power is considered an innate capacity of words (regardless of the question of the origin of the connection between a word and its meaning), it appears to privilege a referential conception of meaning. See Kunjunni Raja 1969: 19-20, and Coward 1990: 6-7.    
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actuality (ontological, epistemic) of its referent. Thus, the idea that a word may denote a 
referent other than its "primary" one and that this primary referent may be absent from 
the locus of reference – both notions seen as constitutive of secondary denotation – has 
far-reaching consequences, often problematic, for theories that maintain a word-world 
correspondence.42 The varied, often highly creative ways in which Indian thinkers have 
explained away, utilized, and sometimes succumbed to the philosophical challenges 
posed by figurative meaning are my topic in the chapters that follow.  
 
3. An Outline 
   The dissertation is divided roughly into two parts. The first part (chapters I-II) 
provides a contextualized account of upacāra by examining the concept’s semantic and 
conceptual scope in the Yogācāra’s non-Buddhist intellectual milieu, specifically in the 
fundamental works of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools and especially in Bhartṛhari’s 
Vākyapadīya. The second part (chapters III-V) examines the understanding of the term in 
some Yogācāra śāstras and sūtras against the background of their broader Buddhist 
context. Since they trace and constitute what is a rather non-linear intertextual 
conversation, the chapters' ordering is designed mainly to facilitate understanding, with 
each chapter building on the explication of terms, themes, and arguments introduced in 
the preceding ones.   
In chapter I I examine the terminology, definitions, and philosophical 
understanding of upacāra in the fundamental works of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya; these 
appear in the context of their theories of meaning and form part of the schools' broader 
                                                 42 Bronkhorst (2001: 475-477) has suggested that the need to respond to the bedrock assumption of a correspondence between language and reality has been a driving force in shaping the landscape of Indian philosophical discourse.  
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discussion of the denotation of nouns. The Nyāya definition of figurative expression, I 
argue, is designed to align with the actual use of figures in ordinary language, in keeping 
with the school’s realism, while the Mīmāṃsā is lead by its hermeneutical considerations 
and presuppositions regarding the eternality (nityatvā) of the word (śabda) to construct a 
fixed system of semantics in which much of ordinary language is paradoxically seen to be 
figurative.  
Chapter II turns to the understanding of figurative usage in the school of 
grammatical analysis, focusing on Bhartṛhari’s influential Vākyapadīya (VP). A 
contemporary of Sthiramati, Bhartṛhari’s extensive engagement with figurative language 
and upacāra provides important context for the understanding of the Yogācāra argument. 
My discussion centers on the second and third kā2as of his VP, along with the Vtti 
when available and the later commentaries by Puṇyarāja and Helārāja. Beginning with 
the second kā2a, I demonstrate how, by means of an analogy between figurative 
meaning and perceptual error, Bhartṛhari lays the foundations for a sophisticated 
pragmatist account of both meaning and actuality in epistemic terms, exemplifying the 
possibility of a correspondence relation between language and phenomena that holds 
without the assumption of an ontological objective ground (that is, without an external 
object serving as the referent of a word). This perspective is reinforced by the third 
kā2a’s sabandha-samuddeśa section, where Bhartṛhari argues in favor of an 
upacārasattā, a figurative or secondary existence for all the referents of words.  
 Finally, it is suggested that both these sections may be seen as complementary, providing 
Bhartṛhari with a tow-tiered explanation of the operation of ordinary language – the 
epistemic factors that determine meaning and its status (the second kā2a) and its 
enabling conditions (third kā2a) – that is independent of ontological considerations. 
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Subsequent chapters will reveal the importance of this account for our interpretation of 
the Yogācāra understanding of upacāra, motivated as it is by a similar need to explain the 
practical value, and what is more, the meaningfulness of discourse, without appealing to 
an external objective grounding.  
  Chapter III deals with the Yogācāra understanding of upacāra as expressed in 
one of the school's earliest sources, the Tattvārthapa"ala chapter of the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi, along with its commentarial sections in the Viniścayasagrahaī, 
both ascribed to AsaEga. The latter’s discussion of upacāra appears in a set of arguments 
aimed at demonstrating the inexpressibility of the ultimate nature of reality (svabhāvatā) 
through the use of reasoning (yukti). This AsaEga aims to do by a critique of an 
essentialist theory of meaning, (such as that of the Mīmāṃsā), understood as 
presupposing some form of correspondence between a designation, an object, and its 
essence. So defined, this correspondence is necessarily invariable and – importantly – 
monosemic. AsaEga therefore proceeds to refute it by, inter alia, introducing the 
contradictions implied by the possibility of a polysemy of figures – that is, various 
metaphors denoting the same object. His use of a ubiquitous Yogācāra analogy – that of 
an illusory being created by a magician – to explain polysemy helps uncover the role he 
assigns upacāras within philosophical discourse. Through the lens of this analogy, I 
propose, the argument from polysemy is seen to undermine a monosemic world-word 
correspondence primarily by emphasizing the referential interchangeability of figures 
and the very ease with which language proliferates through metaphorical usage. Within 
this framework, upacāras are therefore conceived not just as content carriers (that is, as 
informative) but also as performative – actively manifesting and invoking the 
groundlessness of language through their proliferation.   
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In chapter IV my presentation of AsaEga’s use of upacāra to critique an 
essentialist theory of meaning is complemented by an exploration of a variety of other 
Buddhists sources that stand in some relation to the Yogācāra, all considered with an eye 
to their possible contribution to Sthiramati’s later theoretical synthesis of upacāra.  
 First, Vasubandhu’s employment of upacāra in his Abhidharmakoabhāya, 
though mostly hermeneutical, is shown to include also an epistemic function: upacāra 
unveils the referents’ true identity or status hitherto obstructed by their literal meaning. 
This, I argue, emerges as a central feature of subsequent Yogācāra accounts of figurative 
usage, in which upacāras are understood as sign-posts of sorts, indicating through their 
very presence the breach between how we take things to be and how they truly are. 
Next, an analysis of the Yogācāra-related La'kāvatārasūtra shows how the sūtra 
links the school’s hermeneutic and linguistic understanding of upacāra with its ideas on 
the causal activity of consciousness and the construction of the life-world. Here upacāra 
is viewed as a linguistic sign that indicates at once an absence and a presence: the 
ontological non-existence and referential absence of an allegedly real (primary) object, 
and the presence of a causal deep-structure that can be referred to only indirectly. 
Finally, I look briefly at yet another possible source of influence on Sthiramati’s 
understanding of upacāra. It consists of a string of arguments presented by Dignāga in 
the fifth chapter of his seminal Pramāasamuccaya (a variation of which appears to be 
included in Sthiramati’s TriśBh) where he uses the possibility of figurative usage to 
deny the existence of knowable universals and buttress his own nominalism.   
Chapter V concerns Sthiramati’s discussion of upacāra in his commentary on 
Vasubandhu’s Triśika, which joins many of the elements mentioned in previous 
chapters into a rather structured and highly sophisticated philosophical account. Broadly, 
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I describe Sthiramati as making two related claims. The first, pushing the definition of 
upacāra to its logical conclusion, says that figurative application is defined solely by the 
absence of the referent from the locus of reference. Since for him all phenomenal things, 
being unreal, come under this category, Sthiramati concludes that all language usage is 
figurative. Sthiramati’s second claim (which, I argue, echoes the LAS understanding of 
upacāra) joins the metaphorical view of language with a Yogācāra account of the 
transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-pariāma) to posit what Jonathan Gold has 
described as “a figurative theory of reference.”43  
Building on these premises, I propose that, considering the causal efficacy of 
language, Sthiramati’s pan-figurative claim may rather be regarded as implying a causal 
figurative theory of reference, which pits itself not against realism so much as against the 
limitations placed on discourse by the Madhyamaka’s view of language as self-
referential. I argue that this enables the Yogācāra to distinguish between levels of 
discourse within the conventional realm: in accordance with its soteriological needs, the 
school is able to maintain a discourse in which diversified descriptions of reality are 
considered meaningful under the same referential principle, and at the same time to 
contend that some descriptions (such as those supplied by the Yogācāra's own 
philosophical discourse) are more meaningful than others. Seen in this light, Sthiramati's 
claim of pan-metaphoricity emerges as highly instrumental not only in undermining a 
correspondence theory of truth but also in providing the necessary theoretical support for 
the hierarchy of meaning posited by the Yogācāra philosophical and soteriological 
discourse.  
                                                 43 Gold 2007.  
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 Finally, in the Conclusion I draw out those features and themes that are common 
to the various accounts of upacāra and examine further ways in which the concept may 
be applied to deepen and enrich our understanding of the Buddhist and more generally 
Indian philosophical engagement with figurative language. I end with a brief "case 
study," testing more concretely how the Yogācāra discourse of upacāra as outlined in 
this essay helps us make sense of lists of similes prevalent in the school’s literature.  
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Chapter I 
 Figurative Meaning and the Denotation of Words in the  
Early Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā  
 
The following Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya discussion of the denotation of words is 
firmly situated within the context I discussed above of a common adherence to strictly 
referential theories of meaning. In the case of the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya, as we will see 
below, this assumption is joined with a substantivist ontology that takes the referent of a 
word – whether the class (ākti for the Mīmāṃsā, jāti for the Nyāya) or the class-
qualified-by-the-individual (jāti-viśī"a–vyakti) – to be a real existent entity (and the same 
holds for relations, qualities, etc.).44 
 
1. Figurative Meaning and the Denotation of Words in the Mīmāsā Sūtra and  
Śabara Bhāya   
 
The early Mīmāṃsā45 view of the denotation of words is discussed at length in 
Śabara’s Bhāya (ŚāBh) on the Mīmāsā-sūtra (MīS) 1.1.30- 35.46 There it is argued that 
                                                 44 Deshpande 1992: 4.  45 The following analysis is limited to those Mīmāṃsā sources that could have been available to the authors or compilers of the early Yogācāra texts. These include, foremost, Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā-sūtra and Śabara’s Bhāṣya, as well as the Vṛtti and other pre-Bhāṣya texts that have been lost but are mentioned and cited in the Bhāṣya and other sources. On the identity of the Vṛttikāra and pre-Śabara Mīmāṃsā thinkers, see Verpoorten 1987: 7-8.  46 In this chapter I use the following editions of the MīS and ŚāBh: for adhyāyas 1-3,   Pohlus (accessed: 25 February, 2010); this e-text was edited on the basis of six different editions, with page numbers referring to the Mahesachandra edition (1863-1889); for all other Adhyāyas, Sastri 1931-1934. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.    
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the sole referent of a word  – for instance, of the nominal “cow” – is the ākti, the abstract 
generic property or the class property (cowness), and not the vyakti, the individual 
substance (the particular and unique cow).  
The term ākti as it appears in ŚāBh is far from having a consensual scholarly 
interpretation.47 As pointed out by Peter Scharf,  Śabara’s usage of the term is rather 
ambiguous, at times indicating the abstract generic property shared by individuals of the 
same class (what the early Nyāya termed jāti) and at others, the general and common 
“shape” or “configuration of parts” of an individual (“ākti” for the early Nyāya).48 
Madhav Deshpande, while acknowledging Śabara’s ambiguity on this point, nonetheless 
argues that the term's primary meaning for him was the generic abstract property (a 
meaning explicitly defended later on by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa). According to Deshpande, this 
interpretation is clearly supported by the definition of ākti supplied by the ŚāBh and is 
further implied by the school’s ontological presuppositions, among which is the view of 
ākti as an “ontologically distinct part of external reality,” an object of perception that is 
involved in validating the existence of such a reality.49  
This interpretation stands in opposition to Madeleine Biardeau’s argument, in her 
study of Indian epistemology and theories of meaning, against identifying the ākti with 
the jāti in the sense ascribed to it by the early Nyāya, namely, as indicating the generic 
                                                 47 A discussion of the various scholarly interpretations of Śabara’s bhāṣya of ākṛti is found in Deshpande 1992: 19-22.   48 Scharf 1996: 214-222. According to Scharf, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa takes great pains to resolve the indeterminacy in the ŚāBh regarding this issue, taking ākṛti, jāti, and the sāmānya all to be synonymous with the generic abstract property. Ibid. 204, 12-14.  49 Deshpande 1992: 21-2.  
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property.50 Drawing on Biardeau’s general observations, Othmar Gächter has nonetheless 
offered an understanding of jāti according to which the term does not stand solely for the 
abstract generic property but mediates between it and the specific identifying 
characteristics:  
Consequently, ākti is the distinguishing factor of various objects [their 'viśeaa' 
– for instance, the dewlap in the case of a cow. R.T] and on account of this it 
simultaneously integrates the individual specified objects into a class (jāti), by 
which ākti gets the feature of sāmānya, i.e., being a common feature of a class. 
(Gächter 1983: 196)51  
 
An exhaustive survey of this complex topic and its various scholarly interpretations is 
beyond the scope of this study, and in what follows it is taken up only insofar as it bears 
on the understanding of indirect language usage in the overall theory of meaning of the 
Mīmāṃsā. Still, the following analysis of several ŚāBh sections seems to suggest that 
viewing the ākti as the abstract generic property is highly compatible with Mīmāṃsā’s 
hermeneutical considerations and with its fundamental premise of the eternality (nityatvā) 
of the word (śabda). 52  
The demand for a decisive and consistent interpretation of the Vedas and 
especially of Vedic injunctions does not allow meaning to be determined either by 
convention or by an appeal to contextual factors. The Mīmāṃsā therefore requires a 
system of semantics in which the relation between words and their referents is invariable 
                                                 50 Biardeau 1964: 161-67, cited in Deshpande 1992: 19.  51 A similar interpretation is presented by D’Sa (1980: 92), who contends that in this matter ŚāBh is responding to the early Nyāya view that both the configuration (ākṛti) and the generic property (jāti) are involved in denotation. For a critique of D’Sa’s argument, see Deshpande 1992: 20.  52 The question of whether śabda is merely the physical-sonic reality or also the signifying unit is debated in the ŚāBh. Śabara appears to regard both aspects – the semantic and the physical – as inseparable and mutually constitutive of the ontology of the word. See Scharf 1996: 199-202, and Gächter 1983: 41-2, 56.   
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(as expressed in the schools’ notion of this relation as autpattika – “innate” or 
“originary”).53 Given that this requirement is coupled with the notion of the eternality of 
śabda,54 it can only be fulfilled if the object of reference is the unchanging and lasting 
universal (and not the semi-fixed “shape” or the contingent “individual”). For this reason, 
and those given by Deshpande, the principle of hermeneutical charity leads me, in what 
follows, to adopt  the understanding of ākti as a generic property (while indicting 
instances in which its interpretation is ambiguous).  
The MīS discussion of the denotation of words, following the siddhāntin's premise 
presented above, begins with the pūrvapaka that the referent of the word cannot be the 
ākti and therefore must be the vyakti.55 The bhāya follows with a definition of these two 
elements and a clarification of the main reservation underlying the pūrvapaka:  
Among Substances, Qualities and Actions – that factor which is common to 
several individuals is the 'Class,' and that which possesses certain specific 
(uncommon) characteristics is the 'Individual.' Why then should there be a doubt 
(regarding the meaning of words)? Because when the word 'gau9' ('cow ') is 
pronounced, there appears the notion of the Class, and yet it is the Individual that 
is connected with actions. (Jha 1933: 118)  
 
                                                 53 For a discussion of the term autpattika, see Gächter 1983: 42-3; D'Sa 1980: 93-4; and for its definition in ŚāBh on the MiS 1.1.5, see chapter III page 156-157.   54 Regarding ŚāBh on MīS 1.1.5, in which “autpattika” is glossed as “nitya,” Biardeau has argued that the eternality of śabda should be understood primarily as indicating a fixed and unchangeable semantic relation (1964: 156-7); cited in Gächter 1983: 43-44. Gächter himself (Ibid. 60-64) and Scharf (1996: 198) present a similar view, arguing more forcefully against interpreting the term as having any metaphysical connotations (as it was later taken by kumārila Bhāṭṭa) and contending that it  indicates no more than a sense of semantic consistency and continuity.   55 Prayoga-codanābhāvād arthaikatvam avibhāgāt // MīS_1,3.30. “Words cannot denote the [ākṛti] because of the impossibility of enacting injunctions [since a word is] monosemic [and] because of the non-separation [of ākṛti and vyakti].”    
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kā punar ākti9, kā vyaktir iti. dravyaguakarmaā sāmānyamātram ākti9, 
asādhāraaviśeā vyakti9 ; kuta9 saśaya9? gaur ity ukte sāmānyapratyayād, 
vyaktau ca kriyāsabandhātY. (ŚāBh to MīS 1.3.30: 79-80)  
 
 
Here the pūrvapakin points out that certain transitive actions (like sacrificing, etc.) 
prescribed by Vedic injunctions are intelligible only insofar as they are directed toward 
specific individuals (one is required to sacrifice a particular goat and not all goats). Since 
it is not possible for a single word to refer in one case to the individual and in another to 
the class (because of the requirement that words be monosemic if meaning is to be 
determined definitively), nominals must refer to the vyakti and not to the ākti.56 The 
pūrvapakin, however, is aware of a possible difficulty: if indeed words refer only to the 
individual, how is knowledge of the class possible (how is a particular goat identifiable as 
belonging to the Goat species)? His solution is to view the class as a defining mark 
(cihna-bhūta) of the individual (not unlike the later Nyāya view of the universal as 
qualifying the individual). In other words, the word “cow” is seen as referring to an 
individual animal whose possession of the generic property of “cowness” identifies it as a 
cow.57 The pūrvapakin then concludes with a rebuttal of the opposite stance: words also 
cannot denote merely the class (seen as a type), since many language usages are 
intelligible only insofar as they are directed at tokens – for instance, expressions stating 
numbers (“six cows”), etc.58   
                                                 56 yatroccāraṇānarthakyam, tatra vyaktyarthaḥ׀ ato 'nyatrākṛtivacana iti cet׀ uktam anyāyaś cānekārthatvam iti׀ ŚāBh on MīS 1.3.30: 79-80.   57 kathaṃ sāmānyāvagatir iti cet׀ vyaktipadārthasyākṛtiś cihnabhūtā bhaviṣyati, ya evam ākṛtikaḥ, sa gaur iti׀ yathā yasya daṇḍo 'sti, sa daṇḍīti, na ca daṇḍavacano daṇḍiśabdaḥ׀ evam ihāpi׀ Ibid. 80.  See also D'Sa 1980: 88.   58 ŚāBh on MīS 1.3.31-32, see Jha 1933: 118-19.    
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Responding to these objections, the siddhāntin points out that injunctions to 
perform certain actions are authoritative only if words refer to the ākti. This is because 
Vedic injunctions – for instance, to erect a “falcon altar” (śyenacita) – are seen as 
general injunctions meant to be fulfilled repeatedly; but this understanding is undermined 
if the word śyna9 denotes a particular object. 59 Indeed, since “individuals” are sui generis 
by definition and cannot be replicated without losing their individuality, there would be 
no way of fulfilling the injunction at all given the pūrvapakin's understanding of śyena9.  
The pūrvapakin responds by indicating that this line of argumentation leads to a 
polemical “draw”: whereas he himself has previously shown that injunctions require the 
individual to be the referent of certain words, the siddhāntin now similarly demonstrates 
the necessity of the ākti as referent – though he has not shown why the latter has to be 
the sole referent. This exchange exposes two central and potentially clashing 
presuppositions underlying the Mīmāṃsā theory of meaning. On the one hand, it requires 
fixed and unchanging semantic relations, which prohibit words from having different 
referents at different times – for instance, alternately denoting the ākti and the vyakti. On 
the other hand, it seems that meaningful language usage requires that both these elements 
be comprehended; hence, their relation has to be accounted for.   
Against this background it is suggested that the ākti is the primary referent of a 
word, and when it appears to denote the vyakti it does so only figuratively. 60 This 
                                                 59 ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt // … ākṛti śabdārthaḥ׀  kutaḥ? kriyārthatvāt׀ śyenacitaṃ cinvīta iti vacanam ākṛtau saṃbhavati, yady ākṛtyarthaḥ śyenaśabdaḥ׀  vyaktivacane tu na cayanena śyenavyaktir utpādayituṃ śakyata ity aśakyārthavacanād anarthakaḥ׀  tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ׀  MīS_1,3.33: 80-1. See D'Sa 1980: 88-9, and Scharf 1996: 220-1, 242-3.                                                                                                                                                                     60 This is brought up by the Pūrvapakṣin, recounting the Siddhantin’s assumed view:  yad apy ucyate - vrīhīn prokṣatīti vyaktilakṣaṇārthākṛtir iti, śakyam anyatrāpi śyenacitaṃ cinvīta iti vaditum ākṛtilakṣaṇārthā vyaktir iti׀ kiṃ punar atra jyāyaḥ׀ MīS 1.3.33: 81. Jha 1933: 120. Scharf’s 
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explanation enables Śabara to yield referential priority to the ākti while still accounting 
for the presence of both elements in the comprehension of ordinary language usage. The 
pūrvapakin, however, points out that even this does not lay the debate to rest because the 
same explanation can be applied to justify his own position, claiming that a word’s 
primary meaning is the vyakti, while the ākti is signified indirectly. Thus he concludes 
his objection by asking: which of the two assumptions is the right one?  
The siddhāntin replies by establishing, first, the necessity of the cognitive 
primacy of ākti (the primacy of its apprehension), and as an implication, its logical and 
referential priority:  
Because the Class is permanently related to the Individual; so that when the 
Class, as the one relative, is cognised, the cognition of the other relative 
(Individual) would naturally follow. That the Individual is cognised on the 
utterance of the word is a fact evident to everyone; but what is not 
evident is the distinction as to whether the cognition of the Individual 
follows directly from the Word itself, or from the Class (which is first denoted 
by the Word). This can be ascertained only by induction (by reasoning 
based upon affirmative and negative premises), as follows : –(a) Even without 
the Word being uttered, if one cognizes the Class, he necessarily cognizes the 
Individual also (affirmative premise); (b) even on the word being uttered, if, 
by reason of some mental derangement, the man fails to cognize the Class, 
then he fails to cognize the Individual also (negative premise) ; – [and the 
irresistible conclusion from these premises is that it is the Class that is 
denoted by the Word, and the cognition of the Individual follows only from 
the cognition of the Class.] (Jha 1933: 122)61 [square brackets in the original] 
 
…āktir hi vyaktyā nityasabaddhā, sabandhinyā ca tasyām avagatāyā 
sabandhyantaram avagamyate; tad etad ātmapratyakam, yac chabda uccarite 
vyakti9 pratīyata iti; ki śabdād utākter iti vibhāgo na pratyaka9; so 
'nvayavyatirekābhyām avagamyate; antareāpi śabdam, ya āktim avabudhyeta, 
avabudhyetevāsau vyaktim; yas tūccarite 'pi śabde mānasād apacārāt kadācid 
ākti nopalabheta, na jātucid asāv imā vyaktim avagaccheta; nanu 
vyaktiviśi"āyām āktau vartate; vyaktiviśi"āyā ced varteta, vyaktyantaraviśi"ā 
                                                                                                                                                 translation of the passage seems to take it as implying not a secondary signification but rather that the ākṛti becomes the defining “mark” that “makes known” the vyakti (1996: 280-1).   61  See also D'Sa 1980: 89.   
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na pratīyeta; tasmāc chabda āktipratyayasya nimittam; āktipratyayo 
vyaktipratyayasyetiYY (ŚāBh to MīS 1.3.33: 82-3) 
 
The passage demonstrates that, while the ākti and the vyakti are inseparable, the former 
has cognitive primacy over the latter. This is non-evident in ordinary language usage, 
however, and has to be inferred on the basis of first-hand experience and "thought 
experiments." The inference establishes that, once a word is uttered, comprehension of 
the ākti is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for that of the vyakti, implicitly 
establishing the former as referentially prior as well. Therefore, according to the 
Mīmāṃsā, when one comprehends a word, one necessarily first comprehends its artha, 
its object of reference and meaning, as the ākti, even when this is not immediately 
apparent.   
 This view clearly breaks with a realist theory of meaning insofar as it renders all 
denotation of individuals figurative (in this respect, the Mīmāṃsā seems closer to the 
Buddhists than one would expect).62 In addition to this linguistic a-realism, another 
important philosophical implication of this view is that the “speakers’ reference” 63 is 
rendered inconsequential for meaning. As Śabara explicitly states, whether the speaker is 
understood to be talking about the ākti or the vyakti is determined according to his 
intention, but this does not bear on the meaning of the word.64 This view sheds light on 
                                                 62 See Kunjunni Raja 1969: 248-9.  63 See Kripke (1979), and Geach (1980); cited in Ganeri (1996:10).   64  na guṇabhāvo 'smatpakṣasya bādhakaḥ׀ sarvathā tāvat pratīyate׀ arthād guṇabhāvaḥ pradhānabhāvo vā׀ svārthaṃ ced uccāryate, pradhānabhūtā׀ atha na svārtham, parārtham eva, tato guṇabhūtā׀ na tatra śabdavyāpāro 'sti׀ ŚāBh to MīS 1.3.33: 83. “All that we mean is that in every case the Class is denoted; whether it is denoted as the secondary or the primary factor depends upon the purpose (and intention) of the speaker: if the Class is spoken of with a view to itself, then the Class is the primary factor; if, on the other 
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the hermeneutical implications of the Mīmāṃsā principle of apaurueya, which may be 
seen as aiming at eliminating agency and contingency with regard not only to the 
authorship of the Veda but also to its interpretation. Rejecting the speaker’s intention as a 
determinant of meaning therefore serves the school’s overall aspiration for a disembodied 
and “objective” system of hermeneutics.  
This referential model, however, does not fully account for the ākti-vyakti 
relation, since the claim that the ākti is the primary meaning and the vyakti is denoted 
figuratively does not in itself tell us how they are related to each other. Śabara seems to 
take these to be qualifying relations, as the ākti is both the referent of the word and the 
qualifying factor (viśeaa) of the vyakti. The ākti’s logical and epistemic precedence 
over the individual is therefore explained as the outcome of a relation between a qualifier 
and the thing qualified – since in order to know something that is qualified one has first 
to possess knowledge of the qualifier. 65 It is worth noting, though, that understanding the 
ākti-vyakti relation in this way does not necessitate viewing their relation also in terms 
of primary and secondary signification, and indeed the former interpretation, in terms of a 
qualification, was preferred by several scholars.66 
                                                                                                                                                 hand, it is spoken of, not with a view to itself, but to something else, then it is of course the secondary factor. But the Word has got nothing to do in this matter (of the Class being the primary or the secondary factor).” Jha 1933: 122-3. The distinction between “secondary” (guṇa) and “primary” (pradhāna) is here drawn with respect not to meaning but to the speaker’s intention (whether he aims at the particular or the species).   65 … satyam etat gotvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyatīti׀  yatra gotvaṃ tasyāṃ vyaktāv iti׀  evaṃ tarhi viśiṣṭā vyaktiḥ pratīyeta׀yadi ca viśiṣṭā, pūrvataraṃ viśeṣaṇam avagamyeta׀  na hy apratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaṃ kecana pratyetum arhantīti׀ ŚāBh on MĪS 1.3.33: 82.   66 Such as D'Sa (1980), Gächter (1983), Scharf (1996). Scholars who interpret the ākṛti-vyakti relation as one of both qualification and indirect usage include Jha (1933), Deshpande (1992: 98, 102 n.292), Ganeri (1996: 9, 17: n.11, n.12).   
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To recap: the Mīmāṃsā metaphysical and hermeneutical presuppositions require a 
referential scheme in which a word refers exclusively to the ākti but which nonetheless 
accounts for the simultaneous cognition of the other element, the vyakti, as required for 
the comprehension of various language usages. The ŚāBh explanation presents two main 
features of such a scheme: the first describes the ākti and vyakti as the primary and 
secondary meaning of a word respectively, and the second treats them as a qualifier 
(denoted by the word) and the thing qualified. While it is hard to determine whether 
Śabara takes these to be complementary or mutually exclusive explanations, later 
commentators seem to have embraced one or the other of these features, but not both: the 
figurative referential model was adopted by the Bhāṭṭa school, and the qualifier-qualified 
model by the Prābhākaras.67 Representations of the Mīmāṃsā stance in early Nyāya 
literature, however, decisively present it as subscribing to the figurative referential model. 
This is most clearly explicated in the section of the Nyāya- sūtra on the denotation of 
nouns, to which I now turn.  
 
2. Figurative Meaning and the Denotation of Words in the Nyāya-Sūtra and the 
Nyāya-sūtra-Bhāya and Vārtika    
 
The discussion in the Nyāya sūtra begins by framing the investigation as an 
attempt to determine the referent of a particular noun: “cow” (gau9).68 The siddhānta’s 
                                                                                                                                                  67 Coward 1990: 6.  68 This discussion closes the second adhyāya of the Nyāya-sūtra (NyS) and its bhāṣya (NySBh), 2.2.59 – 2.2.69, here cited from the following Sanskrit E-text: Indology Student Team, University of Tokyo. "Gautama: Nyayasutra with Vatsyayana's Nyayabhasya." This electronic edition is based on Tarkatirtha’s (1936-1944) edition of the text. All page numbers given for the Sanskrit verses refer to the latter. In my own translation and interpretation I have often consulted the translation by Jha (1984). 
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position is that a word refers to all of the following as inseparable elements – the 
individual (vyakti), the configuration (ākti), and the universal or generic property (jāti)69 
– while usage determines which element is principle and which subordinate.70 This thesis 
is followed by a lengthy discussion in which three key objections are refuted: that the 
word refers solely to the individual; to the generic property (the stance associated with 
the Mīmāṃsā); or to the configuration.  I outline these claims and their rebuttal in turn. 
 
2.1 The denotatum of the noun is the individual (vyakti).   
 
This pūrvapaka is supported by an appeal to ordinary language usage, which 
presupposes the particularity and diversity of referents, for instance in phrases expressing 
possession, such as “Kaudinya’s cow.” 71 If this phrase is to be capable of directing one 
to a desired action (the criterion for meaningful language usage), for instance in the 
injunction to "care for Kaudinya’s cow," it must be interpreted as denoting a specific 
cow; such a demand for diversity and particularity in the understanding of nouns could 
not be met if words denoted only a generic property (in this case, cowness). Therefore, 
words denote the individual.  
                                                                                                                                                  69 The Nyāya distinguishes between the “ordinary” generic property (jāti) and the “pure” universal (sāmānya). While the former indicates the commonality of otherwise diverse things (the cowness inherent in two individual cows), the latter conjures only the type without its tokens (the cowness of all cows). See NyS and NySBh 2,2.69: 693, and Potter 2004 (1977): 256. As for the configuration, the later Nyāya tends to omit it, taking words to refer at once to the particular-as-qualified-by-the-generic-property. Ganeri 1996: 12.  70 padenārthasampratyaya iti prayojanam, nāmapadaṃ cādhikṛtya parīkṣā, gaur iti padaṃ khalv idam udāharaṇaṃ tadarthe vyaktyākṛtijātisannidhāv upacārāt saṃśayaḥ || NyS  and NySBh 2,2.59: 658-9; 2,2.66: 670-1. Here and in the subsequent sūtra the term upacāra is glossed by the Bhāṣyakāra as “usage” (prayogaḥ), but in later sūtras it is explicitly applied to denote figurative usage.   71 śabdasya prayogasāmarthyāt padārthāvadhāraṇam …NyS and NySBh 2.2.60: 660-1.  
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The pūrvapaka is refuted by the claim that if indeed a word denotes only the 
individual, one of two absurd consequences necessarily follows: either the word “cow” 
gives rise to the cognitions of all individual cows, or else language is composed entirely 
of proper names, providing a unique word for each and every object.72 Therefore, since 
meaningful language usage necessarily requires the possibility of drawing abstractions, 
the individual cannot be the sole referent of a noun.  
 
2.2 The denotata of the noun is the generic property (jāti) and applies to the 
individual only figuratively.  
  
 The discussion then turns to the argument, apparently representing the Mīmāṃsā 
position, that the noun denotes only the generic abstract property.73 Here the pūrvapakin 
is called upon to explain how it is possible, given such a view, to maintain ordinary 
language usage, which, as just argued, is directed at individuals. The pūrvapakin 
(henceforth the “Mīmāṃsaka”) offers the following explanation:  
If the meaning of a word is not the ‘individual’ then how is it used in the sense of 
the ‘individual’? On account of various reasons, despite the fact that [the 
individual cow] is not there [as the primary meaning] of that [the word ‘cow’], 
there is the secondary usage [of the word ‘cow’], in that sense…. 
 
yadi na vyakti9 padārtha9 katha tarhi vyaktāv upacāra iti? nimittād atadbhāve 
'pi tadupacāra9/… (NySBh_2,2.62: 662) 74 
 
                                                  72  NySBh 2,2.61: 662. This argument is explicated in the Vārtika. See Jha 1984: 1019.  73 Ganeri 1996: 9.  74  The bhāṣya’s gloss clarifies that "tadupacāraḥ" should be understood in this case as a locative case tatpuruṣa compound: “atadbhāve 'pi tadupacāra iti atacchabdasya tena śabdenābhidhānam iti” ("…that which is not the meaning of the word, is expressed by that word”). NySBh 2.2.61: 662.  
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 Words, then, refer to individuals only in a secondary, figurative way. This claim 
is supported by several examples of figurative application, each illustrating a different 
type of relation between the primary and secondary referents. So, for instance, with 
respect to the expression “feed the stick” (ya"ikā bhojayeti) it is stated that the word 
“stick” is figuratively applied to the Brahmin who carries it because of their immediate 
association (sahacaraa).75 Similarly, in the contested case of “cow” the Mīmāṃsaka 
concludes that while the word’s primary referent is the abstract generic property (jāti) 
“cowness”, it is figuratively applied to the individual due to a relation of “association” or 
“inherent connection” between the universal “cowness” and the individual cow. 76  
 Uddyotakara’s commentary in the Nyāya-vārtika raises a noteworthy point 
concerning the relation of association between the generic property and the individual. 
Although the Vārttika’s assumed date of composition, circa 650 CE, situates it in a much 
later stage in the understanding of figurative usage, Uddyotakara’s argument nonetheless 
appears more sharply to delineate the implications of the view of figurative language 
usage held by the Mīmāṃsaka opponent. He begins by stating the opponent's alleged 
                                                 75 sahacaraṇād --- yaṣṭikāṃ bhojayeti, yaṣtikāsahacarito brāhmaṇo 'bhidhīyata iti׀ NySBh 2.2.62: 663. Other types of relations are demonstrated through such stock examples as “the platforms are shouting” (mañcāḥ krośanti), an expression in which the word platform is figuratively applied to the people occupying it because of their location (sthāna). In another famous example, “the cows are grazing on the Gaṅgā” (gaṅgāyāṃ gāvaś caranti), the river figuratively denotes its bank because of their relation of proximity (sāmīpya). Lastly, a “causal” relation (sādhana) is seen to underlie the figurative use in the phrase “food [is] life” (annaṃ prāṇā iti): the latter stands for the former because it is its cause. See Jha 1984: 1020-21, and Kunjunni Raja 1969: 233-4.  76 Here yogāt, as evidenced by its gloss in the bhāṣya, actually implies inherence – for instance, of the color black in a black cloth. This connection is therefore seen a condition allowing for a figurative use of the word “black” to denote the cloth rather than its primary referent, i.e. the black dye. yogāt --- kṛṣṇena rāgeṇa yuktaḥ śāṭakaḥ kṛṣṇa ity abhidhīyate/ … tatrāyaṃ sahacaraṇād yogād vā jātiśabdo vyaktau prayjyata iti/NyS  2,2.62: p 664  
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definition of “association” as exemplified in the expression “Let the ‘sticks’ enter” 
(ya"ikās praveśayeti):   
What is the ground (bīja) for figurative usage [for instance, when] Brahmins [are 
referred to as] ‘sticks’? Since figurative usage cannot occur without the ground 
for figurative usage, [here] as we have stated it is ‘association’.  Association 
means a permanent connection (nityasambandha9) with the stick….  
 
kim punar atropacārabīja ya"ikā brāhmaā iti / na hy upacārabījam 
antareopacāro labhyate / nanūkta sāhacaryam iti sāhacarya nāma ya"ikayā 
nityasambandha9; (NySVa to NyS 2.2.62: 317)77  
 
The Vārttika stresses that the various relations between primary and secondary referents – 
in this case, the relation of association – are conceived not as mere characteristics of 
figures but as necessary conditions for their emergence, the “seeds” from which they 
sprout. In the case of an association, Uddyotakara appears to argue that the Mīmāṃsaka 
must consider this an invariable concomitant (nityasambandha), implying that the stick is 
always associated with the Brahmin. If this claim seems unwarranted, recall that the 
original discussion concerns the association between individuals and the generic 
property, which, according to the Mīmāṃsā, cannot be contingent if language usage is to 
remain meaningful.   
 Uddyotakara then proceeds to present the siddhāntin’s critique:     
 Because [he has] a permanent connection with the stick, [the Brahmin] may be 
[denoted] by [the expression] ‘one who possesses the stick’ (ya"ikāvān) and not 
by the [word] ‘stick.’ The term ‘one who possesses a stick,’ [however, is used] in 
its primary meaning [i.e., to refer to the Brahmin directly and not figuratively]. 
Therefore, the ground of figurative designation must be accounted for 
differently.78  
                                                 77 Uddyotakara 1887.  78 Uddyotakara's concern in this passage may be the broader question of why figurative meaning is understood as such. A possible reply would state the fundamental condition of the opposition (bādhana) for the primary meaning in a discursive context, and perhaps would also refer to the prayojana as conceived by later Ālaṃkārikas (for instance, Abhinavagupta), which regards the intended poetical impact (vyañjanā, etc.) as grounds for the appeal to secondary meaning. However, insofar as such a framework regards the 
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ya"ikāsambandhāc ca ya"ikāvān iti syān na ya"iketi ; ya"īkāvān iti cāya 
śabdo mukhya eveti ; tasmād upacārabījam anyad vaktavyam iti ; (Ibid.)  
 
The siddhāntin points out that once an association is seen to be invariable it serves to 
explain direct and not figurative designation.79 Thus, the permanent association between 
the Brahmin and the stick allows one to refer to the Brahmin always as “the one who has 
a stick” (ya"ikāvān), which is not a figure. Therefore, the objection concludes, given that 
association can account also for direct denotation, it cannot serve as the ground for 
figurative usage (that is, a cause that necessarily brings it about). The Mīmāṃsaka 
therefore needs to come up with another explanation.80   
Underlying this siddhāntin’s argument is a claim that the Mīmāṃsā’s appeal to 
figurative signification is in fact redundant. If, as the Mīmāṃsā assume, the generic 
property and the individual are invariably connected (i.e., if denoting the one necessarily 
conjures the other), why then is there any need to insist that words denote only one of 
these and not both (as argued by the early Nyāya)?  
The Mīmāṃsaka replies by offering a fuller description of the referential 
mechanism that brings about figurative language, in the course of which he introduces the 
idea of superimposition:    
                                                                                                                                                 speaker's intetntion (tātparya) as central to the determination of meaning, it cannot be accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka, who strives, as I have said, for a neutralization of the speaker’s meaning.     79 The siddhāntin's claim is more limited, since for him it would suffice to show that association sometimes serves as the cause of figurative usage and at other times causes direct usage – a circumstance that automatically disqualified it from serving as a causal explanation for figurative usage.   80 Furthermore, the Naiyāyika could also argue that instead of describing this as an invariable association (and taking what seems like a direct denotation of nouns to be figurative), we may just as well speak of a (stronger) relation of inherence, suggesting that the word “cow” directly denotes the individual cow by virtue of the fact that the generic property inheres in the individual. 
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To begin with, the word ‘stick’ [is applied to the] stick because of the generic 
property (jātinimitta9).  [Here] the generic property is the ‘stickness’ (yā"ikātva) 
[that] exists in the stick. The Brahmin’s linkage (yoga9) with the stick, [which is 
in turn] connected with ‘stickness,’ is because of an ‘association’. [So,] having 
superimposed (adhyāropya) upon the Brahmin the generic property [‘stickness’], 
which subsists and is connected with the stick, one refers to the Brahmin as a 
‘stick. The ground for the figurative usage of other words can be similarly 
explained.  
 
ya"ikāyā tāvad aya ya"ikāśabdo jātinimitta9 ya"īkātva jāti9 sā ya"ikāyā 
vartate tayā ya"ikātvayuktayā ya"īkayā brāhmaasya yoga9 sāhacaryāt 
sayuktasamaveta jāti brāhmae ‘dhyāropya braāhmaa ya"ikety āha ; 
eva śeāy upacārabījāni svayam utprekanīyānī iti YY (Ibid.)  
 
The Mīmāṃsaka argues that association is a relation between individuals (the stick, the 
Brahmin) having nothing to do with meaning (which is fixed by words that refer to the 
generic property). While this association is indeed a necessary condition for figurative 
usage, it is not a sufficient condition for its occurrence. The transference of meaning 
involved in speaking of the Brahmin as a “stick” occurs because of the fulfillment of a 
further condition: the generic property (stickness) of one individual (stick) is as it were 
superimposed (adhyāropya) on another individual (Brahmin). It is therefore association,  
as supplemented by the act of superimposition,  that gives rise to figurative usage, i.e., to 
the denoting of a generic property (stickness) that does not initially exist in the locus of 
reference (the individual Brahmin).81  
 Here, once again, we encounter the Mīmāṃsā demarcation of two distinct aspects 
of language:82 the meaning of words in the strict sense, as denoting only generic 
properties, and their use in ordinary language to denote whatever individual object is at 
                                                 81 It is unclear whether this superimposition is supposed to be cognitive or semantic. While the Nyāya may have an interest in interpreting it as cognitive, thereby exposing the non-realism of the Mīmāṃsā, the Mīmāṃsā in fact could accept, if at all, only a semantic superimposition. I return to this issue below.  82 Roughly parallel to the linguistic division of labor between semantics and pragmatics.   
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hand.83 Bridging these two distinct aspects is figurative application, as was earlier shown. 
The novelty of this account, however, lies in its attempt to ground figurative application 
in a superimposition of the referents of words onto all other objects, which in turn renders 
these objects viable for signification. But this thesis is advanced, we should recall, by a 
Naiyāyika, and whether it represents an actual position of the Mīmāṃsā is doubtful. 
Indeed, both Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have argued against seeing qualitative 
metaphor (gauī) as based on superimposition, contending that this would necessarily 
involve a delusional aspect that is not in fact present in the comprehension of figures in 
ordinary language. Both thinkers therefore conclude that, in this case, what allows for 
figurative usage – as in the statement that “Devadatta (is) lion” (siho devadatta9) – is a 
similarity of qualities (e.g., between the lion and Devadatta).84  
 Underlying this aversion to superimposition as an explanation for figurative usage 
may be the Mīmāṃsā view that, insofar as the meaning of words is concerned, ordinary 
language and the language of scripture should be viewed as one and the same.85 In light 
of this view, it is indeed hard to imagine that the Mīmāṃsā would incorporate 
superimposition into its understanding of denotation and accept the implication that the 
better part of scriptural language usage is delusional. This reveals a fundamental 
difficulty in the Mīmāṃsā account of denotation, stemming from a notion of figurative 
usage that is not evident in ordinary language usage. Conflicting agendas corner the 
school into a position that is philosophically hard to justify: on the one hand, adhering to 
                                                 83 Within this scheme, the invariable connection between the individual and the generic property is constitutive of the latter aspect of language but inconsequential to the former.   84 See Kunjunni Raja 1969: 243-4.  85 See Scharf 1996: 196, and Clooney 1990: 132. 
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a word-world correspondence as required by scripture (and in contrast to the Buddhists), 
yet on the other, implying that we frequently do not mean what we say.  
  To sum up: for the Mīmāṃsā, the distinction between primary and secondary 
signification is seen to be reflective of an underlying metaphysical structure. The logical 
priority of primary meaning is explained as the outcome of an originary (autpattika) 
relation between a word and the generic property, while secondary meaning lacks this 
sort of grounding (and this is what constitutes its figurative nature). Insofar as it takes all 
communication concerning individuals to be figurative, the Mīmāṃsā seems to present a 
non-realist conception of language. Paradoxically, however, this non-realism is the 
outcome of an overt privileging of semantics over pragmatics which deems the word-




















Bhartṛhari on Figurative Meaning  
in the Second and Third Kā2as of the Vākyapadīya 
 
1. Introduction 
Continuing our task of outlining the non-Buddhist context of the Yogācāra 
engagement with upacāra, we now proceed to examine the school of grammatical 
analysis, focusing on Bhartṛhari’s understanding of figurative meaning in his seminal 
Vākyapadīya (VP). The main rationale for this particular focus is that Bhartṛhari’s 
encyclopedic VP represents the first substantial work in this tradition to deal with both 
the linguistic and the philosophical aspects of figurative meaning. Early Grammarians, 
notwithstanding their immense influence on the mode of analysis and technical 
vocabulary of Indian philosophy of language, in fact had a very limited interest in 
figurative meaning as an independent topic.86 Focusing as they did on the formal aspects 
of language rather than its pragmatics or philosophical implications, thinkers such as 
Yāska and Pāṇini did not view figurative usage as presenting any distinct kind of 
meaning above and beyond literal meaning, and generally addressed this topic as part of 
their discussion of the primary sense of a word.87 As for Patañjali’s Mahābhāya, though 
it briefly discusses figurative signification and offers examples of the possible relations 
                                                 86 Gren-Eklund 1986: 14-16.  87 Kunjunni Raja 1969: 40-41, 235. See also Gren-Eklund 1986: 91.   
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between the primary and the secondary denotatum, it does not consider the issue beyond 
its immediate semantic implications.88 
Bhartṛhari's comprehensive treatment of figurative meaning far exceeds his 
predecessors' concerns. The discussion of this topic takes place primarily in two sections 
of the VP: in a long passage in the second kā2a extending roughly between 2.250 and 
2.317, and in the Sambandha-samuddeśa chapter of the third kā2a, kārikās 3.3.39-51. 
The encyclopedic and the "perspectival"89 nature of this vast work (comprising almost 
2000 verses) is also reflected in both these sections, which therefore provide us with the 
sort of broader context necessary for an illustration of the views regarding figurative 
usage that prevailed in Bhartṛhari’s time (450-510 CE).90 In addition, the philosophical 
depth and complexity of these sections, bringing together issues of grammatical analysis, 
philosophy of language, and epistemology, afford an opportunity to explicate some of the 
fundamental presuppositions underlying the understanding of figurative usage in Indian 
theories of meaning. This explication will become especially useful when we reach 
Sthiramati's account of upacāra in chapter V.  
That there was a two-way theoretical exchange between Bhartṛhari and Buddhist 
schools of thought, especially the Mādhyamika, Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, 
                                                 88 For a list of the Mahābhāṣya examples of various kinds of figurative signification, see Kunjunni Raja 1969: 235; for a brief discussion of this section in light of later sub-commentaries, see Gren-Eklund 1986: 81.  89 See Jan Houben 1995: 16, and also Aklujkar 2001: 460. I return below to the issue of Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism.    90 These dates are not definite and depend on the respective dating of Dignāga, who cites the VP in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya and is thought to have lived between 480-540 CE. For a brief survey of the various views on the dating of Bhartṛhari, see Houben 1995: 5: n.7.   
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seems more than probable. Bracketing both ancient and modern speculations about the 
sectarian identity of Bhartṛhari, we know from the VP and the Mahābhāyadīpikā 
(MBhD) that Bhartṛhari was most likely acquainted with both Buddhist and Jain views:91 
his commentators – although operating in a much later period – explicitly identify 
sections of the VP as introducing Buddhist stances,92 and there is of course the 
approximate citation of the VP 158 and 2.155 in Dignāga’s Pramāa-samuccaya,93 as 
well as many other instances in which VP positions and verses can be coupled with 
Buddhist views.94 In light of this evidence, the pertinence of examining the VP's 
engagement with figurative language is clearly manifest.  
   A full survey of the structure of the VP and its central ideas is beyond the scope 
of this work (as perhaps of any single monograph). Still, in attempting a brief outline of 
some of the treatise’s presuppositions I find helpful Jan Houben’s essay on the 
Sambandha-samuddeśa,95 to date the most encompassing and thorough study of this 
chapter, and one that is also meticulously grounded in the broader context of the VP as 
well as the MBhD.  
In his introductory remarks Houben points out three fundamental presuppositions 
underlying the VP, which may also serve as guiding principles for its interpretation. 
                                                 91 Ibid. 8: n.15.  92 Ibid. 25: n.51, and 246-247.  93 Herzberger (1986) is a monograph dedicated to tracing and reconstructing the philosophical link between Bhartṛhari’s work and the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.   94 See, among others, Nakamura (1972), Kelly (1994), Lindtner (1994), Bronkhorst (1996), and Unebe (2004).   95 Houben 1995.  
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These are presented as an alternative to what was for many years the prevailing 
interpretative approach to the VP, according to which the work propounds linguistic 
monism (śabdādvaita). Houben does not ignore the advaitic elements in the VP but 
doubts the coherence of taking them to constitute the VP "stance," noting that linguistic 
monism is neither satisfactorily explicated in the VP, as one would expect if it amounted 
to a full-blown position, nor can it account for many important features of the treatise.96 
Rather than reading the whole work in light of its "monistic" verses (1.4-14), Houben’s 
analysis focuses on the Sambandha-samuddeśa chapter, which he examines through the 
prism of expanding contextual circles, resulting in a re-appraisal of the opening verses of 
the Brahma-Kāṇḍa.97  
This hermeneutical move serves Houben to identify the three VP presuppositions 
he articulates, the first of which is the "perspectivism" of the treatise. This, he clarifies, 
should not be mistaken for a full-fledged relativism or skepticism; it is rather a “constant 
awareness of the ‘limits of philosophical and theoretical discourse.’”98 Here Houben 
refers back to an important paper by John Kelly,99 which examined the possibility of 
understanding the VP in its entirety as offering an argument about the limits of a formal 
analysis of meaning. Houben adopts this approach and utilizes it to explain what was 
                                                 96 Ibid. Ashok Aklujkar also argues against a reading of Bhartṛhari as a Vedāntin and proposes that he be regarded rather as a Trayyanta-vādin, a term used in the vṛtti to VP 1.10, 2.22, 2.233, indicating ideas close to those later propounded by Śaṃkara or Maṇḍana-miśra but in a time before the Vedānta was viewed as a defined school or system of thought (2001: 461, 468: n.23).     97 Houben 1995: 308-310.  98 Ibid. 17.  99 Kelly 1994.  
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traditionally viewed as the polemical nature of the work as representing rather an 
encyclopedic wealth of perspectives, all of which are valid from their own point of view 
and none are exclusively true.100  
The second presupposition or principle Houben identifies carries the first to its 
logical conclusion: it suggests that this multiplicity of perspectives and the absence of a 
definite and final account of meaning imply not only the limits of formal analysis but also 
the inability of ordinary language to fully describe or reach reality. Hence an inherent gap 
is assumed in the VP between two perspectives (much like the Buddhist model of the two 
truths): the first is the point of view of language as a closed system, and the second of an 
underlying ultimate reality. According to Houben, this model can account for many of 
Bhartṛhari's theoretical preferences – most notably, his pragmatic and functionalist 
approach to language and its phenomenal referents, on the one hand, and his articulation, 
on the other, of a notion of an ultimate reality.  
That the VP assumes there may be a reality that underlies ordinary discourse 
seems uncontested. The questions that remain, however, concern what this reality entails 
and how it stands in relation to the views of other schools of thought with which 
Bhartṛhari was familiar. Houben leaves these questions rather open-ended, but he does 
indicate that Bhartṛhari’s understanding of true reality, whatever its specifics, clearly falls 
on the side of Indian idealist, non-dualist, or absolutist positions (such as those of the 
Yogācāra, Mādhyamika, and Advaita-vedānta schools, respectively) and not with 
philosophical realism and pluralism (of the sort held by the Vaiśeṣika).101 
                                                 100 Houben 1995: 116-118.  101 Ibid.18-20.   
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Houben’s third and final principle regards the implications of the Grammarians' 
traditional assumption about the permanency (nityatva) of linguistic units, their meaning, 
and the semantic relations between them. As was shown in the previous chapter, the 
permanency assumption requires one to come to terms with the contingency of language 
usage and phenomena (which in the case of the Mīmāṃsā school, for instance, was done 
by an appeal to secondary meaning). In the case of the Grammarians, the difficulty posed 
by this assumption is of a different but no less vexing nature. It arises from the conflict 
between the need, on the one hand, to maintain a fixed system of semantics, and on the 
other, to uphold the analytical practice of Pāṇinian grammar, which is incompatible with 
a fixed semantics insofar as its linguistic units change or even altogether lose their 
original meaning (and which does not understand the relation of permanency in absolute 
terms). Houben claims that Bhartṛhari’s most important contribution to this tradition is in 
finding a way out of this impasse by arguing that it is the sentence, rather than individual 
words or word parts, that serves as the basic linguistic unit of meaning, thereby 
understanding the permanency of the relation between words and their meanings to be 
merely of a second order and analytically derivative.102  
As both of the sections I address in this chapter discuss not the indivisible 
sentence but individual words and their meanings, we will not delve further into this 
thesis,103 but instead will focus on the more pertinent second implication of the 
                                                 102 Ibid. 20-21.  103 In Houben's study, the elaboration and reconstruction of this thesis is a central preoccupation (Ibid. 22). It should be noted that Houben, like other scholars, seems to identify this thesis as Bhartṛhari’s own and as largely free of the VP's perspectivism. Taking this thesis to be pivotal to Bhartṛhari’s project, Houben views the second kāṇḍa, in which this stance is explicated, as the theoretical core of the treatise (in contrast to the third kāṇḍa, which deals with individual words as the basic linguistic unit).   
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permanency assumption indicated by Houben. It isn't difficult to see why, under a 
referential theory of meaning, the assumption of a permanent semantic relation – 
regardless of whether it is seen as given or is supported by additional metaphysical claims 
– inevitably binds knowledge and language together. Under this assumption, both 
knowledge and thought, insofar as they are intentional in the phenomenological sense, are 
necessarily intertwined with verbalization, and therefore gain the latter’s powers and are 
bound by its limitations. In this respect Houben draws on B.K Matilal’s distinction 
between two possible interpretations of Bhartṛhari’s claims that all awareness is 
language-impregnated: the "strong version" interprets this claim as implying that all 
cognitive episodes are equivalent to verbal thoughts, while the "weaker version" implies 
only that all cognitive episodes are to some extent, even implicitly, mediated by 
language.104 Matilal is indecisive about attributing one of these two versions to Bhartṛhari 
himself, though ultimately he appears to opt for the stronger, based on his interpretation 
of VP 1.124 and because this version is compatible with his reading of Bhartṛhari as 
promoting a notion of a śabda-tattva.105 Houben, as we have seen, emphasizes the 
grammatical rather than the metaphysical grounding of this claim, arguing that while 
Bhartṛhari was often read by his later traditional interpreters and rivals as advancing the 
stronger claim, it is in fact the weaker claim that better accords with his overall position 
in the third kā2a.106  
                                                 104 Matilal 1990: 127-128, 133-135.  105 Ibid.124, 134. Aklujkar also seems to understand Bhartṛhari as leaning toward the stronger claim (2001: 464).   106 Houben 1995: 20.  
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Either way, both claims suggest that the perceived world, if not altogether 
determined by language (as the "strong version" implies), is only intelligible insofar as it 
is impregnated and mediated through language.107 Given this view, the third 
presupposition emerges as a natural extension of the first two, and all three together 
represent an understanding of the relations between language and reality according to 
which analysis and theoretical discourse are unable to supply a definite, exclusive 
account of meaning. Thus these assumptions point to the limitations of ordinary language 
in describing real and non-dual reality, and culminate with the belief that language 
mediates all phenomenal experience.  
Bearing this framework in mind, we turn now to consider the discussion of 
figurative usage in the second and third kā2as of the VP.  
 
2. Figurative Meaning in the Vākyapadīya: The Second Kā a108 
 
Although it is primarily concerned with the indivisible sentence as the basic 
linguistic unit, some sections of the second kā2a are dedicated to a discussion of the 
meaning of individual words (this line of inquiry is justified by the commentators as an 
expression of the Grammarian commitment to expound all linguistic phenomena; more 
on this below). The same is true of the discussion of figurative meaning in the second 
                                                 107 The "strong version" excludes the possibility that any non-conceptual "primitive" experiences appear in one's awareness; the "weak version" may allow for such experiences but nonetheless assumes the involvement of language in any attempt to make them intelligible. See Matilal 1990: 135-141.  108 I use Ives Ramseier's E-text edition (2004) of the Sanskrit VP verses, which follows the edition of Wilhelm Rau (1977). For the Sanskrit text of the vṛtti and for Puṇyarāja’s ṭīkā, I use Iyers’s edition (1983), and have also consulted his translation of the second kāṇḍa’s verses (1977). Unless otherwise stated, all translations of the VP kārikās, vṛtti, and ṭīkā are my own.   
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kā2a,109 which extends between kārikās 2.250-317 and presents a vast array of 
contending views on many other linguistic and epistemic issues. Here our focus will be 
two sub-sections: kārikās 2.250-2.256, which will supply an introduction of sorts to the 
theoretical framework in which this discussion is conducted, presenting some of the basic 
assumptions that underlie it; and kārikās 2.285-297, which present the possibility of 
providing a criterion to distinguish between primary and secondary meaning even in the 
absence of an external object serving as the referent of a word. This is done by way of an 
analogy between knowledge claims in the case of a perceptual error, and figurative 
meaning. The elaboration of this analogy, as we will see, amounts eventually to a 
sophisticated pragmatist account of both meaning and actuality, exemplifying the 
possibility of a correspondence relation between language and phenomena that does not 





                                                 109 It should be noted that the term used in this section to denote figurative usage is gauṇa, and not upacāra, which appears only in the discussion of figurative usage in the third kāṇḍa. The question arises whether this change of terminology implies also a change of meaning. One possible reply would be to regard these terms as corresponding to the different shades of meaning represented by the terms "figurative" and "secondary" respectively, noting that the second kāṇḍa discusses gauṇatvaṃ mostly in the context of its usage or application (vṛtti), while upacāra, as implied by the term’s verbal stem, is used in the third kāṇḍa to indicate a certain subservient and dependent status (for instance, qualifying existence, sātta). Unfortunately, this ordering of the VP terminology, while tempting, does not seem to reflect actual practice, in which both terms are used to indicate the entire range of senses conveyed by figurative/secondary meaning. This receives further support from Puṇyarāja, who in his ṭīkā on the second kāṇḍa treats both terms as largely interchangeable (perhaps tending more often to use upacāra to indicate the kind rather than the token). See more below.    
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2.1 Kārikās 2.250-256: some preliminary distinctions.  
 
The second kā2a’s discussion of figurative usage opens with a consideration of 
various approaches to the issue of multiple meanings. Polysemy is discussed in a wide 
variety of Indian śāstric sources as far back as Yāska’s Nirukta,110 and is usually 
regarded as denoting two main categories of phenomena: cases in which several words 
have the same meaning (paryāya-śabda), and those in which a single word has various 
meanings (nānārtha-śabda). Though the śāstric interest in polysemy is often merely 
taxonomical, it is typically propelled by the semantic difficulties this phenomenon raises 
for the understanding of the denotative function of words (abhidhā). Before exploring 
Bhartṛhari’s understanding of polysemy, a brief survey of these difficulties and their 
causes will serve to highlight the nature of the connection between polysemy and 
figurative meaning. 
To understand the problems generated by polysemy we must consider it against 
the background of the general adherence of Indian schools of thought to strictly 
referential theories of meaning, discussed in the previous chapter. Within this framework, 
polysemy – i.e., several expressions that denote the same referent – appears to be a form 
of language usage whose meaningfulness is questionable. This difficulty is of course less 
troublesome for systems of thought that do not adhere exclusively to a referential 
understanding of meaning – for instance, in the Western philosophical tradition, post 
Fregean semantics, whose distinction between sense and reference enables it to explain 
polysemy as a perfectly meaningful phenomenon in which various expressions share a 
                                                 110 For instance in Yāska’s Nirukta I.12; see Kunjunni Raja 1969: 32-33.   
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reference but differ in their added cognitive value.111 For Indian schools of thought, 
however, especially ones that assume a monosemic relation between a word and its 
meaning like the Mīmāṃsā, polysemy presented vexing difficulties.112 In the absence of a 
sense-reference distinction by which to differentiate semantically between polysemic 
expressions, Indian theories of meaning have typically handled these difficulties by 
appealing either to a distinction between primary and secondary signification or to the 
suggestive function of words.  
This seems also to be the underlying context of the discussion of figurative usage 
in the VP second kā2a, although polysemy was never as weighty a problem for the 
Grammarians as it was for the Mīmāṃsā. Though picked up by Bhartṛhari as a viable 
topic of discussion, it was considered, as we will see, not as an antinomian element but 
rather as an inseparable aspect of the denotative function of words, made possible by 
figurative usage.   
 Bhartṛhari, in the context of the discussion of figurative meaning, appears to 
address only polysemy of the second kind described above: a single word with multiple 
meanings. His lengthy discussion contains, as I have said, a vast array of views, often 
contradictory, whose proponents are seldom disclosed. In his commentary on VP 2.250, 
Puṇyarāja attempts to outline the organizing principles of this section, the internal 
hierarchy of the various opinions, and the questions they address:   
Some thinkers have declared that the word which has many meanings is one [for 
all its meanings]. These multiple meanings are restricted to one meaning due to 
[their] differentiation according to [various] reasons.  
                                                 111 Frege 1948: 210, 230.  112 While for others like the Buddhists, polysemy was a valuable tool for criticizing a correspondence theory of truth. See chapter III, part 3.3 of this essay.   
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ekam āhur anekārtha śabdam anye parīkakā9  
nimittabhedād ekasya  sārvārthya tasya bhidyate // VP 2.250  
 
[Puṇyarāja’s Dīkā:] Regarding this verse there are two theories: the 'one word 
theory' (ekaśabdadarśana) [which says that the word is one for its various 
meanings], and the 'many words theory' (anekaśabdadarśana) [by which each of 
these meanings constitutes a different word]. In addition to that, according to the 
adherents of the view that each separate word is the basic linguistic unit of 
meaning (padavādin), both word and meaning are real, however according to the 
opinion of the Grammarian they are not real, so altogether there are four views. 
Even though these were refuted earlier, the author of the commentary still accepts 
them [provisionally] for the purpose of maintaining ordinary language usage 
(vyavahāra). And since this treatise on grammar is an auxiliary to everything, 
therefore even the opinions concerning word and meaning which are not accepted 
are stated. In the case of the 'one word theory' (ekaśabdadarśana), there is the 
[understanding] of the secondary application of a word (śabda-upacāra) as 
dependent on (nimittaka9) whether its usage is well established (prasiddhi) or not. 
And, there is also the [understanding] of secondary application [with respect to] 
the denotatum (arthopacāra), which is of two kinds – one in which the denotatum 
is [the word’s] own essence (svarūpārthatvena), and one in which the denotatum 
is an external object (bahyārthatvena), so altogether three views. In reference to 
these and the previously mentioned, it should be understood that by [the 
combination of] these three views with the four views which were indicated, 
twelve views are produced [all together]. In reference to the 'one word' theory, 
etc., he says in the verse 'they say that both primary and secondary are discerned 
(vicāra) as one,' [and so] with respect to all [its] meanings the word 'cow' 
expresses [all of them in] one. However, in that case, why is it that all the 
meanings [of the word] are not displayed (prakāśana) simultaneously?  For this 
purpose he said 'due to a differentiation according to reasons” (nimittabhedād), 
etc. And because of the wish to explain [the] differentiation according to reasons, 
'all meanings are restricted' (sārvārthya bhidyate) was said.113  
 
atraiekaśabdadarśanam anekaśabdadarśana ceti dvau pakau / tatarāpi 
padapadārthayo9 satyatva padavādimatena  asatyatva ca 
vaiyākaraamateneti catvara9 pakā9 / pratikiptam api paka vyavahārārtham 
agīkaroty eva "īkakāra9 / yata9 sarvapāradam ida hi vyākaraa śāstram / 
tatra cāya sthita ityatra puna9 padapadārthāva'gīkaroti / 
tatraikaśabdadarśane śabdopacāra9 prasiddhyaprasiddhinimittaka9 /taraiva 
cārthopacāro dvividhā savrūpārthatvena bāhyārthatvena ca iti traya9 pakā9 ; 
evam anyātra tad evem etais tribhi9 pakai catvāro ‘pi pakā abhihitā dvādaśa 
                                                 113 Iyer, in his own translation of this kārikā, combines the words (nimitta)-bhedāt’ and bhidyate, rendering them jointly as “differentiated," but in Puṇyarāja’s commentary, the latter seems to be understood along the lines of a constraint or a restriction. Iyer also takes "nimitta" to denote “circumstances,” whereas “causes” would appear to be a more appropriate rendition in this context.    
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sampadyanta iti boddhavyam ; tatraikaśabdadarśanasamāśrayaena tāvad 
gauamukhyavicāram ekam āhur ityādinākaroti ; sarvev apyartheav eka  eva 
gośabdo vācaka9 ; yady eva yugapadeva sarvārthaprakāśana kasmān na 
karotītyāha nimittabhedād ityādi ; nimittabhedo vakyamāas tasmāt 
sārvārthya bhidyata iti YY (Iyer 1983: 103)  
 
Here Puṇyarāja clarifies right from the outset that though none of the opinions 
presented above are Bhartṛhari’s own, they are addressed because of the Grammarians’ 
commitment to account for all linguistic phenomena, without overlooking the perspective 
of ordinary language.114 The encyclopedic nature of the VP is therefore explained as an 
expression of its non-sectarian nature, as knowledge of grammar is understood to be 
fundamental to all schools. In keeping with this attitude, Puṇyarāja suggests that the 
section under discussion can be seen as expressing twelve different views, derived from 
two main approaches to the understanding of polysemy (of the nānārtha-śabda kind). 
These are, respectively, the “one word theory” (ekaśabdadarśana), by which the word is 
considered to be one for all its various meanings, and the “many words theory” 
(anekaśabdadarśana), which treats each distinct meaning as constituting a distinct 
(though phonemically identical) word.  
 
2.1.1 The Ekaśabdadarśana view.  
 
In what follows we restrict our focus to the “one word theory," presented roughly 
in kārikās 2.250-2.256.115 This section seems to revolve around a single, fundamental (if 
                                                 114 Iyer 1968: 99.  115 According to Kunjuni-raja, Bhartṛhari shows a preference for the anekaśabdadarśana view, although strictly speaking he regards only the sentence as the basic unit of meaning (1969: 35).   
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implicit) question: given the “one word theory,” how are the multiple meanings of a 
given word differentiated so that it may convey one particular meaning?116  
The VP answers this question by appealing to the distinction between primary and 
secondary meaning, categories that correspond respectively to the one conveyed meaning 
and to all the other meanings. To support this claim the section next engages in a 
presentation of the criteria or reasons (nimitta) for identifying and distinguishing between 
the two kinds of meaning.  
Here again Puṇyarāja’s propensity to schematize and classify proves useful, as he 
points out that the figurative usage discussed in this section can be grouped into two 
kinds. The first, which he terms śabda-upacāra (discussed in 2.251-254), refers to 
figurative meaning that appears to be determined and differentiated from the literal 
meaning by certain factors intrinsic to its usage. The second kind – termed artha-upacāra 
(2.255-2.256) – is based on the understanding that the meaning’s status (primary or 
secondary) is determined by the relations that hold between a word and an objectified 
thing-meant117 (which can be either the word’s own intrinsic essence or an external 
object). 
 Let us first address the category of śabda-upacāra, which Puṇyarāja illustrates 
through the example of the word "cow" (go) figuratively applied to denote a person from 
among the Vāhīkās.118 According to the "one word theory," the word “cow” denotes the 
                                                 116 See Iyer 1968: 101-2.  117 Here I am following Houben in using this term for artha rather than “referent,” “designatum,”  “denotatum,” etc, since in this context especially it often indicates not merely the object but the cognitive content involved in verbal understanding.    118 My analysis here follows Iyer’s (1968: 102-103).   
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cow and the Vāhīka in essentially the same way, as both meanings are said to be implied 
by the same denotative power of the word.119 In actual usage, however, the word only 
"picks out" one of these meanings at a time because of the speaker’s intention or 
contextual and co-textual considerations.120 In this respect, what renders one meaning 
primary and another secondary is nothing more than their established usage (prasiddhi) in 
ordinary language.121 The distinction between direct and indirect signification, according 
to this view, is determined by the pragmatics of language usage and is regulated by 
convention. All meanings of a word are therefore given by its denotative power alone, 
and there is no need to assume that words additionally possess some special "figurative" 
power.  
 In the case of artha-upacāra, however, the meaning’s status as primary or 
secondary is a function of the word’s objectified denotatum. According to Puṇyarāja, 
these denotata can be of two kinds – either intrinsic, if they are the word’s own essence 
(svarūpārtha, i.e. its set of phonemes in their order), or extrinsic (bāhyārtha, like the 
generic property "cowness" in the case of the word “cow”). Any other application of a 
word – for instance, to indicate the individual cow – is hence considered to be merely 
figurative.  
                                                 119 yathā sāsnādimān piṇḍo gośabdenābhidhīyate ׀ tathā sa eva gośabdo vāhīke 'pi vyavasthitaḥ ׀׀ VP 2.252   120 yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate ׀ arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ vā yogāc chabdāntareṇa vā ׀׀ VP 2.251. The VP supports this point with another example – that of a single mantra, which, although it is pronounced identically on all occasions, is accepted as having various meanings in different contexts and for different agents without any apparent confusion: tathādhyātmam  adhidaivam adhikratu ׀ asaṃkareṇa sarvārtho bhinnaśaktir avasthitaḥ ׀׀ VP 2.254 .  121 sarvaśaktes tu tasyaiva śabdasyānekadharmaṇaḥ ׀ prasiddhibhedād gauṇatvaṃ mukhyatvaṃ copajāyate ׀׀ VP 2.253.  
 59 
The artha-upacāra denotata of the first kind, in which the thing-meant is the 
word’s intrinsic essence, are presented thus in kārikā 2.256 and its vtti:122  
The essence of words is attached (anuajyate) to all their meanings. The object 
alone changes, [while] the phonemes (śruti9) as the essence [of the word] are 
fixed.  
 
tathā svarūpa śabdānā sarvārthev anuajyate  
arthamātra viparyasta svarūpe tu śruti9 sthirā123  // VP 2.256 // 
 
[Vtti:] Some other scholars think that the word always occurs [in relation] to its 
essence (svarūpa) [i.e. the phonemes that constitutes it]. This essence – which is 
intrinsic to it [to the word], never transgresses its relation with it and is never 
shared with another word – is the word’s [primary] meaning. [As for the] 
understanding of its denotation with respect to all things, the essence (rūpa) is 
superimposed on the objects [that these] words [denote]. [For instance, the 
essence of] the word 'cow' is [superimposed] on the lump of flesh [and the two are 
considered interchangeable] just as in Pāṇini’s verse 'the term Vddhi [stands for 
the lengthening into] a long ā and the diphthongs ai and au.'124 Regarding the 
essences [of words], they are always understood as they are heard [i.e. according 
to the order of audible phonemes] and among both, the essences and denoted-
objects, it is merely by changes in the order of the [phonemes being the] essence 
that ordinary language usage is carried on. And because it is eternal, this [the 
word], in the case of secondary signification, is applied to all things that are 
assumed to have [a similarity of] qualities, because of this [very same] reason…  
 
anye tvācāryā manyante svarūpe śabdo nitya vartate / sa eva tasyāntara'go 
‘vyabhicārī śabdāntaraiś cāsādhārao ‘rtha9 / tatra cānupadeśapratipatti9 
sarveśām /  rūpan tu śabdānāmarthavadhyāropyate / yo go śabda9 so ‘ya 
                                                 122 The authorship of the vṛtti, traditionally ascribed to Bhartṛhari, is a question of ongoing scholarly debate. For a survey of opinions on this matter, see Houben 1995: 13. There, and in a series of articles on the relations between the VP and the vṛtti, Houben has argued that regardless of one’s stance concerning the authorship of the latter, the discrepancies between these two texts make it methodologically plausible to differentiate between them when interpreting Bhartṛhari’s thought. Criticizing this view, Aklujkar (2001: 466: n.10) has argued that there is sufficient evidence to support attributing the vṛtti to Bhartṛhari and that Houben has demonstrated not a substantial difference but merely a difference of emphasis between the views of the two treatises, which may be accounted for by the commentarial intent of the vṛtti.    123 In some renditions of the VP, “śrutiḥ sthirā” is replaced by”sthitiḥ sthirā.” See Iyer 1983: 256: n.5. Here I follow Rau’s edition, whereas Iyer's translation of the kārikā follows the latter option: “The same form of a word is superimposed on all its meanings. It is the object that changes. The word is unchangeably fixed to its form” (1968: 112).   124  As Hṭa IdhyaIyiI 1.1.1:  "Vṛddhir āT-aiC." See Katre 1989: 7. 
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pi2u ‘rtha9 / tathā yo vddhi śabdata ādaica iti / tatra svarūpeveva śrutayo 
nityāvabuddha9 arthasvarūpayostu rūpaviparyāsamātrea sarvo lokavyavahāra9 
kriyate / nityatvācceya sarvaviśayā guakalpanā gauvyapadeśe 
nimittatvenopādīyate… (Iyer 1983: 256-257) 
 
A word, it is claimed here, denotes only its intrinsic essence, which is "what is heard," 
i.e., its ordered pattern of phonemes, and which is understood as its primary meaning. 
When a word is used to indicate any other objects associated with the original one by 
virtue of a certain similarity of properties – as in the case of both the cow and the Vāhīka 
indicated by the word “cow” – its essence is said to be superimposed on these objects, 
both of which, however, are considered to be denoted figuratively. Thus, this stance takes 
meaning to be strictly intra-linguistic, with little concern for pragmatics. As such, it is 
able to sustain an invariable and fixed (nitya) connection between a word and the thing-
meant – in the strong sense that was presented by the Mīmāṃsā and that, for different 
reasons, could appeal also to the Grammarians,125 but at the cost of rendering the bulk of 
ordinary language usage secondary.126   
                                                 125 On the various interpretations of nityā in the context of the Mīmāṃsā, see chapter I, part 1. For Bhartṛhari, as we've seen, the fixed semantic relation is a necessary assumption for the meaningfulness of language but does not necessarily amount to a metaphysical claim (as it may also be conventional). While for the Mīmāṃsā the removal of any considerations of pragmatics in the determination of meaning is intended to create a fixed system of semantics and hence to support scriptural authority, the Grammarian's lack of concern for pragmatics stems instead from his preoccupation with the formal aspect of language.    126 Toshiya Unebe has argued that this kind of artha-upacāra should be identified as representing the position of the Grammarians and probably of Bhartṛhari’s himself, but there is reason to question this claim. Unebe's argument is grounded in two main sources: first, he points out that Vinitadeva’s sub-commentary on Sthiramati’s Triṃśika-bhāṣya explains a Pūrvapakṣin objection in terms that are very similar to this stance, and identifies it as the view of the “Grammarians”; next, on the basis of this and an interpretation of VP 2.256 in the context of Pāṇinisūtra 1.1.68, he argues that Bhartṛhari admits this stance as “the conclusion from his standpoint as a Pāṇinian grammarian, although he does not thoroughly reject other views” (2004: 137, 141-144). Vinitadeva’s sub-commentary to this section is addressed in chapter V, but we may already note that in the VP vṛtti section discussed above (which is not mentioned in Unebe’s article), Bhartṛhari explicitly presents this stance as the view of “some other scholars” (anye tv ācāryā manyante), casting doubt on the conclusion that the view is his own.    
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In the second case of the denotata of artha-upacāra, the primary meaning of a 
word is understood to be given by its denotation of an external object (bāhyārtha), taken 
here to be the generic property (jāti) and not the individual (dravya). VP 2.255 and its 
vtti provide us with an explanation of the operation of figurative signification in this 
case:     
It is held by some, that due to a certain reason, the Vāhīka is related to the generic 
property of 'cowness.' The object alone has been aberrated [but] the word is 
posited with its own [one] meaning.  
 
gotvānua'go vāhīke nimittāt kaiś cid iyate  
arthamātra viparyasta śabda9 svārthe vyavasthita9 // VP 2.255 
 
[Vtti:] According to some scholars there is no other usage of the word apart from 
its primary meaning [which is by reference to] its own object. However, [in 
figurative usage] a superimposition (adhyāropa) is performed of a form [of one 
object] onto a different object. In this manner [the meaning is] one because it is 
the same [in both cases], [just like] the word 'snake' applies itself [only to] its own 
object, [but when it is applied to] such substance (dravya) as the rope, it presents 
an aberration. [Hence] with reference to objects other [than its own] the word 
superimposes the form of another object. In the same manner, because a similarity 
is observed in some properties [of the cow and the Vāhīka] or because of the 
association of the actual (bhūta) word with an existent thing (bhavina9), having 
apprehended 'cowness,' while there is a cognition of a resultant (prāpta) 
aberration of form regarding the Vāhīka [when he is indicated by the word 'cow'], 
the word merely applies itself to the lump of flesh with a dewlap etc. Here the 
aberration is only with respect to the form of the denotatum, while the error with 
respect to the object [indicated by] the word is visible. 
 
ekeāmācāryāām mukhyāt svaviayād anyatra śabdasya vttir nāsti ; 
rūpāntarādhyāropas tu arthāntare kriyate ; yathaivaika9 samabhāvāt rajjudravye 
prāptaviparyāsa9 sarpaśabda9 svaviaya prayu'kte viayāntareu 
viayāntrarūpam adhyāropayati yathā kasyacid eva sadśasya dharmabhūtasya 
darśanād bhāvino vā bhūtapadāsa'gād gotvam āsādya vāhīke 
prāptarūpaviparyāsāyā buddhau gośabda sāsnādimatyeva pi2e prayu'kte 
tatrārtharūpamātraviparyāsa9 śabdasya tu viaye vyabhicāro dśyate YY (Iyer 
1983: 256) 
 
According to the Vtti, the figurative usage of the word “cow” to denote the 
Vāhīka is based on the superimposition (adhyāropa) of one material object (the cow) on 
another (the Vāhīka). This process is enabled by the perceived similarity of properties 
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between these two objects, and is carried out in such a way that the generic property (i.e. 
gotva, "cowness") of the first object is conceived as residing in the latter. Therefore, 
while the word “cow” is applied to indicate two different objects, its denotation – of 
“cowness” in both cases – is the same. To clarify this point, the Vtti compares figurative 
usage to perceptual error, as when a piece of rope is mistakenly perceived as a snake. 
Both cases, the analogy implies, involve a superimposition of one entity onto another  
because of their common properties,127 but without altering the semantic function of the 
words that refer to these objects.128 Thus the analogy underscores the fact that the 
superimposition in question is not semantic (that is, operating merely on the linguistic 
level) but rather cognitive (as reflected by the Vtti's use of the term “buddhi”). 
According to the Vtti, when one calls the Vāhīka a “cow” it is because one perceives in 
him the generic property of "cowness," just as one perceives a snake (or "snakeness") in a 
piece of rope. The crucial difference is that in the case of the Vāhīka-as-cow the error is 
deliberate and immediately visible, which it is not in the case of the rope-as-snake.129 So, 
                                                 127 In the case of a perceptual error, this commonality of properties is complemented by additional causes pertaining to the perceptional procedure (e.g., faulty perception that results from defective sense faculties, darkness, etc.).    128  In other words, just as the word “cow” always denotes the generic property “cowness,” so the word “snake” refers to the same object ("sankeness") that is wrongly perceived to inhere in the rope.   129 This observation about the difference between perceptual error and figurative usage is explicitly stated also in Puṇyarāja’s gloss of “aberration” (viparyāsa) in his commentary to the VP 2. 274:  “[When] an object is thought to appear in the place of another as if by an aberration [through] a word like 'cow' etc., the latter is said to be figurative.” viparyāsād ivārthasya yatrārthāntaratām iva manyante sa gavādis tu gauṇa ity ucyate kva cit // VP 2.274. [Ṭīkā:] “An aberration can [appear] because of a misconception [or] by superimposition. [Saying] 'that is silver' [when there is merely mother of pearl] is [an example of] misapprehension [which is an] aberration. Regarding this, however, having superimposed on the Vāhīka the qualities that are associated with the cow, [they] are [rightly] apprehended, [and] therefore this [kind of] 'aberration' refers to a superimposed thing. This is why it was said [in the kārikā] 'as if by aberration.' [And] because there can be no [aberration of the first kind] which ensues on the ground of something that is 
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while in the second kind of arthaupacāra figurative usage involves the same kind of 
cognitive superimposition as occurs in perceptual error, it is not a type of perceptual error 
but merely analogous to it. This distinction is essential for our understanding of the VP 
section I address next (2.285-297), in which figurative usage is explained through the 
prism of its analogues with perceptual error.   
 
2.2  Kārikās 2.285-297: figurative meaning and the analogy with perceptual  
error.  
  
The context of the discussion carried out in these verses130 is outlined by 
Puṇyarāja, who understands them as a response to an earlier verse131 that proposed that 
the meaning of a word is whatever the hearer understands in the moment of its utterance. 
Puṇyarāja mentions an objection to this view (which I will call the "mentalist" view)132,  
ascribing it to the Naiyāyikas, who argue that given such an inclusive criterion for 
meaning, all meaning would necessarily be primary and therefore there would be no 
grounds for drawing the distinction between primary and secondary signification.133 The 
                                                                                                                                                 [already] apprehended, therefore [in this very example] it is [understood] as language usage that is either primary or secondary." …viparyāsaś cādhyavasāyena bhavati, adhyāropeṇa ca / rajatam idam ity atra viparyayādhyavasāya eva / iha tv adhyāropya gogatān guṇān vāhīke ‘dhyavasyatītyadhyaropitatadbhāvo ‘yaṃ viparyāsaḥ / ata eva ‘viparyāsād iva’ ityuktaṃ /tasmād adhyavasitatadbhāvanimittaprayukto nāsti gauṇamukhyavyavahāra iti \\ Iyer (1983: 111-112).  130 For a complete running translation of these verses and portions of the vṛtti, see appendix 2.3.    131 The reference is probably to VP 2.278: śrutimātreṇa yatrāsya sāmarthyam avasīyate׀taṃ mukhyam arthaṃ manyante gauṇaṃ yatnopapāditam.    132 Because it takes meaning to be determined by whatever cognitive content arises through the word’s denotative power regardless of the ontological status of the thing-meant.      133 The ṭīkā to 2.285 reads: “According to the approach of the Nyāya school, [if] that which occurs in the mind [were] the meaning of the word, there could be no distinction between primary and secondary. To doubt this he says: [the verse].” idanīṃ nyāyadarśanachāyayā bauddha eva śabdārtho nāsti kaścicchabdeṣu 
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critique reflects the Nyāya’s realist presupposition that meaning is fixed by the referential 
relations between words and a world of real external objects. Within this framework, the 
question of whether a word is used in its primary or secondary sense is dependent on the 
ontological status of the thing-meant, i.e. on its existence or nonexistence (respectively) 
at the locus of reference. Since this sort of explanation is irrelevant to the proponent of 
the mentalist view, he is called upon to supply an alternative criterion for the distinction 
between primary and secondary meaning. 
The section under discussion attempts to do just that. It proceeds by examining 
the denotation of words with regard to perceptual error – for instance, the word "water" 
applied to a mirage – as a test case. Since in cases of perceptual error the referent of a 
word is necessarily unreal and therefore the determination of meaning necessarily an 
"internal," cognitive affair, the following verses set out to show that even here the 
primary-secondary distinction holds. In doing so they touch upon more fundamental 
epistemic questions regarding the possibility of meaningful language usage in the 
absence of an external and objective ground for meaning.  
We begin with the presentation in 2.285 of the mentalist approach and its 
understanding of figurative meaning:   
Whenever a thing-meant [by a word] – even when it is excessively contradictory 
– is ascertained, then the primary [meaning of the] word is set in accordance with 
that knowledge.  
 
 [Vtti:] Regarding this, some scholars do not accept at all the application (pravtti) of 
words like ‘likeness,' etc. with respect to what merely appears in the mind [i.e. that in 
seeing water in a mirage the word water means 'water-like']. [For instance,] when the 
[illusory] appearance of water which is a mirage arises in the mind, only the word 'water' 
                                                                                                                                                 gauṇamukhya vibhāga ity āśaṅkyāha. Iyer 1983: 116. But Iyer, unlike Puṇyarāja, identifies this as the Mīmāṃsā stance, expressed in the following: śabdavattūpalabhyate tadāgame hi dṛśyate tasya jñānaṃ yathā ‘nyeṣam MīS iv 1.6.15 (Iyer 1977: 125).  
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in its primary sense should be applied to it. Since the ground for the employment of a 
word (pravttinimitta) is the same in all cases [i.e. in the case of real perception and in 
that of a mirage], it serves to incite the [same] word usage.  
 
atyantaviparīto 'pi yathā yo 'rtho 'vadhāryate  
yathāsapratyaya śabdas  tatra mukhya9 prayujyate // VP 2.285 //   
 
iha kecidācāryā buddhipratyavabhāsamatrea sarvatra tulyādiśabdapravtti 
vyavacchindanti /  jalanirbhāsāyā hi mgatakāyā buddhāv utpannāyā  
mukhya eva jalaśabda9 prayoktavya iti / tulya hi pravttinimitta sarvatra 
śabdasya prayojaka bhavitum arhati / (Iyer 1983: 264) 
  
According to the verse, the mentalist position takes whatever meaning is 
understood by a word to constitute its primary meaning. The Vtti seem to stress that this 
occurs irrespective of the ontological status of the referents of words.134 Instead, a 
different condition is proposed as the determinant of primary meaning – the "ground for 
the employment” (pravttinimitta) of the word, i.e. that factor which makes its usage 
possible.135 The MBh mentions four pravttinimittas, which carve up all nominals into 
four categories: generic terms (jātiśabda), quality words (guaśabda), action words 
(kriyāśabda), and arbitrary names (yadcchāśabda).136 In the case before us, the ground 
for the application of the word "water" would be the conceived generic property of 
“waterness.” But this does not entail that the latter necessarily inheres in the individual 
substance (dravya), nor indeed that it exists at all. As Scharf notes, the Mahābhāya's 
                                                 134 Therefore, according to the vṛtti, the mentalist stance rejects any explanation that does not take the word "water" to possess one and the same meaning when applied to a mirage and when to actual water (for instance, it rejects the view that takes the meaning of a word to alter relative to its referent, implying that when applied to a mirage the word "water" means "water-like thing").    135 Or in Deshpande’s words: “A property whose possession by an entity is the necessary and sufficient condition for a given word being used to refer to that entity” (1992: 56).  136 See The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (1962: vol. 1, 19, lines 20-21), cited in Scharf 1996: 22-23: n.6.  
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engagement with the various pravttinimittas is concerned not at all with their actuality 
but only with their function as semantic conditions.137 In this respect, the ground for the 
application of the word "water" (the perceived "waterness," existent or otherwise) is the 
same in the case of seeing real water and of seeing a mirage, and therefore so is the 
word’s usage and its meaning.  
For the mentalist, then, primary meaning is constituted by whatever presents the 
ground for the application of a word, regardless of the referent’s ontological status. But 
this picture still does not explain how, if at all, a notion of secondary meaning can emerge 
from these assumptions.138 The subsequent kārikās, 2.286 to 2.297, appear to offer such 
                                                 137 Scharf 1996: 23: n.6.  138 This is because the pravṛttinimitta serves as both a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of a word; thus, any secondary usage would still appear to rely on the pravṛttinimitta; but then the pravṛttinimitta could no longer serve as a criterion for primary meaning, since the meaning of all words would be rendered primary. Thus 2.285 raises an interpretative difficulty: in what sense is the "primary meaning" it discusses primary? Iyer’s analysis presents one possible solution by reading 2.285 as expressing a mentalist approach that does not accept any distinction between primary and secondary meaning, and then contrasting this with kārikās 2.286-2.297, which he reads as proposing a mentalist approach that does embrace such a distinction. This interpretation, however, seems at odds with Puṇyarāja’s comments in both the introduction and conclusion of this section, which imply that the mentalist approach is a single, cohesive view, and one that generally enables a distinction between primary and secondary meaning (see page 77-78 below). An alternative solution, compatible with the ṭīkā, may be to read the entire section (2.285-297) in light of the analogy between figurative language and perceptual error, and in particular the cognitive process associated with experiencing the latter. In Indian philosophical lore, cases of perceptual error are described as progressional in terms of knowledge: they are processes in which what is initially seen as one object (say, a snake) is gradually discerned to be a different object (a rope) because of its evident lack of efficacy as the initially perceived object. Employing this model, we may regard kārikā 2.285 as corresponding to the first stage of this process, when all knowledge appears before the mind as prima facie valid, and accordingly, all words appear to convey primary meaning. Kārikās 2.286-297 would then be viewed as corresponding to the second stage, in which one comes to an awareness of the discrepancy between the valid and erroneous perception and in which, therefore, the distinction between primary and figurative meaning becomes apparent (due to various enabling conditions, such as a realization of the fact that the primary meaning is somehow barred, etc.). Whereas in most cases one is immediately aware that a secondary meaning is used, sometimes (as in the case described in 2.285) one is only retrospectively aware of a secondary usage (as in the case of calling a mirage "water"). Insofar 
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an explanation, which proceeds by way of an analogy between figurative language and 
perceptual error (in most cases the kārikās present the perspective of perceptual error, 
while the Vtti unpacks the implications for the understanding of figurative usage):   
Even though the ascertainment of the reality of the thing-meant is dependent on 
one’s understanding of it, all understanding does not arise [in the same manner as] 
in the case of something [i.e. a thing-meant] that is generally established [as 
actual] (prasiddha).139 VP 2.286  
 
 [Vtti:] Those who maintain that there is a distinction with relation to the 
conditions [that give rise to] the primary and secondary [application of words] 
think that although the ascertainment of the form of a thing-meant is dependent on 
its understanding, in some cases, without transgressing the understanding of the 
particulars of this [form], the common usage [of a word] determines whether it is 
primary or secondary. How is that so? [In reply, the following verse is offered:]  
    
Seeing [real] water is the same as the seeing of [unreal water in] a mirage, etc. 
However, because of the difference with respect to touching [them], etc., a mirage 
is not water. VP 2.287 
 
[Vtti:] Even though in the case of mirages a cognition arises which is the same as 
the appearance of [real] water as it is attained by sight, still, since it is not possible 
to touch it, bathe in it, drink it, or see it when one arrives at its location, it is not 
water. Therefore, for those who follow what is generally established as actual 
(prasiddhānā), there is no application (pravtti) of a word in its primary 
meaning in the case of a mirage.   
 
yady api pratyayādhīnam arthatattvāvadhāraam  
na sarva9 pratyayas tasmin prasiddha iva jāyate //  VP 2.286  
 
[Vtti:] gauamukhyavyavasthāpravibhāgavādinastu manyate – pratyayādhīne 
‘pyartharūpasyāvadhārae kvacit tadviayāā pratyayānām avyabhicārea yā 
pravttir loke gauamukhyabhāva vyavasthāpayati katha /  
 
darśana salile tulya mgatādidarśanai9 ; 
bhedāt tu sparśanādīnā na jala mgatikā // VP 2.287  
 
                                                                                                                                                 as this presents a plausible alternative interpretation, it suggests that the analogy between perceptual error and figurative usage is also structural.     139 The translation of prasiddhi as "generally established" is presented by Houben as referring to what is conventional or according to practice (1995: 323). As will be shown below, however, here prasiddhi also means what is determined to be real and actual, hence when indicating an object it will intermittently be translated also as “established as actual” or “actual.”   
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[Vtti:] yady api salilarūpanirbhāsā cakurdvārikā tathābhūtaiva buddhir 
mgatakāsu jāyate tathāpi sparśanasnānapānādīnāmabhāvāt taddeśaprāptau 
cādarśanān neda salilam iti tāsu prasiddhānā mgatakāsu nāsti mukhyasya 
śabdasya pravtti9 ;; (Iyer 1983: 264) 
 
 
Focusing first on the perceptual-error branch of the analogy, we find both kārikā 
2.286 and its Vtti arguing that while there is no difference between correct and erroneous 
perception insofar as the visible form of an object is concerned, the two are not equally 
valid. Once they are examined in terms of the respective efficacy of the object of 
knowledge, only one is established as a valid cognition and its object as actual. So, 
according to this framework, while all epistemic knowledge, whether true of false, 
appears before the mind in the same manner, it is still in need of a justification whose 
conditions go beyond appearance. This justification consists in examining the efficacy of 
the object of knowledge, which serves here as the criterion for determining both its 
actuality (prasiddha) and the validity of the knowledge claim.  
The same criterion, we may observe, is at work also in determining the meaning 
of a word. Whereas meaning is determined solely by the way in which a word is 
understood regardless of the ontological status of its referent, its own status as primary or 
secondary is discerned according to common usage, that is to say, according to the 
actuality of the referent as determined by its efficacy. So, for example, the primary 
meaning of the word “water” is not determined by its relation to a real existent object 
possessing "waterness," but because it is applied to a state of affairs that fulfills whatever 
is commonly considered to be the function and purpose of water. Conversely, it is said to 
be applied only figuratively (or secondarily) to a state of affairs that does not fulfill this 
condition.  
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Efficacy is therefore understood to be the criterion for determining both the 
actuality of the perceived object and the status of the meaning of the word that indicates 
it.140 In this respect, the category of things considered actual and the category of what is 
taken to be the primary meaning overlap – but only insofar as they are established on the 
basis of this criterion.   
The primacy afforded to efficacy as the criterion for determining both actuality 
and meaning is emphasized again in kārikās 2.288 and 2.289 and in their vtti. There, this 
criterion serves to define a notion of truth that is overwhelmingly presented in epistemic 
rather than ontological terms:  
Even when the snake and the rope are seen to be the same, their discrepancy is 
discerned by their [respective] dissimilar actual effects. VP 2.288  
 
[Vtti:] Regarding a substance being the rope, which at some point, due to its 
shape and color, may give rise to a cognition of a snake – despite this, 
disregarding the common effect that arises by seeing [them], and after separating 
[them] because of their dissimilar respective effects, [for instance], by noticing 
[the absence of ] movement and hissing [in the case of the rope] – as the 
difference between them is evident, the object of the word [that is considered to 
be] primary is [also] determined.  
 
Whatever discrepancy is noticed due to certain visible circumstances that bring 
about the aberration of the actual object, that [discrepancy] is termed ‘untruth.’  
VP 2.289  
 
[Vtti:] Here, in the case of objects that appear to be established, a false perception 
is to be known [as caused by delusion] due to darkness, eye affliction, 
intoxication, drinking poison, and by being in a desert, etc., which are the causes 
of [perception] that is contradictory to the established object. 
 
yad asādhāraa kārya prasiddha rajjusarpayo9 ;  
tena bhedaparicchedas  tayos tulye 'pi darśane // VP 2.288  
 
                                                 140 Here my interpretation diverges sharply from that of Unebe (2004: 145), which, following Nakamura (1972: 399), takes Bhartṛhari to be pointing to external reality as the final arbiter both of right and wrong cognition and of primary and secondary meaning.  In my view the VP provides no indication whatsoever that Bhartṛhari succumbs to this sort of realist theory of meaning, and indeed includes abundant evidence to the contrary (see my discussion of the third kāṇḍa below).  
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[Vtti:] yadyapi rajjudravye kadācid varasasthānadvārea sarpabuddhi9 
punarupadyate tathāpi sādhāraa darśanādikārya tadapāsya 
śvāsagamanadraśanādibhir asādhāraai9 kāryair mukhyaśabdaviaya9 
paricchidya vyavasthāpyate nirjñāte ca bhede //  
 
prasiddhārthaviparyāsa-nimitta yac ca dśyate ; 
yas tasmāl lakyate bhedas tam asatya pracakate // VP 2.289  
 
[Vtti:] iha prasiddhārthaviparyayahetubhya9 santamasa-timiropaghāta-madya-
viapāna-marudeśāvasthāna-ādibhya9 prasiddhākārevartheu darśanaviparyayo 
vijñayate… (Iyer 1983: 265) 
 
In this passage the perceptual illusion is described in terms of a gradual process of 
understanding in which what is initially seen as a particular object (a snake) is later 
discerned to be a different one (a rope). Examining the initially perceived object in terms 
of its efficacy gives rise to the realization of a discrepancy (bheda) between two 
excluding knowledge claims (that there is a snake before one's eyes, and that there is 
merely a rope),141 and this discrepancy is what is meant by “un-truth" (asatya). Note 
that underlying this epistemic framework is a rather Instrumentalist conception of truth, 
insofar as the validity of a knowledge claim is said to be determined according to its 
efficacy (and not according to the ontological status of the object of knowledge) as 
discerned by common practice. And since efficacy determines truth, it follows that any 
judgments about the alleged ontological status of the object are logically dependent on 
judgments about its efficacy.  
Let us now turn to the second branch of the analogy, which deals with the way 
linguistic meaning is discerned and its status determined. As in the case of perceptual 
error, so too the determination of meaning is understood to occur through a progressional 
                                                 141 The latter claim is termed the "contradicting" or "correcting" awareness (bādhaka pratyaya). Matilal 1986: 183.   
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process of understanding. Initially, the word "snake" is used to indicate a certain state of 
affairs (a snake) and is understood to convey the word's primary meaning. But an 
examination of the referent in terms of its efficacy,142 followed by the realization that it is 
not a snake, raises an "obstacle" (skhaladgati, literally "stumbling gait") to understanding 
the word in its primary meaning. Hence it is taken to denote the referent (the non-snake, 
in this case a rope) only figuratively. Once again, as with perceptual error, the process is 
based on the realization of a discrepancy – in this case, between the alleged and actual 
status of meaning – manifested in the appearance of an "obstacle" to understanding the 
word in its primary sense, and is seen as constitutive of all cases of figurative 
transference.143   
It is hard to establish whether this progressional model is applied to the 
determination of meaning only analogically, or whether it is treated as an accurate 
description of the cognitive process involved in such determination. As mentioned earlier 
(Vtti to VP 2.255), figurative usage assumes an immediate comprehension of the "error" 
involved in the metaphorical transference.144 But this does not exclude the possibility that 
understanding figurative usage does in fact entail undergoing the cognitive process 
                                                 142 It is important to clarify that efficacy as a criterion for meaning is not a notion that applies exclusively to the object or to the word; rather, it is that which constitutes the word-object relation when this relation is understood to express the primary meaning. A word is efficacious if it is understood to indicate a certain object whose efficacy is as expected and prescribed by the word. In this sense, efficacy (as fashioned by common practice) appears as a criterion both for the meaningfulness of language usage and for the actuality of states of affairs.    143 Puṇyarāja’s commentary on 2.297 (addressed below) defines the primary meaning of a word as that which prevails in everyday discourse and is without a "stumbling gait" (skhaladgatitva), and any other kind of meaning as necessarily secondary. See Iyer 1968: 108.  144 This contrasts with perceptual errors, where the "error" is required to be implicit and veiled for some time before it is revealed, and thus necessarily involves a diachronic dimension.   
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described above, which may well be instantaneous and subliminal.145 Still, regardless of 
this question, the most notable aspect of the analogy is the fact that it interprets meaning 
in purely epistemic terms as an understanding that is given to us through a gradual 
process of corroboration and falsification very much like the various stages of inference 
(anumāna), and one whose status is determined by the same criterion – efficacy – that 
justifies knowledge claims.  
 By now it can already be acknowledged that the so-called mentalist stance does 
allow for a distinction between primary and secondary usage and that it is far from 
metaphysical realism. Instead, it presents a sophisticated pragmatist account of 
knowledge and actuality, which allows for a correspondence relation between language 
and phenomena without requiring the assumption of an ontological objective ground. 
This point is further clarified in the subsequent kārikās, roughly 2.290-295, which shed 
light on some important features of efficacy and serve to delineate the ways in which this 
position differs from both philosophical realism and radical anti-realism. These kārikās 
present additional cases in which efficacy serves to tell apart the actual and non-actual – 
cases not just of perceptual illusion but also of an object and its artificial duplicate or its 
                                                 145 A similar explanation is proposed by Abhinavagupta regarding the understanding of a complete sentence. In his locana to Dhvanyāloka 1.4 he mentions the Prābhākarā's claim that the meaning of a sentence is understood instantaneously, but points out – citing Dhvanyāloka 1.17 for support – that one must assume that underlying it is an implicit diachronic process: "Our author will go on to say 'just so does the suggested sense flash forth in an instant in the minds of the intelligent auditors who are averse to the literal sense and in quest of real meaning,' but this is because the auditor has considered the subject so often that the succession, which must be hypothesized, is not felt, because there is no overt manifestation of succession among notions that belong to the same category, just as we are unaware of the succession in our memory of concomitance and verbal convention." Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan 1990. [Locana:]yadvakṣyāmaḥ-- ‘tadvatsacetasāṃ so 'rtho vākyārthavimukhātmanām /buddhau tattvāvabhāsinyāṃ jhaṭity evāvabhāsate //’[Dhvanyāloka 1.17] iti //kiṃ tu sātisayānuśīlanābhyāsāt tatra sambhāvyamānī 'pi kramaḥ sajātīyatadvikalpaparamparānudayād abhyastaviṣayavyāptisamayasmṛtikramavanna saṃvedyata iti׀׀  S'astri 1940: 66.   
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reflection, and of objects that are seen in dreams or are created fictions. I will focus on 
the last two examples, starting with the dream:  
While real146 poison and the like are the cause of death etc., when [they are tasted] 
in dreams, these things are ineffective [for achieving] the same purpose.   
 
maraādinimitta ca yathā mukhyā viādaya9 Y 
na te svapnādiu svasya tadvad arthasya sādhakā9 YY VP 2.295 
 
The verse explicitly claims efficacy as the criterion for differentiating between what is 
actual and what is not. It is interesting to contrast this claim with the early Yogācāra 
attempts to disprove this very point by arguing that in some cases even actions performed 
in a dream can bear fruit.147 This argument serves the Yogācāra to advance what Matilal 
has called the Buddhist “pan-fictional" approach, which uses cases such as dreams and 
illusions to cultivate a sweeping doubt by presenting the possibility that we may be 
entirely delusional in our grasp of every day experiences.148 The mentalist position, 
however, for reasons that will be presented shortly, does not succumb to this skeptical 
view.   
                                                 146 Here "mukhya" may be understood as used ambiguously to denote both the "real" existentthing and the "primary" meaning of the word.   147 For instance, according to Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatika: "An activity that has been performed is just like being effected in a dream." [Vṛtti:] "A case of being effected in a dream is like where semen is released even without a couple's coming together.” svapnopaghātavatkṛtyakriyā siddheti veditavyaṃ ׀ yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim antarena śukravisargalakṣaṇaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ.  Anacker 1984: 162, 414). Nakamura sees the VP use of such examples as sufficient indication that these verses are a critique directed specifically at the Yogācāra (1972: 400-402). However, the same examples, arguments, and counter-arguments seem to have characterized many other Indian philosophical schools as well, and could, for instance, just as easily be read against the background of Bhartṛhari’s alleged identity as a "Vedāntin."  148 Matilal 1971: 134.  
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 The passage seems to articulate yet another crucial and more subtle point 
regarding efficacy, namely that it is not relative or dependent on any particular epistemic 
vantage point:  
With respect to touching and taking cover in cities through buttresses, walls, and 
torrents – these [usages] are not [possible] in the case of an [imaginary] city of 
gandharvas.   
   
[Vtti:] [E]ven the inhabitants of this place [the gandharvas city] do not see these 
[i.e. the buttresses, walls, and towers], therefore these things cannot be known as 
the objects [of words] in the primary sense. 
 
vapraprākārakalpaiś149 ca sparśanāvarae yathā Y 
nagareu na te tadvad gandharvanagarev api YY VP  2.292  
 
[Vtti:]…taddeśasthair eva tāni na dśyate iti teām mukhyaviayatva na 
vidyateYY (Iyer 1983: 266) 
 
What is at stake in these verses is the definition of efficacy: ought it be determined in 
accordance with the epistemic framework in which it is given, or regardless of it? The 
Vtti clarifies that the issue under discussion is not merely an imagined object’s lack of 
efficacy in everyday reality (as already shown by the previous example), but its inability 
to be efficacious even from within the point of view of the fictional realm itself.  
But what are we to make of this claim? Is not the pipe smoking of a Sherlock Holmes, for 
instance, while not efficacious in the same way as the pipe-smoking of flesh and blood 
detectives, still arguably efficacious within the confines of C. Doyle's work of literature? 
The suggestion that it is would likely be embraced by the Mādhyamika philosopher 
Nāgārjuna, who does not take efficacy to be a criterion for the reality of its subject or 
context. In a famous section of his Vigrahavyāvarttaī, in the course of clarifying the 
type of negation applied by his notion of emptiness, Nāgārjuna likens it to one imaginary 
                                                 149 Should read “-talpaiś”. See Iyer 1983: 266.   
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man negating the existence of another.150 Despite the ultimate non-existence of both an 
essential agent and the object of negation, he points out, the negation itself remains 
efficacious.151 This claim can be advanced, however, only given the assumptions of the 
Mādhyamika radical realtivism, which advocates a view of experience as oscillating 
between various epistemic vantage points, all equal in terms of their reality and differing 
only in their levels of coherence.152 But these assumptions are not shared by the VP, 
judging by the vtti of 2.29, which describes the inhabitants of an imagined city as 
powerless even to see it with their eyes, let alone to take cover within its walls. This point 
is crucial since it shows that, according to this VP section, while efficacy is determined 
without regard to ontology, it does nonetheless serve as a clearcut criterion for 
differentiating the actual from the non-actual. So understood, the notion of efficacy 
necessarily prescribes a hierarchy of epistemic vantage points, within which the vantage 
point of fiction is viewed as merely derivative of and logically dependent on that of 
actuality.  
Although here the vtti does not address the question of meaning, the analogical 
framework enables us to carry this point to its logical end and apply it also to the 
determination of the status of meaning. Doing so, we find a recurrence of the same 
hierarchical structure – in other words, efficacy emerges not just as the criterion for 
telling primary from secondary meaning but also as a notion that enforces a particular 
                                                 150 VV 27. For a detailed discussion of this example, see chapter III, part 3.8.   151 This is intended to be understood as analogous to our everyday reality in which agents lacking intrinsic nature negate the intrinsic nature of other agents and themselves, using language which lacks any intrinsic nature.   152 For a discussion of the Mādhyamika in relation to the question of status and meaning of fictional discourse from an analytic philosophy perspective, see Crittenden 1981. 
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epistemic and logical hierarchy, which posits secondary meaning as necessarily 
dependent on the primary one.    
The presuppositions of the mentalist position, as presented by Bhartṛhari, enable 
us now to describe it as situated rather far from both philosophical realism (recall its 
disregard for ontology in validating knowledge and determining meaning) and non-
realism (because of its insistence on a fixed epistemic hierarchy of  experience and on the 
existence of a clear-cut criterion for discerning this hierarchy). But what of the theoretical 
forces and considerations that designed this complex set of presuppositions? What are the 
philosophical motivations of this position? Though it is tempting to find in this stance 
premonitions of the Advaita-vedāntic view of the existential indeterminacy of the 
phenomenal world (as based on the model of the existential indeterminacy of objects seen 
in illusion, presented by its notion of anirvacanīyakhyāti),153 I would argue that to do so 
is to read too much into this section, considering its immediate context. Instead, the 
concluding kārikās of this section seem to supply a closure of sorts that casts this stance 
as rising out of the Grammarians’ commitment to the way language and reality are 
ordinarily understood by common practice, which in turn is taken as a condition for their 
meaningfulness: 
Things that are seen to be otherwise [than how they are] by changes related to 
[circumstances] of time, place, and the senses, are [nonetheless] determined 
decisively according to what is established as actual by common practice. VP 
2.296 
 
Verbal usage is not [regulated on the basis] of knowledge [that arises] from 
defects [of the senses] or that is supernatural. Words are based on common 
practice. VP 2.297 
                                                 153 Literally its "inexplicability"; which indicates, however, that, on the one hand, the illusory object is not entirely non-existent (because of its appearance in perceptual awareness), but on the other hand, the "correcting awareness" (here, claims presented by scriptures) does not allow us to view it as existent. Matilal 1986: 190-192.   
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[Vtti:] While a fixed relation (sambandhavyavasthā) between word and meaning 
cannot be made on the basis of knowledge that arises from defects [in the 
senses]…  [and hence] with respect to common usage of words, even Yogins or 
omniscient people do not follow [their own supernatural knowledge].  Due to the 
dependence of the relation between word and meaning on the views of [ordinary] 
people, [the meaning] that is well-known in the world should be followed by all 
who are exerting to express the thing-meant. 
 
deśakālendriyagatair bhedair yad dśyate 'nyathā  
yathā prasiddhir lokasya tathā tad avasīyate YY VP 2.296  
 
yac copaghātaja jñāna yac ca jñānam alaukikam ; 
na tābhyā vyavahāro 'sti  śabdā lokanibandhanā9 YY VP 2.297 
 
 [Vtti:]Yathaivahy upaghātajena jñānena śabdārthasambandhavyavasthā na 
kriyate tathā tāva...[incomplete sentence] yoginā sarvajñānā ca jñāna 
śabdavyavahāreu tair api nānugamyate / prāktalokad"inibabdhanatvāc ca 
śabdārthasambandhasya sarveārthābhidhāne yatna kurvatā loka9 prathito 
‘nugantavya9… (Iyer 1983: 267). 
 
These verses, which can be identified as reflecting Bhartṛhari’s own stance, explicitly 
designate "common practice" as the final measure of what is actual as well as of linguist 
meaning. More than a social or linguistic convention, common practice as it is conceived 
here may best be described as an episteme, determining what is considered to be 
meaningful and the case both experientially and linguistically. Though its content is not 
unchanging, it is still fixed to the extent that it allows for a so-called permanent (nitya) 
relation between a word and its meaning – but only in the sense of this relation's 
givenness and lack of a known origin.   
Finally, Pṇyarāja’s "īkā on 2.297, by spelling out the way this scheme affects the 
distinction between primary and secondary meaning, brings the argument full circle:  
[Dīkā:] Similarly, in order to convey a certain meaning, words are dependent on 
worldly practice being the ground (nimitta) for ordinary language usage, and on 
account of being or not being established [in common usage, that is] with or 
without [presenting] an obstacle [to understanding], they present respectively the 
distinction between primary and secondary meaning. Therefore, even when the 
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thing-meant by the word exists [only] in the mind, the distinction between 
primary and secondary meaning remains – this was proven here. 
 
…tathaivārthasvarūpaprtayāyanāya śabdā lokanobandhanā 
lokavyavahāranimittabhūtā9 pravartamānā9 prasiddhyaprasiddhibhyām eva 
skhaladgatitvāskhaladgatitvābhyā gaunamukhyavibhāgāpādayantītibauddhe 
‘pi śabdārthe vyavasthita eva gauamukhyavibhāga iti siddha / (Iyer 1983: 119)  
 
Puṇyarāja states that the fundamental condition for secondary usage – namely, the 
existence of some sort of obstacle to interpreting a word in its primary sense – is 
determined according to common practice. The obstacle, in other words, is not 
understood as a function of any ontological state of affairs (specifically, of the 
ontological non-existence of the referent in the locus of reference); rather, we resort to 
secondary meaning once a signified state of affairs cannot stand up to the required 
purpose prescribed by the word, as determined by common practice.  
 Kārikās 2.296-297 similarly point out that, as an episteme, common practice 
defines both the norm (what is actual and what is the primary meaning) and the 
deviations from it (a perceptual error, secondary usage). Within this framework, 
therefore, there is no place for the Buddhist attempt (for instance of the Yogācāra) to 
argue that the deviations may actually stand for the norm. These special cases, it is 
understood here, necessarily attest to and reaffirm the norm – not because acknowledging 
an error necessarily assumes a criterion for truth, as the realist would argue, but because 
both norm and error are identifiable and distinct only insofar as they form part of the 
same meaning-giving principle, defined here as common practice. 
Furthermore, insofar as both language and phenomena – meaning and actuality – 
are determined by their respective efficacy as prescribed by common practice, accepting 
this common practice in its entirety and without exception comes to serve as a condition 
for the consistency of our experience and the very possibility of meaningful discourse. 
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This may explain why Bhartṛhari, unlike Nāgārjuna, cannot allow fiction to be 
efficacious in any way:154 it is incompatible with our normal understanding of efficacy 
and therefore would imply a breach of our commitment to common practice. This 
framework suggests that the radical fallacy of the non-realist lies not just in the fact that 
his claims fly in the face of everyday experience and common sense, but more 
profoundly, in the fact that these claims subvert the very conditions that render them 
meaningful in the first place.155  
To recap: The section began by outlining what I have called the mentalist stance, 
according to which meaning is taken to be whatever cognitive content arises by a word’s 
denotative power, regardless of the ontological status of the thing-meant. This raised 
several obvious difficulties related to the understanding of ordinary language, and 
especially the apparent collapse of the distinction between primary and secondary 
meaning. The latter was resolved by the VP's introduction of a criterion other than 
ontology to identify and differentiate between them. This new criterion emerged by way 
of an analogy between knowledge claims in cases of perceptual error and of figurative 
meaning, as both cases were seen to operate under the same basic condition, namely 
without a direct referential connection to an existent external object. The analogy served 
                                                 154 It should be emphasized that the example Nāgārjuna presents in the VV serves to argue that a fictional entity has efficacy only within the realm of fiction. It does not amount to a claim that fiction is efficacious within the realm of everyday allegedly ‘real’ experience. By this example his aim is to show to the Nyāya realist opponent that efficacy (in this case, of a negation) cannot serve as a criterion for reality. For him the realm of fiction and the realm of ordinary experience are distinguished not by their reality (as both are conventional), but by their respective coherency.    155 This critique, however, could also be directed back at Bhartṛhari by the Nyāya realists, who would reject his attempt to establish meaning and actuality on a notion of common practice which does take seriously the givenness of external reality. In this sense Bhartṛhari may be very easily lumped together with the Buddhist non-realist.   
 80 
to generate an epistemic-linguistic framework in which both the actuality of an object and 
the status of meaning are determined by the same criterion – the efficacy (of a word, a 
knowledge claim) as prescribed by common practice. The function of the latter, it was 
argued, is best understood as an episteme, an overarching meaning-giving principle for 
both language and phenomena, which accounts at once for both perceptual error and 
figurative usage.   
Of particular note in this framework is its overwhelmingly epistemic 
interpretation of meaning; both the process of understanding meaning and that of 
determining its status are akin in various respects to the epistemic procedure involved in 
the determination of truth and the justification of knowledge claims. Once its main 
assumptions are uncovered and explicitly articulated in this way, this theoretical 
framework becomes more recognizable as a strong, if implicit, presence in the 
engagement of many other Indian schools with theories of meaning – at times embraced, 
as in the case of the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya, and at other times, as we will shortly see in 
the case of the early Yogācāra, an object for rejection.   
Finally, we saw how this adds up to a sophisticated pragmatist position, distinct 
from both realism and full blown non-realism, which illustrates the possibility of 
accounting epistemically (that is, without appealing to ontology) for a correspondence 
relation between language and phenomena. The importance of this possibility is 
reinforced in the subsequent discussion of upacāra in the third kā2a, which, as we will 
see, reaches a similar conclusion from a different perspective and through a different 
mode of inquiry.  
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2.3 Appendix A: a running translation of VP kārikās 2.285-297.156 
 [Dīkā to 2.285:] According to the approach of the Nyāya school, [if] that which 
occurs in the mind [were] the meaning of the word, there could be no distinction 
between primary and secondary. Having doubted this, the [verse] argues: 
 
Whenever a thing-meant [by a word] – even when it is excessively contradictory 
– is ascertained, then the primary [meaning of the] word is set in accordance with 
that knowledge. VP 2.285  
 
 [Vtti:] Regarding this, some scholars do not accept at all the application 
(pravtti) of words like ‘likeness," etc. with respect to what merely appears in 
the mind [i.e. that in seeing water in a mirage the word water means 'water-like']. 
[For instance,] when the [illusory] appearance of water in a mirages arises in the 
mind, only the word 'water' in its primary sense should be applied to it. Since the 
ground for the employment of a word (pravttinimitta) is the same in all cases 
[i.e. in the case of real perception and in that of a mirage], it serve to incite the 
[same] word usage. 
 
Even though the ascertainment of the reality of the thing-meant is dependent on 
one’s understanding of it, all understanding does not arise [in the same manner as] 
in the case of something [i.e. a thing-meant] that is generally established [as 
actual]. VP 2.286  
 
[Vtti:] Those who maintain that there is a distinction with relation to the 
conditions [that give rise to] the primary and secondary [application of words] 
think that although the ascertainment of the form of a thing-meant is dependent on 
its understanding, in some cases, without transgressing the understanding of the 
particulars of this [form], the common usage [of a word] determines whether it is 
primary or secondary. How is that so? [As a reply, the following verse is offered:]  
    
Seeing [real] water is the same as the seeing of [unreal water in] a mirage, etc. 
However, because of the difference with respect to touching [them], etc., a mirage 
is not water. VP 2.287 
 
 
[Vtti:] Even though in the case of mirages a cognition arises which is the same as 
the appearance of [real] water as it is attained by sight, still, since it is not possible 
to touch it, bathe in it, drink it, or see it when one arrives at its location, it is not 
water. Therefore, for those who follow what is generally established as actual 
(prasiddhānā), there is no application (pravtti) of a word in its primary 
meaning in the case of a mirage.   
                                                 156 The translation is my own; for the sources of the Sanskrit text, see ft. 108.      
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Even when the snake and the rope are seen to be the same, their discrepancy is 
discerned by their [respective] dissimilar actual effects. VP 2.288  
 
[Vtti:] Regarding a substance being the rope, which at some point, due to its 
shape and color, may give rise to a cognition of a snake – despite this, 
disregarding the common effect that arises by seeing [them], and after separating 
[them] because of their dissimilar respective effects, [for instance], by noticing 
[the absence of ] movement and hissing [in the case of the rope] – as the 
difference between them is evident, the object of the word [that is considered to 
be] primary is [also] determined.  
 
Whatever discrepancy is noticed due to certain visible circumstances that bring 
about the aberration of the actual object, that [discrepancy] is termed ‘untruth.’  
VP 2.289  
 
[Vtti:] Here, in the case of objects that appear to be established, a false perception 
is to be known [as caused by delusion] due to darkness, eye affliction, 
intoxication, drinking poison, and by being in a desert, etc., which are the causes 
of [perception] that is contradictory to the established object. 
 
The highs and lows [depicted] in a painting having the same form as a mountain 
etc. do not [posses] like-wise the effect of blocking etc. VP 2.290    
 
While [there can be] a continuous contact of the hand with a wheel,   
it is not like [touching] the wheel of a fire brand, which stops once touched. VP 
2.291  
 
[Vtti:]…moreover, when there is an interruption of the movement of [the fire 
brand], its appearance as wheel of light is not perceivable. Because of that, what 
is grasped [as the fire wheel] is not as it seems (ayathārtha) and it is discerned 
that it cannot be the object of the word 'wheel' in its primary sense.  
 
With respect to touching and taking cover in cities through buttresses, walls, and 
torrents – these [usages] are not [possible] in the case of a Gandharva [imaginary] 
city. VP 2.292 
   
[Vtti:] …even the inhabitants of this place [the gandharva city] do not see these 
[i.e. the buttresess, walls, and towers], therefore these things cannot be known as 
the objects [of words] in the primary sense. 
 
Whatever purposes are accomplished through real (mukhyair) wild and domestic 
animals, etc., that much is not possible in the case of clay animals, therefore to the 
latter is added the suffix 'ka.'  VP 2.293 
 
[Vtti:] Here [in the verse, real] animals – wild, domestic, etc. – with respect to 
the seen and unseen fruits of [various] purposes, by serving as the instrument  for 
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accomplishing (sādhanatvena) such [actions] as dissecting, eating, and sprinkling 
water, are determined as being real (mukhyā9). This is not the case, however, for 
earthen or wooden animals. Therefore, since there are only few properties that are 
similar [between real and model animals], when a relation between the object and 
the subject of comparison (upamānopameyabhāva) is established, [then] there is 
ground for [words] to take on [the suffixes] according to the explanation 
prescribed by the treatise [Pāṇini’s sūtra 5.3.96] 'concerning an image when there 
is a comparison.' 
 
A great expanse of land is covered by actual things as mountains, etc.;  
[their] reflection, however, is seen to occupy [merely] a small area. VP 2.294 
 
While real poison and the like are the cause of death etc., when [they are seen] in 
dreams, these things are ineffective [for achieving] the same purpose. VP 2.295 
 
Things that are seen to be otherwise [than how they are] by changes related to 
[circumstances] of time, place, and the senses, are [nonetheless] determined 
decisively according to what is established as actual by common practice. VP 
2.296 
 
Verbal usage is not [regulated on the basis] of knowledge [that arises] from 
defects [of the senses] or that is supernatural. Words are based on common 
practice. VP 2.297 
  
[Vtti:] While a fixed relation (sambandhavyavasthā) between word and meaning 
cannot be made on the basis of knowledge that arises from defects [in the 
senses]…  [and hence] with respect to common usage of words, even Yogins or 
omniscient people do not follow [their own supernatural knowledge].  Due to the 
dependence of the relation between word and meaning on the views of [ordinary] 
people, [the meaning] that is well-known in the world should be followed by all 
who are exerting to express the thing-meant. 
 
[Dīkā:]…similarly, in order to convey a certain meaning, words are dependent on 
worldly practice being the ground (nimitta) for ordinary language usage, and on 
account of being or not being established [in common usage, that is] with or 
without [presenting] an obstacle [to understanding], they present respectively the 
distinction between primary and secondary meaning. Therefore, even when the 
thing-meant by the word exists [only] in the mind, the distinction between 
primary and secondary meaning remains – this was proven here. 
 
 [Dīkā to 2.285:] idanī nyāyadarśanachāyayā bauddha eva śabdārtho nāsti 
kaścicchabdeu gauamukhya vibhāga ityāśa'kyāha –    
 
atyantaviparīto 'pi yathā yo 'rtho 'vadhāryate  
yathāsapratyaya śabdas  tatra mukhya9 prayujyate // VP 2.285 // 
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[Vtti:] iha kecid ācāryā buddhipratyavabhāsamatrea sarvatra 
tulyādiśabdapravtti vyavacchindantiY jalanirbhāsāyā hi mgatakāyā 
buddhāv utpannāyā mukhya eva jalaśabda9 prayoktavya iti / tulya hi 
pravttinimitta sarvatra śabdasya prayojaka bhavitum arhati / 
 
 
 yady api pratyayādhīnam arthatattvāvadhāraam  
na sarva9 pratyayas tasmin prasiddha iva jāyate //  VP 2.286  
 
[Vtti:] gauamukhyavyavasthāpravibhāgavādinastu manyate – pratyayādhīne 
‘pyartharūpasyāvadhārae kvacit tadviayāā pratyayānām avyabhicārea yā 
pravttir loke gauamukhyabhāva vyavasthāpayati katha /  
 
darśana salile tulya mgatādidarśanai9 ; 
bhedāt tu sparśanādīnā na jala mgatikā // VP 2.287  
 
[Vtti:] yady api salilarūpanirbhāsā cakurdvārikā tathābhūtaiva buddhir 
mgatakāsu jāyate tathāpi sparśanasnānapānādīnāmabhāvāt taddeśaprāptau 
cādarśanān neda salilam iti tāsu prasiddhānā mgatakāsu nāsti mukhyasya 
śabdasya pravtti9 ;; 
 
yad asādhāraa kārya prasiddha rajjusarpayo9 ;  
tena bhedaparicchedas  tayos tulye 'pi darśane // VP 2.288  
 
[Vtti:] yadyapi rajjudravye kadācid varasasthānadvārea sarpabuddhi9 
punarupadyate tathāpi sādhāraa darśanādikārya tadapāsya 
śvāsagamanadraśanādibhir asādhāraai9 kāryair mukhyaśabdaviaya9 
paricchidya vyavasthāpyate nirjñāte ca bhede //  
 
prasiddhārthaviparyāsa-nimitta yac ca dśyate ; 
yas tasmāl lakyate bhedas tam asatya pracakate // VP 2.289  
 
[Vtti:] iha prasiddhārthaviparyayahetubhya9 santamasa-timiropaghāta-madya-
viapāna-marudeśāvasthāna-ādibhya9 prasiddhākārevartheu darśanaviparyayo 
vijñayate…  
 
yac ca nimnonnata citre  sarūpa parvatādibhi9 Y 
na tatra pratighātādi kārya tadvat pravartate YY VP 2.290  
 
sparśaprabandho hastena yathā cakrasya satata9 ; 
na tathālātacakrasya vicchinna spśyate hi tat // VP 2.291 
 
[Vtti:]…kiñca kriyāvirāme tasya jyotiś cakravad ākāro nopalabhyate ; tasmād 
ayathārtha tadgrahaamaviayo mukhyasya śabdasyety avadhāryate / p 266  
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vapraprākārakalpaiś157 ca sparśanāvarae yathā Y 
nagareu na te tadvad gandharvanagarev api YY VP  2.292  
 
[Vtti:]…taddeśasthair eva tāni na dśyate iti teām mukhyaviayatva na 
vidyateYY 
 
mgapaśvādibhir yāvān mukhyair artha9 prasādhyate  
tāvān na mnmayev asti tasmāt te viaya9 kana9 // VP 2.293  
 
[Vtti:] iha mukhyā mgapaśvādyo d"ād"aphalev arthev eva 
viruddhabhakaaviśasanādiu yathā sādhanatvena vyavati"hante na tathā 
mnmayā dārumayā vā ; tasmāt kasyacideva sadśasya dharmasya 
bhāvādupamānopameyabhāvasambandhe sati “ive pratiktau “ ityetat 
prakaraavihitānā pratyayānām utpattau nimitta labhante ;; 
 
mahān āvriyate deśa9 prasiddhai9 parvatādibhi9  
alpadeśāntarāvastha pratibimba tu dśyate YY VP 2.294  
 
maraādinimitta ca yathā mukhyā viādaya9 Y 
na te svapnādiu svasya tadvad arthasya sādhakā9 YY VP 2.295  
 
deśakālendriyagatair bhedair yad dśyate 'nyathā  
yathā prasiddhir lokasya tathā tad avasīyate YY VP 2.296  
 
yac copaghātaja jñāna yac ca jñānam alaukikam ; 
na tābhyā vyavahāro 'sti  śabdā lokanibandhanā9 YY VP 2.297 
 
 [Vtti:]Yathaivahy upaghātajena jñānena śabdārthasambandhavyavasthā na 
kriyate tathā tāva...[incomplete sentence] yoginā sarvajñānā ca jñāna 
śabdavyavahāreu tair api nānugamyate / prāktalokad"inibabdhanatvāc ca 
śabdārthasambandhasya sarveārthābhidhāne yatna kurvatā loka9 prathito 
‘nugantavya9… (Iyer 1983: 264-267)   
 
[Dīkā:] …tathaivārthasvarūpaprtayāyanāya śabdā lokanobandhanā 
lokavyavahāranimittabhūtā9 pravartamānā9 prasiddhyaprasiddhibhyām eva 
skhaladgatitvāskhaladgatitvābhyā gaunamukhyavibhāgāpādayantītibauddhe 
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3. Figurative Meaning in the Vākyapadīya: The Third Kā a158 
 
 As indicated by its name, the Sambandha-samuddeśa, the third chapter of the 
third kā2a of the VP, looks from a variety of philosophical perspectives at the nature of 
the relation between a word and its meaning (and by implication, at the more general 
relations between language, thought, and reality). The discussion of secondary or 
figurative existence (aupacārikī-sātta) extends over kārikās 3.3.39-51,159 and is triggered 
in response to various semantic difficulties arising from the view (not to be mistaken for 
Bhartṛhari’s own) that meaning is a function of the relation between a word and the 
thing-meant as an external object.160 Such semantic difficulties arise, for instance, when 
one denotes non-existent objects (like the "rabbit’s horn") or objects that existed in the 
past or will exist in the future, since under this view they are rendered referenceless and 
therefore meaningless. More fundamentally, this view is incompatible with the 
assumption of a permanent (nitya) relation between a word and its meaning, as this 
                                                 158 Here as before, the VP kārikās are based on Ives Ramseier’s E-text, which is itself based on Rau’s 1977 edition. The Sanskrit text of Helārāja’s commentary is based on Iyer (1963). Houben (1995) supplies a complete and remarkably lucid and layered translation of the entire Sambandha-samuddeśa and Helārāja’s Prakīrṇa-prakāśa, which I use frequently in this section. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine.   159 This section follows on the heels of a preliminary discussion of various models of the word-meaning relation, with a particular focus on two generally accepted views: the first regards this relation in terms of the suitability (yogyatā) that holds between a word and the thing-meant, and explains it as analogous to the relation between a sense faculty and the object of sense (see kārikās 3.3.29-31, discussed in Houben 1995: 233-245); the second model – discussed in karikas 3.3.32-33 and ascribed by Helārāja to the Buddhists – views the relation as a causal dependence between a word and its meaning.  160 Ibid. 263-264.  
 87 
assumption cannot be maintained if the existence of one side of this relation – the thing-
meant – is said to be contingent.161  
Kārikās 3.3.42-48 consider several examples of the semantic difficulties 
generated by this view, of which we will focus on two paradigmatic cases. The first, 
presented in kārikā 3.3.42, deals with the apparent impossibility within this framework of 
explaining how negative particles are added to nominal-stems. Johannes Bronkhorst 
explains this difficulty as arising most clearly out of negative existential statements, such 
as, in his example, the claim that “Martians do not exist”; under the assumption that 
words refer to existent external objects, "martians" is rendered referenceless.162 
Helārāja’s interpretation seems to take a similar line. Using the example of the compound 
"a non-Brahmin" (a-brāhmaa), he points out that since the Brāhmaṇa cannot be 
connected with a negation,163 the expression “a-brāhmaa” cannot refer to an existing 
Brahmin. Therefore, he poses the question, “If he [the Brāhmaṇa R.T] does not exist, 
                                                 161 This point seems to have been considered by Helārāja, who states in his commentary on kārikā 3.3.39 that “For this reason even in phrases like 'the rabbit’s horn' and 'the wheel of fire,' since they are never removed from their respective meanings, the eternality (nityatā) of the relation [between word and meaning] is established.” Ity alātacakraśaśaviṣāṇādīnām api śabdānām nityam arthair viyogāt saṃbandhanityatāsiddhiḥ ׀ Iyer (1963: 150:19). It should be noted, however, that this interpretation assumes that the "permanence" (nityatā) of the relation is a function of the ontological status of its members. By contrast, Houben (1995) takes this section to be about the relation not between the word and the thing meant but between the word and the thing meant, on the one hand, and another word or word-part on the other. This is in line with his understanding of Bhartṛhari’s conception of the permanence of the relation (expressed in the VP but more prominently in his MBhD) as independent of the ontological status of its members (pp. 64-66, 260).   162 Bronkhorst 2001: 479.  163 It is unclear, however, whether this is because the Brāhmaṇa, as an existent entity, cannot be said to not-exist, as in the argument of those who take words to refer to external objects (and in the interpretation preferred by Houben’s translation, p. 380), or else because as a nominal stem (prātipadika) and regardless of its ontological status, the Brāhmaṇa is necessarily qualified by existence (bhāva) and as such cannot be qualified by non-existence, i.e. by a negative particle.  
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how can there be use of the word for those who defend the external existence of linguistic 
meaning?”164 Here again it should be emphasized that the semantic difficulty arises not 
merely because of the assumption that words refer to external objects but because of the 
further assumption that these very objects must exist not as possibilia but in actuality.  
The second major semantic difficulty addressed in these kārikās concerns verb 
forms, and particularly those that include the notion of "origination," as expressed in 
kārikā 3.3.43 in the statement that something is being born:  
Obtaining its individuality is called 'birth', and the obtainable is obtained by 
something which exists. If it exists, why should it be born? And how should 
it be born if it does not exist? (Houben 1995: 263) 
 
ātmalābhasya janmākhyā sattā labhya ca labhyate / 
yadi saj jāyate kasmād athāsaj jāyate katham // VP 3.3.43  
 
Using the example of the phrase “the sprout takes birth"165 (jāyate’'kura9), Helārāja’s 
commentary explains that while taking birth in the sense of “obtaining one's 
individuality” requires an existing agent as a pre-condition for the performance of the 
action, such an agent cannot be said to exist before the action of birth achieves its 
object.166 If the sprout already exits, it cannot be born (in the sense of coming into 
                                                  164 Iyer 1963: 153:7-154:5, and Houben 1995: 379-380; see also Houben, p. 264.   165 Houben chooses to translate the verb jāyate as “taking birth” since it maintains the semantic-syntactical elements of the expression in Sanskrit, especially the verbal suffix’s indication of an agent as the performer of the action (1995: 265).   166 The same argument is applied in kārikās 47-48 to the notion of "existence": when something is said to "exist," this is taken to mean that there is an "it" that comes in contact with existence; but in what sense can there be an "it" before it comes in contact with existence? See Ibid. 266-267.  
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existence), but if it does not exist, then there is no referent to the verbal suffix that is 
expressive of the act of taking birth.167 
The solution is presented in kārikās 3.3.39-41, where it is argued that the referents 
of words have merely secondary or figurative existence:     
When something is designated, the things denoted by words have another, 
Secondary Existence (aupacārikī or upacāra-sattā); it shows the individual 
form of all things in all phases.  
Just as an object like a crystal etc., in association with variously colored 
things that adhere to it, obtains on account of its own capacity a relation and 
seems to acquire the same color,  
Like that, the word too, being first fixed in this Existence, acquires a relation 
with properties that are contradicting and non-contradicting. (Houben 1995: 257) 
 
vyapadeśe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī / 
sarvāvasthāsu sarveām ātmarūpasya darśikā // VP 3,3.39 
spha"ikādi yathā dravya bhinnarūpair upāśrayai9 / 
svaśaktiyogāt sabandha tādrūpyeeva gacchati // VP 3,3.40  
tadvac chabdo 'pi sattāyām asyā pūrva vyavasthita9 / 
dharmair upaiti sabandham avirodhivirodhibhi9 // VP 3,3.41 
 
This secondary or figurative existence, it is claimed in subsequent kārikās (on which 
more below), underlies all forms of language usage. But what exactly is this aupacārikī-
sātta, and in what sense does it represent a solution to the linguist difficulties introduced 
above?  
There seems to be no single decisive scholarly reply to these questions. According 
to Bronkhorst, we should interpret these claims more or less literally as arguing that 
words denote their referents indirectly and figuratively.168 So, for instance, in the case of 
the sprout that "takes birth" (Bronkhorst refers instead to a pot that “comes into being”) 
                                                 167 janmānurodhād asattvābhyupagame dhātvarthe kartṛtvānupapatteḥ pratyayārthavirodhaḥ ׀ tadanurodhāt sattvābhyupagame janmalakṣaṇa dhātvarthavirodhaityarthaḥ || Iyer 1963: 154:14. Note that the problem here lies not in the lack of reference for the expression “birth” but in the referencelessness of the verbal suffix that indicates the agent (through number and tense).    168 Bronkhorst, forthcoming, p. 83.   
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the word "sprout," when taken as the agent of the action, is understood to signify the 
sprout figuratively as the future object of the completed action; a similar explanation is 
proposed in order to resolve the difficulty involved in the negation of nouns.169   
Another interpretation of aupacārikī-sātta, following Helārāja, views it as a 
provisional mental existence given to the referents of words. According to this 
interpretation, words refer not to real existents but merely to mental images. This offers a 
ready solution to the semantic difficulties at hand because expressions that appeared to be 
referenceless, such as the "rabbit’s horn," now turn out to refer to mentally constructed 
entities. In a similar manner, the semantic difficulty with respect to an unborn thing that 
"takes birth” is resolved once both the assumed agent of the action and its object are 
viewed as entities that are merely presupposed by our understanding and have only a 
mental existence (kārikās 3.3.45-46). 170 As for the problem posed by the negation of 
nouns, kārikās 3.3.40-41 present the analogy between a word and a crystal, interpreted by 
Helārāja as implying that just as a crystal may take on the color of whatever it reflects, no 
matter how divergent form its original hue, so a word, when its referent is seen to have 
only a mental existence, can stand in a relation with the semantic power of negation.171 
                                                 169 Bronkhorst does not specify how this is supposed to work in the case of negation – in what sense, for instance, is the word "martians" in the phrase "Martians do not exist" used figuratively? The apparent difficulty here lies in the fact that in Indian lore figurative usage typically also assumes the possibility of the same expression having a direct primary usage. Perhaps one way to understand Bronkhorst's argument involves assuming that “martians” is used figuratively to signify whatever phenomenon is mistaken for an agentive presence on Mars.  170See Houben 1995: 263, 265.  171 Houben presents a detailed discussion of the origin and application of the crystal analogy in pre-Bhartṛhari Sanskrit philosophical literature, but concludes that its theoretical application in kārikās 3.3.39-41 is limited (Ibid. 261-262).  
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The analogy itself, however, does not illuminate the details of the linguistic or referential 
mechanism that allows for this capacity of words, and it is only in Helārāja’s commentary 
to kārikā 3.3.42 that we find further clarification. Recall that the thing-meant, as an 
existent, cannot stand in a relation with a negation, and that according to Helārāja, this 
applies both to the thing-meant as an external object and as possessing only mental 
existence. How, then, does secondary existence enable a noun to be connected with a 
negation? Helārāja’s interpretation seems to present a shift in the understanding of what 
is entailed by such a negation: given the secondary existence assumption, negation is no 
longer understood as implying the non-existence of the object of negation, but rather 
merely its absence from the locus of reference (in accordance with the ubiquitous śāstric 
definition of figurative usage).172 So, for instance, when the expression "a-Brāhmaa” is 
used to indicate a katriya, the negation indicates that there is no existent "external" 
Brāhmaa in the locus of reference (the katriya). According to Helārāja, the negation in 
this case qualifies not an existent (the referent, whether the external or the mental 
Brāhmaa) but the assumed external Brāhmaa, which is mistakenly superimposed 
(adhyāropa) on the mentally existent one.173   
In cases of this sort, the link between secondary existence and figurative usage 
seems obvious. But what of instances of language usage said to be grounded entirely in 
secondary existence? What in that case serves us to distinguish between the 
understanding of aupacārikī-sātta as mental existence and upacāra’s sense as figurative 
usage?  
                                                 172 atadbhāve 'pi tadupacāraḥ/… NySBh_2,2.62  see chapter I page 37.   173 This interpretation, although not explicitly stated by Houben, closely follows his translation of Helārāja’s commentary to 3.3.42. See Iyer 1963: 153:7-154:5, and Houben 1995: 379-380.  
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Addressing this very concern, Houben points out that though Helārāja elsewhere 
glosses upacāra as the "superimposition" (adhyāropa) of a name on a thing, he does not 
clarify how this definition is related to the notion of a "secondary existence."174 To fill 
this gap, Houben turns to the Yogācāra175 understanding of upacāra, which may well 
have been known to Helārāja and perhaps even to Bhartṛhari.176 He presents his own 
understanding of Sthiramati’s account of upacāra in the Triśika-bhāya, which can be 
summarized as follows: words refer to external things only figuratively since these things 
are merely superimposed on the real underlying mental substratum, which is the 
transformation of consciousness (vijñānapariāma);177 and based on this, suggests that 
“there is therefore a close relationship, if not a complete identity, between upacāra and 
adhyāsa or adhyāropa.”178 
Since chapter Vof this essay is devoted to an analysis of Sthiramati’s 
understanding of upacāra in his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triśika, I will not dwell 
on this interpretation here except to note that nowhere in Sthiramati’s discussion, nor for 
                                                 174 Iyer 1963: 150:14. See Houben 1995: 258.   175 Houben uses the name Vijñānavāda indiscriminately to indicate both early Yogācāra (i.e. the Asaṅga-Vasubandhu strain of thought and the later commentaries by Sthiramati) and Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Here "Yogācāra" refers only to the former.  176 Helārāja explicitly refers in various instances to the Vijñānavāda, which for the most part he identifies with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. He also identifies particular sections as expressing Buddhist views – for instance, kārikās 3.3.32-33, which suggest a model according to which a word and its meaning are bound by a causal relation. Houben 1995: 246-247.   177 Houben leaves open the question of whether this mental substratum, being the transformation of consciousness, can be regarded as the primary meaning of the word. Below I argue that a primary referent as the ultimate sign, would be conceived by the Yogācāra mostly in terms of a causal process (and not necessarily as a mental substrate). See chapter V, part 2.    178 Houben 1995: 259 & n. 411.  
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that matter anywhere in the writings of the other Yogācāra thinkers discussed in this 
work, is upacāra glossed either as adhyāsa or as adhyāropa (although the latter term is 
used by Sthiramati in the Triśika-bhāya to refer to the superimposition of an object on 
the transformation of consciousness). Moreover, as I will argue in the subsequent 
chapters, early Yogācāra thinkers and their commentators understood the (figurative) 
referential relation described above primarily in causal terms,179 with both a word and the 
thing-meant regarded as different products of a recursive causal chain of mental activity. 
On the face of it, this would appear to be quite different from the classical understanding 
of adhyāsa or adhyāropa as a mistaken "projection" of one disengaged element onto 
another (for instance, the superimposition of the snake onto the rope, often expressed by 
the seventh nominal case ending).180 Thus, it is doubtful whether Yogācāra thought is 
indeed the source of the identification of upacāra with superimposition, although this of 
course does not exclude the possibility of an exchange of ideas between this school of 
thought and that of Bhartṛhari and his later interpreters, nor does it diminish the appeal of 
Houben’s suggestion that such an exchange may shed light on Helārāja’s understanding 
of the figurative aspect of aupacārikī-sātta.     
                                                 179 Helārāja, as I've said, identifies the model that assumes a causal relation between word and meaning as that of the Buddhists (see ft. 176). Houben contends that of all the Buddhist schools known to Bhartṛhari this model can most convincingly be ascribed to the Vijñānavāda, though he notes that “so far we have not found an explicit discussion in Vijñānavāda texts of the relation between word and thing-meant as a causal relation” (Ibid. 246). In subsequent chapters I hope to show that this indeed is how Sthiramati, and to some extent also Asaṅga, understood referential relations. Ibid. 258-259.  180 This also seems to be the way in which adhyāropa is understood in the vṛtti to 2.255 (see part 2.1.1 of this chapter) dealing with artha-upacāra: “[In figurative usage] a superimposition (adhyāropa) is done of a form [of one object] on a different object…" rūpāntarādhyāropas tu arthāntare kriyate ׀׀  Iyer (1983: 256).  
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On this same matter Houben also mentions what he sees as an important 
difference between the Yogācāra and Bhartṛhari’s treatment of upacāra. According to 
him, while the former engages upacāra in the context of denying the existence of 
external objects, the latter uses it only as a means to clarify the function of ordinary 
language in the face of particular semantic puzzles, and with no metaphysical 
undertones.181 In support of this claim, Houben stresses the perspectival character of this 
engagement with upacāra when considered in the context of the entire third kāṇḍa: other 
chapters of this treatise, he points out, address similar referential issues and semantic 
problems but from different perspectives, thus resulting in altogether different 
solutions.182 Seen against this backdrop, the sambandha-samuddeśa’s discussion of 
aupacārikī-sātta emerges not as a conclusive account of the function of language but as 
one of several possible perspectives, which grow out of particular semantic difficulties 
and embody a set of presuppositions about language and reality that is far from 
universally binding. 
But how are we to square this interpretation, emphasizing the provisional and 
perspectival nature of the secondary-existence claim, with the concluding passage of this 
section (kārikās 3.3.49-51), which clearly asserts that secondary existence is all-
encompassing and underlies all language usage without exception? The passage reads as 
follows: 
Therefore, [that Existence] which does not contradict different properties that 
contradict [one another], which is resorted to by all kinds of words in order 
to present things as contradictory, 
Which has no temporal distinction, but is present in objects that belong to 
                                                 181 Houben 1995: 259, 263.  182 Ibid. 260-261, 272. See also Bronkhorst 2001: 479-480.  
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different times, which is for all words the cause of their use [pravtti-nimitta. R.T] 
and which is Secondary, 
That [Secondary] Existence, indeed, not a single word meaning goes beyond 
it. And it has been shown to be different from Direct Existence in the 
Mahābhāṣya. (Houben 1995: 268) 
 
tasmād bhinneu dharmeu virodhiv avirodhinīm / 
virodhikhyāpanāyaiva śabdais tais tair upāśritām // VP 3.3.49  
abhinnakālām artheu bhinnakālev avasthitām / 
pravttihetu sarveā śabdānām aupacārikīm // VP 3.3.50 
etā sattā padārtho hi na kaś cid ativartate / 
sā ca sapratisattāyā9 pthag bhāye nidarśitā // VP 3.3.51 
 
These summarizing kārikās indicate that it is the secondary/figurative existence of the 
referents of all words that allows them to stand in a relation with negative particles, to 
refer either to non-existent referents or to referents that existed in the past or will come to 
be in the future.183 This secondary existence of the thing-meant is said to encompass all 
language usage – perhaps since all language usage inevitably falls under one of the cases 
stated above – and therefore “not a single word meaning goes beyond it.” Thus, while the 
scope of this claim is not incompatible with Houben’s appeal to Bhartṛhari’s 
perspectivism,184 nonetheless it does suggest that the secondary-existence claim has 
broad philosophical implications and importance, far beyond those of an ad hoc solution 
to local semantic problems. The claim that all words figuratively signify referents that 
exist only in the mind embodies a radical critique of the realist correspondence theory of 
                                                 183 Houben 1995: 268-269.  184 That is because it can be understood to be given either from an emic point of view, as aiming to give a definite and complete account of meaning, or from an etic point of view, according to which it is revealed to be one among many possible explanations, shaped by a particular set of presuppositions and aimed at solving a distinct set of semantic problems.    
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truth (without necessarily succumbing to metaphysical idealism),185 and as such, 
emphasizes the hermetic nature of language and its inability to truly reach reality.186 Seen 
in this light, the secondary-existence claim can be interpreted as a general argument about 
the limits of language, while Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism, accordingly, may be regarded as 
an argument that demonstrates not just "the limits to formal analysis of meaning,” as 
proposed by Kelly, but also, more fundamentally, the absence of an exclusive, definite 
account of the relation between language and reality.187  
 A further important question stemming from the all-encompassing scope of the 
secondary-existence claim concerns the status of ordinary language and especially the 
distinction between primary and secondary signification evident in everyday discourse. If 
                                                 185 It can be understood as a kind of a linguist variant of  an ‘epistemic idealism,’ in which while language and its structures of meaning are constructs, this does not entail either the non existence of some kind of objective reality or its being only in the mind.    186  An introductory remark by Helārāja to 3.3.40 seems close in spirit to this claim: it emphasizes that all phenomena are necessarily mediated and constrained by language, which is established in secondary existence: “So in the case of language usage (vyavahāra) which is overflowing (pūrita) with this [secondary] existence, if one [still] assumes another [direct] existence on the grounds of its practical efficacy, etc., [or] for some [other] insignificant (‘saw-dust’ like, kāṣṭhabusaprāyeṇa) reason – let this [direct primary] existence [of his] thrive, we don’t mind. [That direct existence], however, has no involvement with language usage. If at all, that [direct existence] is applied in language use [only] when it is reflected through [secondary] existence." …evaṃ cānyaiva sattayā pūrite vyavahāre yadyarthakriyākaraṇādinā kāṣṭhabusaprāyeṇa kenacinnabandhanenānyasattā kalpyate tadvardhatāṃ sā, na tatra cintāsmākaṃ vyavahāre tu tasyā nāstyanupraveśaḥ, yadi paramasyāmeva sā pratibiṃbitā vyavahiyata … Iyer 1963: 151:6-8.   187  An interpretation along this line appears to be suggested by Saroja Bhate (1994: 71-73), who sees the discussion of aupacārikī-sātta as the culmination of an argument that runs through the VP regarding the inability of language to describe ultimate reality – a topic that is openly treated in the final section of the sambandha-samuddeśa (kārikās 3.352-88). Houben, although sympathetic to this view as implied in the VP (see the introduction to this chapter), emphasizes a distinction between the section on aupacārikī-sātta, which he reads as given solely from the point of view of ordinary language and everyday reality, and the concluding section of the sambandha-samuddeśa, clearly given form the point of view of ultimate reality (1995: 261, 273).     
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all words denote referents that have secondary existence, what, if anything, could 
constitute the primary referent of a word? And if there is no such referent – if all 
language usage is figurative – how is the distinction between primary and secondary 
meaning to be maintained?  
In kārikā 3.3.51, Bhartṛhari mentions the Mahābhāya’s view of secondary 
existence, pointing out that it is differentiated there from present or direct existence 
(saprati-sattā). Houben’s translation and analysis of the pertinent Mahābhāya sections 
indicates this "direct existence" as qualifying presently existent referents (as opposed to 
past or future ones),188 and claims that in light of this, “for Bhartṛhari, while his theory of 
Secondary Existence applies to all words, it is suggested […] that a word meaning may 
have Primary or Direct Existence in addition to Secondary Existence.”189 This 
interpretation, however, seems to depend for its plausibility on restricting, if not entirely 
forgoing, the all-encompassing scope of the claim of secondary existence. One way to 
settle this apparent conflict would be to interpret the all-encompassing claim not as 
descriptive of the case de-facto but as stipulating that all words have the potential to be 
based on secondary existence (insofar as they may signify past or future referents, etc.). 
Houben does not develop this point, seeming to leave it undetermined: on the one hand, 
he is doubtful whether Bhartṛhari’s explicit view of secondary existence as all-pervading 
indeed lines up with what the Mahābhāya had in mind, while on the other he claims we 
                                                 188 Probably the Mahābhāṣya on 5.2.94. See Houben 1995: 269-272.    189 Ibid. 259: n. 411.   
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should not be tempted by this discrepancy to overrate either the scope or the metaphysical 
implications of Bhartṛhari’s claim.190  
It is possible, however, to suggest another explanation, one that would allow us to 
accept the all-encompassing scope of secondary existence without reservation 
(specifically, without assuming a primary referent), while also maintaining the distinction 
evident in ordinary language between primary and secondary meaning. This requires us 
to go beyond the perspective of the sambandha-samuddeśa and reintroduce, as an 
alternative but complementary perspective, the understanding of figurative meaning in 
the second kā2a. Methodological justification for this juxtaposition of two kā2as 
whose emphasis is decidedly dissimilar may be found in the fact that the implicit 
understanding of figurative usage in both kā2as, although put to different ends, is 
similarly presented in terms of an absence (of the referent from its locus of reference).  
In the sambandha-samuddeśa section – assuming that it indeed argues for a pan-
figurative view of all language usage – this absence means that all the referents of words 
are in fact independent of whatever external entities they stand for. Under this premise, 
there is neither theoretical need nor possibility to assume a primary meaning as the 
outcome of a relation between a word and an existent.191 Hence the assumption of 
secondary-figurative meaning is seen here as a necessary condition for the very 
meaningfulness of ordinary language (given, of course, a referential theory of 
meaning).192  
                                                 190 Ibid. 271-272.   191 In view of this interpretation, the word "pṛthak"' as used in 3.3.51 is understood to mean not "different" but rather "separate," implying that here secondary existence and direct existence operate on different realms.   
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The second kā2a's engagement with figurative meaning, on the other hand, is not 
concerned with the enabling conditions of meaningful discourse so much as with the 
epistemic factors that determine meaning and its status. Whereas the sambandha-
samuddeśa takes the absence of a referent from the locus of reference as a permanent 
feature of all language usage, in the second kā2a sections it is understood to be 
contingent – determined pragmatically within the context of a particular language usage, 
and again, independently of the substantivist ontological status of the referents of words.  
Despite their differences, these perspectives are compatible insofar as both 
present theories of meaning that are at once referential and constructed as an alternative 
to a realist theory of meaning (and to its reliance on a correspondence theory of truth). 
Where the second kā2a shows this account of meaning to be epistemologically possible, 
the third kā2a shows it to be semantically necessary for the meaningfulness of 
language.193 Moreover, when considered jointly, these two perspectives can be seen as 
                                                 193 I find some support for this conclusion, as well as for the joining of the views of secondary meaning presented in the second and third kāṇḍas, in the following passage by Matilal, delivered as a general description of Bhartṛhari’s thought without reference to any particular section of the VP : “I believe this to be Bhartṛhari’s own view, which may be stated as follows… The objects meant are assumed by the realist to constitute the external objects or the ‘furniture’ of the external world. But Bhartṛhari nowhere explicitly argues for this position although he mentions it as one of the standard views. He is not a realist in this sense. For him the object meant is what is grasped by the speaker’s awareness. So it is the item that figures in his awareness. Our activities, which may be prompted by language, deal with external realities, a cow or a horse, but language does not mean or signify them. They are nevertheless understood at the utterance of a word because otherwise our activities will not be possible. Being asked for food we cannot very well present the speaker’s ‘mental’ food! But nevertheless linguistic signification refers to a separate realm.” Matilal 1990: 129. According to Matilal, then, while language is not meaningful via its relation to external objects, nonetheless a world-word correspondence is maintained through the mediation of practical necessities. It should be noted that this analysis does not exclude the possibility of viewing language and phenomena as two independently existent and yet mysteriously corresponding realms. My analysis of the second kāṇḍa, however, has demonstrated the way in which both ordinary language and "external phenomena" are constituted by the same practical framework without assuming the precedence of either one, at least from the point of view of every day experience (whereas from the ultimate point of view, language may be understood to constitute the underlying reality). 
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forming a single two-tiered account of ordinary language, which allows for the bridging 
of the gap between its enabling conditions and its usage. For, according to the joint 
account which includes both perspectives, while any expression, insofar as it is 
meaningful, must necessarily be figurative (in the sense presented in the sambandha-
samuddeśa), it may also (as shown in the second kā2a) be determined to be either 
figurative or primary in the everyday sense of these terms, depending on its usage and the 
epistemic context in which it is applied.  
To recap: I have argued that, when taken together, these two perspectives on 
figurative meaning may provide us with an explanation of the operation of ordinary 
language – both in terms of its enabling conditions and the specifics of its usage – and 
that this explanation is independent of realist or substantivist ontological considerations. 
While this need not amount to idealism, it can be seen as a sweeping argument about the 
limits of language, emphasizing its autonomy, on the one hand, and its closed self-
referential nature, on the other. These points are central to our reading of the chapters on 
the Yogācāra understanding of upacāra – a discussion that grows out of the similar need 
to account not just for the practical value of discourse (always easy for the Buddhists) but 
also for its meaningfulness (far more tricky) in the absence of an external objective 
grounding for language. As we will see below, while the early Yogācāra thinkers also 
made use of a two-tiered account of language in which figurative meaning plays a 
prominent role, the school's staunch non-realism did not allow it to give common practice 
the same epistemic position (as constituting both language and phenomena) that it was 
accorded in the second kā2a. Instead, different strategies and solutions, both dialectical 





AsaEga on Upacāras in the Tattvārthapa"alam of the Bodhisattvabhūmi 
 and in the Viniścayasagrahaī. 
 
1. Introduction   
 The Tattvārthapa"ala (TApa") – the Chapter on the Meaning of Reality194 – 
consists of the fourth chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BBh),195 and along with its 
commentarial sections in the Viniścayasagrahī (VS)196 offers a highly sophisticated 
philosophical account of the relation between language and reality, or more precisely, of 
the way language obscures reality. Both texts, which form part of the vast 
Yogācārabhūmi (YB) corpus traditionally ascribed to AsaEga,197 are extremely rich in 
                                                 194 The title, of course, admits of more than one translation. Janice Willis (1979) proposes “Knowledge of Reality,” arguing that in the text artha is often synonymous with jñāna; Dan Lusthaus (forthcoming, 109), emphasizing the linguistic engagement of this chapter, translates it as “The Chapter on Objects and Meanings.” The TApaṭ philosophical and hermeneutical method of arguing on various levels of discourse simultaneously may suggest that these multiple meanings of the title are not just viable but also intentional. I have therefore chosen to render “artha” as the rather ambiguous “meaning.”  195 Dutt 1978: 1-282, and TD. 4037 sems tsam, wi 1a1-213a7, of which the Tattvārtha chapter consists Ibid. (1978: 25-40), and TD. 4037 20b4-32a1. I am using the following edition: Derge T. (199–?). Bstan ’Gyur Sde Dge’i Par Ma: Commentaries on the Buddha’s Word by Indian Masters (Electronic Edn, 11 Cds). [Reproduced from Editions of the Individual Sections Published in Delhi at the Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1986, Itself a Reproduction from Prints from the 18th Century Sde-Dge Blocks]. (213 Vols.).   196 TD. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 1a1-zi 127a4. Only fragments of the VS have survived in Sanskrit; for a list of these, see Kritzer 2005: xiv: n.5.    197 According to Chinese sources, the Yogācārabhūmi was authored by Maitreya, who then transmitted it to Asaṅga. Ibid. xvii. According to Tibetan sources, it was composed by Asaṅga after Maitreya was revealed to him. For an account of Asaṅga’s life according to Tibetan sources, see Thurman 1984: 28-30. Below I address the question of the authorship of the YB in light of contemporary scholarship.  
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references to upacāra, most notably in a set of arguments designed to demonstrate the 
inexpressibility of reality through the use of reasoning (yukti).198  
A systematic study and translation of the TApa" was published by Janice Willis, 
who has also translated a portion of the VS commentary in her PhD dissertation.199 
Impressively lucid, Wills’ translation nonetheless does not attend to the specialized 
meaning of upacāra, which she translates as “attaching (designations)” or “attributing,” 
thereby leaving out of view much of the linguist philosophical context – both Buddhist 
and non-Buddhist – of AsaEga’s arguments. Moreover, her selective translation of the VS 
does not include the section on the five categories (pañca dharmās, vastūni), which 
comments on the upacāra related passages from the TApa".200 In the current chapter, 
therefore, I present an analysis of upacāras that is based on my own re-translation of the 
relevant passages from the TApa", as well as of the accompanying passages from the VS, 
which have, to the best of my knowledge, not before been translated into English. I argue 
that both texts, while engaging with non-Buddhist theories of meaning, present a unique 
Buddhist understanding of the philosophical role of figurative language. In this respect, 
although the TApa" and VS arguments do not amount to an elaborate pan-metaphorical 
claim of the sort presented in Sthiramati’s Triśikabhāya (see chapter V), they 
nonetheless anticipate and lay the foundation for the subsequent Yogācāra understanding 
of upacāra. I will return to these claims after first considering, below, the place of the 
                                                 198 BBh: Dutt 1978: 30. TD 4037 25a.3-25b3. VS: TD 4038 11b2- 13a5.  199 Willis 1976: 185-257, and Willis 1979.  200 Willis has translated the VS sections from the Peking Tanjur edition 5539, sems tsam 'i 19b6-29b, which correspond to folios 18b-26a of the Derge edition; the passages that are a direct commentary on the upacāra related sections in the TApaṭ comprise folios 11b-14b of the Derge edition.  
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TApa" in the YB textual corpus, its authorship, central ideas, and textual relation to the 
VS. 
1.1 The authorship and dating of the Tattvārtha chapter of the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi and its relation to the Viniścayasagrahaī.  
 
    The YB comprises five subsections: the Maulī-bhūmi201 (consisting of seventeen 
parts, the most extensive of which are the BBh and the Śrāvakabhūmi), the VS, the 
Vivaraasagrahaī, the Prāyayasagrahaī, and the Vastusagrahaī.202 The fact that 
the VS systematically discusses the topics and arguments raised in the Maulī-bhūmi 
section, often in the same order, has encouraged scholars both traditional and modern to 
view it as commentarial.203 This view is often coupled with the assumption that both texts 
are the work of a single author or compiler – namely, AsaEga. Contemporary scholars 
associated with this view include Willis and the late Alex Wayman, both of whom have 
taken the VS to be contemporaneous with the BBh and to be aimed, as implied by its title, 
at the examination and clarification of theoretical difficulties in the latter.204   
The notion of a linear commentarial relation between the two texts is challenged 
by the possibility that the YB was not the work of a single author or compiler. This option 
is advocated most notably by Lambert Schmithausen, who, in a long series of influential 
essays published over the span of more than three decades beginning in the early 
                                                 201 The title of this collection of texts appears in a Sanskrit fragment of the VS. See Schmithausen 2000: 245.   202 This subdivision is given, for instance, by Bu-ston. See Rin-chen-grub 1931: 55-6, cited in Willis 1979: 47.  203 Robert Kritzer (2005: xiv) points out that the VS is in fact not a complete commentary of the Maulī-bhūmi, as the extant Tibetan and Chinese versions make no reference to the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi (the fourteenth part of the Maulī-bhūmi).  204 See Wayman 1989: 201-3, and Willis 1979: 3-4, 48: n.8).  
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nineteen-seventies, has pointed to the doctrinal stratification of the YB as indication that it 
is a work of compilation, probably over a long period of time.205  
This view also called for a revision of what had by then become the customary 
ordering of Yogācāra texts. While scholarly narratives of the school’s textual and 
doctrinal development varied in many respects, all seemed to revolve around one 
relatively stable point of reference: the composition of the Sadhinirmocanasūtra (SNS), 
which, alongside the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, was usually considered to be the oldest 
distinctly Yogācāra scripture.206 As against this strand of thought, Schmithausen, relying 
on a philological analysis of the YB, has argued that the compilation of the Maulī-bhūmi 
actually preceded the SNS (and ipso facto also the much later VS) and marks the first 
appearance of the Yogācāra notion of the storehouse consciousness (Ālayavijñāna). 207 
This view clearly carries implications for one's understanding of the VS commentarial 
intent and context, for insofar as the VS is taken to have been composed later than the 
                                                 205 Schmithausen 1987: 1.6.5.-1.6.7, 8.1.1-3). This view was also asserted by Aramaki 2000: 39: n. 2, cited in Kritzer 2005: xvii-xviii.  206 Etienne Lamotte dates the SNS to around the second century CE, noting that it refers to the Perfection of Wisdom Scriptures and hence cannot be older than the earliest of these (1935: 25). John Powers (1993) has argued that any attempt to date the SNS must account for the fact that it is quoted in the treatises ascribed to Vasubandhu and Asaṅga; for its citation in the VS; and for the dating to 514 CE of its first known translations into Chinese by Gunabhadra (443-45) and by Bodhiruci. He therefore concludes that the sūtra existed in its present form sometime before the end of the third century CE (pp. 4-6).   207 Schmithausen 1987: 1.6.1-4, 2.2-3. Schmithausen does admit some exceptions in the form of instances in which the Maulī-bhūmi seems to presuppose the SNS, but he takes these to be later interpolations of what he considers to be a rather stratified text. A similar argument is deployed to explain how it may be that the VS, in which the SNS is quoted at length and in the order of its chapters, also contains a textual core that seems to pre-date the SNS . Ibid. 1.6.7: n.132, and Schmithausen 2000: 246.  
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BBh and by a different author, it must be assumed to have been open to the influence of 
later doctrinal developments.     
Schmithausen's account is further complicated by two recent studies that have 
redefined the context of the YB and the range of its inter-textual interaction. The first is 
Robert Kritzer’s “Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhumi: Yogācāra Elements in the 
Abhidharmakośabhāya,” discussed in chapter IV, part 1, which presents overwhelming 
textual evidence that Vasubandhu’s AKBh reflects a close knowledge of many sections of 
the YB (including from the BBh and especially from the VS).  Kritzer’s thesis thus implies 
that the composition or compilation of both the VS and BBh took place no later than the 
end of the fourth century CE, the presumed date of the AKBh.208  
The second work is Hartmut Buescher’s The Inception of Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda. 
Buescher adopts Schmithausen’s chronological ordering of the Yogācāra texts but argues 
for a different narrative of the school’s doctrinal development. Like Schmithausen, 
Buescher takes the Maulī-bhūmi (in which the BBh is included) to precede the SNS and 
VS, but unlike him, he argues that the SNS and not the Maulī-bhūmi is the origin of the 
notion of the storehouse consciousness and other distinct Yogācāra features, which are 
present later also in the VS. Buescher’s thesis is discussed in greater detail below, but for 
present purposes it suffices to note that, in his scheme, the BBh and the VS are seen not 
merely as removed in time and authorship, but as representing two distinct phases of 
doctrinal development. Seen against this background, the commentarial activity of the VS 
seems to be construed as something more along the lines of re-interpretation than mere 
explication or clarification (as it was treated by Wayman or Willis).   
                                                 208 For a discussion of the dating of the AKBh and Vasubandhu, see chapter IV, part 1.    
 106 
Shaping as they do the interpretive framework with which one approaches the 
texts, these diverse accounts of the authorship and chronology of the BBh and VS have 
far-reaching implications for the analysis and understanding of the texts. In order to 
delineate these implications, and as a broad introduction to the central ideas of the TApa" 
and VS, the following section presents a more elaborate analysis of Buescher and Willis’ 
diverging understandings of the TApa", as representatives of the two main contrasting 
interpretive approaches to the text. Both studies, it is argued, similarly understand the 
TApa" as reacting to the Madhyamaka’s notion of emptiness and as offering a re-phrasing 
of the “middle way” (madhyamā-pratipat) by examining the relation between things 
(dharma, vastu) and designations (prajñapti); but whereas Buescher treats the BBh in 
isolation from what he considers to be later doctrinal developments in the VS, Willis, 
holding them to be contemporaneous texts, regards them as complementing each other. 
These differences result in incompatible accounts of what is entailed by the key terms 
vastu and prajñapti and by their relations.   
 
1.2 Vastu and prajñapti in the TApa-: Buescher’s interpretation. 
   
The term vastu has a broad range of meanings in Indian śāstric lore, but in the 
Buddhist early Yogācāra literature, and in the BBh in particular, it is used rather 
consistently to denote the objective end of the act of cognition. According to Dan 
Lusthaus, however, this typically refers not to the phenomenal object but to its ineffable 
ontological ground, the basis for experience which is nonetheless inaccessible to it:   
Vastu is one of the many Sanskrit words usually translated as 'object,' and 
its semantic spread covers everything from 'thing' to 'substratum of a perception.' 
Its precise meaning must be determined within specific contexts, but in general 
vastu implies that the object has an ontological status not fully reducible to the 
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role it plays in cognition, and that in fact the vastu itself may not be fully 
disclosed in cognition, raising issues similar to those connected with Kant's notion 
of a noumenon or an in-itself. More than any other Sanskrit term for object, vastu 
implies a mysterious ontological existence belonging to the object beyond what 
appears in cognition. (Lusthaus 2002: 226)  
 
A similar understanding of the vastu’s ontological status appears in Buescher’s 
account of the TApa" as part of his broader thesis regarding the textual and doctrinal 
origins of the Yogācāra. Briefly, Buescher argues that the SNS and not the Maulī-bhūmi 
is the earliest source of the essential features of what he terms the “Yogācāra-
Vijñānavāda” ontological stance. Among these features he lists the doctrine of the Three 
Natures (svabhāvatraya), the “Representation-only” claim (vijñaptimātratā), and the idea 
of “storehouse consciousness” (ālayavijñāna).  
This thesis is defended in the face of two central opposing views. The first, which 
Buescher calls the “La'kāvatāra Theory,” traces the central features of the Yogācāra-
Vijñānavāda to the early stages of the La'kāvatārasūtra (LAS).209 The second is 
Schmithausen's “Ālayavijñāna Theory,” set forth in his seminal essay Ālayavijñāna: On 
the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, 
where he argues that the notion of the storehouse consciousness was first introduced in 
the basic section (Maūli-Bhūmi) of the YB in order to solve a particular theoretical 
                                                 209 Buescher mentions Christian Lindtner as the main proponent of this thesis, according to which some Yogācāra notions appear already in the Acintyastava and the Bodhicittavivaraṇa ascribed to Nāgārjuna (second century CE) and hence could only originate in an Ur-version of the LAS, predating the SNS (which Buescher dates to the middle of the third century CE). Buescher counters this thesis, inter alia, by denying Nāgārjuna’s alleged authorship of these two texts, thereby undermining the claim that they necessarily predate the SNS. For his arguments against the “Laṅkāvatāra Theory,” see Buescher 2008: 24, 33-4, 40. For his dating of the SNS, see Ibid. 4, 16-19.  
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difficulty – namely, the ability to resume cognitive activity following the “attainment of 
cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti). 210  
Buescher's rebuttal of this view is extensive and includes the production of both 
doctrinal and philological evidence in support of his own thesis,211 but for our current 
interest the most salient feature of his account lies in the fact that it presupposes a view of 
textual and philosophical development as driven chiefly by the need to resolve theoretical 
aporias. This view is exemplified in his proposal to regard the conception of the 
storehouse consciousness and other features of the “Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda” in the SNS 
as the school’s response to a philosophical impasse. The schools’ need to settle the view 
of the ultimate as an ontological basis for phenomenal reality, on the one hand, with the 
Madhyamaka’s notion of emptiness on the other, but to do so without recourse to 
Abhidharma ontological realism, compelled it, Buescher suggests, to contrive new 
theoretical tools.212  
Buescher’s narrative of a gradual theoretical development of the Yogācāra-
Vijñānavāda is followed by a corresponding chronological ordering of the school’s 
textual corpus. In this, as I have said, he generally follows Schmithausen’s scheme, in 
                                                 210 Schmithausen 1987: 2.2-3.   211 In a recent review of Buescher’s essay, Mario D’Amato (2009) claimed that while Buescher’s arguments for the primacy of the SNS as the origin of formulated Yogācāra thought “are not unconvincing,” the fact that the term ālayavijñāna never explicitly appears in the SNS (the term used there, as Buescher himself indicates, is ādānavijñāna, “appropriating consciousness”) does indeed cast doubt on the coherence of identifying the latter text as the term’s origin.  More fundamentally, D’Amato questions the importance of the question of the origins of the Yogācāra in light of the fact that Buescher's conclusions – asserting the notion of the storehouse consciousness to be part of a new theoretical model of reality – are already, on philosophical and interpretive grounds and regardless of the question of origin, the common view.  212 Buescher 2008: 62, 169-70.  
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which the Maulī-bhūmi precedes both the SNS and the VS. Within this scheme, however, 
the TApa" is understood to represent an earlier and distinctly different theoretical stage, 
whose aporias may have triggered the later theoretical developments of the SNS.213  
This framework influences Buescher’s interpretation of the message of the TApa" 
in two important ways. First, it allows him to understand it in isolation from the 
commentarial sections presented in the VS. Second, it appears to justify a view of the text 
as a form of work in progress, inclining Buescher toward an emphasis on argumentative 
loose ends and open questions (often at the expense of a more charitable reading of the 
text that is attuned to possible solutions implicit in it).  
Consider, for instance, Buescher's interpretation of the TApa"'s attempt to 
reconfigure the notion of emptiness and the idea of a “middle realization” (madhyamā-
pratipat).214  The issue is presented in a section that Buescher asserts, rather 
convincingly, to be “the first Mahāyāna critique against the Madhyamaka.” 215 Therein, 
the latter is depicted as “denying” (apavadamāno) any ultimate ontological foundation 
(vastu), and as asserting that “all is purely designation alone” (prajñaptimātram eva).216 
This position is criticized by the Yogācāra via the argument that the existence of the 
vastu is assumed because it is a necessary determinant or basis of verbal designations 
                                                 213 Ibid. 170.   214 Buescher renders this “the hermeneutical mid realization,” understanding it to be a specific term used by the tradition to indicate a correct interpretive approach to scriptural assertions about emptiness (Ibid. 176).   215 The evidence he provides in support of this claim includes Bhāvya’s presentation of the Yogācāra critique of the Madhyamaka in the fifth chapter of his Madhyamakahṛdaya (kārikās 82-3), which seems to re-state the critique presented in the TApaṭ. Ibid.(174-5,n 3). See also Lindtner 2001: 67.  216 Dutt 1978: 31, 5ff.   
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(prajñaptivāda-nimitta-adhi"hānam) without which their existence and function cannot 
be explained. Designations, the TApa" seems to argue here, must always be “of 
something,” and denying the reality of their basis – the vastu – necessarily entails the 
denial of their own existence, which in turn amounts to nihilism.217  
If this is indeed, as Buescher claims, the first critique to be brought against the 
Madhyamaka from within the Mahāyāna, then it is not a very forceful one. It is founded, 
as the Madhyamaka would have surely pointed out, on the assumption that referential 
relations necessarily require referents to be real – i.e., that they presume, as the basis for 
designations, the existence of an underlying ontological structure; but it is precisely this 
assumption that the Madhyamaka’s account of the self-referential nature of language 
rejects. A critique of anti-realism, this indicates more broadly, if it is to have force, 
cannot be based on arguments from common-sense, whose very denial is what anti-
realism stands for.218  
Thus, interpreting the TApa" arguments as Buescher does leaves the text wanting 
from a philosophical perspective – promoting a foundationalist understanding of 
emptiness that can be supported only by means of a misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation of the Madhyamaka position. This, of course,  is of a piece with 
Buescher's view of the TApa" as representing the problematic starting point rather than 
the culmination of a theoretical journey; but it is not the only way of construing this 
argument, as will be evidenced by Willis’ interpretation presented in the next section.         
                                                 217 Buescher 2008: 174-5.   218 A realist could, however, hypothetically argue that anti-realism manifests a practical contradiction, since its language usage, knowledge claims, and actions reaffirm a realist world view (this kind of argument is famously presented by the realist opponent in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvarttaṇī, and is recounted in the VS discussed below). But the Yogācārin cannot succumb to this kind of realism.   
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Buescher, having dealt with the issue of “denying” (apavadamāna) in the TApa", 
proceeds to argue against the other mistaken extreme view of "superimposing" 
(samāropa). This view, he claims, should be understood as an erroneous conflation of the 
true existent, the vastu – in his words, “the ‘Thing-in-itself’…the [pure] ‘something-
being-present" – with the phenomenal object as it appears in “sensory experiences.”219 
According to Buescher, the TApa" notion of the vastu as existent but not phenomenally is 
made compatible with emptiness via the TApa" assertion that the latter is logically tenable 
only when "something" exists that can be void of something else.220 Emptiness, in light of 
this, is seen as indicating not merely an absence but also a presence – the inexpressible 
reality of the vastu empty of duality and conceptual construction.221  
                                                 219 Buescher 2008: 176, with regard to Dutt 1978: 30, 28ff. Buescher's terminology here is overtly Kantian and he indeed repeatedly points out what he considers to be structural similarities between the TApaṭ ontological model and the Kantian program. The vastu, as a basis for designation that is itself ineffable, is regarded as akin to Kant's Thing-in-itself (Ding an sich): constituting experience without being an actual object of experience. Buescher does, however, take care to clarify the overt differences form the Kantian scheme – for instance, that the Yogācāra’s soteriological horizons allow for the possibility of direct but non-discursive knowledge of the vastu, as "suchness" (Ibid. 193, 195-7).  220 kathaṁ punar durgṛhītā bhavati śūnyatā| yaḥ kaścic chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā tac ca necchati yena śūnyam| tad api necchati yat śūnyam| iyam evaṁ rūpā durgṛhītā śūnyatety ucyate| tatkasya hetoḥ| yena hi śūnyaṁ tadasadbhāvāt| yac ca śūnyaṁ tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyeta| sarvābhāvāc ca kutra kiṁ kena śūnyaṁ bhaviṣyati| na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā yujyate| tasmād evaṁ durgṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati| kathañ ca punaḥ sugṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati| yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati| yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṁ bhavati tatsad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti| iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir yathābhūtā aviparītā…. (Dutt 1978: 32, 6ff). Buescher (2008: 190) views this definition of emptiness as a forerunner of the one presented in the SNS VIII.31. 221 Buescher 2008: 190, with regard to the following: kathañc ca punaḥ sugṛhītā śūnyatā bhavati… tad yathā rūpādisaṁjñake yathā nirdiṣṭe vastuni rūpam ityevam ādiprajñaptivādātmako dharmo nāsti| atas tadrūpādisaṁjñakaṁ vastu tena rūpam ityevamādiprajñaptivādātmanā śūnyam| kiṁ punas tatra rūpādisaṁjñake vastunayavaśiṣṭam| yaduta tad eva rūpam ityevamādiprajñaptivādāśrayaḥ| tac cobhayaṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti yad uta vastamātrañ ca vidyamānaṁ vastamātre ca prajñaptimātraṁ na cāsadbhūtaṁ samāropayati| na bhūtamapavadate nādhikaṁ karoti na nyūnīkaroti notkṣipati na pratikṣipati| yathābhūtañ ca tathatāṁ nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatāṁ yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti|…. (Dutt 1978: 32, 12,15f).   
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This way of understanding the ontological model of the TApa" raises two main 
theoretical difficulties, which Beuscher sees, as I have said, as triggering later theoretical 
developments of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda. According to him, the first aporia revolves 
around the apparent dissonance between the depiction of the vastu as an existent set apart 
from imputations, on the one hand, and its description, on the other, in purely epistemic 
terms (for instance as inexpressible, nirabhilāpya, or as manifested as non-dual, 
advayaprabhāvita, etc).222 According to Buescher, this difficulty is addressed only later – 
first by the SNS identification of vijñaptimātratā223  with vastumātra, and later on by 
Vasubandhu’s assertion that the distinction between vastu and prajñapti is itself a product 
of discursive thought.224  
The second aporia consists in the fact that while the vastu is said to serve as the 
ontological “basis” for imputational designations, the TApa" nowhere explicates the 
nature of this relation. Buescher notes the lack of such an explanation with regard, for 
instance, to the relation between the vastu and vikalpa, citing the following TApa" 
paragraph (here produced in his translation):  
And this, concisely [said], then turns out to be a binary modus: 
                                                 222 Buescher 2008: 191.  223 Which he renders as: “[the] state of being all cognitively constituted.”  224 Buescher 2008: 191, 196-97. He refers to verse 20 of Vasubandhu’s Triṃśika: “yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate /parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate // (Lévi 1925: 14, v.20), which he translates: “By whatsoever representation, whatsoever 'something-being-present' (vastu) is representationally constructed, that is one of an Imaginatively Constructed Nature only — it is not truly found” (Buescher 2008: 200). Lusthaus is less decisive about the precise meaning of this verse: “It is unclear from Vasubandhu's verse whether he means that vastu is nothing but the consequence of 'imaginative-rationalizing construction' (parikalpita) or whether imaginative construction is 'superimposed' upon actual vastus. Different traditions have used this ambiguity to import their own answers….” (2002: 313: n. 66). TheVS, as is demonstrated below, seems to emphasize that the vastu – insofar as it is conceptualized, as a category – is the product of vikalpa.  
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notional construction and, serving both as the foundation for 
constructions and as the noematic reference point in constructions, 
the something-being-present (vastu). And this pair, then, should be 
understood as mutually motivating each other since beginningless time.  
(Buescher 2008: 175) 
 
tac caitad dvayaY bhavati samāsata9 vikalpaś ca vikalpādhi"hānaY 
vikalpālambanañ ca vastu| tac caitad ubhayam anādikālikaY cānyonyahetukañ 
ca veditavyam. (Dutt 1978: 36:5f) 
 
Upon which he comments:   
  
With respect to the process of constructing empirical reality, TApat conceives 
both vikalpa (notional construction) and vastu (mātra) as ontological conditions, 
whereby the latter serves as the basis (adhithāna) for, and the reference point 
(ālambana) of, vikalpa. And while both those ontological conditions are 
coincident with time itself (which is difficult to trace back to its beginning), they 
do so in a relationship of mutually motivating each other.  
(Buescher 2008: 198: n.2) 
 
Note that despite the obvious causal interconnectedness and mutual dependence 
between vastu and vikalpa exemplified by the use of the term “anyonyahetuka,” 
Buescher maintains a strict hierarchy between the two, regarding vastu as the ontological 
basis and primary reference point for vikalpa. But he concedes that this relation remains 
inexplicable in the TApa". Only in later treatises, he argues, is it accounted for as a 
“purely psychical affair” between the subliminal storehouse consciousness and the 
derivative functional consciousness (pravttivijñāna).225  
It is possible, of course, that Buescher is correct in his assessment that the TApa" 
represents an early Yogācāra stage in which the school had not yet developed the 
theoretical apparatus required to fully explicate the vastu-vikalpa relationship. The result 
of this historical assumption, however, is a philological interpretation that is not attuned 
to the distinctly Buddhist tendency to privilege causal explanations. In this respect, 
                                                 225 Buescher 2008: 198: n. 2.  
 114 
Buescher's interpretation renders the TApa" notion of vikalpa more akin to a ŚaEkara’s 
understanding of adhyāsa, according to which the unreal phenomenal is merely an 
obscuration of the ultimate, the two having no causal interaction whatsoever.  
According to Buescher, the closest that the TApa" comes to explicating the 
relations between the vastu and vikalpa is in saying that, while the former is distinct from 
the latter insofar as it is not a conceptually constructed object of perception, it can 
nonetheless be figuratively designated as such an object (for instance, by attributing to it 
materiality, etc):226  
The very mode of a binarily conceived ontology (vastumātra & vikalpa; Ding an 
sich & Begriff) entails a separateness between the something-being-present and a 
consciousness perceiving it. Though each one implies the other, they are different 
from each other. The vastu(matra) is not something that has been constituted by 
consciousness: when consciousness functions 
relatively in terms of ordinary cognitive processes, it is not manifest 
(aparinipanna),227 because consciousness constitutes entities (bhāva), something 
the vastu is not. However, from the point of ultimate reality, vastu has no 
form (na rūpī paramārthasatyatayā), but it is of inexpressible nature and 
therefore not non-existent (nābhāva9) — which again makes it possible that on 
the conventional level (savtisatya) some form gets metaphorically attributed to 
it (rūpopacāra).... (Buescher 2008: 199)  
                                                 226 He is referring to the following passage: viśeṣaprajñaptyeṣaṇāgataṁ yathābhūtaparijñānaṁ katamat| yataś ca bodhisattvo viśeṣaprajñaptau prajñaptimātratāṁ paryeṣya tasmin rūpādisaṁjñake vastuni viśeṣaprajñaptim advayārthena paśyati| na tad vastu bhāvo nābhāvaḥ| abhilāpyenātmanā 'pariniṣpannatvān na bhāvaḥ| na punar abhāvo nirabhilāpyenātmanā vyavasthitatvāt| evaṁ na rūpī paramārthasatyatayā| nārūpī saṁvṛtisatyena tatra rūpopacāratayā|… Dutt 1978: 37:12ff. Translated by Willis: “What is the knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated designations for particularity? It is that knowing whereby the bodhisattva, after having investigated the designations for particularity as designations only attached to the given things called 'form,' etc., sees designations for particularity as having a not-two meaning. The given thing is neither completely present nor completely absent [neither existent nor nonexistent]. It is not present, since it is not 'perfected' (pariniṣpannatva), owing to its having an expressible 'self.' And it is not altogether absent, since in fact it is determined to have an inexpressible essence. Thus from the stance of absolute truth (paramārthasatya), it is not formed (rūpī), yet from the stance of relative truth (saṃvṛtisatya) it is not formless, since form is attributed to it” (1979: 137-138).  227 Here Bueshcer avoids translating the term in the specialized sense given it by the three natures scheme (since, in keeping with his thesis, he considers its usage to predate this scheme). Still, even in this context the term seems closer to exprssising something that is not-completed rather than not-manifest.  
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This connection of indirect signification, he emphasizes, does not indicate any 
real causal interaction between the vastu and upacāras. Here too, with respect to the 
understanding of upacāra, he describes an evolutionary narrative of theoretical 
development: while the TApa" does admit vastu as the basis for upacāras, this is still far 
from the manner in which later “Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda” texts (here he likely refers to the 
Triśikabhāya) identify this basis with consciousness (vijñāna):    
[H]ere in the Tattvārthapa"ala, it is still vastu that is meant to be the basis for 
upacāra — hence the basis for the change from the Thing-in-itself to the Thing-
as-it-appears. And there was yet a theoretical distance, as a considerable historical 
space of reflecting the problem, to be bridged until vijñāna itself was recognized 
as constituting the very basis for upacāra in the sense of being not only the agent 
of metaphorizing reality, but also the locus upon which metaphorical attributions 
(upacāra) occurred; vijñāna itself being conceived as the dynamic 
phenomenological, and sole ontological, foundation of cognitive constitutions…. 
(Buescher 2008: 199) 
 
To sum up, according to Buescher’s interpretation, in the TApa" the Vastu serves 
as the ontological yet inexpressible basis for imputations – a role whose exact 
machinations remain inexplicable in the text. This lacuna, he suggests, may be the 
motivation for later theoretical developments that address it by introducing the notion of 
the storehouse consciousness, the Three Natures scheme, and the “representation-only” 
claim. These ideas are seen as bridging the gap between the ultimate existent and its 
phenomenal manifestations, between the ontological and the epistemic. As I have argued, 
this interpretation depicts the TApa" as philosophically deficient, since it is understood to 
be promoting an ontological model it can neither defend nor properly explain. Moreover, 
it appears that some form of circular hermeneutical logic binds together this interpretation 
of the TApa" and Buescher’s overall narrative of the Yogācāra theoretical development: 
the broader narrative serves to legitimize an inquiry of the TApa" independently from the 
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VS or other Yogācāra texts, and the resulting interpretation yields, as we have seen, the 
inevitable aporias that, in turn, reinforce the already established narrative.  
Insofar as it is a feature of any act of interpretation, this movement back and forth 
between text and context, amounting to their simultaneous construction, does not 
undermine Buescher’s interpretive force or the meticulousness of his philological and 
doctrinal analysis. It does, however, serve as a reminder that his analysis is the upshot, 
ultimately, not of "philological facts" but of a pre-conceived interpretive framework, and, 
as such, reflects its presuppositions.   
 
 
1.3 Vastu and prajñapti in the TApa-: Willis’ interpretation. 
 
In her study of the TApa", Willis is informed by a set of assumptions altogether 
different from Buescher's concerning the authorship of the text and its place within the 
Yogācāra corpus. To begin with, Willis works within the confines of the traditional 
ascription of both the TApa" and the VS to AsaEga, treating the latter text as a direct 
contemporaneous commentary on the former. This allows her rather freely to rely in her 
interpretation of the text on the Three Natures scheme, not mentioned in the TApa" but 
highly visible in the VS. In this respect, she seems to view the two texts as representing 
complementary perspectives on the same reality (tattva), with the TApa" focused on an 
explication of this reality in terms of the relations between things and their designations, 
and the VS reframing these relations in terms of the Three Natures scheme.228 The 
outcome is an understanding of the TApa" ontological model that differs radically from 
Buescher's. Specifically, as I will demonstrate below, Willis understands AsaEga to be 
                                                 228 Willis' study and translation of the VS focuses solely on the section dealing with the Three Natures (TD. 4038, sems tsam, zi 18b1-27a7). Willis 1976: 216-257.   
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using the  term “vastu” dialectically, its sense varying according to context so that at 
times it is seen as designating an inexpressible existent, and at others a constructed 
category, the product of vikalpa.  
Willis’ interpretation of the TApa" is presented in the context of her broader 
argument against viewing the Yogācāra as advancing metaphysical or ontological 
idealism – a topic of ongoing scholarly controversy. On the one side of this debate are 
scholars who maintain that the Yogācāra arguments do aim to establish a kind of 
subjective or metaphysical Idealism, by which nothing exits outside of the perceiving 
consciousness.229 On the other are those who question the adequacy of ascribing to the 
Yogācāra any "idealistic" ontological claims, instead interpreting the school as offering a 
variant of epistemic idealism that neither denies the existence of an external world nor 
collapses it into consciousness. This latter approach suggests that the Yogācāra claims are 
best understood as altogether bracketing ontology and operating strictly within an 
epistemological and phenomenological discourse.230  
                                                 229 This sort of interpretation of the Yogācāra ideas, according to which reality is considered to be merely a fluctuating non-dual stream of mental events, can be found in the early translations and interpretations of La Vallée Poussin (1928), and in D.T Suzuki's study of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra  (1930). Contemporary scholars who have embraced such an interpretation include Matilal (1974), Garfield (2002), Griffiths (1986), Hopkins (1999 & 2002), and Wood (1991).   230 Early works featuring this pioneering interpretation include Wayman (1965) and Ueda (1967), followed by Willis (1979), Kochumuttom (1982), Kalupahana (1987), Lusthaus (2002), and Gold (2006). In attempting to unpack the idea of "epistemic idealism" it may be useful to recall Kant’s distinction between Berkeley’s "dogmatic idealism" and his own "transcendental idealism." According to Kant, Berkeley’s dogmatism is revealed in the fact that he infers the non-existence of a material external world from the impossibility of conceiving of space as separate from the conceiving spirit. Kant, of course, supported the opposite conclusion: that Berkeley’s argument in fact demonstrates how the forms of sensibility are subjective conditions for our knowledge and necessarily assert the existence of something that is external and independent of consciousness. See Kant 1996: 288-290. For a discussion and appraisal of this controversy concerning the Yogācāra idealism, see King 1994, Garfield 2002: 155-159, Trivedi 2005, and Tzohar 2010.  
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Willis’ position, which was far from consensual at the time of its publication, may 
be aligned with the latter approach, since her fundamental claim is that the seemingly 
idealistic pronouncements of the Yogācāra should not be understood as describing 
ultimate realty but rather as expressing the school’s interest in the ways in which the 
mind actively constructs a false picture of reality. For Willis, however, the view that the 
Yogācāra claims regarding the activity of consciousness are to be understood largely in 
epistemic terms does not entail that the school has no ontological commitments 
whatsoever. Indeed, at the heart of the TApat arguments Willis traces a notion of 
emptiness that is not merely negational. Combined with the scheme of the Three Natures, 
this amounts to what appears to be an interpretation of the Yogācāra as absolutist, even if 
minimally so.  
Not unlike Buescher, Willis sees the correct elucidation of emptiness as one of the 
main aims of AsaEga’s TApa" 231 But whereas he holds that the TApa" indiscriminately 
identifies those who are “denying” (apavadamāna) with the Madhyamaka, she does not. 
In her reading, the TApa" identifies apavadamāna with a mistaken nihilistic interpretation 
of the Madhyamaka’s notion of emptiness, which it aims to set right. Here Willis 
conceives of AsaEga, much like subsequent Tibetan interpretations, not as breaking away 
from the Madhyamaka’s notion of emptiness but rather as seeking to buttress and defend 
it against misinterpretation; as trying, that is, to clarify a hermeneutical point rather than 
present a sectarian debate.  
Willis proceeds to support this view by appealing to the Three Natures scheme 
whose function here she describes as an “insulation against nihilism.” This insulation is 
                                                                                                                                                  231 Willis 1979: 15-17, 107-8.   
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achieved by using the scheme to supplement the model of the two truths (seen as parallel, 
respectively, to the Imagined and Perfected natures) with a third interim category of the 
Dependent nature. Here the Dependent, understood as a realm of relative existence 
devoid of any essential nature (svabhāva), is nonetheless obscured by the false duality of 
grasper-grasped that is the mark of the non-existent Imagined nature.232 When freed from 
these dual constructions, the Dependent appears as the ultimate and ineffable Perfected 
nature (parinipanna). Within this framework, emptiness is understood, not unlike in 
Buescher's reading, as both an absence (of self-nature) and a presence – though the 
presence, in this case, is of an inter-dependent ineffable realm.233 
Having thus neutralized or at least bracketed the view of the Yogācāra as 
presenting metaphysical Idealism, Willis' interpretation of the TApa" understanding of 
emptiness appears to bring it quite close to that of the Madhyamaka, their differences 
now involving choice of method more than the fundamentals of a worldview. Both 
schools, from her perspective, interpret emptiness above all as the absence of intrinsic 
nature and therefore as interdependence. To this extent they fundamentally agree, even if 
the PrāsaEgika Madhyamaka is metaphysically parsimonious while AsaEga, guarding 
against nihilism, is obliged to be more explicit and identify this interdependency as an 
existent and inexpressible reality.  
                                                 232 Ibid. 18, 116.  233 Willis relies in this analysis on Thurman’s presentation of the SNS explication of the Three Natures scheme: "When all things are said to be empty of intrinsic substance, this only applies to them in their mentally constructed nature – they continue to exist as relative things, and their ineffable relativity devoid of conceptual differentiation is their absolute nature…." Thurman 1978: 27, cited in Willis 1979: 18.      
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Within this framework, the vastu comes to be understood differently in different 
argumentative contexts (in stark contrast to Buescher's fixed interpretation of the term). 
At times it appears as the vastu-as-object, i.e., the objective sensory pole of experience, 
distinctly identified as such by experience. This does not refer to an inexpressible 
ontological existent, but to whatever ontic content is given by the experience of objects. 
On other occasions it is identified with the Dependent nature and, as such, serves as both 
the ontological underlying reality and the causal basis for imputations (which are, in turn, 
classified as the Imagined nature).234 
This oscillation between two meanings of "vastu" recurs throughout the passages 
of the TApa" and VS as interpreted and translated by Willis. For instance, while in some 
passages the vastu is equated with suchness,235 elsewhere it is said to stand in a relation 
of mutual dependence with the designations (which is incompatible with its alleged 
ontological and logical priority over the designation),  rendering it merely a phenomenal, 
                                                 234  These two senses of the vastu are found, for instance, in the following two definitions supplied by Willis in her study of the TApaṭ: “…Vastu in this context refers, as the Tibetan equivalent dngos po suggests, to any perceivable or tangible object of experience. The closest approximation to vastu used in this sense is the ordinary English term ‘thing.’ It is translated here as ‘given thing’ because there is also the idea of its being a specific thing ‘at hand’ or 'in the mind,' i.e., available for ostensive definition, at least to oneself, as Asaṅga’s closing statement to the section indicates: ‘This is this, and not any other’” (1979: 72); and, in contrast, a glossary definition: “Vastu (dngos po): The given thing at hand. The object upon which cognitive attention is focused. Any perceivable entity serving as a base for cognition/imputation. Proper understanding of this term is essential for correct comprehension of Asaṅga's entire explication. Translated here as the 'given thing,' vastu is properly the base of imputation. On to this base, various names are attached (as well as aberrant judgments and other forms of mental imputation, such as the assertion of ‘externality’). In accordance with Asaṅga’s three nature theory, the vastu is the key representative of the paratantra (i.e., dependency) nature. While the naming process is considered totally imaginary (parikalpita nature), being false, aberrant, and imparting no truth, nevertheless imputation occurs only in relation to some base of imputation (i.e., a vastu) which must exist in some way (even if that mode of existence is imperfect). Correct understanding of both the nature of imputation and of the base of imputation yields insight which is, according to Asaṅga’s terminology, ‘perfected,’ i.e. pariniṣpanna” (Ibid. 190).   235 Ibid. 91, 107, 136, etc.  
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constructed thing.236 Willis' interpretation of the TApat passage on the relations between 
the vastu and vikalpa perhaps best exemplifies this latter understanding of the vastu, and 
is telling of the broader differences between her own reading of the text and Buescher's 
(whose interpretation of this same passage was discussed above).The immediate context 
here is a discussion of eight kinds of conceptual discrimination (vikalpa), of which this 
passage considers one in particular  – the “discrimination of what is neither agreeable nor 
disagreeable (priyāpriyavikalpa)":  
What is discursive thought which is contrary to both the agreeable and 
disagreeable? It is that discursive thought which has as its mental support a given 
thing [vastu. R.T] which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant, neither captivating nor 
revolting to the mind. And this whole process is composed of two elements only: 
discursive thought, and the given thing, which then becomes the mental support of 
discursive thought and the foundation of discursive thought. It should be 
understood that these two are mutually caused (anyonya-hetuka) and without 
beginning in time. A previous discursive thought is the cause which generates a 
present given thing which, in turn, becomes the mental support of discursive 
thought. And again, the generated given thing which is the present mental support 
for discursive thought is the cause which generates the future discursive thought 
having that as its mental support. (Willis 1979: 131)  
 
…priyāpriyobhayaviparīto vikalpa9 katama9| ya9 śubhāśubha-
manāpāmanāpatadubhayavivarjitavastvālambano vikalpa9| taccaitad dvayaY 
bhavati samāsata9 vikalpaśca vikalpādhi"hānaY vikalpālambanañca vastu| 
taccaitadubhayamanādikālikaY cānyonyahetukañca veditavyam| pūrvako 
vikalpa9 pratyutpannasya vikalpālambanasya vastuna9 prādurbhāvāya 
pratyutpannaY punarvikalpālambanaY vastu prādurbhūtaY pratyutpannasya 
tadālambanasya [vikalpasya] prādurbhāvāya hetu9| tatraitarhi 
vikalpasyāparijñānamāyatyāY tadālambanasya vastuna9 prādurbhāvāya| 
tatsaYbhāvācca punarniyataY tadadhi"hānasyāpi tadāśritasya vikalpasya 
prādurbhāvo bhavati| (Dutt 1978: 36: 3-11)  
  
 In contrast to Buescher’s translation, here the term “anyonyahetuka” is 
decisively understood as a recursive causal process in which both the vastu and vikalpa 
are mutually dependent – an understanding, that is, which denies the former any 
                                                 236 Ibid. 111-12, 131, etc. In theVS : Ibid. 1976: 272-273.    
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ontological priority.237 Willis is clear in pointing out that here vikalpa is interchangeable 
with “name” or “designation,” taking this claim to imply a dependency between the 
vastu-as-object and the designation.238 The vastu, therefore, in this case, is not taken to be 
a real existent but rather one side of a dual and erroneous distinction between things and 
their names; and this, in turn, makes way for the claim that the Bodhisattva’s proper 
understanding of vikalpa leads to the simultaneous dissolution of both discursive thought 
and the vastu. 239   
Thus, Willis’ interpretation takes the vastu to be operating as a “basis” 
(adhi"hāna) for designations in two different senses. The first construes it as an 
interdependent and ineffable underlying reality, which serves as both the causal basis for 
the Imagined nature and the locus upon which the latter is imputed. The second 
understands the vastu as the phenomenal objective pole, the referent of designations 
(which in fact is linked to designations by a relationship of mutual dependence).240  
This scheme has some important implications for the understanding of the 
relations between language and reality as presented in the TApa". Both Buescher and 
                                                 237 Willis does not say explicitly what is entailed by the vastu's role as the “foundation” (ādhiṣṭhānaṃ, “basis” in Buescher terms) or “mental support” (ālambana, “reference point” in Buescher terms) for vikalpa, but viewing their relation as either causal or referential is compatible with her overall presentation of the vastu.    238 This dependency shows the vastu's and the designation's lack of self-nature, but also serves as an “insulation” against the negation of the existence of either one of the elements. Willis 1979: 112.  239 Ibid. 132.  240 To some extent, this double sense of "vastu" is already presupposed by Willis’ identification of it as the Dependent, which is, by definition, conceived dialectically. Seen from the conventional point of view, the identity of the Dependent as such is recognizable only insofar as it stands in relation to the Imagined. From the ultimate perspective, once it is free from the Imagined it can no longer be conceived as the Dependent, and is recognized as the ineffable Perfected.  
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Willis point out that although the TApa" criticizes a correspondence theory of truth, 
language is nonetheless seen in the text to be somehow related to, or based upon, the 
vastu as a true existent. But while Buescher argues that the nature of this relation remains 
inexplicable in the TApa", Willis’ characterization of the vastu as the Dependent allows it 
to be seen as the causal basis underlying imagined phenomena.   
Despite some points of similarity, then, Willis and Buescher's interpretive 
frameworks are incompatible – primarily because Willis interprets the TApa" with the 
help of the Three Natures doctrine, which according to Buescher was unavailable at the 
time of its composition. Buescher’s interpretation is constrained by a particular history of 
ideas, whereas Willis’ is guided by a concern to maximize coherence and meaningfulness 
within the confines of the traditional interpretation of the Yogācāra as adhering to several 
core doctrines and texts. While her interpretive choices lead her to find in the TApa" a 
rather cohesive and finalized philosophical worldview, Buescher’s emphasis on its 
antinomies and loose ends yields a diachronic conception of the text as episodic and 
incomplete – merely a snapshot of a single moment in the school’s evolving stream of 
thought.  
There is something to be said for both approaches. Within an intertextual 
framework, as I have suggested earlier, the diachronic perspective functions as a 
necessary safeguard against anachronism and an a-historical, essentializing approach to 
the realm of ideas. A complementing synchronic interpretive approach, however, seems 
not only justifiable but also capable, potentially, of supplying valuable insight on the 
fundamental presuppositions and tropes of this realm. In light of this, the following 
sections will appeal to both perspectives in the process of attempting a close reading of 
the TApa" and those VS arguments relating to the understanding of upacāra. Working 
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broadly within the boundaries of the diachronic framework laid out by Schmithausen and 
Buescher, I attempt as far as possible to engage with the BBh and VS as autonomous 
enteties, viewing the latter not merely as commenting on the former but as advancing an 
independent argument.241 This approach is complemented, however, by a view of both 
texts as situated within and hence in conversation with the broader context of Indian 
śāstric Sanskritic theories of meaning. Thus, I attempt to offer a philosophical 
reconstruction of this conversation between the TApa" and VS and their possible 
interlocutors, who are often un-named, arguing that it is not merely a plausible context 
but a necessary one for the proper understanding of their claims. This reconstruction is 
guided, and to some extent also justified, by an interpretive principle of charity,242 
checked by the awareness that an argument's coherence and consistency is not also a 
guarantee of the adequacy of interpretation.243 
 
                                                 241 I adopt the same approach with respect to the question of the authorship of these texts, but for the sake of convenience, since both texts are argumentative and constructed as a polemical exchange, I refer henceforth to the siddhāntin-Yogācārin’s stance as that of Asaṅga.   242   That is, maximizing the extent to which we attribute coherence and internal consistency to a given argument by opting, as a starting point, for the interpretation that would render it most plausible. This entails adopting a Gadamerian call for hermeneutical self questioning, one that involves, as emphasized by Dan Arnold, taking the apparent weaknesses of an argument, at least at first, to be the mark of one's own failure of understanding (2005: 7-9). Arnold argues for the application of this principle of charity, as a measure of sound interpretive procedure, in the reconstruction of Indian philosophy. His own essay sets a prime example of the employment of this principle, applied here to the outlining and reconstruction of the epistemic conversation between the Buddhist (both Pramāṇikās and Madhyamakās) and the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā around the second half of the first millennium C.E. The benefits of this approach are particularly visible in his interpretation of Candrakīrti as presenting a transcendental argument compatible with a realist conception of truth – an unorthodox yet convincing interpretation, compelling in the possibilities it offers to re-think the presuppositions of Indian epistemology.   243 See Skinner 1969: 39.   
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2.  The Upacāra-Related Arguments in the TApa- and VS: An Outline  
 
Before venturing into a close reading of the TApa" and the VS sections dealing 
with upacāra, an outline of their argumentation will serve to lay before us in broad 
strokes what is an intricate and at times confusingly elliptical philosophical venture. 
AsaEga’s engagement with upacāra appears, as I have said, in a set of arguments 
designed to demonstrate through reasoning (yukti) the inexpressibility of the true 
essential nature of reality (svabhāvatā).244 But how can one reason coherently that 
something is beyond the grasp of language? AsaEga’s solution is ingeniously simple: the 
inexpressibility of the ultimate essential nature will be demonstrated by pointing out the 
utter incoherence of any expressible essential nature. AsaEga is not concerned here with a 
discussion of the ontological status of an ultimate essential nature (which he takes to be 
the object of "noble wisdom") but rather with the epistemic question of its accessibility to 
conceptual knowledge. Because this sort of knowledge is attainable only within the 
framework of an essentialist theory of reference, by which meaning is given through 
some form of correspondence between a designation, an object, and its essence, AsaEga 
proceeds to posit the contours of such a theory (very much along the lines of non-
Buddhist theories of meaning prevalent in his time) – with the sole intention of showing 
it to be incoherent. In brief, the theory he considers holds that a thing (vastu, dharma) “Is 
found to be as it is expressed,” implying that designations and the designated object 
correspond insofar as they stand in some relation to an essential nature. So defined, this 
correspondence is necessarily invariable and – importantly – monosemic: for if a thing 
can have only one essence, it can correspond to only one designation. This sort of scheme 
                                                 244 Irrespective of the controversy regarding Asaṅga’s authorship of the TApaṭ and the VS, for the sake of convenience and since both texts are polemical by nature, I address the the Siddhāntin as “Asaṅga” and the proponent of the pūrvapakṣa as “the opponent.” 
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presupposes that words have the ability to be in contact with and truly reveal the 
underlying ontological reality, which ability, in turn, is seen as a criterion for their 
meaningfulness.  
In order to refute this theory AsaEga then scrutinizes all the possible logical 
relations between these three elements (the thing, the designation, and an essential 
nature), showing each in its turn to be incoherent. The scenarios that concern him here 
are not of possible linguistic relations between these elements (qualification, inherence, 
etc.) but of their possible relations of logical priority, since that which has priority is 
thought to be the "locus" of the essential nature and the channel through which it is 
manifested and apprehended. This manifestation and apprehension is seen, in turn, as a 
necessary condition for determining the identity of both object and designation, and 
therefore for meaning.   
In the TApa" these various possible relations are described and then refuted by 
means of three arguments addressed at three distinct scenarios: (1) that the essential 
nature is determined and apprehended equally through the designation and the thing 
(henceforth "the first argument" or "the argument from polysemy"); (2) that it is 
apprehended and determined through the designation alone (the "second argument"); and 
(3) through the thing alone (the "third argument").245  The VS rearranges these three 
arguments in a slightly more systematic order and adds a forth possible relation, namely, 
                                                 245 Willis takes both the first and second arguments to be given “from the point of view of the designation” (in the sense that it is seen as imparting the essential nature) and the third as given “from the point of view of the object” (seen as imparting the essential nature) (1979: 105-6). From the analysis of the TApaṭ and VS  presented below it seems more plausible that the thing or the designation, rather than serving as the origin of the essential nature (for  which I could not find any evidence in the text), serve as its “locus,” and as such are epistemically and logically prior rather than ontologically prior.   
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that the essential nature is apprehended and determined neither by the thing nor by the 
designation but by something altogether different (the "fourth argument").  
The first scenario, which assumes that the thing and its designation are constituted 
by a shared essential nature, is refuted in the TApa" by introducing the possibility of a 
polysemy of figures – a circumstance in which various metaphors, upacāras, denote the 
same object. AsaEga argues that if this possibility is admitted, the presuppositions of an 
essentialist theory of reference lead to absurd consequences such as the existence of a 
single object with multiple essences. AsaEga’s choice to appeal not just to any polysemy 
but to one that is based on the use of upacāras is not obvious and indeed prima facie 
seems to render his argument more vulnerable. In particular, this choice exposes him to 
the sort of criticism that may be leveled by an essentialist understanding of figurative 
signification, such as that held by the Mīmāṃsā school and by the early Nyāya. 
According to this critique, which I reconstruct below in greater detail, the faults of 
AsaEga’s argument from polysemy are manifested in its inconsistency: assuming, on the 
one hand, a distinction between literal and figurative meaning, while at the same time in 
effect deflating this distinction by rendering their differences inconsequential to the 
overall determination of meaning. An essentialist qua Mīmāṃsā account of figurative 
meaning, by contrast, shows this distinction to be not merely compatible with but 
grounded in a monosemic one-word-one-essence relation. Thus, since the theory can 
account for the possibility of multiple figures denoting a single thing, AsaEga’s argument 
from polysemy is said to be ineffective.   
Responding to this challenge, the TApa" second and third arguments (and the 
additional fourth argument in the VS) refute the possibility that the essential nature is 
imparted either by the designation, by the thing, or independently of both, thereby 
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undermining altogether the essentialist theory of meaning. This has important 
implications for the TApa" understanding of indirect signification. The arguments for the 
untenabllity of an essentialist-ontological grounding for meaning serve to show that, for 
AsaEga, the distinction between primary and secondary meaning is neither the outcome 
nor a representation of an underlying referential-metaphysical structure but is merely 
determined by convention. Thus, for AsaEga, we cannot speak of a metaphorical meaning 
"above and beyond" ordinary language usage, since both are equally conventional. While 
this falls short of a full blown pan-metaphorical claim of the kind presented later on by 
Sthiramati in the Triśika-bhāya (discussed in chapter V), it can certainly be said to lay 
the foundations for this view by establishing the sameness of primary and secondary 
meaning with respect to their reference.  
  The VS, which reiterates and further develops the general line of argumentation 
in the TApa", offers additional important insight into the relation between language and 
reality. Most notably, the VS arguments explicitly reframe the relation between the word, 
the thing, and an essential nature in terms of their dependence, and deny at the outset that 
either the designation or the thing has logical or epistemic priority.246 So described, the 
essentialist theory of reference, with its grounding in what amounts to a relation of 
logical interdependence, translates into a theory of meaning that seems close to the 
Mīmāṃsā notion of an originary (autpattika) relation between the word and the thing-
meant. This similarly highlights the fallacy inherent in the essentialist theory of meaning, 
which I describe below as the result of joining two incompatible assumptions: on the one 
hand, that designations and their referents are interdependent, and on the other, that either 
                                                 246 Or, spelled out in the counterpositive (pratiyoga): that neither the thing nor its designation is logically or epistemically prior.  
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the designation or its referent is the locus of an independently existent and self-reliant 
essence (and therefore is logically prior).   
Next, the VS sheds light on the role of upacāras within philosophical discourse. 
This is achieved through a recounting of the argument from polysemy, elucidated through 
the magic show analogy – a ubiquitous figure in Yogācāra texts, which appears as a 
leitmotif throughout the VS arguments. In this variant of the analogy, a magician creates 
an illusory being that is transformed into various creatures (likened to the multiplicity of 
upacāras). Through the lens of this analogy, the argument from polysemy is seen as 
demonstrating above all the referential interchangeability of figures as a means of 
undermining a monosemic world-word correspondence. Within this framework, upacāras 
are conceived not just as content carriers (that is, as informative) but also as performative 
– actively manifesting through their proliferation the groundlessness of language.   
Finally, the VS refutes also the fallback position of taking the essential nature 
merely to "reveal" or “illuminate” the designation. This argument is developed into a 
more comprehensive negation of a "correspondence theory of meaning,"247 which then 
gives rise to a series of objections by the opponent (both the objections and AsaEga’s 
responses will be shown to recall similar exchanges in early Madhyamaka texts). The 
opponent sees AsaEga as guilty of the skeptic’s fallacy and questions the very coherence 
and legitimacy of AsaEga’s use of language, since the content of his claims challenges 
the very assumptions that enable their meaningful expression (this critique is addressed in 
particular to his "inexpressibility" claim). AsaEga’s reply points out that while a world-
word correspondence can be efficacious at the conventional level, it reflects nothing but 
                                                 247 Henceforth I use this neologism to indicate an essentialist theory of meaning based on a correspondence thery of truth.    
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the machinations of discursive thought (vikalpa), hence the meaningfulness of language 
is not taken to be a criterion for its adequacy. Within this framework, his own assertions 
(and by extension those of philosophical discourse in general) are understood to be 
efficacious insofar as they have informative value (making known a certain possible state 
of affairs but without reifying it) and more importantly because of their performative 
value (by actively engaging in self-negation they delineate their own limits and the 
possibility of the ineffable).  
 
3. The Upacāra-Related Arguments in the TApa- and VS: A Close Reading  
 
3.1 Demonstrating the inexpressibility of an essential nature in the TApa-: 
some preliminary distinctions. 
 
AsaEga begins by pointing out the general program of his argument, i.e. the claim 
of the inexpressibility of the true nature of all things and the reasoning that will support 
this claim:   
If one may ask, by means of what reasoning is the inexpressible essential reality 
(svabhāvatā) 248 of all dharmās 249 to be known?  [it is as follows:] Whatever 
designation for the intrinsic identities (svalakaa) of things, such as 'matter,' 
'sensation,' [and all the other aggregates] as mentioned before, up to 'Nirvāa,' – it 
should be understood as designation only (prajñaptimātram). It is not the essential 
nature (svabhāva, ngo bo nyid) [of these things] and there is no other object of 
speech or a sphere [of an engagement of] speech which is excluded from that.250 
                                                 248 Sometimes also translated as “ultimate essential nature.”    249 Often translated as “phenomena,” though this fails to capture the meaning of the term as referring to a class of things both phenomenal and numenal.     250 Willis writes concerning the translation of this passage and the referent of the word “that” (tat): “Here ‘that’ may be seen as applying equally and simultaneously to 'designation' and to 'essential nature,' such that the passage may be rendered (first tad), 'designations are not equivalent to the essential nature of dharmas,' and (second tad), 'essential nature is not the sphere of speech nor the object of speech.' The ambiguity may well be intentional here, emphasizing – from both directions – the absence of essential nature in/through designations” (1979: 102). While the second rendering is compatible with what follows in 
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That being the case, the essential nature of things is not found to be as it is 
expressed; however, neither is nothing found at all. 251  
[But if] it is absent (avidyamāna9) yet not entirely absent, then how [exactly] is 
it? It is found as the abandoning252 of reification (samāropa) of that which does 
not exist,253 and as the abandoning of the complete repudiation (apavāda) of that 
which exists. Moreover, that ultimate intrinsic nature (pāramārthika9 svabhāva9) 
of all dharmās should be understood as solely the sphere of non-discursive 
intuitive wisdom (jñāna).  
 
tatra kayā yuktyā nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatā sarvadharmāāY pratyavagantavyā| 
yeyaY svalakaaprajñaptir dharmāāY yaduta rūpam iti vā vedaneti vā 
pūrvavadantato yāvan nirvāam iti vā prajñaptimātram eva tad veditavyam| na 
svabhāvo nāpi ca tad vinirmuktas tad anyo vāggocaro vāgaviaya9| evaY sati na 
svabhāvo dharmāāY tathā vidyate yathābhilapyate| na ca puna9 sarvea 
sarvaY na vidyate| sa punar evam avidyamāno na ca sarvea sarvam 
avidyamāna9| kathaY vidyate| asadbhūtasamāropāsaYgrāhavivarjitaś ca 
bhūtāpavādāsaYgrāhavivarjitaś ca vidyate| sa puna9 pāramārthika9 svabhāva9 




                                                                                                                                                 the next paragraph of the text, I find the Tibetan to be helpful in this case, taking “designation” (‘dogs pa) as the only referent of "that."    251 Here I join Wills’ choice of the less ontologically committed expression “not found” for avidyate, and “absent” for avidyamānaḥ (yod par mi 'gyur). Ibid.100-1.   252 Following the translation of the compound asaṁgrāha-vivarjita into Tibetan as legs par ma zin pa spangs pa.   253 asadbhūta. The Tibetan translation reads: “which does not exist with an intrinsic identity” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa ma yin pa). TD. 4037 wi 25a1.  254 / de la rigs pa gang gis chos thams cad brjod du med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par rig par ji ltar khong du chud par bya zhe na/  chos rnams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid du 'dogs pa 'di lta ste/ gzugs zhes bya ba 'am/ tshor ba zhes bya ba 'am/  'du shes zhes bya ba 'am/ 'du byed rnams zhes bya ba 'am/ rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba nas/  snga ma bzhin du tha na mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya ba'i bar gang yin pa de ni btags pa tsam du zad par rig par bya ste| ngo bo nyid kyang ma yin la/ de las ma gtogs pa dang de las gud na yang ngag gi spyod yul dang ngag gi yul med do// de ltar na chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid ni ji ltar brjod pa de bzhin du yod par mi 'gyur la/ thams cad kyi thams cad du med pa yang ma yin no/  de de ltar yod pa / yang ma yin la/  thams cad kyi thams cad du med pa yang ma yin na/ ji ltar yod ce na/  rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa ma yin pa la sgro btags pa'i legs par ma zin pa spangs pa dang/ yang dag pa la skur ba btab pa'i legs par ma zin pa spangs pa yod do /  chos thams cad kyi don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid de yang rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kho na'i spyod yul ma yin par rig par bya'o/ TD. 4037 sems tsam, wi 25a3ff.    
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First, the passage clarifies that the inexpressible reality, or the essential nature of 
all things, is to be identified neither with the designations (prajñapti) nor with their 
designata, both phenomenal and noumenal. This may help explain the subsequent 
assertion that the real essential nature of a thing is not as it is expressed: as the 
commentary below will affirm, the phrase should likely be read in this context as 
implying that an essential nature is not to be mistaken for the essence of a designatum 
(which would amount to its reification, samāropa). This does not imply, however, that it 
is altogether non-existent; such a claim would merely represent the opposite extreme of 
total negation, apavāda. Rather, it exists but in a manner that is situated midway between 
these two poles, ineffable and accessible only to gnosis.  
Two points call for emphasis regarding this passage. The first is that, despite what 
might have been expected, the passage does not state that things or objects are not really 
as they are expressed – a routine Buddhist attack on realist correspondence theories of 
truth – claiming rather that an essential nature does not exist as it is expressed.255 But 
what does it mean for an essential nature to be expressed by language in the first place? 
What kind of language usage aims at expressing essences?  
Here we find the first indication that AsaEga’s critique is directed not merely at 
ordinary language usage but more fundamentally at the sort of understanding of language 
in which essences play an active role. Something of the nature of this role can be grasped 
from the following VS passage:  
                                                 255 This claim is repeated elsewhere in the TApaṭ: “When a dharma [qua thing] has the name 'form' and so on… the dharmas having those names 'form,' etc., are themselves not identical with the designations 'form,' etc. Nor is there any dharma found outside of those that is identical to 'form,' etc. Again, for those dharmas having the names 'form,' etc., one should understand that what does exist there in the ultimate sense, with an inexpressible meaning, is the true mode (dharmatā) of essential nature…." Willis 1979: 119-120.  
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[I]t should be known that naïve beings adhere to [invest] expressible things [with] 
an essential nature that is in accordance with the expression and in accordance 
with the name, because of these five causes.256 That being the case, when asked 
what is the essential nature of a thing, [they] would reply that 'its essential nature 
is form,' and they would not reply that 'its name is form’.... 
 
…byis pa rnams ni brjod par bya ba'i dngos po la rgyu lngas ming ji lta ba dang 
brjod pa ji lta ba bzhin du ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen par rig par bya ste/ 'di 
ltar 'di'i dngos po de'i ngo bo nyid gang yin zhes dris na/ ngo bo nyid gzugs yin no 
zhes lan 'debs par byed kyi/ ming gzugs yin no zhes lan 'debs par mi byed pa 
dang/… (VS TD. 4038, zi 21a2-3) 
 
 The critique presented in this short passage is not merely of the ordinary parlance of the 
naïve but also of their attempt to philosophize in response to the question “What is 
something’s essential nature?" In light of this, the position described as taking an 
“essential nature to be as it is expressed” appears to encapsulate a certain "naïve" theory 
of meaning according to which the essential nature is given within a tripartite relation that 
holds between itself, a thing (dngos po, vastu), and its corresponding designation, with 
the latter seen as able to be in contact with and reveal the underlying ontological reality 
of things. Here AsaEga lays down the first foundations of an essentialist theory of 
meaning whose subsequent refutation will allow him to show that, since words cannot 
reach the essence of things, there can be no real correspondence with true reality – which 
is therefore inexpressible. 
 This brings us to the second point worth noting in AsaEga's earlier passage, 
namely that it actually refers to two kinds of essential nature – the real, ultimate essential 
                                                 256  These are understood to be five types of "attachment with respect to subtle [things]": 1) an attachment to impermanent things as if they were permanent; to suffering as if it were happiness; to what is impure as if it were pure; to the selfless as self; and to the sign-process [mtshan ma, nimitta] as if it were the Imagined nature. See VS TD. 4038, zi 20b7: phra pa la mngon par zhen pa phra ba ni lnga po 'di dag yin par rig par bya ste/mi rtag pa la rtag par /mngon par zhen pa dang/sdug bsngal ba la bde bar mngon par zhen pa dang/mi gtsang ba la gtsang bar mngon par zhen pa dang/ bdag med pa la bdag tu mngon par zhen pa dang/ mtshan ma la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa'o//.  . 
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nature of all things, and the unreal essence of a designated thing. Whereas the former is 
inexpressible, the latter is expressible insofar as it stands in referential relations with 
things and their designations. Both these points are further clarified in the parallel 
expository section in the VS, which also adds a brief outline of AsaEga’s argumentative 
strategy, to which we now turn.  
 
 
3.2 Demonstrating the inexpressibility of an essential nature in the VS: some 
preliminary distinctions. 
 
If then it is asked whether all things are included in these five categories (dngos 
po de dag, vastūni) or are not included, we reply that they are. If it is asked how 
the essential nature of257 these categories (chos de dag, dharmās) can be 
expressed, we answer that the essential nature is inexpressible. If one asks, how 
[then] are we to view their [intrinsic] identity [mtshan nyid, lakaa]? It is said 
that [their] identity is just like an illusion, [but] it is not non-existent. For example, 
while through magical creation there is the existence [of such things] as horses 
and elephants, chariots and infantry, jewels, pearls, silver and gold etc., they also 
do not exist intrinsically. In this way, although the intrinsic nature exists only as 
name and signs (ming dang mtshan ma), it does not exist as a thing (dngos po) 
which appears [in the way in which it is designated by] a particular designation.  
 
….ci dngos po lnga po de dag gis chos thams cad bsdus pa yin nam/ 'on te ma 
yinzhe na/ smras pa yin no chos de dag gis ngo bo nyid gang yin par brjod par 
bya zhe na/smras pa/brjod du med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin no// de dag gi mtshan 
nyid ji lta bu yin par blta bar bya zhe na/smras pa/sgyu ma lta bu'i mtshan nyid 
yin gyi/med pa nyid ni ma yin te/ 'di lta ste/dper na sgyu ma'i las nyid kyis ni yod 
la/rta dang glang po che dang / shing rta dang/dpung bu chung dang /nor bu 
dang / mu tig dang / gser dang|dngul la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du ni yod pa ma 
yin pa de bzhin du ngo bo nyid kyang ming dang mtshan ma tsam nyid du ni yod 
la/4ngo bo nyid dang /khyad par du gdags par snang ba'i dngos por ni yod pa 
ma yin no/ TD. 4038, zhi 11b2ff  
 
 
Here, in place of the TApa" list of “dharmās” proceeding from “matter…up to 
Nirvāṇa,” the passage discusses the scheme of the five categories (pañca-dharmās, 
                                                 257 Here it seems fitting to have a genitive particle replacing the instrumental-agentive "gis."    
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pañca-vastūni)258 said to subsume all of reality. These are: “sign-source” (rgyu mtshan, 
nimitta), “name” (ming, nāman), “discursive thought” (rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa, also 
“mental construction”), “suchness” (de bzhin nyid, tathatā), and “right-knowledge” (yang 
dag pa'i shes pa, samyag-jñāna).259 Such Buddhist classifications have obvious 
organizational and mnemonic functions, but they also serve epistemic and soteriological 
purposes, as exemplified by the following passage from the sixth chapter of LAS:   
[Mamhamati:] Most Revered One, please tell me the characteristic of the 
procedure to obtain the divisions, the 'five basic features of reality,' [i.e. the five 
categories. R.T] 'the [three] self-natures of reality,' the '[eight] discerning 
faculties,' and the 'two selflessnesses' (pañcadharma-svabhāva-vijñāna-
nairātmyadvaya-prabheda-gati-lakaam). Through this characteristic of the 
procedure to obtain the divisions, I and other Awakening great beings will, in 
the serial line of all the stages for practice, perceive these basic features 
distinctly, so that through them we will penetrate all the Awakened truths. 
Because of the penetration of all the Awakened truths there will ultimately be 
penetration of the stage for the tathagatas' personal attainment. (Tokiwa 
2003:416)  
 
atha khalu mahāmatirbodhisattvo mahāsattva9 punarapi 
bhagavantamadhyeate sma-deśayatu me bhagavān, deśayatu me sugata9  
pañcadharmasvabhāvavijñānanairātmyadvayaprabhedagatilakaam, yena 
nairātmyadvayaprabhedagatilakaena ahaY ca anye ca bodhisattvā 
mahāsattvā9 sarvabhūmikramānusaYdhivetān dharmān vibhāvayema, yathā 
tairdharmai9 sarvabuddhadharmānupraveśo bhavet | 
sarvabuddhadharmānupraveśācca 
yāvattathāgatasvapratyayātmabhūmipraveśa9 syāditi  (Vaidya 1963: 91:20) 
  
                                                 258 The Tibetan translation varies between dngos po lnga po and chos lnga po (see, for instance, TD. 4038, zi 8b6 and 22b1 respectively).   259 This scheme is not to be conflated with a different Abhidharma classification into five all-subsuming categories (pañca vastūni), namely, rupaṃ, cittaṃ, caittāḥ, cittaviprayuktaḥ saṃskārāḥ, and asaṃskṛtaṃ, which is presented in the Pañcavastuka and in the first two chapters of the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya. Frauwallner 1995: 135-137. 
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According to the LAS, pre-knowledge of the various categories and classifications 
prepares one subsequently to ascertain them in one's analysis of experience and 
consequently to advance along the path.260  
In the VS, the five categories are correlated with the Three Natures,261 taking 
“name,” “sign,” “discursive thought,” and even “right-knowledge” all to be included in 
the Dependent nature, while the category of “suchness” is included in the Perfected, and 
none in the Imagined nature.262 This stands in contrast to the organization of the five 
categories in other Yogācāra texts; the Madhyāntavibhāga (MV), for instance, includes 
“name” in the Imagined nature.263 This discrepancy between the VS and MV is noted in 
Tsong kha pa’s “Essence of True Eloquence” (Legs bshad snying po), where, following 
                                                 260 Accordingly, the remainder of the sixth chapter of the LAS deals with the the ways in which a correct understanding of these classifications and divisions dispels the false discursive thought (vikalpa) that is the mark of the naïve (bāla).  261 This is concordant with other Yogācāra śāstras, in which the five categories also appear as a subset of one of the ten (or so) aspects of reality (tattvas). For instance, in the Madhyāntavibhāga (MV), the five categories are said to make up the “grouping aspect of reality” (saṃgrhatattva), which is then correlated with the “fundamental aspect of reality” (mūla-tattva) along with its subdivision into the Three Natures" scheme. See MV III.13.a. Anacker 1984: 238. On the five categories in the MV commentary and Sthiramati’s sub-commentary, see O'Brien 1954: 234-236. The juxtaposition of these classificatory schemes – the five categories, the ten aspects of reality and their sub-divisions, and the Three Natures – highlights new inter-relations among them, providing a multi-perspectival analytical account of experience.    262 …ngo bo nyid gsum dang rgyu mtshan dang/ming dang rnam par rtog pa la sogs pa chos lnga po dag las ngo bo nyid dang po chos lnga po de dag las du dag gis bsdus she na/smras pa/gang gis kyang ma bsdus so//ngo bo nyid gnyis pa du dag gis bsdus she na/smras pa/bzhis so//ngo bo nyid gsum pa du dag gis bsdus she na/smras pa/gcig gis so TD. 4038 zi 22b1-3. For a translation and discussion of this section, see Willis 1976: 79-82, 239.   263 According to O’Brien, the criterion underlying the MV's organization of the five categories is the extent of their reality. Thus, “name” is included in the Imagined nature because it is the only category that stands for non-existence. Insofar as “sign-source” and “discursive thought” are seen as outcomes of the real causal processes that bring them about, they fall under the Dependant nature. Finally, in accordance with the same criterion, both “right knowledge” and “suchness” are grouped under the Perfected nature. See O'Brien 1954: 234-236.  
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Sthiramati’s commentary to the MV, he explains it to be only an apparent inconsistency. 
The issue is taken up by Tsong kha pa in his discussion of a section from Bhāvaviveka’s 
Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavttti.  There, Bhāvya presents a pūrvapaka 
characterizing the Imagined nature as “identity un-reality” (lakaani9svabhāvatā) 
because it does not include any of the aforementioned five categories. Tsong kha pa 
identifies the opponent as Yogācārin and the pūrvapaka as a rephrasing of the VS 
passage discussed above, which he explains as follows:   
(This is) the position of the Compendium264 that the imagined is not included in 
the five (categories), among which 'name' is defined as an anomalous creation and 
'causal process' [nimitta. R.T] is defined as the imagined’s designative base. (The 
imagined) cannot be any of the first four, as it is not a thing, nor can it be reality, 
since it is merely a conceptual designation. In regard to the Center and Extremes’ 
equation of 'name' with the imagined, Sthiramati explains that 'name' there stands 
for its referents, and not the actual name itself. Further, in all such expositions, the 
'causal process' equated with the relative includes only causes which are created 
things, although the Compendium states that among causes there are also 
uncreated things.265 Thus (acknowledging) that (for the Idealist) the imagined is 
identity-unreality by reason of its non-inclusion in the five (categories), 
nevertheless, (for Bhavaviveka) such non-inclusion is not the meaning of identity-
unreality. (Thurman 1984: 266-267) 
 
  Bracketing Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of Bhāvya’s claims266 and focusing on 
his understanding of the VS, we see that he appears to take the latter's organization of the 
five categories scheme as an expression of a fundamental Yogācāra premise, namely, that 
the unreality of the Imagined as the realm of language is dissociated from the underlying 
causal reality of the Dependent. Bearing this framework in mind, let us return to the VS 
                                                 264 Compendium = VS, Center and Extremes = MV.  265 Explained thus by Thurman: “The uncreated can be a cause for the Idealist in its capacity as a base for names, etc.” (1984: 267: n.9).  266 Which paves the way for his subsequent understanding of the differences between Bhāvya and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka thinkers. See ft. 325.   
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assertion that the essential nature of the all-subsuming five categories is inexpressible. 
This claim is followed by an objection by a hypothetical opponent who appears to 
presuppose that it is the essential nature that constitutes the distinct identity of a thing, 
revealed through its defining characteristics (lakaa). If the essential nature of these 
categories is indeed inaccessible to language, how is it, asks the objector, that they are 
known as distinctly identifiable things? In the absence of a known ontological factor that 
determines their identity, how are they distinguishable?   
 
3.2.1 The magical creation analogy.  
AsaEga replies by appeal to a variant of the magical creation analogy, which 
appears to be derived from a similar occurrence of the analogy in the first chapter of the 
SNS. 267 There, the analogy is also used to address a difficulty regarding the inexpressible 
nature of reality – specifically, the question of how it is that enlightened beings, on the 
one hand, are said to have knowledge of inexpressible reality, and on the other still use in 
their speech constructed conceptual oppositions (for example, the fundamental opposition 
between compounded and uncompounded phenomena). In response, the SNS employs the 
magical creation analogy to present two different epistemic accounts of the same reality, 
                                                 267 “Son of good lineage, for example, a magician or a magician's able student, standing at the crossing of four great roads, after gathering grasses, leaves, twigs, pebbles or stones, displays various magical forms, such as a herd of elephants, a cavalry, chariots, and infantry; collections of gems, pearls, lapis lazuli, conch-shells, crystal, and coral; collections of wealth, grain, treasuries, and granaries....” Powers 1995: 15. /rigs kyi bu/'di lta ste/dper na/sgyu ma mkhan nam sgyu ma mkhan gyi slob ma mkhas pa zhig lam po che'i bzhi mdor 'dug ste/ dag gam/lo ma dag gam/shing dag gam/gseg ma dag gam/gyo dum dag gcig tu bsdus nas sgyu ma'i //las sna tshogs 'di lta ste/glang po che'i tshogs dang/rta pa'i tshogs dang/shing rta'i tshogs dang/dpung bu chung gi tshogs dang/nor bu dang/mu tig dang| baiDUR+Ya dang/dung dang/man shel dang/byu ru'i tshogs dang/nor dang/'bru dang/mdzod dang/bang ba'i tshogs rnam par bstan na…/ SNS. TD. 106, ca 1b1-55b7.  
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personified by two types of spectators watching the magic show.268 The first are the naïve 
(bāla) spectators who take whatever illusions they see to be true, and only later realize 
their falseness. Spectators of the second kind are the “wise,” who see into the causal 
circumstances from which the illusion arises and neither accept its existence nor utterly 
deny it:    
When those sentient beings…who have natures endowed with wisdom, who 
recognize that these are grasses, twigs, pebbles, and stones – hear and see these 
things, they think: 'This herd of elephants that appears does not exist… But, with 
regard to them there arises the perception of a herd of elephants and the 
perception of the attributes of a herd of elephants… These magical illusions exist.' 
Having thought, 'These visual deceptions exist,' they emphatically apprehend and 
emphatically assert in accordance with how they see and hear. Subsequently they 
do not make the conventional designations: 'This is true, the other is false.' 
(Powers 1995: 17) 269   
  
The same approach is said also to be applied by Bodhisattvas with regard to the 
conceptual construction as “compounded and un-compounded”:    
When those sentient beings…who have attained the supramundane wisdom of the 
Aryas, who manifestly recognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena, 
thinking that, 'The compositional signs ['du byed kyi mtshan ma, saskāra-
nimitta, R.T] that arise from mental constructions exist like a magician's illusions; 
these obscurations [rnam par rmongs pa, R.T] of the mind exist,' they 
emphatically apprehend and emphatically assert in accordance with how they see 
and how they hear… But they do not subsequently make the conventional 
designations: 'This is true, the other is false.'… (Powers 1995: 19)  
 
According to the SNS, the reading of reality of enlightened beings is characterized 
by a multi-layered perspective on the ontology of illusory phenomena. While they discern 
                                                 268 This is pointed out by Jonathan Gold (2006: 20-22). Gold’s analysis of this SNS section, among other Yogācāra texts, is presented in support of his interpretation of “duality” as standing for constructed discursive oppositions rather than the subject-object poles of experience (and, accordingly, against its interpretation as a negation of externality and its reduction to a subjective mental realm).    269 de la sems can gang dag byis pa'i rang bzhin can ma yin pa/… SNS TD. 106, ca 6a7-6b7   
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the unreality of the perceived object as such (the herd of elephants, or “compositional 
signs”), nonetheless they are aware of its existence as a mental construct. This same 
distinction is repeated in the VS version of the magical creation analogy, employed in this 
case to explain the status of identifiable distinct things. Like magically induced things, so 
too identifiable distinct things do not exist as they appear to be – i.e., essentially and 
independently, as is implied by their corresponding designations. Nonetheless, they do 
indeed exist in some form: as “name and signs,” i.e., as mental constructs. The analogy, 
then, serves to answer the objection by demonstrating that the distinct identity of things is 
illusory and is neither imparted by nor reflects any underlying ontological reality, 
although it does exist as a name or a mental construct. 
The magical creation analogy is ubiquitous in Mahāyāna literature and especially 
in the Yogācāra lore. Some well-known variants of the analogy appear, for instance, in 
the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (TSN) and also in the Mahāyānasūtrālakāra (MSA) and its 
commentary, the Mahāyānasūtrālakārabhāya (MSABh), where it serves to explicate 
the Three Natures scheme.270 Jonathan Gold has convincingly argued that underlying the 
uses of the analogy in these particular texts is an understanding of experience in terms of 
mere appearances (ākti) bifurcated into the following aspects: the appearance’s false 
content (i.e., the unreal object), and its facticity as present before the mind, as forming 
part of a causal mental flux. These two aspects of appearance in turn correlate 
respectively to the manner in which every phenomena appears in non-existent duality (the 
Imagined nature), but at the same time is also real insofar as its occurrence is the 
outcome of an underlying causal process (the Dependent).271  
                                                 270 Gold 2007: 4.  
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While it is possible that this understanding is implied by VS use of the magical 
creation analogy,272 the way in which the analogy is elaborated in the treatise’s 
subsequent arguments suggests a different emphasis.273 As I will show below, the 
analogy is not concerned with the explication of the Three Natures scheme so much as it 
is focused on portraying the linguistic realm from the perspective of the Imagined.274 This 
enables it to illustrate the sense in which language usage can be engaged in self-negation, 
thereby undermining theories of meaning grounded in a word-world correspondence. In 
this respect the analogy rather straightforwardly serves the text’s declared aim of 
demonstrating the inexpressibility of reality through reasoning, the limits of language 
through its usage.  
 
3.2.2 The argumentative strategy.  
The essential nature [of a sign-source (rgyu mtshan, nimitta)] is not apprehended 
[and referred to]275 through a sign-source – neither by sign-source [as a thing] nor 
                                                                                                                                                 271 Ibid. 3-6.This perspective therefore renders the Imagined an ”inseparable aspect of the Dependent,” and is consistent with Gold’s interpretation of the Three Natures scheme as representing three interconnected perspectives on reality rather than distinct ontological or experiential realms. See also chapter V, ft. 37.   272 And in this sense the VS can be seen as supplementing the binary distinction in the TApaṭ between unreal “nominal” dharmas and their existent, ineffable, essential nature with a third perspective, a "buffer" of sorts, identified with the Dependent.   273 This is perhaps supported also by the fact that whereas other sections of the VS make rather frequent reference to the Three Natures scheme, there is no explicit mentioning of it in the section under discussion.    274 In this respect it is concordant with the interpretative framework presented by Tsong kha pa and mentioned above, according to which the Imagined, as the realm of language, is dissociated from the Dependent.     275 Dmigs, which in its verbal form (upa-/labh in the Sanskrit) means "to apprehend” or “to observe”, but which also means “supporting” or “referring to.” The latter is closer to the verbal root’s nominal derivation in Sanskrit – ālambana (dmigs pa) – meaning "support” or “point of reference,” which in Buddhist usage 
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through the name 'sign-source.' And just as in the case of the sign-source, the 
essential nature of names is not [apprehended] through names, the essential nature 
of discursive thought through discursive thought, the essential nature of Suchness 
through Suchness, and also the essential nature of right knowledge  (yang dag pa'i 
shes pa) is neither apprehended by right knowledge nor through the name 'right 
knowledge.' Why is it so? Because an essential nature of all these [five categories] 
is entirely logically unviable…. 
 
/rgyu mtshan rgyu mtshan zhes bya ba'i ming des rgyu mtshan gyis ngo bo nyid 
dmigs su med do//rgyu mtshan ji lta ba de bzhin du ming gis ming gi ngo bo nyid 
dang/ rnam par rtog pas rnam par rtog pa'i ngo bo nyid dang/ de bzhin nyid kyis 
de bzhin nyid kyi ngo bo nyid dang/ yang dag pa'i shes pas yang dag pa'i shes pa 
zhes bya ba'i ming des yang dag pa'i shes pa'i ngo bo nyid dmigs su med do// /de 
ci'i phyir zhe na/de'i ngo bo nyid rnam pa thams cad du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro//276 
  
     Here AsaEga focuses on the sign-source (rgyu mtshan, nimitta) as standing for the 
other four categories,277arguing that the objectification of an essential nature of a sign-
                                                                                                                                                 often comes to mean the object as it is conceived in conceptual thought and in its function as the basis for conceptual cognition. See Hopkins 1992: 345:923, Chandra 1985: 1863.   276 TD. 4038, zi 11b5-6.    277 In Buddhist lore nimitta has an exceptionally broad range of meanings within linguistic, epistemic, and meditative contexts. Emphasizing the term’s epistemic sense, Franklin Edgerton (1953) glosses it in his dictionary as “appearance,” referring mostly to the manner by which the five sense objects are known (297). Lusthaus (2002) supplies a phenomenological definition of the term in the Yogācāra context, taking it to be the sensorial end of cognition (the ālambaṇa being the objective end): “Nimitta signifies the characteristic sensorial marks of an object […], especially in the sense that such marks serve as the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the cognition of something that is observable. Ārambaṇa signifies the 'objective-pole' of cognition [….] Those 'content-conditions' which 'support' cognition are the nimitta alambana. As both Husserl and Yogācāra remind us, the function of a content-condition can be fulfilled just as adequately by a hallucination, dream or non-veridical content, as by a veridical percept” ( 227). Here Nimitta is viewed as the (causally efficacious) ‘qualitative’ aspect of cognition, the ārambaṇa being its ‘objective’ complementary aspect – and this, regardless of the veridicality of that cognition. A different emphasis is proposed in Schmithausen's definition of the term in the context of the pravṛtti section of the VS (TD. 4038 Shi 3b4-9b3). There, he points out that the nimitta, insofar as it is identifiable, already involves conceptualization: “[Nimitta is] objective phenomena as they are experienced or imagined, admitting of being associated with names, and being (co) conditioned by subjective conceptual activity (vikalpa)....." Schmithausen 1987: 357: n.511), cited in Waldron 2003: 219: n.18). Considering the VS inclusion of the nimitta in the Dependent, Thurman (1984: 221-222, 266-7), and following him, Willis (1976: 219 n.15), have suggested translating it as “sign- process” and “sign-source” respectively. Both names capture the meaning of nimitta as the causal sensorial process (identified as the Dependent) that underlies the 
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source is untenable, as it cannot be said to be apprehended (dmigs su med, na labhyate) 
either through its corresponding designation or through the object. This should not be 
understood, however, as an argument for the non-existence of a sign-source as the object 
of experience.278 AsaEga is not interested in discussing the ontological status of the 
essential nature of the sign source but rather the epistemic question of its accessibility to 
knowledge and concepts. The possibility of such knowledge requires that the essential 
nature of a sign-source operate under an essentialist theory of reference – a theory, that is, 
for which meaning is given through a correspondence between a designation, an object, 
and its essence. AsaEga therefore turns next to refute this option, by scrutinizing the 
various possible relations between these three elements and then showing each of them to 
be incoherent.  
   This is, as I have said, the goal of a set of arguments in the TApa" and their rough 
parallels in the VS. The three TApa" arguments, which I consider next, examine the 
relations between these elements under the assumption that the essential nature must, in 
any essentialist scheme, be imparted and determined either by the object, by its 





                                                                                                                                                 identifiable and conceptualized impression – which is the objectified nimtta seen from the perspective of the Imagined.   278 That is, it should not be understood as a token of the typical Buddhist argument indicating that there is no object of experience corresponding to a self.   279 A similar set of arguments also appears in a summarized version in Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (MS). The arguments and their interpretation by Tsong kha pa are discussed below.   
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3.3 The TApa- "first argument": the argument from polysemy. 
 
I now turn to AsaEga's first argument in the TApa", the argument from polysemy:  
If again any dharmās or some thing (vastu) exist in the manner in which they are 
expressed, then those dharmas and that thing would come to have the nature 
(tadātmaka) of their [expressions].280 That being the case, there would be various 
and numerous essential natures for a single dharma and for a single thing. Why 
so? Because of many and various figurative designations (prajñaptaya 
upacārā9)281 which would be applied by numerous expressions (abhilāpai9) to a 
single dharma and a single thing. [In that case] no restriction (niyama9) 
whatsoever could be maintained with respect to the multiplicity and variety of the 
verbal designations, [as an expression] should consist of, be made of, and  have 
the essential nature of that dharma and that thing, through one specific verbal 
designation and not through the other remaining verbal designations. Therefore, 
there is no [expression] that consists in, is made of, and has the essential nature of 
those dharmās and things by means of [any] verbal designations, all of them, or 
just some.  
 
sa cet punar yathaivābhilāpo yeu dharmeu yasmin vastuni pravartate 
tadātmakāste dharmā vā tadvastu syāt| evaY sati bahuvidhā bahava9 svabhāvā 
ekasya dharmasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyu9| tat kasya heto9| tathā hy ekasmin 
dharme ekasmin vastuni bahuvidhā bahavo bahubhir abhilāpai9 prajñaptaya 
upacārā9 kriyante| na ca bahuvidhānāñ ca bahūnāY prajñaptivādānāY niyama9 
kaścid upalabhyate| yad anyatamena prajñaptivādenaikena tasya dharmasya 
tasya vastuna9 tādātmyaY tanmayatā tatsvabhāvatā syān nānyair avaśi"ai9 
prajñaptivādai9| tasmāt sakalavikalai9 sarvaprajñaptivādai9 sarvadharmāāY 
sarvavastūnāY nāsti tādātmyaY nāsti tanmayatā nāsti tatsvabhāvatā| (Dutt 1978: 
30:8)282  
                                                 280 The term ātmaka, taken as the qualified end of a bahuvrīhi compound, can be interpreted as “of the nature,” “of the character,” and also “composed of” or “consisting of.” See Apte 2003: 136, and Monier Williams 1956: 136, 434. Hence, tadātmaka was taken to mean “constituting its nature,” or “of the nature,” which concords with the Tibetan translation of the term as de'i bdag nyid. Willis translates tadātmaka as “identical,” which however renders designations and things indistinguishable (1979: 102-3). Below, dealing with the parallel claims in the VS, I argue that this "identity" in fact amounts to the semantic unity of a word and its meaning.   281 prajñaptaya upacārāḥ can be taken to mean “designations and figures” but also “designations that are figures.” The Tibetan “… 'dogs te nye bar 'dogs pa…” is similarly ambiguous, since the connector te can be read both as conjunctive and as meaning “namely,” “to wit,” etc. Here I have opted for the latter meaning, which better harmonizes with the overall argument.   282 gal te chos gang dag dang/ dngos po gang la ji ltar brjod pa 'jug pa bzhin du chos de dag dang dngos po de de'i bdag nyid du 'gyur na ni/  de ltar na chos gcig pu dang/ dngos po gcig pu'i ngo bo nyid rnam pa sna tshogs mang por 'gyur bar rigs so/  de ci'i phyir zhe na/ 'di ltar chos gcig pu dang / dngos po gcig pu la 
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The passage criticizes the assumptions that things are “as they are expressed” and that 
things and designations are of the “same nature” – both claims understood here as 
implying an essentialist theory of meaning in which the correspondence between a thing 
and its designation is constituted by their respective connection to an essential nature.283 
AsaEga points out that this view implies a relation between the thing and its designation 
that is not merely invariable but also exclusive and monosemic, as both elements are 
necessarily constituted by a single essential nature.284  
Having set up the essentialist theory of meaning in this way, AsaEga is now 
poised to refute it by introducing the possibility of a polysemy of figures – that is, a 
circumstance in which various metaphors, upacāras, denote the same object. (For 
instance – to combine two stock śāstric examples of figurative application – referring to a 
child as “lion,”siho māavaka9, and also as “fire,” agnir-maavaka9.) If this possibility 
is admitted, the presuppositions of an essentialist theory of meaning lead to absurd 
consequences – for instance, to a single object (child) having various and multiple 
essences (child-ness, fire-ness, lion-ness, etc). This consequence is untenable for 
                                                                                                                                                 mang po dag gis rnam pa sna tshogs mang por brjod cing 'dogs te nye bar 'dogs par byed la/ 'dogs pa'i tshig rnam pa sna tshogs mang po dag pas 'dogs pa'i tshig gang yang rung ba gcig cig chos de dang dngos po de la de'i bdag nyid dang de'i rang bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid du 'gyur la/ 'dogs pa'i tshig lhag ma gzhan dag ni ma yin zhes bya ba'i nges pa ci yang mi dmigs te/ de bas na 'dogs pa'i tshig thams cad ni mtha' dag gam/ kha cig kyang rung ste/ chos thams cad dang dngos po thams cad kyi de'i bdag nyid du 'gyur pa yang med la/ de'i rang bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid du 'gyur ba yang med do/  TD. 4037 wi 25a2-5  283 As was explicated in the passage quoted above, this relation between dharmās and their designations involves an “[expression] that consists in, is made of, and has the essential nature of those dharmās and things….”   284 This implication follows given the further assumption that the essence is necessarily the sole determinant of the identity of a "thing."’    
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essentialist theories both because it contradicts their definition of an essence as exclusive 
and singular, and more broadly because, given their assumptions, it forestalls what is a 
precondition for any system of semantics: the formulation of a criterion for the 
sanctioning (niyama9) and determination of meaning.  In the absence of such a criterion, 
no reason can be given to support the claim that a given designation refers to any one 
particular thing and not to all other things; that is to say, all meaning breaks down.285  
The use of polysemy to undermine the assumption of an invariable connection 
between words and their referents is not unique to AsaEga,286 and should be viewed 
                                                 285 This reading differs significantly from Willis' interpretation of the same argument. Since she does not, as I have said, address  upacāra in the sense of figurative application, Willis explains the polysemy in question in terms of the epistemic and linguistic discrepancies that exist between the different language usages of different users:  “…since for any one particular thing, many different names are applied -– by different beings and under different circumstances. The varied designations, it should be clear, are the results not only of different languages but also of differing psychological situations, emotional responses, and their consequent perceptions. For example, I am reminded of the common Yogācāra illustration cited by Edward Conze under his discussion of 'The Yogacarins' in Buddhist Thought in India. The illustration points out that beings at different stages of rebirth perceive things differently: 'One and the same object, say a river, leads to totally different ideas on the part of hungry ghosts, animals, men and gods.... The hungry ghosts, by way of retribution of their past deeds, see nothing but pus, urine and excrement; fishes find there a home; men see fresh and pure water which can be used for washing and drinking; the gods of the station of infinite space see only space' (p. 256). Such differing perceptions, of course, generate the use of different designations for the same given thing….” (1979: 103-104). Simply put, polysemy, for Willis, is the fact that we call the same things by different names because we experience them differently. Given this interpretation, however, it is not quite clear in what sense (and from what point of view) may the referent of all these names still be viewed as one and the same (one is tempted to say that it is only form an enlightened point of view). Hence, here it seems more plausible to view polysemy as occurring within the scope of a single point of view or experience, and as linguistic rather than epistemic.     286 It appears, for instance, in the bhāṣya to the Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.56, where the Siddhāntin argues that since the same words are used by different social and ethnic groups to denote different things (or that various languages denote the same things differently), the relation between a word and its referent is not innate (svābhāvikaḥ) but  rather conventional. jātiviśeṣe cāniyamāt || sāmāyikaḥ śabdād arthasampratyayo na svābhāvikaḥ/ ṛṣyāryamlecchānāṃ yathākāmaṃ śabdaviniyogo 'rthapratyāyanāya pravartate/ svābhāvike hi śabdasyārthapratyāyakatve yathākāmaṃ na syād yathā taijasasya prakāśasya rūpapratyayahetutvaṃ na jātiviśeṣe vyabhicaratīti// . See also Jha 1984: 845.  
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against the background of the long-standing non-Buddhist śāstric discussion of this issue.  
In part 2.1 of chapter II, I briefly dealt with some of the presuppositions underlying this 
disscusion, most notably the general adherence of Indian schools of thought to strictly 
referential theories of meaning, and the absence of an explicit sense-reference distinction 
in Indian theories of meaning. As I argued there, within this framework, and especially 
for schools of thought like the Mīmāṃsā that assume a monosemic relation between a 
word and its meaning, polysemy presented some vexing theoretical difficulties. AsaEga, 
as we have seen, was quick to capitalize on this weakness. 
 
3.3.1 A critique of Asa9ga’s argument from polysemy. 
Though AsaEga's use of polysemy to criticize an invariable connection between 
words and their referents was not itself a novel strategy, his argument is exceptional 
insofar as it relies specifically on polysemy that is based on figurative application. On the 
face of it, this choice appears to render his argument more vulnerable to criticism – from, 
for instance, the proponent of an essentialist theory of meaning whose understanding of 
figurative signification resembles that presented by the Mīmāṃsā.287 While this line of 
criticism is nowhere explicitly presented in the TApa" or the VS, it nonetheless appears to 
have been anticipated and addressed implicitly in both texts’ subsequent arguments. A 
reconstruction of this potential critique, therefore, will provide vital context for the 
understanding of AsaEga’s stance.  
The proponent of this critique would argue that figurative meaning is forever 
parasitical on the primary meaning, and as such can be seen as the outcome of a two level 
                                                 287 As explicated in chapter I.  
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process of understanding.288 The priority accorded here to primary meaning is epistemic 
as well as logical – one must know the literal meaning in order to understand the 
figurative one. Next, he would suggest that AsaEga is not in a position to reject this 
assumption, since his appeal to figures demonstrates that he in fact accepts the ordinary 
language distinction between primary and secondary meaning (and hence their logical 
and epistemic hierarchy); at the same time, he does not, at least at this stage, offer any 
explanation for its cause and implications. 
So for example, applied to the case of the boy signified as “fire” and “tiger, the 
opponent’s objection would point out that these cases of indirect signification are 
logically and epistemically dependent on the boy’s initial and primary signification as 
“boy.” Recall that AsaEga’s argument from polysemy charged that under an essentialist 
theory of meaning all these designations are traced to their respective essential nature, 
which is untenable. But this assumes, the opponent would argue, that these various 
designations denote the boy in just the same manner (via the essence); and this 
assumption is unwarranted because it overlooks, or else denies, the apparent semantic 
differences between direct and indirect signification. In either case, AsaEga’s argument is 
sloppy if not flawed because he implicitly relies on the hierarchy underlying the 
distinction between direct and indirect signification at the same time that his argument 
deflates their hierarchy by rendering their differences inconsequential to the overall 
determination of meaning.  
                                                  288 As figurative meaning is understood to be the outcome of a linguistic-cognitive process in which the literal meaning is "barred" (arthabadhita). This implies, for instance in the case of Bhartṛhari, an understanding of figurative meaning primarily in epistemic terms, that is, very much as if it were a knowledge claim arrived at by a gradual cognitive process of falsification and corroboration – like inference. See chapter II, part 2.2.     
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Below I argue that indeed this is exactly what AsaEga ultimately seeks to assert, 
but for his opponent – a Mīmāṃsaka, for instance – such an argument is bound to seem at 
once wrong and superfluous. It would seem wrong because for the Mīmāṃsā the 
semantic difference between primary and secondary meaning is far from redundant, given 
that they are said to be the outcome of different kinds of relations between language and 
reality. But it would also be superfluous, because the way that the Mīmāṃsā understands 
figurative language enables it to fend off AsaEga’s argument from polysemy without 
forsaking the literal/figurative meaning hierarchy.  As demonstrated earlier (chapter I), 
words, according to the Mīmāṃsā, directly denote the universal or generic property, 
referring to individuals only figuratively.289 Given this scheme, AsaEga’s argument from 
a polysemy of figures need not pose any special difficulty, since only one expression (the 
literal meaning of the word) stands in direct contact with the essence (“boy” with 
“boyness”), while all other figurative expressions (”fire” or “lion”) do not. Thus, the 
essentialist account of figurative meaning, insofar as it allows one to maintain a 
monosemic one word-one essence relation while still accounting for the possibility of a 
polysemy of figures, appears to be immune to AsaEga’s critique.290 
                                                 289 It should be noted that Asaṅga presents an essentialist theory of meaning that is modeled upon but not identical to the Mīmāṃsā theory of meaning. Thus, insofar as ontology is concerned, for example, the Mīmāṃsā conception of the generic property does not entirely conform to what Asaṅga, in his construction of an essentialist theory of reference, describes as an "essential nature."   290 According to the opponent, when speaking of the boy as “ tiger” and “fire,” only the word “boy” denotes the essence (the generic property boyness), while it also figuratively denotes the individual boy. The words “tiger” and “fire” denote boyness only figuratively, while referring directly to their respective essences (lionness and fireness), which are then “super-imposed,”  either cognitively or semantically, onto boyness. An important condition for this usage (the upacāra bīja) is considered to be the similarity of qualities between the individual boy and a tiger (being ferocious) or fire (being tawny, etc).   
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AsaEga’s ensuing arguments address this line of response by exposing what 
appears to be a fallacy inherent in the essentialist account of reference. This fallacy is 
uncovered gradually, as the TApa" and the VS arguments scrutinize and refute one by one 
each possible interpretation of the supposed referential relations between a thing, its 
designation, and the essential nature, until finally the essentialist theory of reference is 
revealed to hold two incompatible presuppositions: on the one hand, that the designation-
designatum relation is originary; and on the other, that the one has logical priority over 
the other insofar as it is said to be in contact with the essential nature. The demonstrated 
incoherence of an essentialist theory of meaning has important implications for the 
understanding of the distinction and hierarchy between primary and secondary meaning, 
and serves as a reply to the opponent’s critique. If sound, it establishes that while the 
distinction between primary and secondary meaning may be accepted as the outcome of 
convention, there is no ground for assuming that it indicates or reflects any deeper 
referential-metaphysical structure.  
   A detailed presentation of this argumentation follows, beginning with the two 




3.4 The TApa- "second argument": an essential nature is not apprehended or 
determined by the designation. 
 
 The argument from polysemy, as we have seen, refuted the assumption that the 
correspondence between a thing and its designation is constituted by their mutual relation 
to an essential nature (without viewing either as prior). The ensuing "second argument" 
posits and refutes the assumption that the thing-designation correspondence is constituted 
by an essential nature that is apprehended and determined solely by the designation – i.e., 
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as suggested by Willis,291 that an object’s essential identity is set and conceived only 
once it has been designated:  
Furthermore, assuming the dharmas such as matter etc. as have been indicated 
previously are held to have the essential nature through292 their designations, there 
may be [a state of affairs in which] first there is a thing, and afterwards the 
figurative application of a verbal designation (prajñaptivādopacāra9) according 
to one’s intent (chandata9, dga' mgu). In that case, [however,] before the 
figurative application of the verbal designation, when the figurative application of 
the verbal designation is still unmade, that dharma and that entity would be  
ithout an essential nature. [But] when it is without an essential nature, a verbal 
designation for a non-thing would not be logically tenable. And in the absence of 
a figurative application of verbal designation, an essential nature [apprehended 
through] the verbal designation of that dharma and that thing, would not be 
feasible. 
 
api ca sa ced rūpādayo dharmā yathāpūrvanirdi"ā9 prajñaptivādasvabhāvā 
bhaveyu9| evaY sati pūrva tāvad vastu paścāt tatra chandata9 
prajñaptivādopacāra9| prākprajñaptivādopacārād akte prajñaptivādopacāre sa 
dharmas tadvastu ni9svabhāva eva syāt| sati ni9svabhāvatve nirvastuka9 
prajñaptivādo na yujyate | prajñaptivādopacāre cāsati prajñaptivādasvabhāvatā 
dharmasya vastuno na yujyeta|  (Dutt 1978: 30:17)293 
 
  The assumption underlying this argument – that the act of naming constitutes the 
thing through apprehending or revealing its essence – entails granting the designation 
                                                 291 Willis 1979: 104.   292 The Tibetan translation of the TApaṭ renders the compound prajñaptivādasvabhāvās  a genitive case tatpuruṣa compound (the essential nature of the verbal designations). In theVS commentary, however, it is taken as the instrumental case: “In case it is argued that when one assigns a name to a sign-source (rgyu mtshan, nimitta), the essential nature of the sign-source comes about through the power of the name….” /gal te ji ltar rgyu mtshan la ming rnam par 'jog par byed pa de bzhin du ming gi dbang gis rgyu mtshan gyi ngo bo de nyid 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhe na/ VS  TD. 4038 Zi 12a1. An eliding of the difference between an instrumental "sa" suffix and the genitive case is quite common in wood-block prints. The latter appears more plausible in light of the rest of the argument.  293 gzhan yang gal te gzugs la sogs pa'i chos sngar ji skad bstan pa rnams 'dogs pa'i tshig gi ngo bo nyid yin du zin na/ de lta na je dngos po sngar byung la/ phyis de la dga' mgur 'dogs pa'i tshig nye bar 'dogs na ni/  b. 'dogs pa'i tshig gis nye bar 'dogs pa'i snga rol 'dogs pa'i tshig gis nye bar ma btags pa'i tshe/  chos de dang dngos po de ngo bo nyid med pa kho nar 'gyur ro// ngo bo nyid med par gyur na yang dngos po med pa la ni 'dogs pa'i tshig gis nye bar gdags su mi rung ngo/ 'dogs pa'i tshig gis nye bar 'dogs pa med na yang/ chos dang dngos por 'dogs pa'i tshig gis ngo bo nyid du yod par mi rung ngo/ /TD. 4037 Wi 25a5-7.  
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logical priority over the thing. This priority, however, is incompatible with the possibility 
of non-conceptual experiences or pre-named things (for instance, things apprehended 
before language acquisition), since these would then be rendered essence-less. Thus, 
since it is not the case that phenomena come into being solely by the power of speech, 
designations cannot be seen as the locus of the essential nature.294 
 
 
3.5 The TApa- "third argument": an essential nature is not       
apprehended or determined by the object. 
 
Finally, AsaEga turns to consider the third possible relation, by which the 
essential nature is solely apprehended through the thing (as the designatum):  
Again, suppose that before there was a figurative application of verbal 
designation, when it is yet unmade, a dharma and a thing would be of the nature 
(tadātmakaY) of that [the designation]. If that were the case, even without the 
figurative application of the verbal designation ‘matter’ there would [still] occur 
an ideational cognition (buddhi) of ’matter’ whenever there was a dharma [or] a 
thing known as matter (rūpasaYjñaka). But this is not the case. Therefore, by 
virtue if this reasoning one should understand that the essential nature of all 
dharmas is inexpressible. And one should know that just like in regard to matter, 
such is the case with sensation, etc., up to nirvana, as mentioned before.295 
 
sa cet puna9 pūrvam eva prajñaptivādopacārād akte prajñaptivādopacāre sa 
dharmas tad vastu tadātmakaY syāt| evaY sati vinā tena rūpam iti 
prajñaptivādopacārea rūpasaYjñake dharme rūpasaYjñake vastuni 
rūpabuddhi9 pravartate| na ca pravartate| tad anena kāraenānayā yuktyā 
nirabhilāpya9 svabhāva9 sarvadharmāāY pratyavagantavya9| yathārūpam 
evaY vedanādayo yathānirdi"ā dharmā antato yāvan nirvāaparyantā 
veditavyā9| … (Dutt 1978: 30:22)296 
                                                 294 Buddhists do, of course, yield logical precedence to our conceptual scheme insofar as it reifies the reality of "things and selves," which are viewed as essentially existent. This precedence, however, is believed to result not from language’s privileged access or connection to an essential nature (since such an essential nature does not exist) but rather from its constructive and creative power (vikalpa, prapañca, etc.).   295 My translation of this passage rather closely follows Willis’ (1979: 105).   296 gal te 'dogs pa'i tshig nye bar 'dogs pa'i snga rol nas/ gzugs de gzugs kyi bdag nyid yin te/  phyis kyang gzugs kyi bdag nyid la gdogs pa'i tshig gis bsdus pa'i gzugs su nye bar 'dogs par byed na yang /de lta na ni 
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There are several ways to interpret this rather elliptical argument.297 One key is 
supplied by Tsong kha pa in the second section of his Essence of True Eloquence (Legs 
bshad snying po), where he indicates a similarity between the TApa" arguments discussed 
above, the ones presented in the VS, and three arguments advanced in the 
Mahāyānasagraha (MS).298 Despite discrepancies between these sections, Tsong kha pa 
takes all of them to be expressing the same basic idea, which is explcilty stated only in 
the MS: 299 
                                                                                                                                                 gzugs zhes 'dogs pa'i tshig nye bar 'dogs pa de med bzhin du yang gzugs zhes bya bar 'gyur ba'i chos dang/  gzugs zhes bya bar 'gyur ba'i dngos po de la gzugs kyi blo 'jug par 'gyur pa'i rigs na mi 'jug ste/ de bas na gtan tshigs 'di dang/ rigs pa 'dis chos thams cad brjod du med pa'i ngo bo nyid du khong du chud par bya'o.… TD. 4037 Wi 25a7-b2.  297  The interpretation I propose below differs from Wills’, who understand it as follows: “The above passage speaks from the side of the things themselves and considers the proposition that the essential nature of things already is such that it defines and dictates what names should properly be applied to them. But, were it true that things themselves dictated their correct names, then there should be complete and universal agreement about what each thing is called. Moreover, such universal agreement should exist despite the various language, perceptual, and psychological responses mentioned before. But clearly this is not the case….” (1979: 105-1065). Willis takes the reliance of the designation upon the designatum and its essence to be a problematic proposal because it implies a uniformity of meaning that is nowhere to be found. Below I argue that what is at stake here is the impossibility of granting logical priority to the designatum and essence over the designation, so that the absurd implication of assuming such a priority is not, as Willis claims, a universal correspondence, but rather a view of the whole system of semantics as divorced from actual language usage.   298 All these works he considers to be Asaṅga's. According to Tsong kha pa, these arguments are specifically directed against the “Realists” (dngos por smra ba, sat-bhāva-vādin or sat-vastu-vādin), a label usually used to indicate any essentialist or substantivist philosophical stance, either Buddhist or non-Buddhist, that takes things to be established inherently. Tsong kha pa often uses this term to criticize Bhāvya, alluding to the essentialism implicit in his stance. See Dreyfus and McClintock (2003: 24), McClintock (2003: 131, 159 n.26), Ruegg (2006: 323, 326), Thurman (1984: 238, 291).  299 The MS reproduces the TApaṭ argument from polysemy and the "third argument" (referring to them respectively as “the incompatibility of the multiplicity of nature” and the “incompatibility between natures”) but not theTApaṭ "second argument." Instead, the MS presents another argument – “the incompatibility of confused natures”– which appears neither in the TApaṭ nor in the VS and uses 
 154 
The Elucidation of Intention does not give any reasons proving the relative to be 
devoid of the imagined. Hence, as this must be understood, the Bodhisattva 
Stages and the Compendium give three reasons each. The Universal Vehicle 
Compendium also states:  
To answer the question, ‘what makes it clear that the reality of the relative is not 
as it appears in the imagined reality?’ (We say) it is established because of the 
incompatibility between their natures, the incompatibility of multiplicity of 
nature, and the incompatibility of confused natures.' (Thurman 1984: 236-7)300 
 
This passage offers a different perspective on the aim of the TApa" and VS 
arguments. According to Tsong kha pa, the similar arguments in all three texts are in fact 
addressed at the lack of explanation in SNS as to why the Imagined cannot be subsumed 
within the Dependent. In this light, the arguments discussed above are seen to be 
demonstrating that a real inexpressible essential nature (identified as the Dependent) 
cannot be in contact or serve as the referent of a designation (identified as the 
Imagined).301 This interpretation (explicit only in the MS) is compatible with the 
interpretation of the TApa" and VS arguments presented so far, and supplements it with a 
further interpretative layer by expressing it in terms of the Three Natures. While there is 
no doubt that the Three Natures scheme informs both the VS and MS, there are doubts, as 
I have mentioned, as to whether it can be applied to the TApa" and whether all three texts 
are in fact later than the SNS, as Tsong kha pa assumes (I return to this aspect of Tsong 
Kha pa’s interpretative scheme at the conclusion of this chapter).  
                                                                                                                                                 homonyms to counter the assumption of an exclusive one-word–one-essence relation. See Thurman 1984: 237.  300 “The Elucidation of Intention” = Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SNS); “Bodhisattva Stages” = Bodhisattvabhūmi (BBh);  ”Compendium” = Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (VS); “The Universal Vehicle Compendium” = Mahāyānasaṃgraha (MS).   301 Thurman 1984: 238.  
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Setting this matter aside for the moment, let us turn to Tsong kha pa’s 
interpretation of the MS argument from the “incompatibility between their natures,” 
which is parallel to the TApa" “third argument”:   
To express simply the proof of the relative being empty of the imagined because 
of the incompatibility between the natures of the two; if the fact of a round-bellied 
thing being the locus or basis of the expression 'pot' were to be established by the 
intrinsic identifiability or reality of round-belliedness, it would not be established 
on strength of conventions, and hence, the conventionally subjective cognition, 
without requiring any convention, would arise thinking 'pot' in regard to the 
round-bellied thing, before there was any designation of the name 'pot.' (Thurman 
1984: 237) 
 
According to Tsong kha pa's interpretation, this argument attacks the following premise: 
A relation of correspondence between the designation and the particular object is not the 
outcome of convention – i.e., it is determined in a manner that logically precedes and is 
not influenced by any actual language usage, and is grounded (somehow) in the relations 
between the essential nature and the object. But were that so, Tsong ka pa explains, the 
comprehension of meaning would occur without requiring any actual language use either 
in thought or in speech. This leads to many absurdities, most notably the rendering of all 
language usage an outer manifestation of an incommunicable private “language” whose 
semantics is determined prior to and independently of any actual language usage. Given 
the broad similarity between the MS section and the third argument in the TApa" 
(bracketing for now the question of the applicability of the Three Natures scheme to the 
latter), the statement in the TApa" third argument that “…suppose that before there was a 
figurative application of verbal designation, when it is yet unmade…” can now be read as 
presenting a logical condition rather than a temporal one. And since such logical priority 
was shown to be untenable, the essential nature cannot be apprehended or determined by 
the thing (which cannot serve as the "locus" of the essential nature).  
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3.6 An interim summary of Asa9ga’s three arguments. 
  
The three arguments of the TApa" presented above set out to refute three possible 
relations between words, objects, and their essences as a means to demonstrating the 
incoherence of an essentialist theory of reference. The argument from polysemy 
attempted to achieve this by showing that the requirement of the essentialist theory of 
reference for a strict monosemy is untenable. The second and third arguments examined 
the possibilities that the essential nature is apprehended either through the designation or 
through the thing, respectively. Both options were refuted by showing that, given its 
assumptions, an essentialist theory of meaning can take neither the designation nor the 
designatum to be logically prior and independent of the other. This appeared to leave 
only logical inter-dependence as a feasible relation. Viewed in (essentialist) referential 
terms, such a relation may appear close to the Mīmāṃsā notion of an innate, originally 
emergent (autpattika) connection between a word and its thing-meant.302 A definition of 
this relation is supplied in ŚāBh on the MiS 1.1.5:  
  ‘Autpattika’ – what we mean by this is nitya. It is ‘origin’ that is indirectly spoken 
of as existence (presence). It is the existence, inseparable from the word and the 
object, that constitutes the relation and there is no relation (made, produced) after 
both of them have been produced…. (Gächter 1983: 43)303 
 
                                                 302 An alternative un-denotative explanation for the same kind of logical relation is that the designation inheres in or is in actual physical contact with the thing-meant. Such a thesis is presented as a pūrvapakṣa stance in the NyS 2.1.53 and NySBh, one part of a broader discussion on the question of whether a word (śabda) may serve as a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) or is subsumed in inference and perception. The siddhāntin argues against the “relation of contact” hypothesis, pointing out that if words and objects inhered in each other, then objects would exist in the locus of their designations (the word “sword” would cut the mouth), or else designations would be in the locus of their objects – in which case speech would be impossible as words would not "reach" the speaker’s throat. Jha 1939b: 539.  303 See also D'Sa 1980: 93-4.  
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autpattika iti nitya brūma9. utpattir hi bhāva ucyate lakaayā. aviyukta9 
śabdārthayor bhāva9 sabandhena, notpannayo9 paścāt sabandha9….304  
 
Here Śabara glosses “autpattika” as referring primarily to the common and simultaneous 
origination of both a word and its meaning qua referent. The term nitya, as mentioned 
earlier (chapter I, part 1), stands here for an invariable connection, which is also marked 
by the necessary co-existence of word and meaning, so that neither one precedes the 
other.305  
Viewing the essentialist theory of reference in these terms enables us to pin point 
the cause of its incoherence and its vulnerability to AsaEga’s critique.306 It emerges as the 
outcome of the conjoining of two incompatible presuppositions: on the one hand, that a 
relation of logical interdependence holds between words and their referents as prescribed 
by their semantic unity, and on the other, that either the word or its referent 
independently constitutes or is the locus of an independently existent and self-reliant 
essence. This reading seems to be supported by the parallel sections in the VS, to which I 
turn next. Though it reiterates the second and third TApa" arguments, the VS nonetheless 
explicitly reframes the word-thing relations in terms of a dependence, as a result of 
refuting the claims that one or the other is prior. 
 
                                                 304 Pohlus (accessed: 25 February, 2010).  305 Gächter 1983: 42-45.  306 It also sheds light on the earlier assertion that “a dharma and a thing would be of the nature (tadātmakaṁ) of that [the designation],” a statement that appears to express simply the semantic unison of a word and its thing-meant. In fact it is this notion of identity that uncritically informs the “naïve” view that the essential nature of matter is “matter” (see part 3).  
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3.7 Part I of the VS account: the designation is not dependent on the sign-
source. 
 
  The VS rearranges the TApa" arguments into a different scheme, engaging a 
tetralemic structure of four possible relations between object, designation, and essence: to 
the three relations considered in the TApat it adds the possibility that the essential nature 
is apprehended neither by the object nor by the designation but by something else 
altogether. The VS also refutes, through a separate argument, the possibility of 
understanding the relations between the essential nature and the designation purely in 
epistemic terms by regarding the essential nature as revealed or illuminated (and not 
constituted) by the designation. These supplements to the TApa" analysis, as I will show 
below, provide new insight concerning the role of upacāras and the condition of 
ineffability, while also introducing a reflexive discussion on the role and meaning of 
philosophical discourse.  
The VS section opens, like the TApat, with a brief presentation of the goal and 
method of its reasoning. Its aim, as presented earlier, is to show that “the essential nature 
[of a sign-source] is not apprehended [and referred to] through a sign-source – neither in 
a sign-source [as a thing] nor through the name ‘sign-source’… Because an essential 
nature of all these is entirely logically unviable.”307 This is then demonstrated by the 
                                                 307 Whereas the TApaṭ discussed a tripartite relation between the designation, the desginatum qua object, and an alleged essential nature, for the VS the sign-source takes the place of the designated object. The reason for this preference may be traced to the fact that the VS understanding of the classification of the five dharmas takes both the sign-source and the name to be included under the Dependetn nature (unlike, for instance, the MV scheme, according to which the sign-source falls under the Dependent nature and the name under the Imagined). It seems to me that by using "sign-source" for the designated object Asaṅga aims, on the one hand, to underscore its existence in terms of the underlying causal reality of the Dependent (a perspective absent from the TApaṭ), and on the other, as we will see, to avoid the reification of the five dharmas classification (recall that Asaṅga intends the analysis of the sign-source to be applied to the other four categories as well). Thus, while the VS uses similar arguments to those that appear in the TApaṭ, it 
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following set of arguments, beginning with a rough parallel of the TApa" “third 
argument:”   
If one argues that with regard to positing [any] sign-source with whatever 
essential nature, since one figuratively designates names that correspond to that, 
[then] the figurative designations [therefore] are reliant (rag las pa) on that sign-
source. If that were so, however, then before the figurative designation [is made], 
there would rise a cognition of that as the sign-source, in accordance with [the 
later] assigning of a name. And, since for a single sign-source there would be 
many figurative designations, and because of their variety, many essential natures 
would ensue. Therefore it is not tenable that the figurative designation is 
dependent upon the sign-source (my emphasis).  
 
gal te ngo bo nyid gang gis rgyu mtshan rnam par gzhag pa de la de dang mthun 
pa nyid kyi ming nye bar 'dogs par byed pa'i phyir nye bar 'dogs pa ni rgyu 
mtshan la rag las pa yin no zhe na/ des na nye bar 'dogs pa'i sngon rol na/ji ltar 
ming rnam par gzhag pa bzhin du rgyu mtshan la de'i blo 'byung bar 'gyur ba 
dang/ rgyu mtshan gcig la yang nye bar 'dogs pa mang ba'i phyir dang/ sna 
tshogs pa'i phyir bdag nyid mang po 'thob par 'gyur bas/ de'i phyir nye bar 'dogs 
pa rgyu mtshan la rag las par mi rung ngo// (VS TD. 4038 Zi 11b4, 11b6-12a1) 
 
Insofar as a designation is always of something, the opponent seems to argue, one must 
assume that it is logically dependent upon its referent (here the sign-source is treated as 
the locus of the essential nature). But this alleged logical priority is incompatible, as we 
have seen, with the necessary co-existence of the designation and the referent, and hence 
is untenable. Moreover, the passage concludes by pointing out that even if the 
dependence of the designation upon its referent were possible, it would still be refuted by 
the argument from polysemy.  
                                                                                                                                                 emphasizes (through the illusory bodies analogy) the sense in which the appearance of the object does have some reality – as an inter-dependent causal nexus that brings it about  – which is what in fact the sign-source stands for. In this respect, the VS use of the sign-source is concordant with the stated purpose of the TApaṭ to avod both extremes of reification and absolute negation, since the term implies the non-essentiality of the object (hence countering samāropa), and at the same time points to the object’s underlying reality (thereby answering the apavādins).       
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Next, the VS addresses the converse scenario, i.e., that the designation is logically 
prior to the sign-source qua referent. While this passage follows the TApa" second 
argument quite closely, it also adds a rather baffling claim about a “fault of dependency,” 
which is in turn unpacked by yet another instance of the magical creation analogy:   
If it is argued that at the moment when one assigns a name to a sign-source, the 
essential nature of the sign-source comes about through the power of the name. If 
it were so, however, then before the figurative designation [is made] the essential 
nature of the sign-source would not exist, and if that does not exist also the 
figurative designation would not come into being, and therefore there would be 
the ill-consequence (thal bar 'gyur ba, prasa'ga) of the non-existence of both. 
Furthermore, due to the multiplicity and multifariousness of the figurative 
designations, there would be the fault of Dependency [of an essential nature – 
posited to be intrinsically real in itself, because of] having multiple essential 
natures. As for the Dependency – [it is] of the figurative designations upon the 
sign-source, and because of that it is not tenable that all the figurative 
designations [are the locus of] the essential nature that is the same,308 with that 
[which is figuratively designated]. 
It [the Dependency of designation upon an essentially real sign-source] is like the 
existence of the various bodies of an illusory being. As, for instance, in the case of 
the manifestation  (mngon par 'du byed pa, abhisaskāra) by a magician of an 
illusory being [manifested] through [its] various bodies [such as] the body of a 
man, a women, an elephant, a horse, a bear,309 a hyena,310 etc. Just as none of 
these bodies are the nature (bdag nyid) [of that being], similarly one should see 
that the figurative designations of the sign-source are not its nature. 
 
gal te ji ltar rgyu mtshan la ming rnam par 'jog par byed pa de bzhin du ming gi 
dbang gis rgyu mtshan gyi ngo bo de nyid 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhe na/ des na nye 
bar 'dogs pa'i sngon rol na rgyu mtshan gyi ngo po [line 2] nyid med par 'gyur te/ 
de med na nye bar 'dogs pa yang med par 'gyur bas de'i phyir de gnyis yang med 
par thal bar 'gyur ba dang/ nye bar 'dogs pa mang ba'i phyir dang /sna tshogs 
pa'i phyir bdag nyid mang po nyid dang/gzhan gyi dbang du 'gyur ba'i skyon du 
yang 'gyur ro // gzhan gyi dbang du 'gyur pa ni rgyu mtshan la nye bar 'dogs pas 
de'i phyir nye bar 'dogs pa thams cad kyis/ de'i bdag nyid kyi ngo bo nyid yin par 
mi rung ste/ sgyu ma'i skyes bu'i lus sna tshogs grub pa dang 'dra ste/ 'di lta ste/ 
                                                 308 de'i bdag nyid kyi ngo bo nyid (reconstructed as tadātmikasvabhāvatā), which was previously translated as “of the same nature," is here rendered "the same" in order to avoid the redundant phrasing “an essential nature that is of the same nature."   309 Dom (ṛkṣa). Tibetan-Sanskrit Buddhist Terminology Based on the `Mahāvyutpatti' and `Yogācārabhūmi' (2004: mvyut_4780).   310 Dred (tarakṣuḥ). Ibid. mvyut 4782. 
 161 
dper na sgyu ma mkhan gyis skyes ba dang/ bud med dang/ glang po che dang/ 
rta dang /dom dang / dred kyi lus la sogs pa'i lus sna tshogs kyis sgyu ma'i skyes 
bu mngon par 'du byed pa de ni  lus gang gis bdag nyid kyang ma yin pa de bzhin 
du/ rgyu mtshan yang nye bar 'dogs pa thams cad kyis de'i bdag nyid ma yin par 
blta bar bya'o/ (VS TD. 4038 Zi 11b6-12a5) 
 
The thesis that the designation is logically prior to the sign-source is refuted here 
by means of two distinct arguments. The first follows the contours of the TApa" second 
argument and requires no new explication. The second argument employs the argument 
from polysemy to establish the contrastive option – i.e., that in fact the designations are 
dependent on the sign-source rather than prior to it; hence “the fault of dependency.” But 
how precisely is this “fault of dependency” arrived at from the argument from polysemy? 
A reply to this question seems to be offered by the magical creation analogy, whose use 
here differs in important respects from its earlier application in the VS and the SNS. 
 
3.8   Part II of the VS account: the argument from polysemy as viewed  
through the magical creation analogy.  
 
The analogy describes a magician who creates an illusory being and transforms it 
so that it appears – perhaps in rapid succession – as the "bodies" of various creatures.311 
The analogy is quite straightforward: the illusory being is analogous to the sign-source 
qua referent, while the various "bodies" – various appearances of this being – are 
metaphors (nye bar ‘dogs pa, upacāras), the many ways in which one can figuratively 
designate the same designatum.  
Although the analogy presents a distinction between the "illusory being" and its 
"bodies," this does not seem to imply here a distinction between a Dependent causal 
ground and its Imagined manifestations, or between two aspects of appearances (as was 
                                                 311 It is quite obvious from the text that the various bodies are all considered to be of the same illusory being (sgyu ma'i skyes bu'i lus sna tshogs grub pa…).  
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the case in the previous SNS and VS use of the analogy; see part 3.2.1). Here the analogy 
is rather used to indicate another aspect of the argument from polysemy by emphasizing 
the referential interchangeability of the various figures insofar as they all designate the 
same sign-source. As I will show below, this feature serves not only to clarify the 
meaning of the "fault of dependency but also to shed light on the particular role AsaEga 
attributes to upacāras in his overall argumentation.  
Regarding, first, the so-called fault of dependency, the way in which this fault is 
explained via the emphasis of the magical creation analogy on the referential 
interchangeability of figures can be represented by the following reasoning:  
1) The thesis to be refuted is that the designation, insofar as it is the locus of the 
essential nature, is logically prior to the denoted sign-source.  
2) If indeed this is the case, then the designation must be a necessary condition for 
the identity of the designated sign-source (insofar as the latter is constituted by the 
essential nature).  
3) But this is incompatible with the possibility of a polysemy, i.e. of various figures 
denoting the same sign-source, with each such designating figure allegedly functioning as 
the locus of an essential nature.  
4) The reason provided for this incompatibility is that, given a polysemy, the 
identity of the sign-source will never be entirely dependent on only one 
designation/figure, as it can always derive its identity from the essential nature related to 
another figure.  
5) This implies that each figure, considered individually, is superfluous insofar as 
the denotation of the sign-source is concerned (rendering the sign-source the only stable 
element in signification).  
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6) In this respect the figures can be seen to be dependent on the sign-source and not 
the other way around, as the initial thesis posits (hence the “fault of dependency”).  
The fact that the figures are referentially interchangeable therefore attests to their 
dependency upon the sign-source and hence to their inadequacy as the loci of an essential 
nature. It should be noted that within this framework the figures’ sense does not come 
into play; it is only their referential function that is at stake.   
But the magical creation analogy appears to carry broader philosophical 
implications. To help uncover these, consider again that in all its variants the analogy 
places great importance on the vantage point of the spectators of the magic show. For 
instance, it is probable that while a “naïve” spectator would at first mistake the 
appearance of the illusory man for a genuine one, the subsequent transformation of this 
apparition into a woman and then into an elephant, a bear, and so on, would surely bring 
him to question the reality of everything that he has so far seen. This points to a crucial 
feature of this variant of the magical creation analogy: the illusion, it turns out, is 
uncovered by the fact of transformation itself, with the very succession of the different 
"bodies" attesting to their ephemeral and unreal existence and hence to their lack of an 
essential nature. Analogously, the possibility of many figures that refer to the same thing, 
and above all the fact of their "succession" – i.e., their referential interchangeability – is 
viewed as diagnostic of the “free floating” nature of language whose words are not tied to 
essentially existent things. It is therefore the very ease with which language proliferates 
through figurative usage, sanctioned only by convention, that exposes the fallacy of a 
correspondence theory of meaning; or so the analogy seems to tell us.  
This interpretation seems to open up a new way of understanding the role of 
figurative language within AsaEga’s philosophical discourse. Figures, in this picture, are 
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no longer viewed as mere content carriers – that is, linguistic entities whose function is to 
supplement the literal meaning of a referent with whatever additional information they 
carry regarding that referent. Instead, by virtue of their referential interchangeability and 
repetition they undermine a monosemic world-word correspondence, and in this sense are 
performative: reflexively invoking and calling to mind a certain understanding of the 
nature of language, not through any particular content but by the mere fact of their 
repeated presence. The medium of figurative usage becomes the message.  
For AsaEga, then, the uniqueness and usefulness of figures lies in their ability to 
demonstrate through their very existence and employment by language users that which 
is otherwise hidden behind habit and convention, namely, the absence of essential ties 
between words and their referents; the lack of any essentialist grounding for language. In 
this respect figures become paradigmatic of all designations, and it is perhaps not 
coincidental that from this point onward AsaEga seems to use “upacāra” as a generic 
term for all language usage and no longer only interchangeably with prajñaptivāda.  
The notion of figurative language as possessing a performance-like quality is not 
unknown in ancient Indian thought, and in the following chapter I discuss in detail its 
broader context as well as its implications for the Yogācāra hermeneutical and 
philosophical discourse. For now, however, it is worth noting the analogy’s affinity with 
a basic Mahāyāna view of language as, on the one hand, the root of our mistaken grasp of 
reality, and on the other, capable of illuminating that mistake and untying its own knot. 
This approach is prominent in the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) literature and 
derivative treatises, in which dialectics is often used not only to pronounce but also to 
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demonstrate the demise of language at its own hands.312  In some sūtra and śāstra 
instances, like the one before us, this broad theme is concretized in the form of particular 
analogies in which language appears as a potent, almost agentive element by virtue of its 
ability for self-negation. Similarly, in a well-known passage from the Vigrahavyāvarttaī 
(VV), Nāgārjuna is criticized on the grounds that his statement that all things are Empty is 
self-contradicting. The opponent’s argument is complex and multilayered, but its main 
thrust is a questioning of the legitimacy and meaningfulness of Nāgārjuna’s own use of 
language. This is achieved by pointing to the practical contradiction involved in negating 
an essential nature via arguments whose linguistic meaningfulness and efficacy require 
the assumption of independently and essentially existing things.313 In response, 
Nāgārjuna clarifies the status of the negation deployed by his notion of Emptiness by 
appealing to the following analogy:  
Suppose that a person, artificially created (nirmitaka), should prevent 
(pratiedhayeta) another artificial person, or that a magical man (māyāpuruaka) 
should prevent another man created by his own magic (svamāyayā ta) [from 
doing something]. Of the same nature would be this negation…. 
(Bhattacharya 1970/71: 233)314 
 
                                                 312 For a brief introduction to some of the dialectical patterns in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, see McMahan 2002: 33-41.  313 VV 1-4; Nāgārjuna’s reply to this critique is presented in VV 21-29. See Bhattacharya 1970/71: 221-4, 231-238.    314 A similar claim is repeated elsewhere in the VV : “[S]uppose that concerning an artificial woman, void of an intrinsic nature (svabhāśūnya), some man should have the false notion (asadgrāha) that it is really (paramārthataḥ) a women and, as a result of that false notion, should feel desire for her. The Tathāgata or a disciple of the Tathāgata would [then] create an artificial man (nirmitako nirmitaā syāt), [and] the latter would dispel the false notion of that man, through the power (adhiṣṭhāna) of the Tathāgata or of the disciple of the Tathāgata. Likewise, by my void statement, comparable to the artificial man (nirmitako-pamena  śūnyena madvacanena), is prevented the idea of an intrinsic nature in all things which are devoid of an intrinsic nature and comparable to the artificial woman.…" Ibid. 235-6.  
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The efficacy of a negation is unaffected by the ontological status of the thing used 
in the negation; this is the essence of Nāgārjuna's retort.315 More fundamentally, he uses 
the analogy to align the reader with the aim of his philosophical activity: clarifying that 
his use of language is aimed not at refuting or asserting any particular theses but rather at 
demonstrating through self-negation language's own "fictionality," or lack of essentiality. 
This point is crucial for the understanding of Nāgārjuna's long-debated statement in the 
VV that “I have, however, no thesis (nāsti ca mama pratijñā).”316 Seen through the lens of 
his "creation of the artificial man" analogy, this assertion would seem to imply that 
Nāgārjuna’s destructive dialectics should be thought of not as establishing Emptiness but 
as demonstrating or manifesting its already-established presence.317 
Viewed against this background, the VS magical creation analogy is seen to be 
operating on more than one level at once: it serves AsaEga's argument directly in the 
ways I have described (primarily by clarifying the "fault of dependency"), but also by 
embodying a basic Mahāyāna imagery and applying its argumentative strategy. In this 
                                                 315 For a survey of different kinds of negation in Indian philosophical lore and the one employed by the Madhyamaka, see Matilal 1971: 162-5.  316 VV 29, Bhattacharya (1970/71: 237).  317 The presence of emptiness is revealed by the negative way of demonstrating the incoherence of any attempt to account for independently existent things. This incoherence is viewed as the outcome of taking our conceptual scheme to be composed of independent and self-standing concepts, while in fact they are inter-dependent. This portrays Nāgārjuna’s critique as operating under the acute awareness that there is no possibility to account for reality outside the limits of a discourse. Emptiness is therefore understood primarily as a conceptual critique, delineating the limits of possible discourse (and thereby, according to some interpretations, outlining the possibility of an ineffable absolute). An understanding of Nāgārjuna’s “positionlessness” along these lines is presented, for instance, in Biderman (2008), Garfield (2002), Huntington (1983), Oetke (2003), Ruegg (2000), and Thurman (1984). These authors differ, however, on the question of whether Nāgārjuna has no stance at all (Huntington, Biderman, and others) or merely holds a stance from the relative point of view but not ultimately (as argued by Garfield, Oetke, Ruegg, Thurman, and others). For more on this debate, see Garfield 2008, and Huntington 2007.  
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respect the analogy functions as an extended argument about the role and meaning of 
AsaEga’s own language usage within a philosophical discourse. It is not just informative 
but also performative, not merely telling but actively begetting and manifesting its own 
demise.318 
 
3.9 Part III of the VS account: the essential nature is not apprehended or 
determined by anything other than the designation and the sign-source. 
 
Finally, having previously shown that the essential nature is apprehended or 
determined neither through the thing and the designation combined (the argument from 
polysemy), nor  through the designation or the sign-source independently of each other, 
AsaEga turns to refute the remaining logical option – that it is known independently of 
both:  
If it is argued that the figurative designation and sign-source bring about an 
essential nature that is separate from both of them together, then it stands to reason 
that it would have been perceived as either the sign-source, the name, both of them, 
or something [altogether] different than that, [but such a thing] is not perceived. 
Therefore, that [kind of essential nature] is not tenable. In light of all of the above, 
an essential nature originates from convention.  
  
/gal te rgyu mtshan dang nye bar 'dogs pa gnyi ga 'dus pas de dang bral ba'i ngo 
bo nyid skyed par byed na ni des na de'i rgyu mtshan nam/ ming ngam/ de gnyis 
ga'am/ bar ma do zhig yin par dmigs pa'i rigs ni mi dmigs te/ de'i phyir de yang mi 
rung ngo// de lta bas na ngo bo nyid ni tha snyad las byung ba yin no/ ( VS TD. 
4038 Zi 12a5-6) 
  
Here this portion of AsaEga’s argument reaches its end point: he has demonstrated the 
conventionality of any essential nature that appears to be as it is designated. But this 
conclusion is arrived at by default, since nowhere does he prove the unreality of the 
essential nature, only its incoherence insofar as it is assumed to be originated and 
                                                 318 And in doing so, also testifies to its efficacy at the level of conventional truth.  
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determined either by the designation or the sign-source, or by the combination of these 
two, or by something altogether different.  
To summarize: AsaEga has shown the unfeasibility of any referential relations that 
involve essence, thereby collapsing the assumptions of an essentialist theory of meaning. 
This result implies, on the one hand, the inexpressibility of a real essential nature (its 
inaccessibility to language), and on the other, the conventionality of any expressed 
essential nature. In this respect AsaEga shows the inexpressibility of the essential nature 
to be actually a criterion of its reality.  
Furthermore, as in the TApa" so too in the VS, the argument that neither the sign-
source nor its designation is logically or epistemologically prior appears to imply that the 
only feasible relation between these elements is one of logical interdependence. This is 
reinforced by the magical bodies analogy, since while it shows that figures may appear 
dependent upon the denoted sign-source (the various bodies being of the illusory being), 
the scene also implies the opposite – that the sign-source cannot be conceived 
independently of the figures (as there is no real "illusory being" perceived independently 
of its apparitions).319 In light of this, the fallacy of the essentialist theory of meaning 
emerges as none other than the attempt to view inter-dependent things (designations and 
their designata) as independent of each other insofar as one of them is assumed to be the 




                                                 319 And in this sense the sign-source is a mere conceptual abstraction based on numerous different experiences. This argument is molded on the classical Buddhist argument for the impossibility of any experience of a distinct "self" as such, independently of its various constitutes.    
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3.10 Part IV of the VS account: designations do not even “illuminate” or 
reveal an essential nature.    
 
In the ensuing section of the VS AsaEga proceeds to refute yet another potential 
objection by adherents to an essentialist theory of reference, according to which 
designations, though they cannot impart the essential nature, nonetheless yield knowledge 
of reality. Here the emphasis is epistemic: language is perceived not as embodying reality 
but as revealing it, making it manifest. The word-world correspondence, in this scheme, 
is therefore understood to be the outcome of the power of words to reveal essential 
reality. AsaEga undermines this assumption with the following analysis:  
If one wishes to say that the figurative designations [illuminate] the essential 
natures and cause them to become manifest [mngon par gsal bar byed pa, 
abhivyañjyante], this too is not tenable, since there will be a fault regarding the 
figurative designations [in any case] whether one has [initially] grasped [their 
referent, i.e. the sign-source], or whether one did not [yet] grasp it. When one is 
figuratively designating, having already grasped the sign-source, it is not tenable 
that [the designation] will cause it to manifest [because it has already been 
grasped, and therefore it is already manifested]. Then again, in the case of 
figuratively designating without having grasped the sign-source, a figurative 
designation without a basis (gzhi med pa, niradhi"hāna) is impossible. And here 
as before, there would also be the fault of [having] multiple natures, due to a 
multiplicity and multifariousness of figures. [Furthermore], the example of 
illumination is not tenable also because it is discordant. Here the discordance is as 
such: [light as] a cause for the manifestation and appearance [of things] is 
undifferentiated (bye brag med pa, aviśiā"a) in relation to all things, but it is also 
variegated. Figurative designation as a cause for grasping, however, is not like 
that. 
 
gal te nye bar 'dogs pa ni ngo bo nyid rnams kyi mngon par gsal bar byed pa yin 
par 'dod na/[Asa'ga]_de ltar yang mi rung ste/_bzung nas sam/_ma bzung bar 
nye bar 'dogs pa'i skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro/gal te rgyu mtshan bzung nas nye 
bar 'dogs par byed na ni mngon par gsal bar byed pa yin par mi rung ngo /ji ste 
rgyu mtshan ma bzung bar nye bar 'dogs par byed na ni gzhi med par nye bar 
'dogs pa mi rung ngo//snga ma bzhin du bdag nyid du ma yin pa'i skyon du yang 
'gyur te/_nye bar 'dogs pa rnams ni mang po sna tshogs yin pa'i phyir ro// gsal 
bar byed pa'i dpe ni mi mthun pa yin pas mi rung ste/ de la mi mthun pa ni 'di yin 
te/ snang zhing mngon par gsal bar byed pa'i rgyu ni thams cad la bye brag med 
pa dang/ sna tshogs pa yang yin la nye bar 'dogs pa ni de ltar 'dzin pa'i rgyu ni de 
lta ma yin pa'o/ (VS TD. 4038 Zi 12a6-b2) 
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As he has done before, AsaEga here capitalizes on the incompatibility between the 
alleged epistemic priority of the designation or the sign-source, and their actual mutual 
dependence. If knowledge of the sign-source precedes the designation, then it cannot be 
said to be revealed by it. On the other hand, it is untenable that the designation is 
perceived first because a designation cannot be without a "basis" – i.e., referenceless.320 
(And even if it could, he adds, this possibility would still be undermined by the argument 
from polysemy.) Finally, AsaEga points out that the opponent’s objection is informed and 
to some extent unduly buttressed by a false view of language as analogous to light insofar 
as both are distinct from the objects they manifest. The analogy breaks down, according 
to AsaEga, because while light falls equally on all things but still reveals their diversity, a 
designation has the capacity to “pick out” only one specific referent.321  
 
3.11 The opponent’s objection: the claim that the essential nature is 
inexpressible is itself an expression of it.   
 
In response, the opponent turns the spotlight on the way in which AsaEga’s non-
realist conception of language affects the veracity and meaningfulness of his own 
assertions. His objection begins by pointing out a practical difficulty involved in claiming 
that the essential nature is inexpressible:  
If it is argued [by the opponent]: by describing something as inexpressible the so-
called 'inexpressible' thing appears to be expressed, therefore [calling it] 
'inexpressible' is untenable. Furthermore, the analogy [of the magically induced 
bodies] is discordant, since although the existence (grub pa) of multifarious 
                                                 320 Here “basis” is understood as a referential basis rather than a substantive or essential one.  A similar assertion is repeated by Sthiramati in his Triṃśika-bhāṣya (see chapter V, part 5).      321 Here Asaṅga suggests, perhaps ironically, that in submitting uncritically to the metaphor of language as light, those who attempt to view language as revealing reality are themselves victims of language’s own tendency toward reification.  
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bodies of an illusory person is not its nature, [nevertheless, in some aspect] the 
existence of a variety of bodies of the illusory person is its nature.  
To this we reply that there is no fault here, since at the moment of stating that 
something inexpressible is 'inexpressible,' [the expressability of] that very 
[statement] has already been refuted. For the purpose of understanding this very 
point, [the statement of the inexpressibility of the real essential nature] was 
employed. And because of its similarity [to the figurative designations] the 
example [of the illusory bodies] is not discordant, [as] the figurative designations 
are also not [a thing’s] nature, but also it is not that there is no point322 in [calling 
the nature] inexpressible.323 
 
gang gi phyir brjod du med par brjod par yang brjod du med pa zhes bya bar 
brjod par snang ba de'i phyir/ brjod du med pa zhes bya bar mi rung la / sgyu 
ma'i skyes bu lus sna tshogs su grub pa de dag gis de'i bdag nyid ma yin yang/ 
sgyu ma'i skyes bu lus sna tshogs su grub pa de'i bdag nyid yin pas/ de'i phyir 
yang dpe mi mthun pa yin no zhe na/ smras pa/ brjod du med pa de brjod du med 
do zhes dam bcas pa'i tshe kho na dgag pa byas zin pas de la nyes pa med do// 
don de nyid rtogs par bya ba'i phyir sbyor bar byed pa yin no/  'dra ba'i phyir dpe 
mi mthun pa yang ma yin la nye bar 'dogs pa dag gis de'i bdag nyid kyang ma yin 
zhing / brjod du med pa'i don med pa yang ma yin no/ (VS TD. 4038 Zi 12b2-4) 
 
The passage presents a twofold objection. The first part argues that AsaEga’s assertion of 
the inexpressibility of reality itself expresses this reality in some minimal way, resulting 
in a performative contradiction (because the thing described as inexpressible cannot by 
definition be the referent of any language usage).324 The second portion argues that 
                                                 322 This section of the VS argument seems to rely on the inherent ambiguity of the term “don” (artha) to present a critique of the inexpressibility claim as referenceless, meaningless, or, in the current passage, purposeless.    323 The interpretation of this passage raises some difficulties, primarily because the argumentative context seems to indicate that here it is the opponent who argues that “…the analogy is discordant,” whereas in the previous discussion of the “light” analogy this was the Siddhāntin’s stance. The likelihood of a misprint – i.e., that a negation has been dropped from the original verse, which otherwise would read "it is not that the example is discordant” (de'i phyir yang dpe mi mthun pa ma yin no zhe na) – is small given that the same form is repeated also in the Peking and Narthang editions of the text. The only coherent interpretation, as far as I can see, is to read the "discordant analogy” as referring not to the “light” analogy but to the previously mentioned magical creation analogy, which is also the topic of the subsequent passage. See the critical edition of the Tanjur: Bstan 'Gyur 1994: v. 74, zi 772, 1048.  324 My use of the notion of a performative contradiction follows Habermas' definition of it as a mismatch between the content and the performance of a speech act. See Matustik 1989. A very similar paradox is 
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AsaEga’s claim of inexpressibility – understood to be asserting that language is incapable 
of revealing any aspect of reality – is incompatible with his use of the magical creation 
analogy. The opponent explains that while the magically created bodies (analogous to the 
figures) may not be the being’s essential nature, nonetheless they constitute its illusory 
nature; by analogy, while designations may not be able to reveal the object’s essential 
nature, they are still expressive of some aspect of its reality – some form of 
"conventional" illusory existence.325 But this is incompatible with the claim of total 
inexpressibility.  
AsaEga therefore finds himself on the horns of a dilemma, apparently forced to 
accept either that his inexpressibility claim admits of exceptions (thereby undermining its 
entire purpose), or that his reliance on the magical creation analogy is inadequate and 
therefore that his argument is, as it stands, flawed. More fundamentally, this line of 
criticism challenges not the propriety of particular analogies but the very meaningfulness 
                                                                                                                                                 presented in Bhartṛhari’s VP (verses 20-29 of the third Kāṇḍa), although the solution proposed there differs radically from that of the VS. According to Houben's analysis of this paradox (1995: 213-233), unlike Western analytical approaches to similar paradoxes (such as the "liar paradox"), Bhartṛhari emphasizes the pragmatic aspect of the scenario at hand, pointing out that the speaker’s intention and the communicative context are factors that do not allow an assertion to become its own object. In other words, once the statement “That is inexpressible” is understood, its expressive function cannot be negated and hence it cannot be placed on the same level with any other expression denoting “that” which can hypothetically be negated.   325 In essence, the opponent's objection is similar to Tsong kha pa's interpretation of Bhāvya's critique of the Yogācāra in the twenty-fifth chapter of his Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛttti. There, Bhāvya presents a pūrvapakṣa characterizing the Imagined nature as “identity un-reality.” According to Tsong kha pa's interpretation, Bhāvya responds that if indeed the Imagined – standing in for the realm of designations –  is non-existent as the Yogācāra claims it to be, then this would imply also the non-existence of the causal basis of these designations in the Dependent (resulting in a view of them as "identity-unreality," lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā). This leads Tsong kha pa to contend that Bhāvya holds a view of things as essentially and identifiably existent conventionally, but not ultimately. See Thurman 1984: 265-272, and also Eckel 2003: 177-182.   
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and legitimacy of AsaEga’s arguments, portraying them as a doomed attempt to escape 
the fact that meaningful language usage is forever conditioned upon a word-referent 
correspondence (regardless of the latter’s ontological status). By arguing that ultimate 
reality is inexpressible (and hence assuming an inherent gap between words and reality), 
AsaEga  purports to negate this correspondence, while in practice, insofar as he himself 
uses language meaningfully, he affirms it. In other words, AsaEga is said to be guilty of 
the skeptic’s fallacy, whereby the very formulation of an epistemic doubt is seen to 
reaffirm – in practice – the prima facie validity of the knowledge claim it seeks to 
undermine.326  
AsaEga’s reply to the first branch of the objection is straightforward and yet notable 
for its ability to argue and at the same time enact the performative aspect of his 
assertions. The claim that the essential nature is inexpressible is intentionally self-
refuting, he proposes, casting its self-refutation as part of an all-encompassing refutation 
of every and any attempt to express reality. Once again we find here parallels to the 
sections of Nāgārjuna’s VV mentioned above (part 3.8), in which he is criticized for 
advancing a claim that similarly undermines itself (if “all things are empty,” as he claims, 
then so is that claim itself). In response, Nāgārjuna affirms this as a way of indicating the 
all-encompassing nature of the negation expressed by his “emptiness” claim. Using the 
same technique, AsaEga replies to the current objection by embracing the objection’s 
view of his own claims as engaging in self-negation. But granting this to the opponent, he 
points out, does not imply that language usage is altogether pointless. Rather, by showing 
                                                 326 On the notion of prima facie justified knowledge in the context of Indian schools of thought, see Dan Arnold’s interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā notion of the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) of the Vedas as stemming from a realist conception of truth (i.e., upholding a distinction between the truth and justification of knowledge claims) (2005: 65-88, 103-114).    
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that every expressed reality is untenable, language is used to delineate the limits of 
expression, and by doing so it indicates the possibility of its transcendence. Thus, the 
inexpressibility claim is far from futile: it is informative insofar as it makes known a 
certain possible state of affairs without reifying it,327 and performative insofar as it 
actively engages in self-negation and, as such, manifests what lies beyond it.  
The opponent’s critique of the magical creation analogy is dissolved in a similar 
manner. Like the inexpressibility claim, the analogy is understood to be engaging solely 
in negation; it indicates the absence of an essential nature without purporting to establish 
an "illusory nature" in its stead. The illusion, therefore, is not used here for the purpose of 
pointing out the multilayered ontological structure of experience but rather, not unlike the 
function of emptiness, to confer upon experience a certain status – namely, lacking an 
essential nature. This amounts to a denial not of the earlier VS assertions that the illusion 
does have some form of existence (and as pointed out by Gold with respect to the TSN 
and MSA; see part 3.2.1) but of the assumption that such an existence can somehow be 
indicated by the illusory bodies. By analogy, it is not the underlying reality of nominal 
phenomena that is denied but rather the claim that nominal phenomena themselves are 
able to describe or illuminate this reality.  
AsaEga, however, has yet to address the more fundamental critique regarding the 
meaningfulness of his assertions in light of the fact that they fly in the face of even the 
                                                 327 This reading of the role of the inexpressibility claim appears explicitly also in the TApaṭ, here quoted in Willis' translation: “Therefore from the Scriptures and also from the Tathagata's supreme lineage of trustworthy successors, one should understand that all dharmas have an inexpressible essential nature. Now, since all dharmas thus have inexpressible essential nature, why is expression applicable at all? Verily, because without expression, the inexpressible true nature could not be told to others, nor heard by others. And if it were neither spoken nor heard, then the inexpressible essential nature could not become known. Therefore, expression is applicable for producing knowledge through hearing” (1979: 125).  
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most basic assumption of a correspondence theory of meaning. The following passage 
raises this point, while recapping the argument so far:  
If it is said: when names are figuratively applied,328 an existent (dngos po, 
vastu)329 [underlying the] sign-source is possible (srid par 'gyur), [but] without 
the figurative application, it is not possible. In this way an analogy based on 
similitude (sādharmya-d"ānta) is tenable, and the notion of inexpressibility also 
stands to reason. If it were not so, the notion of inexpressibility would have been 
referenceless.  
[To this] we reply: as mentioned, in the 'the stage of actuality' (vastubhūmi)330 it is 
instructed that from eight kinds of discursive thought (vikalpa), three kinds of 
presently-arisen (da ltar byung ba, pratyutpanna) existents, arise. And [these] 
three types of arisen existents arise because they are produced through these 
[types] of discursive thought. By the mode of being connected with that the 
thoroughly addictive things (kun nas nyon mongs, saklea) emerge 
uninterruptedly, and because [of all of that] there can be an analogy based on 
similitude. When one abandons figurative designations and discursive thought, 
[then] also the elimination of the thorough-addictions is possible, and yet that is 
not [complete] annihilation since it is perceived by noble wisdom, and therefore 
the notion of inexpressibility is not meaningless.    
 
gal te ming gis nye bar 'dogs par byed na ni rgyu mtshan gyi dngos po srid par 
'gyur la/mi byed na ni mi srid par 'gyur na ni de lta na chos mthun pa'i dpe yang 
rung bar 'gyur la/brjod du med par rtog pa yang rigs par 'gyur ro//gal te de lta 
ma yin na/de'i phyir brjod du med par rtog pa ni don med pa yin no zhe na/ smras 
pa/sa'i dngos gzhir rnam par rtog pa snga ma rnam pa brgyad las da ltar byung 
ba'i dngos po rnam pa gsum 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes ji skad bstan pa yin te/ 
'byung ba'i dngos po rnam pa gsum po de yang rnam par rtog pa rnams kun tu 
skyed pa'i phyir 'byung bas yin te/ de ltar 'brel ba'i tshul gyis kun nas nyon mongs 
pa rgyun mi 'chad par 'gyur ba'i de'i phyir dpe ni chos mthun pa yin no/ rnam par 
rtog pa'i nye bar 'dogs pa spangs na/_kun nas nyon mongs pa ldog pa yang rung 
                                                 328 Literally: "when figures are applied through the use of names" (nāma-upacāra-kriyante).   329 Here I translate vastu  as “existent” rather than "thing" because the context makes it clear that the opponent uses it specifically in the sense of the true ontological basis for designation (which Asaṅga contends is merelyvikalpa).  330 Maulī-bhūmi (often translated as Bhūmivastu). The reference is apparently to a particular passage in the TApaṭ,  included in Willis’ translation: “Precisely because that Suchness is not thoroughly known (aparijñātatva), the eight kinds of discursive thought (vikalpa) arise for immature beings (bāla) and operate so as to create the three bases (trivastu), which further produce the receptacle worlds (bhājanaloka) of all sentient beings“ (1979: 125-126). On the eight kinds of vikalpa, see Ibid. 126-133.     
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ste/ de ni 'phags pa'i ye shes kyis dmigs pa yin pas/ de yang chad ma yin te/ de'i 
phyir brjod du med par rtog pa don med pa ma yin no/  (VS TD. 4038 Zi 12b4-
13a1) 
 
The passage summarizes the opponent's critique, which has shifted from arguing 
that language can reveal the essential nature to the more minimal yet powerful claim that 
a word-referent correspondence is a condition of meaningful language usage. The 
opponent begins by pointing out the almost trivial dependence of any view of the world 
on its representation through language. He seems to contend that even though language 
may supply us with only a partial or derivative picture of real existents – in this case only 
figuratively denoting the “existents underlying phenomenal [sign-source] objects” (rgyu 
mtshan gyi dngos po) – it still must maintain a certain word-referent correspondence as a 
condition of its meaningfulness. In order to be meaningful, his view implies, language 
must be referential, but it cannot be self-referential – it must point to things that are extra-
linguistic. Otherwise the inexpressibility claim would be referenceless and therefore 
meaningless, and it would be impossible to draw analogies based on a similitude between 
things (as opposed to words).331 Therefore, the opponent concludes, for AsaEga’s 
language usage to be meaningful he must accept that in some way – even if derivative or 
distorted – language does describe reality.    
AsaEga’s reply clarifies that both the phenomenal appearance of [sign-source] 
things (rgyu mtshan) and their alleged underlying existents (vastu), insofar as they are 
expressed, are merely conceptual constructs. Language, therefore, is entirely incapable of 
reaching reality, and a word-referent correspondence is merely a feature of the realm of 
discursive thought. Despite these facts, however, the meaningfulness of discourse is 
                                                 331 The opponent refers to a particular sādharmya type of dṛṣṭānta, which is “a type of dṛṣṭānta in which the terms and aspect of subject and examples are in balanced concord.” See Gerow 1971: 201.   
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maintained because meaning is now understood to be given by a word-referent 
correspondence that is a constructed and conventional relation, one that holds regardless 
of the reality of these elements.  
The passage, then, presents two different perspectives on language and meaning. 
For the opponent, words are meaningful insofar as they correspond (not necessarily 
directly or accurately) to referents that are real existents, at least at their core. For 
AsaEga, this correspondence is no more than an intrinsic feature of the constructed 
conceptual realm itself, so that language can be meaningful without conveying any real 
knowledge about reality. And it is also effective insofar as it is informative (in ways other 
than supplying information on reality) and performative. Thus, since it is both efficacious 
and not without a referent (albeit unreal), the inexpressibility claim is no less meaningful 
than any other language use viewed from the conventional point of view.  
AsaEga concludes the passage with the statement that knowledge of the true 
inexpressible reality is possible, characterizing it negatively, as the elimination of figures 
and discursive thought, but also positively – as the object perceived by noble wisdom. 
The opponent finds it hard to see how the elimination of discursive thought and figures 
does not necessarily entail the total annihilation of the phenomenal realm:  
If one says: if  you abandon figurative designations [produced through] discursive 
thought, since they set forth existents and sign-sources, then by means of any 
single noble wisdom, there will be the ill-consequence of the cessation of all 
living beings and inanimate things which are held together (bsdus pa) by [the 
combination of] discursive thought and the sign-sources. Just as, for instance, in 
the example of a magician and [his] illusory acts. 
  
gal te rgyu mtshan gyi dngos po rnam par gzhag pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa'i nye 
bar 'dogs pa spong ba yin na/ de lta na 'phags pa'i ye shes gang yang rung ba 
gcig gis rgyu mtshan dang rnam par rtog pas bsdus pa'i sems can dang/_sems can 
du bgrang ba ma yin pa'i dngos po thams cad 'gog par thal bar 'gyur te/ 'di lta 




Underlying this passage is the presupposition that the phenomenal world in its entirety is 
identical with and the product of discursive thought and verbal activity. The opponent 
points out that the elimination of discursive thought and subsequently of all phenomena is 
unthinkable for a bodhisattva who is supposed to remain in sasāra and attend to the 
well-being of others. AsaEga’s reply illuminates some aspects of the Yogācāra 
understanding of language and discursive thought as actively involved in the construction 
of the intersubjective experience:  
 [To this] we reply: since an entity arises from an un-shared (thun mong ma yin 
pa, asādhārana) cause [through] discursive thought,332 and from a shared cause 
[through] discursive thought, [therefore] any imagined333 thing that arises from an 
un-shared cause through discursive thought will cease, [while] anything that is not 
imagined [due to noble wisdom] and arises from a shared cause through discourse 
thought will not cease, because it is grasped by the discursive thought of others. If 
it were not so, [the existence of] the discursive thought of others would be 
pointless.  
And even though it [that arises from a shared cause] does not cease, it should be 
understood as the purified vision of one whose nature is completely pure, just 
like, for example, in the case of many Yogis [who] through knowledge [that 
should be born] of equipoise (mnyam par gzhang pa) in respect to one object, 
orienting (mos par byed pa) [their attention] to a variety of things, will apprehend 
a variety of visions. 
 
smras pa/ dngos po ni rnam par rtog pa thun mong ma yin pa'i rgyu las byung ba 
dang / rnam par rtog pa thun mong pa'i rgyu las byung ba yin pas/ rnam par rtog 
pa thun mong ma yin pa'i rgyu las byung ba rnam par brtags pa gang yin pa de ni 
'gog par 'gyur la/ rnam par rtog pa thun mong ba'i rgyu las byung ba rnam par 
                                                 332 In light of the AS section quoted below, and in accordance with other Yogācāra discussions of this issue, I take “un-shared” (thun mong ma yin pa) to be qualifying the “cause” (rgyu) rather than “discursive thought” (rnam par rtog pa), thereby adding an implicit instrumental case ending for the latter. The alternative interpretation of this compound would read: “(a thing)…which has un-shared discursive thought as its cause.”   333 Rnam par brtags pa. A negation is added both in the Peking and the Narthang editions of the text, rendering it “un-imagined” (rnam par ma brtags pa), which however seems incompatible with the overall argument. Bstan 'Gyur 1994: v. 74 zi 1048.    
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ma brtags pa gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi rnam par rtog pas zin pa yin pas mi 
'gog ste/ gzhan du na gzhan gyi rnam par rtog pa don med par 'gyur ro/  
/de ma 'gags na yang rnam par dag pa'i bdag nyid can gyi mthong ba rnam par 
dag par 'gyur bar khong du chud par bya ste/ 'di lta ste/_dper na rnal 'byor pa 
rab tu mang pos dngos po gcig la mnyam par gzhag pa'i shes pas sna tshogs su 
mos par byed pa dag la mthong ba sna tshogs dag dmigs par 'gyur ba de dang 
'dra'o/ (VS TD. 4038 Zi 13a2-5) 
 
AsaEga’s reply should be interpreted against the background of the Buddhist view 
that the arising of the “sentient and insentient receptacle world” (sattva-bhājana-loka) is 
caused by none other than the accumulated actions (karma) of its beings,334 an idea that 
was emphasized and developed in various Yogācāra treatises. For instance, in the 
Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS), ascribed to AsaEga, karma as the cause of the world is said 
to be of two kinds, common and uncommon, which are involved in the construction of 
animate and inanimate realms respectively: 
[W]hat is common action (sādhāraakarma)? It is action that produces various 
changes in the receptacle world (inanimate world, bhājanalokaajanaloka).What is 
non-common action (asādhāraakarma)? It is action that produces various 
changes in the world of beings (animate world, sattvaloka), and also actions by 
beings who dominate them reciprocally. It is with reference to the power of that 
action that there is mention of the reciprocally dominant condition 
(anyonyādhipatipratyaya) of beings. By reason of that reciprocal power which 
dominates them (beings), that action is also called common action. Hence, the 
Sutra says: [It is] like mutual vision, etc., among beings in relation to each other. 
The denial of mutual experience is not admitted. (Walpola 2000b: 118) 
 
This AS section proposes a mapping of experience along three parallel distinctions. The 
most fundamental of these is the distinction between the animate and inanimate spheres, 
supplemented by the distinctions between volitional and un-volitional karma,335 and 
between the intersubjective and private realms of experience. According to this scheme, it 
                                                 334 sattva-bhājana-lokasya bahudhā vaicitryam uktaṃ tat kena kṛtaṃ ? . . . sattvānāṃ karmajaṃ loka-vaicitryaṃ . . .׀ “By whom was the manifold variety of the sentient and in-sentient [receptacle] world created?…The variety of the world arises from action of beings....” AKBh 4.1a. in: Dwarikadas 1981: 567.   335 Walpola 2000b: 118 n.97. 
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is our shared un-volitional karma that regulates and effects what is experienced as 
primarily an independent intersubjective world of nature. In addition it also brings about, 
under some constraints, all intersubjective content of the inter-personal realm (for 
instance mutual vision). Uncommon volitional karma, on the other hand, is responsible 
for regulating and creating the animate and mostly privately experienced realm. 
Considered in this context, AsaEga’s reply in the VS appears to view discursive thought 
along two recursive axes: one the one hand, as the unified cause of all mentally 
constructed phenomena, and on the other as the product of either shared or unshared 
constructive processes (traced back to common and uncommon karma). The 
bodhisattva’s elimination of discursive thought is understood to apply to the un-shared 
kind alone. Therefore, while he is still active in the intersubjective constructed realm of 
sasāra (maintained by the shared discursive thought of others), he no longer actively 
constructs it for himself or others.   
 AsaEga concludes by noting that the bodhisattva sees for what it is even what 
remains of the discursive thought of others, viewed by him as a purified realm, free of 
construction. This is supported by an analogy designed to illustrate a perspectival view of 
experience. The scenario involves a visualization meditation of some sort in which the 
adept practitioner focuses his attention on one particular prescribed object; though several 
such practitioners meditate on the same object, they nonetheless see different things in 
accordance with their different dispositions. By analogy, we are to understand, the 
enlightened mind and the defiled mind, though they see the same things, perceive them 
differently.  
With this perspectival view AsaEga brings to a close his argument regarding the 
relations between language and reality. The way in which language is understood, he 
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seems to be proposing, is a function of one's epistemic vantage point. For the naïve, 
language appears capable of reaching and revealing real referents, things that are said to 
be and appear in accordance with their designations. For the wise, it appears merely as 
the proliferation of interchangeable figures, conventional and hence also meaningful, but 
unable truly to describe reality, which remains inexpressible.  
 
4. Conclusion. 
The portions of the TApa" and VS discussed above are aimed at demonstrating, 
through the use of reasoning, the inexpressibility of an ultimate essential nature. This is 
achieved by scrutinizing and refuting the various possible logical relations between a 
thing, its designation, and an essential nature under an essentialist theory of reference, 
thereby showing it to be incoherent. As indicated by its stated aim, this argumentative 
project assumes a particular vantage point, namely from within the confines of discursive 
thought. In accordance with the methodological constraints of such a position, these 
arguments are reflexively understood as uncovering their own situatedness within 
language and thus as marking the limits of meaningful expression. This perspective 
pervades the relevant sections of the TApa" and becomes explicit in the VS, where the 
self-negating nature of the inexpressibility claim is directly asserted to be paradigmatic of 
AsaEga’s entire argumentative move. This particular vantage point also shapes the way 
the VS section stands in relation to – or rather withdraws from – the Yogācāra scheme of 
the Three Natures. Situated within the confines of and arguing about the realm of 
discursive thought, this section deals exclusively with the perspective of the Imagined; 
the presence of the Dependent is merely implied in the interdependence of designations 
and things. This choice of focus appears to reflect a methodological constraint, namely, 
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the inability to describe adequately or represent something (the Dependent) that is by 
definition extra-linguistic.336 Perhaps this accounts for the fact that the Three Nature 
scheme, though highly visible in other parts of the VS, is not explicitly mentioned in this 
section. 
 This perspective carries implications for the understanding of the overall message 
of the TApa", and most pertinently for the understanding of the role and meaning of 
figurative usage within philosophical discourse. To appreciate these implications let us 
recall briefly several aspects of Buescher’s interpretation of the TApa". Buescher, as I've 
mentioned, understands the ontological model of the TApa" as marked by a series of 
unresolved theoretical difficulties, which he sees as triggering later textual and theoretical 
developments. One such difficulty is that while the vastu is said to serve as the 
ontological “basis” for imputational designations, nowhere does the TApa" explicate the 
nature of this relation. As an example of this gap Buescher points to the absence of an 
explanation regarding the relations between the vastu and vikalpa (see part 1.2). The 
closest that the TApa" comes to explaining these relations, he argues, is in saying that 
while the vastu is distinct from vikalpa insofar as it is not a conceptually constructed 
object of perception, it can nonetheless be figuratively designated as such an object (for 
instance, by designating it as “matter”, rūpa). But Buescher clarifies that this connection 
does not stand for any causal interaction between the vastu and upacāras: while the 
TApa" grants that vastu is the basis for upacāras, this is still a far cry from the 
                                                 336 This interpretation is concordant with Tsong kha pa’s view of these arguments as demonstrating that the Imagined cannot be subsumed within the Dependent. His reading of the TApat, VS, and MS as similarly addressing the same hermeneutical difficulty involving the Three Natures scheme in the SNS appears to raise some difficulties, as I have said, in light of recent views about the authorship and temporal relations of these works. Nonetheless, his interpretation accurately identifies in all these passages a similar philosophical perspective, namely, the view from within the realm of language, as well as a similar diagnosis that this realm has no real existence.  
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identification in a later text – the Triśikabhāya – of this basis with consciousness 
(vijñāna).  
For Buescher, then, the TApa" presents the existent inexpressible vastu and the 
realm of imputational designations as separated by a metaphysical abyss whose bridging 
is attempted only by means of later theoretical developments (for instance, by the 
Triśikabhasya's understanding of upacāra).337 In light of my own proposed 
interpretation of the TApa" section above, by contrast, the inexplicability of the relations 
between the vastu and vikalpa is viewed not as a theoretical deficiency but rather as the 
deliberate result of acknowledging the limits of discourse. This acknowledgement, in 
turn, is seen as the centerpiece of an argumentative strategy in which AsaEga seeks not to 
bridge the metaphysical gap but to highlight its contours, to reveal the limits of discourse 
as a means of indicating the possibility of its transcendence. Similarly, the lack of 
explanation in the TApa" for the "connection" between upacāras and the vastu was 
interpreted here not as an indication of a theoretical vacuum to be filled by subsequent 
texts but as an important feature of the role attributed to figures. Through a demonstration 
of the referential interchangeability of figures, their use in language served to uncover the 
absence of any essential ties between words and their referents, emphasizing the self-
referential nature of language.   
Although upacāras do seem, in the sense described above, to be treated in the 
TApa" and VS as paradigmatic of all designations, I concur with Buescher that what we 
find here is not yet the full-blown pan-metaphorical claim presented later by Sthiramati in 
                                                 337 On which more in chapter V.      
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his Triśika-bhāya. This is not to deny, however, the distinct role that both the TApa" 
and the VS ascribed to upacāras. The use of upacāras in both texts, with its emphasis on 
their proliferation and referential interchangeability, served the distinct purpose of 
pointing out the incapacity of language truly to describe reality. For Sthiramati, as will be 
argued in chapter V,  upacāras are of interest for a different reason, namely, their unique 
referential mechanism, which he explains in terms of an ontological absence (of the direct 
referent from the word’s  locus of reference). This allows Sthiramati to use the pan-
metaphorical view of language to bridge the Imagined and the Dependent natures, the 
vastu and vikalpa – a theoretical move that from the perspective of the TApa" was not 





Upacāra in the Abhidharmakoabhāya, La'kāvatārasūtra,  
and Pramāasamuccaya 
 
Having presented the role of upacāra in AsaEga’s critique of an essentialist theory 
of meaning and a correspondence theory of truth, I now turn to examine additional 
aspects of the concept as they appear in other Yogācāra-related Buddhist sources.  
Guiding my selection of sources were two considerations: first, the presence in them of 
substantial theoretical engagement with upacāra in the sense of figurative usage, and 
second, their potential availability to early Yogācāra thinkers and to Sthiramati in his 
later commentarial work. Meeting these criteria are the late Sanskrit Abhidharma 
literature, most notably Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakoabhāya (AKBh), and, among the 
Mahāyāna sūtras associated (in the broad sense)338 with the Yogācāra – the 
La'kāvatārasūtra (LAS). An exception to this list is Dignāga’s Pramāasamuccya (PS), 
which could have been available to Sthiramati but not to the earlier Yogācāra thinkers – 
and indeed, as we will shortly see, finds echoes in Sthiramati's Triśika-bhāya 
(TriśBh).   
What follows is an analysis of the upacāra-related passages from these three 
sources, presented with an eye to their possible contribution to the early Yogācāra and 
especially to Sthiramati’s understanding of upacāra. Through this analysis, my 
reconstruction of the context of the Yogācāra understanding of upacāra will, I hope, gain 
in specificity, tracing not only the broad presuppositions underlying figurative usage but 
also particular sources of influence and assumptions, some of them highly innovative, 
                                                 338 See Introduction, ft.17.  
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which are presented in the Triśika (Triś) and its commentary. To this end, my 
presentation of the AKBh sections will be supplemented by excerpts from Sthiramati’s 
commentary on it, which grounds the AKBh's mostly hermeneutical concerns regarding 
upacāra in the broader context of Indian theories of meaning. In the same vain, the LAS' 
explicit understanding of upacāra as relying on the causal constructive operation of 
consciousness will be examined in light of its possible theoretical links with both 
Vasubahdu’s Triś and Sthiramati’s TriśBh. Finally, a presentation of Dignāga’s 
arguments regarding upacāra will serve as a backdrop for the subsequent appraisal (in 
chapter V) of Sthiramati’s similar arguments.   
     
1. Upacāra in the Abhidharmakoabhāya  
 
The term upacāra in the sense of figurative application is employed ubiquitously 
in the Sanskrit Abhidharma commentarial literature,339 most notably in the seminal AKBh 
by Vasubandhu (circa 360 CE). Any attempt to determine the textual origins and context 
of the Sanskrit Abhidharma use of the term leads naturally to the Pāli canon. But as 
mentioned, though the term is indeed used there with a variety of meanings, nowhere in 
the suttas, as far as I have found, does it appear in the sense of figurative application. 340  
                                                 339 Apart from the AKBh, the term upacāra also appears frequently in Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra – see Cox 1995: 279: n.21). Saṅghabhadra is traditionally considered a contemporary of Vasubandhu and an author whose works similarly draw on the commentaries on the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canon, especially the Vibhāṣā compendia. For more on the possible connections between the works and life of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, see Ibid. 53-55, 57. For a short note on metaphor in the Vibhāṣā , see Goodman 2005.    340 Among the meanings of upacāra enumerated in the Pāli Text Society dictionary are:  1. approach, access; 2. habit, practice, conduct; 3. way, means, application, use of; 4. entrance, access, i.e., immediate vicinity or neighborhood of; 5. attention, attendance; and 6. civility, polite behavior. Davids 1921: 140. Of these definitions, the notion of "access" or "proximity" appears to be the closest to the term's meaning as 
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This absence, on the one hand, and similarities between the AKBh's use of upacāra and 
that of non-Buddhist śāstric sources (on which more below), on the other hand, highlight 
yet again the cross-sectarian context in which the explanation of this term must be 
sought. Moreover, recent scholarly work pointing to evident links between the AKBh and 
earlier Yogācāra literature341 appears to challenge the idea of a clear-cut sectarian identity 
even within the Buddhist world, opening up an intricate intertextual realm in which the 
question of the origin of particular theories is no longer foregrounded. 
The AKBh comprises a portion of verse (Abhidharmakoakārikās) and 
Vasubandhu’s auto commentary (Abhidharmakoabhāya), with both parts viewed 
traditionally as representing two positions respectively – that of the KāśSmīra Vaibhāṣkā 
branch of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and its critique by the Sautrāntika (identified as 
Vasubandhu’s own stance). This reading is set within a narrative of Vasubandhu’s life as 
constituted by two acts of conversion – first, turning  away from the Sarvāstivāda to join 
                                                                                                                                                 "subsidiary" or "secondary." Most uses of the term in the sense of "access" appear in the commentarial literature in a philosophical and meditative context, indicating the first of two grades of meditative concentration (samādhi): upacāra samādhi (access concentration), followed by appanā samādhi (attainment concentration). So, for instance, in the Visuddhi-magga, Buddhaghosa describes upacāra samādhi as a meditative phase that ensues once the practitioner has internalized the "sign" (nimitta) of the meditative object, which now appears as a clear mental image. The next phase, which is the apex of the upacāra samādhi, involves the appearance of a more subtle "after image" (paṭibhāganimittaṃ) said to be radiant and to “appear as if bursting out of the sign.” But this stage is also unstable, as the practitioner's attention is still not fixed, tending to fluctuate and regress back to seeing the "sign." Though the relation between the image and its "parasitic" after-image may suggest some sort of family resemblance to the way in which secondary meaning is said to be reliant or even superimposed upon primary meaning, any such similarity is purely speculative; here, the term upacāra indicates no more than the preparatory nature of this meditative stage. See Tin 1923: 146-7, and Buddhaghosa 1920: 125-6. In the much later Pāli grammatical treatises, such as Agavaṃsa’s Saddanīti, the term is indeed used explicitly to indicate secondary or figurative usage. See Gren-Eklund 1986: 91.  341 See Kritzer 2005.   
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the Sautrāntika school (as expressed in the composition of the AKBh), and later, under the 
influence of his brother, AsaEga, converting to the Mahāyāna and the Yogācāra school.342  
Critical appraisal of this narrative is complicated by the fact that even the most 
basic details regarding Vasubandhu’s career – the dating of his life, his identity (was 
there one Vasubandhu or two?), and the authorship of the texts traditionally ascribed to 
him – are in dispute.343 Nonetheless, recent scholarship, most notably Robert Kritzer’s 
“Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhumi: Yogācāra Elements in the 
Abhidharmakośabhāya,” questions the narrative and the place it allocates to the AKBh as 
a Sautrāntika treatise. As its title implies, Kritzer's study presents overwhelming textual 
evidence to support the claim that Vasubandhu’s AKBh displays a close knowledge of 
certain sections of the Yogācārabhūmi (YB), from which Kritzer deduces that the AKBh 
was composed already from within a Yogācāra point of view.  
Though the similarities between certain Sautrāntika ideas that appear in the AKBh 
and some of the doctrines of the YB corpus (accepted to be an earlier composition) have 
been noted by various scholars, 344 they have often been explained by appeal to the 
                                                 342 For an abridged biography of Vasubandhu based on the writings of Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang, and Bu-ston, see Cox 1995: 53-55.  343 For a summary of this controversy, see Griffiths 1986: 164-165: n.9, and Mejor 1991: 3-13, cited in Kritzer 2005: xxii-vi. My own study does not enter into this debate, assuming only what appears to be of general agreement: that while there may have been two Buddhist thinkers named Vasubandhu who lived sometime between the late fourth and early fifth centuries CE, the earliest of the two (following Griffith's dating of Vasubandhu to circa 360 AD) is the single author of both the AKBh and other texts such as the Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikam,Triṃśika, and according to some also the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa. (This leaves open the question of his authorship of the commentaries to some Mahāyāna sūtras and to such Maitreya/Asaṅga texts as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Madhyāntavibhāga.)   344 See Kritzer 2005: xxvii-iii.   
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narrative mentioned above, in which the Sautrāntika is featured as an intermediate 
doctrinal phase between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra. This assumption is criticized by 
Kritzer as unfounded and, what is more, unnecessary. His argument proceeds by way of 
an elaborate juxtaposition of passages from both texts that display a high degree of 
similarity in content and vocabulary.345 This similarity, he points out, holds true 
especially of theoretical positions that are explicitly identified in the AKBh as Sautrāntika 
positions, and which fall into two broad categories: those that he traces to the views 
attributed by the Vibhāā corpus to the "Dārṣṭāntikas," and those that are traceable neither 
to this source nor to any other source that precedes the YB.346 Largely on the basis of this 
evidence, Kritzer argues that it is plausible that the title "Sautrāntika" did not refer to an 
already established school of thought but rather was a neologism first coined by 
Vasubandhu in the AKBh to denote non-Sarvāstivāda views, some of which were 
distinctly Mahāyānic.347 This suggests that the AKBh in fact advances an already-
formulated Yogācāra view, with which Vasubandhu “adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin 
Abhidharma so that it no longer conflicts with the central theories of Yogācāra.”348 If 
correct, Kritzer’s thesis bears on all subsequent readings of the AKBh: henceforth, 
interpretations of the text need to account for the possibility that it is an implicit 
                                                 345 Examples are abundant: Kritzer enumerates fifty-five such correspondences between the AKBh and the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (VS), and twenty-five with the Savitarkādi-bhūmi of the Maulī-bhūmi  (a lesser degree of correspondence is found with the Śrāvaka-bhūmi and the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, which he considers, following Schmithausen and Aramaki, to be the oldest parts of the Maulī-bhūmi). Ibid. xxxiii-iv.     346 These theoretical positions include, for instance, the theory of the mutual perfuming of nāma and rūpa, and of the transformation of the life-stream (saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa). Ibid. xxix-xxx.    347 Ibid. xxvii. See also Kritzer 2003.   348 Kritzer 2005: xxx.  
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Abhidharma-Yogācāra synthesis of sorts, bringing it closer to such texts as AsaEga’s 
Abhidharmasamuccaya.  
Bearing this in mind, and attuned also to possible non-Buddhist textual sources of 
influence, we turn now to examine some key references to upacāra in the AKBh, 
alongside their much later commentary by Sthiramati, as a way of drawing out 
Vasubandhu’s understanding of upacāra and demonstrating how Sthiramati’s thought 
both carries on and further develops this understanding.349 
In the AKBh, unlike what we have seen so far, upacāra is not engaged in the 
context of theories of meaning or in discussions of the denotative power of words, but 
instead is employed for strictly hermeneutical purposes. This is but one expression of 
what appears to be a heightened hermeneutical awareness that characterized late Sanskrit 
Abhidharma literary production, stemming, as Collett Cox argues, from its acquired 
canonical status:   
By admitting the authority of the Abhidharma as the authentic word of the 
Buddha, the northern Indian Buddhist schools were forced both to explain 
systematically the relationship between the abhidharma and sutra collections, and 
to develop interpretative criteria for evaluating rival textual sources and resolving 
contradictions among textual positions.350 
 
In the AKBh, an exemplar of late Abhidharma textual production, this hermeneutical 
awareness is marked by two conflicting outlooks. The first is the view of the Kāśmīra 
Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika school, which understands all Abhidharma assertions as definite 
                                                 349 For passages from the AKBh I employ Leo Pruden’s English translation of La Vallée Poussin’s French translation (which is, in turn, translated from the Chinese and the Sanskrit as preserved in Yaśomitra’s commentary). Pruden compared La Vallée Poussin’s work (and other sources) with the Sanskrit version using Pradhan’s edition, which I therefore also reproduce following the translation. See Pruden’s Introduction in La Vallée Poussin 1988: xxiii-xxv. Translations from Sthiramati’s commentary, the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya-ṭīkā-tattvārtha-nāma (AKBhT), are my own.   350 Cox 1992: 173.  
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(lākaika), and as conveying the explicit meaning (nītārtha) of the Buddha;351 and the 
assertions of the Sūtra as conveying only the implied intention (abhiprāyika9) of the 
Buddha, as figurative (aupacārika), and therefore as interpretable (neyārtha).352 This 
stands in opposition to the second outlook, of the Sautrāntikas, which as the school’s 
name indicates takes the Sūtra to convey the decisive meaning of the Buddha’s teaching 
and the Abhidharma as interpretative extrapolations.353  
Within this framework, Cox notes, different hermeneutical techniques were 
applied to handle different kinds of textual contradictions or inconsistencies. One such 
technique involves a broadening of the initial referential range of expressions so that they 
are understood figuratively. As I argue below, while the technique is indeed readily 
applied in the AKBh to both Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika positions, it has functions that 
go beyond its role as a hermeneutical device; within this context, upacāra also carries 
epistemic significance, serving as an indicator, a sign-post of sorts, for the unreality of 
our most basic convictions.  
                                                 351 According to Saṅghabhdra, moreover, the Abhidharma assertions should serve as the criterion for determining whether a Sūtra statement is of definitive (nītārtha) or provisional (neyārtha) meaning. See Ibid. 162.  352 See AKBh  6.3: “tasmād ābhiprāyikaḥ sūtreṣu nirdeśo lākṣaṇikas tv abhidharme / (Pradhan (1975: 333:7-8) discussed in Cox 1992: 167; and also AKBh 3.24: “…abhiprāyikaḥ sūtre lākṣaṇiko 'bhidharmaḥ,” and AKBh 5.2, which deals with the interpretation of the term anuśaya (latent defilements): “aupacāriko vā sūtre 'nuśayaśabdaḥ prāptau / yathā duḥkho 'gniriti / lākṣaṇikas tvabhidharme kleśa evānuśayaśabdaḥ / tasmāt saṃyuktā evānuśayāḥ /” Pradhan 1975: 133: 16-17 and 278: 8-9, discussed by Dhammajoti 2007: 18-19. With respect to the latter example, Dhammajoti translates aupacārikaḥ as “expedient," but in light of the discussion in AKBh 5.2, “figurative” is more suitable, as the term is immediately followed by an unmistakable metaphor – duḥkho 'gnir – “suffering (is) fire.”   353 Vasubandhu articulates his doubts regarding the Sarvāstivāda ascription of the Abhidharma literature to the Buddha in the first chapter of the AKBh, a critique identified by Yaśomitra as expressive of the Sautrāntika stance. See Cox 1992: 161.  
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To understand this further function let us look at several uses of the notion of 
upacāra in the AKBh. In the first Dhātus chapter of the treatise, Vasubandhu presents a 
definition of the eleven "tangibles" (spra"avya), among them “hunger” and “thirst,” 
which terms are said to be merely figurative:    
Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, 
weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst. The elements will be explained 
below…. [H]unger’ is what produces desire for food; ‘thirst’ is what produces a 
desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is 
designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated354 by the name of the 
effect. In the same way that it is said ‘The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause 
of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of 
the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who are in agreement. 
AKBh 1.10. (La Vallée Poussin 1988: 384)  
 
spra"avyam ekādaśadravyasvabhāvam--catvāri mahābhūtāni, ślakatvam, 
karkaśatvam, gurutvam, laghutvam, śītam, jighatsā, pipāsā ceti| tatra bhūtāni 
paścād vakyāma9|… jighatsā  bhojanābhilāakt| kārae kāryopacārāt| yathā--  
buddhānā sukha utpāda9 sukhā dharmasya deśanā| sukhā sa'ghasya sāmagrī 
samagrāā tapa9 sukham YY (Pradhan 1975: 7) 
 
Sthiramati’s commentary, the Abhidharmakoabhāya"īkā (AKBhT),355 explains the 
doctrinal need underlying this figurative usage:  
Regarding the statement 'hunger is that which produces desire for food, thirst is 
that which produces desire for drink,' one may object that a phenomenon that is a 
mental factor cannot be the object of bodily sense faculties (lus kyi dbang po, 
kāya-indriya). For this reason it was stated, ‘Due to the figurative designation of 
the cause by the [name] of the effect." Regarding certain tangibles causing the 
desire to drink and the desire to eat, which arise internally, it is stated [there] that 
hunger is the cause for the desire for food and thirst is the cause for the desire for 
drink. Hence the figurative designation of the effect as the cause. If one does not 
agree that it is [indeed] the figurative designation of the name of the effect for the 
                                                 354 kāraṇe kāryopacārāt. Here Pruden, following La Vallée Poussin, translates upacāra simply as “designating;” but the remainder of the passage leaves no doubt that figurative designation is intended in this case.    355  Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣyaṭīkātattvārthanāma (chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa don gyi de kho na nyid ces bya ba) TD. 4421 tho 1b1-426a7, do 1b2-387a7.    
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cause, [we answer that then] it will not have been stated that hunger produces the 
desire for food and thirst produces the desire for drink. In case one may [still] ask 
as to the reason for this, [for answering him] the statement 'hunger and thirst are 
desire for food and drink' is explained by an analogy – ‘the birth of the Buddha is 
happiness’ – which is ubiquitously mentioned [in the scriptures]. The birth of the 
Buddha is not in itself happiness, but it is the cause of happiness and therefore is 
said to be happiness. In the same way one should apply this to the teaching of the 
doctrine, etc., and to the other [examples].  
 
…bkres pa ni zas 'dod par byed pa'o/_/skom pa ni skom 'dod par byed pa'o zhes 
bya ba la gal te sems las byung ba'i chos ni lus kyi dbang po'i yul du yod pa ma 
yin zhe na/ de'i phyir rgyu la 'bras bu btags pa brjod par mi 'dod na ni 'di skad du 
bkres pa ni zas 'dod par byed pa'o/  khong pa nas zas 'dod pa dang skom 'dod pa'i 
rgyu reg bya'i khyad par zhig 'byung ste/ der zas 'dod pa'i rgyu la bkres pa dang/ 
skom 'dod pa'i rgyu la skom pa zhes bshad do/ rgyu la 'bras bu btags pa'i phyir 
ro//  gal te 'dir rgyu la 'bras bu btags pa brjod par mi 'dod na ni 'di skad du bkres 
pa ni zas 'dod par byed pa'o/ /skom pa ni skom 'dod par byed pa'o zhes mi brjod 
par 'gyur te/ 'o na ci zhe na bkres pa dang skom pa dag ni zas dang skom 'dod pa 
dag go zhes de skad brjod par 'gyur ro//de nyid la dpe/_sangs rgyas rnams ni 
'byung ba bde/_/zhes rgya cher 'byung ba la/sangs rgyas 'byung ba bde ba nyid 
ma yin gyi/_bde ba'i rgyu yin pas bde bar bshad do//de bzhin du chos bstan pa la 
sogs pa gzhan dag la yang brjod par bya'o // AKBhT TD. 4421 tho 48a5-b2. 
 
According to Sthiramati, the hermeneutical difficulty addressed in this AKBh 
passage is the following: if hunger is a desire for food, then by definition it cannot be 
classified among the tangibles, since desire is considered an intangible mental factor. The 
difficulty is resolved by arguing that the aforementioned tangible is only figuratively 
called “hunger.” The AKBh quotes the scriptural statement that the Buddha’s birth is 
"happiness" because, says Sthiramati, while the birth of the Buddha cannot in itself be 
happiness (as birth is unequivocally suffering), still, since it is the cause of happiness it is 
figuratively called "happiness," thereby designating the cause by the name of its effect 
(kārae kāryopacārāt). It should be noted that this particular metonymic formula does 
 194 
not appear exclusively in the AKBh and can be found, for instance, in the writings of the 
Mīmāṃsā, who of course had a great interest in scriptural exegesis. 356   
This is by no means the only instance of typically śāstric uses of upacāra in the 
AKBh.357 However, the treatise’s use of the term in these instances is uniquely tailored to 
its local purposes. Consider the following example, also from the first chapter of the 
AKBh, concerning the number and nature of elements (dhātus):  
Twelve dhātus are personal, the six organs and the six consciousnesses; six 
dhātus are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc. But how 
can one speak of personal dhātus, or of external dhātus, since there is no ātman? 
The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons falsely grasp 
for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the name of ātman. Compare, 
for example, these two lines of Scripture: ‘The sage obtains heaven, by means of a 
well subdued ātman’ and ‘It is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings 
happiness.’ Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to 
which one gives the name of ātman: they are in fact the point of support of them; 
then one qualifies them as 'internal,' or 'personal,' whereas the visible and the 
other objects of the consciousness are held to be 'external.' AKBh 1.39 (La Vallée 
Poussin 1988: 87) 
 
… a2 vijñānāni a2āśrayā9 --ityete dvādaśa dhātava ādhyātmikā9| rūpādayastu 
a2 viayadhātavo bāhyā9| ātmanyasati kathamādhyātmikam ? bāhya vā ? 
aha'kārasanniśrayatvāc cittam ‘ātmā' ityupacaryate| “ātmanā hi sudāntena 
svarga prāpnoti pa2ita9” ityuktam| cittasya cānyatra damanamukta 
bhagavatā –“cittasya damana sādhu citta dānta sukhāvaham” iti| ata 
ātmabhūtasya cittasyāśrayabhāvena pratyāsannatvāt 
cakurādīnāmādhyātmikatvam, rūpādīnā viayabhāvād bāhyatvam|… (Pradhan 
1975: 27) 
 
                                                 356 Consider, for example, Śabara’s bhāṣya to the Mīmāṃsāsūtra 5.3.3, which deals with the conflicting Vedic statements that a certain ritual should culminate with verses in the Uṣṇīh and Kakubh meters and (elsewhere) that they should be in the Triṣṭubh. Śabara settles this by interpreting another scriptural statement as indicating that here the latter meter is constituted by the former two, standing for both of them as the “cause is figuratively designated by the effect.” Sastri 1931-1934: 5-3-3, p. 1323.   357 For instance, the AKBh's use of such śāstric stock examples of figurative application as the phrase “the cots are crying” (mañcāḥ krośanti) to clarify that the mental faculty is said to “cognize” the dharmas (manasā dharmān vijñāye) only figuratively. See Pradhan 1975: 30:21-25. 
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The issue at stake in this passage is the coherence of using the terms "internal" or 
"external" to qualify the dhatūs, given that the Buddhist claim of no-self renders this 
distinction meaningless. The difficulty is resolved by pointing out that the distinction 
actually pertains to the mind, which is figuratively designated as the "self." 358  This 
interpretation is buttressed by two sūtra quotes that demonstrate the interchangeability of 
mind and self, and by pointing out that the mind serves as a "support" (sanniśraya) of the 
notion-of-self (aha'kāra). This reliance seems to be understood here as the ground for 
figurative usage (the upacāra-bīja in the terminology of the Nyāya), that is, the very 
mark of the connection between the mind and the self and that which makes the indirect 
denotation possible in this case. Sthiramati’s commentary, after clarifying the nature of 
the hermeneutical difficulty, explains the exact nature of this reliance:   
Because it [the dhatū] refers to the self, it is [considered] internal. Internal is that 
which belongs to something inner. If it is asked, when a self does not exist, how 
can there be [anything] internal or external? If there is no moral conduct [then one 
would contend that] the superiority of the superior moral conduct would not be 
possible.  
[We reply: the following statement] appears extensively in the sūtras: 'Because 
the mind is the support for self-grasping;' [however] those who adhere to a self 
use the word 'self' [instead] as the basis for self-grasping. The reason for this is as 
follows: when one merely conceives the qualities of the self359 or merely 
conceives that very subjective agent which attends on the self,360 [self-]grasping 
occurs. Since self-grasping itself is based on the mind, therefore without it there is 
no [grasping of the] self. And, because one places the ‘pride of self’ on this 
[mind], only the mind is the self. [And] because it is reliant on the mind and 
mental factors, ‘self' [is used to] figuratively designate the mind.   
 
                                                 358 The complete argument would run something like this: since the mind is identified as the self, those things that seem to pertain to the self are held to be connected to mental activity and hence are viewed as "internal,"’ while things that do not pertain to the self are considered "external." The external-internal distinction is therefore merely a matter of convention and admits of no ultimate truth. See Hall 1983: 145-146.    359 That is, the self as the substance for its alleged qualities.    360 That is, a conception of a subjective aspect that constituted a notion of a self.  
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/bdag gi dbang du byas pas na nang gi ste/nang gi nyid ni nang gi'o/ bdag med na 
ji ltar nang gi'am phyir 'gyur te/ tshul khrims med par ni lhag pa'i tshul khrims kyi 
lhag par mi 'gyur ba bzhin no zhe na/sems ni ngar 'dzin pa'i rten yin pa'i phyir 
zhes rgya cher 'byung ste/bdag tu smra ba rnams kyi ngar 'dzin pa'i rten la bdag 
ces brjod de/ 'di ltar bdag gi yon tan nyid dam/ bdag gi yul can nyid du rtog pas 
kyang 'dzin pa 'jug go/ /ngar 'dzin pa yang sems la brten te de las ma gtogs pa'i 
bdag med pa'i phyir ro/ 'di la bdag tu nga rgyal bzhag pas na sems kho na bdag 
yin la/ sems las byung ba rnams dang sems la brten pa'i phyir sems kho na la 
bdag tu nye bar 'dogs so// AKBhT TD. 4421 tho 107b1-4  
 
Sthiramati points out that the mind serves as a "support" for the self in the sense 
that the various constituents of a notion of a self are necessarily mediated and constructed 
mentally – since a self is inferred from its perceived qualities; comes into our awareness 
as the epicenter of all knowledge; and is the object of attachment. But this understanding, 
Sthiramati notes, is not evident in our everyday notion of the word "self" as indicating a 
distinct, independent entity, and therefore scriptural guidance and philosophical analysis 
is required in order to bring it to our awareness. In the case before us, this awareness is 
awakened simply by means of the statement that the term “self” is in fact an upacāra, 
intimating that things are not as they appear to be. This point is subtle but important for 
our inquiry, since as we have seen in the case of AsaEga and as we will soon see with 
respect to Sthiramati, the view of upacāra as conveying information regarding the 
referents’ true identity or status hitherto obstructed by their literal meaning emerges as a 
central feature of the Buddhist understanding of figurative usage. Within this framework, 
figurative usage serves not only the hermeneutical function of bridging the stated and 
implied meaning but also an epistemic one, indicating through its very presence the 
breach between how we take things to be and how they truly are.   
This understanding is implied by the various uses of upacāra in the AKBh, but 
only in Sthiramati’s commentary is it spelled out explicitly. In another upacāra-related 
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passage, this same dynamic between the root text and its commentary is especially 
pronounced. There, Vasubandhu presents the Sautrāntika response to the Vaibhāṣika 
attempt to determine if the main constituent of visual perception is the eye (as a sense 
faculty) or the eye-consciousness:   
Here the Sautrāntika say: what is this, are you trying to strike empty space? Now, 
visual cognition arises in dependence on the eye and forms. In that, what 'sees,' or 
what 'is seen'? Rather, without any operation (nirvyapārā), this is merely a 
dharma, merely a cause and an effect. With regard to that for the sake of 
communication (vyavahāra), figurative usages (upacāra kriyante) are employed 
at one’s discretion (chandata9) such as 'the eye sees, the eye cognition cognizes.' 
One should not be attached to this [issue]…. (Hall 1983: 160)   
 
atra sautrāntikā āhu9 -- kim idamākāśa khādyate ? cakur hi pratītya rūpāi 
cotpadyate cakurvijñānam| tatra ka9 paśyati ko vā dśyate| nirvyāpāra hīda 
dharmamātram hetuphalamātra ca| tatra vyavahārārtham cchandata upacārā9 
kriyante -- caku9 paśyati vijñāna vijānātīti nātrābhinive"avyam| AKBh 1.42 
(Pradhan 1975: 31) 
 
The Sautrāntika rebuff the Ābhidharmika’s essentialism, pointing out that the expression 
"the eye sees" must be a figure of speech since one cannot accept the operation in this 
case of some kind of agentive element as the performer of an action. Perceptual 
cognition, the Sautrāntikā clarify, is merely the outcome of an interdependent causal 
nexus and does not require the assumption of any further operation by an agent or an 
object.  
 As noted by Kritzer, this passage is strikingly similar to a passage in the VS 
portion of the YB corpus where it is also argued that visual cognition is produced by a 
causal nexus, with the additional claim that any "seeing" is merely a figure of speech 
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from the ultimate point of view.361  Sthiramati’s commentary on the AKBh passage 
echoes this claim, and then draws from it its fuller implications:   
‘[F]or the sake of communication’ that is, in the world and in scriptures, ‘through 
[one’s] discretion,’ means not through the nature of the object itself. Hence one 
should not cling to it, because the meaning of convention is [figuratively] 
designated, since under ultimate investigation it [the object] cannot be found. 
 
…tha snyad gdags pa'i don du zhes bya ba ni/ 'jig rten dang bstan bcos 
su'o//'dun pa'i sgo nas zhes bya ba ni don gyi mtshan gyis ni ma yin no zhes ston 
par byed pa'o//'di la mngon par zhen par mi bya ste/tha snyad pa'i don ni btags 
pa yin pa'i phyir ro//don dam par btsal na mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro/ TD. 4421, tho 
122 a5-6. 
 
Sthiramati’s use of the phrase “in the world and in scriptures” is repeated in his gloss of 
the first verse of Vasubandhu’s Triś, dealing also with upacāra,362 and his interpretation 
in both passages indeed runs along similar lines. Sthiramati’s overall understanding of 
upacāra in the TriśBh is discussed in detail in chapter V, but for the sake of clarity 
some general remarks about his stance are now in order. Briefly, what we find in his 
interpretation of the AKBh and the Triśika alike is a synthesis of sorts between the 
śāstric understanding of upacāra in terms of the absence of the referent from the locus of 
reference, and the Buddhist assumption of the non-existence of objectified phenomena. 
Within this scheme, the referential absence of the first assumption is identified with the 
                                                 361 mig gis gzugs rnams mthong ba nas yid kyis chos rnams rnam par shes so zhes bya ba'i bar du ji skad gsung pa de la/ ci mig la sogs pas mthong ba nas rnam par shes pa'i bar du yin nam/ 'on te de dag gi rnam par shes pa dag gis mthong pa nas rnam par shes pa'i bar du yin zhe na/ smras pa/_don dam par ni mig la sogs pas kyang ma yin la de dag gi rnam par shes pa dag gis kyang ma yin no// de ci'i phyir zhe na/_dngos po rnams ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i phyir dang/ skad cig pa'i phyir dang/ g.yo ba med pa'i phyir ro// brda'i tshul du ni gtso bo yin pa'i phyir mig la sogs pa la mthong ba po la sogs pa nye bar gdags pas ches rigs so/de ci'i phyir zhe na/ mig la sogs pa dbang po rnams /yod na ni rnam par shes pa 'byung ba ma tshang ba med par nges kyi/_rnam par shes pa'i rgyun ni yod du zin kyang mig la sogs pa dbang po rnams tshang ba'am ma tshang bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro// lta ba la sogs pa tsam la mthong ba la sogs pa nye bar gdags pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin no// VS  TD. 4038, zhi 79b5-80a2. See also Kritzer 2005: 33.   362 See chapter V, page 223-224.  
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ontological non-existence of the second, and by implication all words that denote 
objectified phenomena are understood to be applied only figuratively (their referents are 
non-existent and hence always absent form the locus of reference). Accordingly, the 
expression "the eye sees" is held to be figurative not merely because it stands for an 
alleged agent (as noted in the AKBh) but more importantly because its referent – the eye, 
agentive or not – is non-existent in the ultimate sense and therefore absent from its locus 
of reference.   
To recap: the AKBh understands upacāras largely as a hermeneutical device, 
which, however, also serves a limited epistemic function as a linguistic "sign post" 
calling to mind the concealed order of things. While some upacāra-related passages in 
the AKBh bear an undeniable resemblance to parallel passages in the VS, a significant 
theoretical distance nonetheless remains between the former's mostly hermeneutical 
approach and the latter’s use of upacāras to undermine a theory of meaning based on a 
correspondence theory of truth (see chapter III). This distance is bridged by Sthiramati’s 
commentarial synthesis363 presented in his commentary both on the AKBh and, as we will 
see, on Vasubandhu’s Triś. This feat is achieved by situating the hermeneutical-qua-
epistemic understanding of upacāra of the AKBh within a theory of meaning according to 
which the status of the meaning of a word (as either primary or secondary) is dependent 
on the reality of its referent. Within this framework, the non-existence of objectified 
                                                 363 Another instance of this synthesis with respect to upacāra is Sthiramati’s commentary on Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS), the latter itself an exemplar of Abhidharma-Yogācāra integration. While the term upacāra does not appear anywhere in the root text, Sthiramati’s commentary uses it extensively in ways reminiscent of its application in the AKBh. In the first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccyabhāṣya (ASb) alone, see for example 1.4a, 1.8b, 1.16a, 1.32a; in Tatia 1976: 2, 10, 19, 26.     
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phenomena, viewed in terms of the referents' absence from their locus of reference, is 
taken to imply the pan-figurative nature of all language usage. 
But what is this "locus of reference" from which the primary (unreal) referents of 
words are said to be absent? To what precisely do words figuratively refer? The answer, 
we will see, is found only in Sthiramati’s commentary to Vasubandhu’s Triś. There, the 
locus of reference seems to be identified with none other than the underlying mental 
causal process (the so-called "transformations of consciousness," vijñāna-pariāma) 
which induces composite objects (as the primary referents of words) and serves as the 
actual referential basis of the terms that denote them – i.e., it is that to which words 
figuratively refer.  
While all these elements – upacāras, the non-existence of objectified phenomena, 
and their underlying causal reality – are present in the AKBh (often even in a single 
passage, as in AKBh 1.42), only in Sthiramati’s TriśBh are they explicitly tied together 
theoretically, joining to form a cohesive account of the relation between language and 
reality. Clearly, this account marks a certain theoretical leap from the AKBh and possibly 
also from the Triś’s understanding of upacāra.364 One possible link between the views 
of the root text and those of its commentary may be supplied by the LAS, whose 
understanding of upacāra specifically ties it to the underlying causal activity of 
consciousness. Although lingering questions about the direction of influence between the 
LAS and early Yogācāra thought prevent us from speculating that the latter was the 
                                                 364 Since the Triṃśika has no extant self-commentary it is hard to determine whether Sthiramati’s commentary on the work's first verse represents an accepted interpretation, or else is indeed innovative. The fact that no other major work of Vasubandhu presents these claims on upacāra strengthens the hypothesis that Sthiramati's commentary offers an original synthesis that amounts to a re-interpretation. Even so, it is important to remember that such innovativeness would naturally be covert, the correct interpretation of earlier ācaryās – rather than originality – being the goal of śāstric commentarial discourse.    
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source of some of Sthiramati's ideas, still, the sūtra stands to shed light on some of his 
important theoretical choices regarding upacāra in the TriśBh, as well as on the 
concept’s broader place in Yogācāra thought.  
 
2. Upacāra in the Tenth Chapter (Sagāthaka) of the La7kāvatārasūtra     
 
The term upacāra in the sense of figurative usage appears throughout the LAS, 
most notably in the tenth chapter, the Sagāthaka, which is in verse form and  generally 
considered to be a later addition to the older textual core of the sūtra.365  
Both the LAS's date and, consequently, its relation with early Yogācāra thought 
are in dispute, with very little conclusive evidence to go by (as is the case with many 
other Mahāyāna scriptures).366 Fortunately, things are somewhat clearer regarding the 
dating of the tenth chapter of the sūtra, which can be set within rather definite limits: 
whereas the first extant translation of the LAS into Chinese, carried out in 433 CE367 by 
Guṇabhadra, does not include this chapter, a later translation by Bodhiruci from 513 CE 
includes it, suggesting that the Sagāthaka was composed or at least collated with other 
LAS materials sometime during this period.  
The tenth chapter is also better placed than other parts of the LAS in terms of its 
availability to early Yogācāra thinkers. While the LAS is nowhere mentioned by name in 
                                                 365 See Takasaki 1980: 345-347, and Suzuki 1930: 21-24; both cited in Sutton 1991: 19. See also Forsten 2006: 17-18.   366 For a discussion of the date and textual stratification of the LAS, see Takasaki 1980 & 1982, and Buescher 2008: 23-24. With respect to Buescher, see also chapter III, part 1.1.   367 The first known translation of the sūtra into Chinese, by Dharmarakṣa from 420 CE, is not extant.   
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the works of either Vasubandhu or AsaEga but only in the much later works of Sthiramati 
(470-550 CE)368 and Dharmapala (560 CE),369 there are at least two instances of textual 
evidence of a theoretical link between the sūtra and the works of Vasubandhu – and one 
of them involves the LAS's tenth chapter. As first noted by S. Yamaguchi,370 several 
verses of this chapter are quoted in Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti (with no explicit 
acknowledgement of their source). It thus seems plausible either that Vasubandhu was 
directly acquainted with some portions of the tenth chapter of the LAS, or that the 
relevant sections of his own work and those of the LAS were both based on the same third 
textual source. The second piece of textual evidence, mentioned by both Tucci and de La 
Vallée Poussin,371 involves close parallels between sections of the LAS (3.47, 3.57) and 
of Vasubandhu’s Triś (verses 20, 28). Both LAS passages are found already in the 
work's first extant edition (the 443 CE translation into Chinese), where they are ascribed 
to an undisclosed sūtra. This could, of course, be taken as indicative of the existence of a 
third sūtra source from which drew both the Triś and the LAS; but Schmithausen, 
arguing against such a conclusion, has advanced the hypothesis that it is in fact the Triś 
                                                 368 For a discussion of Sthiramati’s dates, see chapter V, ft. 405.     369 See Sutton 1991: 327: n.1. On the basis of this absence Aucke Forsten presents an "argument from silence,"’ contending that the LAS authors “were undoubtedly familiar with the ideas of Yogācārins and they probably drew upon their texts. Nevertheless, it is not very likely that the LAS was actually composed in Yogācāra circles.” In support of this claim he also cites the fact that the LAS uses many basic Yogācāra categories and concepts only provisionally, advocating their ultimate transcendence. At the same time, he himself acknowledges that many scholars view this as a fundamental feature of the Yogācāra's own theoretical approach. Forsten 2006: 20. My own analysis of the TApaṭ and VS claims regarding the inexpressibility of reality is concordant with this latter premise.        370 Yamaguchi 1972: v.2, 312, cited in Sutton 1991: 14.   371 Cited in Schmithausen 1992: 392.  
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that is the source of the parallel LAS sections.372 If correct, Schmithausen's scenario 
entails a reversal of the traditional assumption regarding the chronological primacy of 
sūtra over śāstra (which, according to him, also explains why the LAS had to disguise the 
śāstric source of these sections).  
In light of all this, while the dating of the LAS and the exact nature of its relation 
with early Yogācāra thinkers remains undecided, it is reasonable to assume that the LAS 
had some theoretical interaction with the works of Vasubandhu and especially the Triś; 
and we can say with certainty that it was known – possibly in its longer version 
containing the tenth chapter – to Sthiramati. Therefore, I turn now to look more closely at 
the LAS's understanding of upacāra, and especially the way in which it grounds this 
notion in a causal description of the operation of consciousness and the construction of 
the external world.  
 Our first section of the LAS Sagāthaka chapter begins with a discussion of the 
nature of discursive thought (vikalpa) and its relation to the non-arising (anutpanna) of 
all things and to their underlying causal reality:373  
                                                 372 Ibid. 392-394. On the face of it, this hypothesis seems incompatible with the fact that LAS verses are cited in Vasubandhu’sVyākhyāyukti; the combination of these claims would imply that Vasubandhu was at once both citing from and informing the LAS.  Schmithausen deals with this difficulty by emphasizing the textual stratification and gradual evolution of the LAS: “As regards the quotation of LAS verses in the Vyākhyāyukti, Takasaki has already pointed out that these verses are not expressly quoted as stemming from LAS. This means that at the time when the Vyākhyāyukti was written some materials now found in LAS were, to be sure, already in existence, but LAS as a composition or compilation of such materials need not have existed yet.” Ibid. 394-397.  373 All translations, if not otherwise indicated, are mine. They are based on Vaidya’s Sanskrit edition of the LAS (1963), which I sometimes compared with the Tibetan translation found in the Lhasa Bka'-'gyur, LK 110, mdo mang, ca 87b-307a. Version consulted: Asian Classics Input Project (Date Accessed: June 2009; Catalogue number KL0107).   
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Having excluded [what seems to consist of] elements, the arising of [all] things is 
not found to exist. [Thus] the mind, [as] the appearances of the elements , should 
always be contemplated as non-arising. 10.705 
 
pratyākhyāya tu bhūtāni bhāvotpattir na vidyate / 
bhūtākāra sadā cittam anutpanna vibhāvayet // LAS 10.705374 
 
Do not discoursvily think discursive thought, [as] the wise are indeed free from 
discursive thought. When discursive thought is thought, [it leads] merely [to] 
duality, not liberation. LAS 10.706 
 
mā vikalpa vikalpetha nirvikalpā hi pa2itā9 / 
vikalpa vikalpayas tasya dvayam eva na nirvti9 // LAS 10.706375 
 
[By] way of the assertion of non-arising illusion is made evident. [However, if 
one assumes in consequence] the arising of illusion to be causeless, [it] will 
undermine [this] claim. LAS 10.707 
 
anutpādapratijñasya māyā ca dśyate naya9 / 
māyānirhetusabhūta hānisiddhāntalakaam // LAS 10.707376  
 
The mind that becomes manifest from time immemorial is to be conceived just 
like a reflection. It should be considered just as it [truly] is: having the appearance 
of the object while not [itself] being the object. LAS 10.708 
 
bimbavad dśyate cittam anādimatibhāvitam / 
arthākāra na cārtho 'sti yathābhūta vibhāvayet // LAS 10.708 377  
 
                                                 374 'byung ba rnams ni ma gtogs par/_/dngos po skye ba med pa ste/_/rtag par 'byung ba 'dra ba'i sems/  /ma skyes par ni rnam par bsgom/  LK 110, mdo mang, ca 296a7.     375 rnam par rtog la ma rtog cig_/rnam par rtog med mkhas pa'o/_/rnam par rtog la brtags gyur na/_/gnyis min mya ngan 'das ma yin/ Ibid. 296a7-b1. Tib. reads (probably wrongly) “it is not duality, and not nirvana.”  376 /mi skye bar ni dam bcas pa'i/_/tshul ni sgyu(r) ma bzhin du snang// sgyu ma rgyu med byung ba ste/ grub mtha' 'das shing nyams par 'gyur//  Ibid. 296b1-2. Tib. reads in last part “contradicts the theory and so undermines it.”  377 thog ma med nas bsgoms pa yi/_/sems ni gzugs brnyan bzhin du snang/_/don lta bu ste don med min/_/yang dag ji bzhin rnam par bsgom/  Ibid. 296b2-3. Here the Tibetan translation differs from the Sanskrit in its rendition of “…arthākāraṃ na cārtho 'sti,“ to which it adds another negation, understanding it as follows: “it [the mind] is object-like but it is not a non-entity,” i.e., not entirely non-existent.    
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The nature of arising is just like an image seen in a mirror, neither [entirely] the 
same nor different [from the actual image] and [yet] not non-existent. LAS 10.709 
 
yathā hi darpae rūpam ekatvānyatvavarjitam / 
dśyate na ca tan nāsti tathā cotpādalakaam // LAS 10.709378  
 
Just as a Gandharvas’ [city], an illusion, etc., are characterized by [their 
dependence] on causes and conditions, similarly, in this way, the arising of all 
things is not non-arising. LAS 10.710 
 
gandharvamāyādi yathā hetupratyayalakaā9 / 
tathā hi sarvabhāvānā sabhavo na hy asabhava9 // LAS 10.710379  
 
Discursive thought with a dual function [distinguishing between grasper and 
grasped] which appears as the person, is set forth, [however] it is not realized by 
the naïve [who hold on to the] metaphors of self and things. LAS 10.711 
 
vikalpa9 puruākāro dvidhāvttyā pravartate / 
ātmadharmopacāraiś ca na ca bālairvibhāvyate //LAS 10.711.380 Vaidya (1963: 
153-154). 
 
What is most striking about this passage is the use of the term “the metaphors of 
self and things” (ātmadharmopacāra), which appears also in the opening verse of 
Vasubandhu’s Triś. In both cases the term describes the realm of metaphor as 
governing the entire range of subjective and objective phenomena alike. But why and in 
what sense are the self and things said here to constitute metaphors? The preceding verses 
seem to supply a possible explanation. There, the claim regarding the "non-arising of all 
things" is understood not as amounting to the total annihilation of all things but as 
indicating their existence as causally dependent mental appearances (10.705). Various 
                                                 378 me long la ni ji ltar gzugs/_/gcig dang tha dad nyid spangs pa/_/snang ste de ni med pa'ang min/_/skye ba'i mtshan nyid de bzhin no| Ibid. 296b3-4.   379 dri za sgyu ma la sogs dag_/rgyu dang rkyen la ltos pa ltar/_/de bzhin dngos po thams cad kyi// 'byung ba yin te mi 'byung med/ Ibid. 296b4  380 /bdag dang chos su brtags pa yis/_/rnam par rtog pa skyes bu ltar/_/'jug pa rnam pa gnyis yi 'jug_/byis pa rnams kyis mi rtogs so/ Ibid. 296b4-5  
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examples, like that of a reflection, an image in a mirror, an imaginary city, etc., then 
serve to explain the true ontological status of all things: though they appear as substantial 
objects, they are not so (10.708-9), but this does not imply a denial of their underlying 
causal reality, which induces their mental appearances (10.707, 10.710). In this limited 
causal sense alone they are therefore said to be "not non-arising." Within this scheme, 
one way to explain the sense in which the terms "self" and "things" are figurative is that, 
since their primary referents are unreal, they are applied only in a secondary sense. But 
what, then, is the denotation of these figures?  No candidate seems to present itself other 
than the underlying causal reality that brings about (the appearances of) these unreal 
primary referents of words. Thus, in the sūtra's terms, while the naïve take words to 
denote real and essentially independent entities (understood as their primary referents), in 
fact they stand for (in a secondary, indirect way) no more than the interdependent causal 
reality that serves as the basis for the appearances of these alleged real entities.   
This interpretation is supported by another passage in the tenth chapter of the 
LAS, which offers a detailed explication of the link between upacāra and the causal 
mental reality underlying all phenomena. The passage begins with a description of the 
way the mind actively constructs the external world:    
Because of seeds and impressions that [originate from what is seen as] external 
reality, discursive thought (vikalpa) is set forth, and due to that, Dependency is 
grasped, and that which is grasped is [then] imagined. 381 LAS 10.407 
 
bāhyavāsanabījena vikalpa9 sapravartate / 
tantra hi yena ghāti yadghāti sa kalpitam // LAS 10.407  
 
What has been grasped arises as an external object in reliance upon the mind, [and 
hence] an error is set forth. [Apart from these] two [causes] there is no [other] 
third cause [involved]. LAS 10.408 
                                                 381 "Dependency" and what is “imagined” stand for the Dependent and the Imagined nature respectively.    
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bāhyam ālambana ghya citta cāśritya jāyate / 
dvidhā pravartate bhrāntis ttīya nāsti kāraam // LAS 10.408 
 
Because of that [grasping] and having relied upon that [i.e. the mind], an error is 
produced; [hence] I say that the six [sense faculties, indriya,] the twelve [sense-
media, āyatanas,] and the eighteen [elements, dhātus,] are merely of the mind.  LAS 
10.409 
 
yasmāc ca jāyate bhrāntir yad āśritya ca jāyate / 
a2dvādaśā"ādaśaka cittameva vadāmyaham // LAS 10.409 
 
Because of the [understanding] of the relation between one’s own seeds and what 
is grasped, attachment to the self is abandoned. Due to embarking on a 
scrutinizing of the mind, attachment to the dharmās is abandoned.  LAS 10.410 
 
svabījagrāhyasabandhādātmagrāha9 prahīyate / 
cittakalpāvatārea dharmagrāha9 prahīyate // LAS 10.410 
 
From the storehouse consciousness [other kinds of] consciousness are set forth,382 
[and] because [of that,] sense-media that are in fact internal appear as external. 
LAS 10.411 
 
yat tu ālayavijñāna tad vijñāna pravartate / 
ādhyātmika hy āyatana bhaved bāhya yad ābhayā // LAS 10.411 
 
Compounded and uncompounded phenomena are forever constructed by the 
unwise, and are never found, like things seen in a dream [such as] as stars or hairs 
LAS 10.412  
 
nakatrakeśagrahaa383 svapnarūpa yathābudhai9 / 
sasktāsaskta nitya kalpyate na ca vidyate // LAS 10.412 
 
Just like a city of gandharvas, illusion, and the water in a 
mirage, [all of which are] not existing yet appearing, so is the dependent nature.  
LAS 10.413  
 
                                                 382 Here I am guided by the Tibetan translation: kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las/_/rnam par shes pa gang 'byung ba/nang gi skye mched rnams yin te/_snang ba gang yin phyir rol to/ LK 110 279a3-4. Given the context of this passage, it seems plausible that the term vijñāna stands for the six sense consciousnesses, though it is possible that it indicates mental activity in general.   383 In the Tibetan: skad dang sgrar gzung rmi lam gzugs – “grasping speech and sound is like [perceiving] forms in a dream.” Ibid. 279a5.   
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gandharvanagara māyā mgatāmbhasā yathā / 
asanto vā vidśyante384 paratantra tathā bhavet // LAS  10.413  
 
[It is] with respect to the three consciousnesses385 [that] I instruct the metaphors of 
self and sense faculties.386 [However,] the mind (citta), mental faculty (manas), and 
consciousness (vijñāna) are without intrinsic identity. LAS 10.414 
 
ātmendriyopacāra hi tricitte deśayāmy aham / 
citta manaś ca vijñāna svalakaavisayuktā // LAS 10.414  
 
The mind, mental-faculty, consciousness; the two kinds of essencelessness;387 the 
five dharmas; the [three] natures; [all are included in] the realm of the Buddhas. 
LAS 10.415 
 
citta manaś ca vijñāna nairātmya syād dvaya tathā / 
pañca dharmā9 svabhāvā hi buddhānā gocaro hy ayam //…388 LAS 10.415. 
Vaidya (1963: 134). 
                                                 384 In the Tibetan: snang ba. Ibid. 279a5.  385 Here the "three consciousnesses" seem to be treated as synonymous, whereas in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya they are viewed as three distinct aspects of the vijñāna-skandha: citta, identified with the storehouse consciousness; the manas, viewed as the source of the conceit of self (manyanātmakaī) in all its various aspects; and vijñāna, consisting of the six sensory consciousnesses. See Walpola 2000b: 21-22.    386 The Tibetan translation in this case diverges conspicuously from the Sanskrit by adding a negation, thereby disassociating the "metaphors of self and senses" from the mind. The sentence then reads: “The metaphors of ‘self’ and the ‘senses’ are not said by me to be [referring] to the mind. The mind, mental faculty, and consciousness are without intrinsic identity....” bdag dang dbang por gdags pa ni/_/ngas ni sems la mi bshad do//sems dang yid dang rnam shes pa//rang gi mtshan nyid bral ba'o/ LK 110, mdo mang, ca 279a6.   387 Probably of the person and of objects, pudgaladharmanairātmya.   388 /sems dang yid dang rnam shes dang/_/de bzhin bdag med rnam gnyis dang/_/chos lnga dag dang rang bzhin rnams/_/de ni sangs rgyas spyod yul yin/ Ibid. 297a6-7.  
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At their core these loaded verses offer a description of the recursive389 mental 
causal process that constructs phenomenal reality through discursive thought. The 
process is said to underlie all compounded and uncompounded phenomena, thereby 
incorporating not merely ordinary objects but also the Buddhist particularized ontological 
and epistemic categories such as the sense-faculties, the sense-media, the elements, and 
the dharmās. Their ontological status is clarified by appeal to the distinction between the 
Imagined and the Dependent natures as representing two perspectives on the same 
phenomena, explicated through examples of the kind we just encountered. On the one 
hand, all these entities are said not to exist as they appear – i.e., in a duality between 
grasper and grasped and as essentially existent things, both features marking the 
Imagined nature. On the other hand, that very appearance is accounted for in terms of the 
underlying causal activity of the mind, identified as the Dependent nature. Thus, what in 
the previous passage was merely implied regarding upacāras is stated explicitly here: 
viewed with respect to the underlying causal mental reality, the terms “self" and "sense-
faculties” are understood as metaphors. Since the primary referents of these expressions 
do not exist (as they appear), they are held to refer indirectly to the mental reality that – 
as this passage clarifies – brings them about.  
  The LAS, we may conclude from this analysis, presents us with an understanding of 
upacāra that is broader than those previously encountered. No longer viewed merely in 
hermeneutical terms as indicating an implied meaning, or in referential terms as the 
                                                 389 In the sense of the vāsanā-bīja distinction, in which certain latent impressions of past experiences in the storehouse consciousness serve as causal "seeds" of further mental activity that brings about, through the mediation of conceptualization, the unreal external reality; the latter, in turn, leaves impressions on the mind, and so on. For a more detailed discussion of this process and its role in vikalpa and language, see chapter V, ft.423, 454.        
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absence of the primary referent from the locus of reference, upacāra is conjoined here with 
a causal phenomenal description of reality. It is viewed as a linguistic sign that indicates at 
once an absence and a presence: the ontological non-existence and referential absence of an 
allegedly real (primary) object, and the presence of a causal deep-structure, which can be 
referred to only indirectly. In this respect it would not be incorrect to view upacāra as the 
linguistic expression of the Three Natures scheme.390 This is not to say that figurative usage 
serves only as a sign post calling into question false referential and ontological assumptions 
(as was shown with respect to the AKBh), but rather that, more fundamentally, it presents 
the same sort of explanatory mechanism in which the Three Natures scheme is employed: 
namely, the ability to resolve alterity through a simultaneously multi–perspectival outlook 
on the same phenomena. Upacāra appears here as a Janus-faced linguistic sign, embodying 
and manifesting the possibility of multiple and often seemingly contradicting meanings – 
thus, a device whose capacity for referential transference is believed to do essentially the 
same theoretical work as the shifting perspectives of the Three Natures scheme.  
While the question of the LAS's chronological relation to the Triś remains 
unresolved, its understanding of language as figurative insofar as it refers to an implicit 
yet all-pervasive underlying (causal, mental) reality is clearly central to Sthiramati’s 
engagement with upacāra in his TriśBh. As we will see below, however, Sthiramati 
does not rest with this account but carries it further, utilizing it to bridge the Yogācāra 
critique of a correspondence theory of truth, on the one hand, and the school's need to 
defend meaningful discourse against the devastating Madhyamaka critique of language, 
on the other.    
                                                 390 This seems to supports Gold (2007) who argued so regarding Vasubandhu’s Triṃś; see chapter V, ft. 442.  
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Before exploring his elaborate account, I turn briefly to look at yet another 
possible source of influence on Sthiramati’s understanding of upacāra. It consists of a 
string of arguments presented in the fifth chapter of Dignāga’s seminal 
Pramāasamuccya, employing figurative usage to deny the existence of knowable 
universals and buttress his own nominalism.  
 
3. Upacāra in the Fifth Chapter of Dignāga’s Pramāasamuccaya  
 
The philosophical thought of Dignāga (480-540) marks a distinct (and some say 
novel) style of philosophizing in India, characterized by debates that venture across 
sectarian lines and therefore require a heightened systematization and standardization of 
logical and epistemic discourse.391 In many respects Dignāga's thought was highly 
influenced by early Yogācāra thinkers, especially Vasubandhu, whose student he is 
traditionally believed to have been. Richard Hayes has noted several common 
presuppositions running through the work of both scholars, including this:  
One area in which the influence of Vasubandhu upon Dignāga  
is especially apparent is in his appreciation of a phenomenalistic view392 
according to which we cannot directly know the external world and 
according to which it is possible for people to have experiences even in the 
absence of external stimuli. What was shown to follow from this view was 
that both words that name complexes and words that name absolute 
simples can in fact be naming only concepts as opposed to things of the 
world as they might be independent of our experience. (Hayes 1988: 173) 
                                                 391 See Arnold 2005: 193.    392 Hayes specifically uses this term to distinguish his own interpretation of Vasubabdu’s stance from Berkeleyan subjective idealism, on the one hand, and Sautrāntika representationalism as presented in the AKBh, on the other. Hayes 1988: 99-104.    
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While Dignāga’s nominalism and apoha theory of meaning, as well as their 
subsequent interpretation by Dharmakīrti, had a tremendous influence on the way 
language was understood and philosophized about in India, here we are concerned only 
with its bearing, however modest, on the issue of figurative usage. Though Dignāga uses 
the term upacāra in the sense of figurative usage quite profusely in his various works, he 
does not (in contrast to Bhartṛhari and, as we shall see, Sthiramati) assign it any special 
philosophical role or meaning. In most cases, Dignāga wields the term much like the 
AKBh does, that is, as a hermeneutical device for explaining away expressions involved 
in apparent doctrinal contradictions or inconsistencies.393 In one case, however, which I 
will now explore in some detail, upacāra does appear to play a more significant role in 
his philosophizing. In the fifth chapter of his seminal Pramāasamuccaya (PS), the locus 
classicus of his theory of language, Dignāga presents a set of arguments in which 
figurative usage is called upon to explain the meaning of general terms. A variation of 
                                                 393 For instance, as noted by Arnold (2005: 277: n11), in the first chapter of the PS  Dignāga appeals to figurative usage to distinguish his own preferred interpretation of the term "perception" (pratyakṣa), from its various other meanings, which he regards as secondary: “The word pratyakṣa is used with respect to three things: the reliable warrant [pramāṇa, R.T] the awareness [that results from the exercise thereof], and the object [of this awareness]. With respect to these [the usage designating] the reliable warrant is primary, and the others are secondary [nye bar btags - Skt., aupacārika]. In this regard an object is [figuratively] characterized as 'pratyakṣa' since it is cognized by [the reliable warrant] called pratyakṣa.” See also Ibid. 34-35. Elsewhere in the same chapter of the PS upacāra is employed to indicate that the undifferentiated sva-samvṛtti is divided into a pramāṇa and prameya aspect only figuratively: “Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and of the object to be cognized (prameya), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (upacāryate) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case, because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,] are devoid of function (nirvyāpāra).” Hattori 1968:  29, 106 n.1.65, 183.   
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some of these arguments appears to be included also in Sthiramati’s TriśBh394 and 
therefore merit a closer look.  
Having previously argued that knowledge is only possible through perception 
(pratyaka) or inference (anumāna), in the fifth chapter Dignāga goes on to show that all 
linguistic knowledge is in fact arrived at through an implicit process akin to negative or 
excluding (anyāpoha) inference. This process allows one to replace the use of universals 
(which are, according to Dignāga, unknowable) with a discourse of particulars (grounded, 
at least partly, in real experiences).395   
The anyāpoha theory of meaning is by no means self-evident, and as indicated by 
Hayes, much of the fifth chapter of the PS, therefore, is an argument for the necessity of 
assuming this view. To this end, Dignāga attempts to undermine the coherence of all 
other accounts of meaning by demonstrating that general terms (jāti śabda)396 can be seen 
to express neither individuals (dravya), nor universals, nor the relations of universals to 
                                                 394 The dating of Sthiramati between 470-550 CE allows for the possibility that he was indeed a contemporary of Dignāga, as stated by Taranatha. See Chattopadhyaya 1970: 201, cited in Kawamura 1976: 42.   395 Hayes 1988: 188-193. The shift from a discourse of universals to that of particulars is achieved by understanding the universal not as the collection of all the individuals of the same class, but as the negation of the absence of all the universal's particular instantiations from a given locus. Thus one’s language is committed only to assertions about specific states of affairs. See Ibid. 86. For Dignāga, knowledge of real particulars (sva-lakṣaṇa) can only be attained through perception, which by definition is immediate (i.e. non-conceptual). On the other hand, language, through inference, supplies only knowledge of the generalized common attributes of things (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), i.e., of constructed composite objects and their generalization into classes. In this respect, the anyāpoha theory’s dismissal of universals allows us to narrow the gap between experiential and propositional knowledge, though it still does not explain how this gap may be fully bridged or eliminated. For a discussion of the inherent tension between perceptual and propositional knowledge in Dignāga’s thought, and a critique of his proposed solution (of viewing propositional knowledge as causally related to its perceptual basis), see Arnold 2005: 36-42.  396 According to Hayes (1988: 203), who draws on B.K Matilal (1971: 37), although Dignāga’s argument deals only with general terms, these are understood to be paradigmatic of all other linguistic units.   
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entities397 or entities as instantiations of universals.398 Echoes of the Nyāya discussion of 
the meaning of nouns, discussed in chapter I, do not seem accidental; indeed, at one point 
in the argument, while considering and ruling out the possibility that words are 
expressive of instantiations of universals, Dignāga specifically addresses the possibility 
of figurative referential relations. This argument is outlined in what follows, relying on 
Hayes’ translation and analysis.   
The assumption laid out for consideration, then, is that general terms express an 
instantiation of the universal, a relation in which the latter is understood as a universal-
possessing entity (jātimat vastu), as the locus of the universal, and as qualified by it.399 Of 
the three arguments Dignāga advances to refute this assumption I will focus on the last, 
which can be schematized as follows: (1) if indeed a general term refers to an 
instantiation of a universal, then it must do so only figuratively; but (2) this is untenable 
because the conditions for figurative usage are not met in the case under consideration; 
therefore, (3) words cannot be said to express an instantiation of a universal.  
Why is it that a word can express an instantiation of a universal, as a universal-
possessor, only figuratively? The reason given for this first assumption is that the notion 
of a certain universal-possessor necessarily presupposes the notion of a certain universal, 
implying that the latter is logically prior. It follows that any generic term that expresses a 
universal-possessor must first be expressive of a universal – that is to say, must take the 
latter as its primary referent and the former as merely secondary. But this requirement, 
                                                 397 Vastu. I have opted to render this as "entity" and not "particular," as translated by Hayes, to avoid confusion of the term with "real particulars" (sva-lakṣaṇa).     398 Hayes 1988: 193.  399 Ibid. 196.   
 215 
Dignāga points out, is incompatible with the very conditions of figurative usage, which 
call for a qualitative similarity between the primary and secondary referent400 of the sort 
that, he contends, is not found in the case before us. He supports this claim in the 
following manner: to find this sort of qualitative similarity, one must be able to isolate 
and name the particular shared quality in the same sequential way in which one identifies, 
for instance, the conch shell and (then) the Jasmine as both being "white." But, of course, 
no such shared quality is observable in the same way between a universal and its 
instantiation. So, for instance (to use Hayes' example), in the case of the generic term 
“cat” applied to the universal “felinity” and the “felinity-possessing” cat, the universal 
and its instantiation are indicated by the term simultaneously and never sequentially.401  
But what if the universal and its instantiation do not have a shared property yet 
nonetheless appear to have one, meeting the conditions for figurative usage? for 
exemplifying this Dignāga uses the analogy of a crystal  – just as it reflects the color of 
the object before it, so the universal-possessor, by virtue of its connection to the 
universal, reflects some of the universal's qualities. According to Hayes, Dignāga refutes 
this possibility with two distinct arguments. The first addresses the possibility that the 
                                                 400 I.e., an expression denoting an object A can be figuratively applied to another object B if and only if A and B are or appear qualitatively similar. See Ibid. 268.   401 Clarifying this argument in his own sub-commentary, Dignāga uses the example of the generic term “real”: “Even if the general term is applied figuratively to the instantiation of the universals, [it is not on the basis of qualitative resemblance] ‘because we do not speak [in this case of a single quality residing in its various loci] sequentially as [we do when we speak of] the white colour of a jasmine flower and a conch shell and so forth.’  We observe that we speak in sequence of those things of which we have a similar idea; for example, we say 'The jasmine flower and the water lily and the conch shell are white.' Since the word [real] is applied simultaneously to both the universal [reality] and its instantiation, there is no qualitative resemblance based on the transfer of an idea from one thing to another.” Pramāṇasamuccyavṛtti (PSV) 5.5, Ibid. 266-267.   
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instantiation of the universal appears to share all the universal’s qualities. This is said to 
be untenable for two reasons: on the one hand, it would imply that one can cognize an 
instantiation of the universal independently of the cognition of the universal, which is 
impossible given the logical priority of the latter; on the other, it would render both 
entities indistinguishable and the distinction between them redundant. The second 
argument addresses the scenario in which the instantiation of a universal is said to reflect 
only some of the qualities of the universal. This would require one to determine which 
qualities of the universal are the shared ones, presupposing the possibility of perceiving 
each quality in isolation from the rest; but our experience, Dignāga argues, simply does 
not operate this way. Objects always appear to us as unified composite wholes and not as 
a collection of independently perceived qualities: we see a clay-colored earthen jug, and 
not its shape, its material, its color as distinct from one another; similarly, one is aware of 
a universal in its entirety, with no ability to tell which of its qualities are reflected or 
found in its instantiation.402 In light of all of the above, since no similar qualities can be 
found between the universal and its instantiation, the latter cannot be said to be expressed 
figuratively by the corresponding general term as prescribed by the former's logical and 
referential priority. Therefore, contends Dignāga, the claim that a general term denotes an 
instantiation of a universal is untenable.   
 Several aspects of this argument are worth emphasizing, above all its reliance on 
what appears to be an unnecessarily narrow definition of figurative usage. As was 
demonstrated earlier with respect to the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā writings on figurative 
usage, and as we may assume Dignāga was well aware, qualitative similarity is not the 
                                                 402 Ibid. 202, 268.  
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only possible ground for figurative usage.403 We can only speculate about the reasons for 
this omission, as Dignāga says nothing on the matter in his commentary.404 But some 
light may be shed on his reasons in the following chapter, in which I explore a similarly 
narrow definition as it appears (to different effects) in Sthiramati’s argument in the 
TriśBh. 
 




Sthiramati’s Pan-Figurative View of Language in the Triśikabhāya 
 
 
Sthiramati (470-550),405 one of the most prominent Yogācāra philosophers in 
sixth-century India, is renowned primarily for his commentarial work on the early 
Yogācāra treatises and sūtras.406 His commentaries on Vasubandhu’s work were of 
particular influence on subsequent generations of Buddhist thinkers, and for Tibetan 
scholars, his writings (following Tsong Khapa's extensive reliance on them) became the 
standard entry point into Vasubandhu’s work.407 Despite his importance, and perhaps 
because of the commentarial nature of his work, there has been limited scholarly 
engagement with Sthiramati as an Indian philosopher of note in his own right; but close 
readings of his commentaries reveal, as I hope to show, a highly sophisticated 
philosophical body of text rife with original and strikingly innovative insights.   
A distinct example of this ingenuity is Sthiramati's analysis of upacāra in his 
Triśikavijñāptibhāya (TriśBh), a commentary on Vasubandhu’s seminal 
                                                 405 These dates place him as an older contemporary of both Bhāvaviveka (490-570) and Dharmapāla (560). On the dating and life of Sthiramati, see Nguyen 1990: 13-23. What little is known about Sthiramati’s life comes from Tibetan and Chinese sources. The Tibetan hagiographies of Bu-ston (1290-1364) and Tāranātha (b. 1575) indicate that he was the son of a ṣūdra in the Ḍaṇḍakāraṇya and a direct disciple of Vasubandhu (the latter is unlikely, given Vasubandhu's generally agreed upon dates). According to Chinese sources he was the disciple of Guṇamati and was connected with the Buddhist universities of Nālandā and Valabhī.  406 These include commentaries on the RatNakūṭasūtra (extant in Chinese and Tibetan); on Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccya; on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, Triṃśikabhāṣya, and his other treatises; and on the MūlaMadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna (Chinese).   407 See Garfield 2002: 111.  
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Triśikakārikā (Triś).408 Though the term appears only once in Vasubandhu’s treatise, 
in the opening verse, Sthiramati’s lengthy explication of it amounts to a full-fledged 
theory of metaphor, subsequently used to support the Yogācāra’s soteriology. As I 
present below, Sthiramati’s account counters the accepted essentialist understanding of 
upacāra as necessitating qualitative similarity between existent real entities and presents 
an alternative definition of it solely in terms of the absence of the primary referent of a 
word from its locus of reference. When complemented by the Yogācāra view of the non-
reality of external objects, the outcome is an understanding of all language usage as 
figurative. This enables Sthiramati to present what Jonathan Gold has described as a 
"figurative theory of reference," which in turn allows the Yogācāra to reject realism while 
still retaining meaningful reference. Pursuing Gold's analysis, and given the Yogācāra 
view of language as causally efficacious (as noted in the previous chapter), I will argue 
that Sthiramati’s pan-figurative claim implies a causal figurative theory of reference 
designed not to respond to the realist challenge so much as to cope with the limitations 
placed on discourse by the radical conventionalism of the Mādhyamika. Such a theory 
enables the Yogācāra to meet its soteriological needs by maintaining a discourse in which 
diverse descriptions of reality are viewed as meaningful under the same referential 
principle, while also contending that some descriptions are more meaningful than others.  
 
 
1. The Triśika, its Commentary, and the Question of the Yogācāra Idealism 
 
 
In the prefatory exposition of his commentary on the Triś, Sthiramati, as is 
customary in this genre, presents the stated purpose of the treatise and identifies its target 
                                                 408 All translations from the Triṃś and TriṃśBh are my own; they are based on Buescher's Sanskrit critical edition (2007). Kārikās are set in bold. 
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audience. The treatise was composed, he writes, “for the correct propounding of the non-
essentiality of the person (pudgala-nairātmya) and of things (dharma-nairātmya).”409 It 
is intended for those who are “engrossed in the (reality) of the person and phenomenon 
and do not realize it to be mind only (cittamātra)”, as well as for the sake of two groups 
of erring "extremists” (ekāntavādins) – probably the Sarvāstivāda and the 
Mādhyamika,410 who assume respectively that “just like consciousness, so too the object 
of consciousness is a substrate,” 411 and that “the object of consciousness, just like 
consciousness, [exists] only conventionally (savtteh) and not ultimately 
(parmārthena).”412  
His preface seems to guide us to a reading of Sthiramati as professing the 
unreality of phenomena, on the one hand, and the ultimate reality of consciousness, on 
the other – that is, as adhering to a kind of metaphysical idealism. But other seemingly 
                                                 409 pudgaladharmanairātmyayor apratipannavipratipannānām aviparītapudgaladharmanairātmyapratipādanārthaṃ triṃśikāvijñaptiprakaraṇārambhaḥ| Buescher 2007: 38:2-4.  410 Sthiramati does not name these schools, but according to Kawamura (1976: 110-111), Vinītadeva’s Triṃśika-bhāṣya-ṭīkā  (TriṃśBhṬ, sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad) identifies the second group as “some Mādhyamikas.”  Kawamura also adds that K'uei-chi, in his commentary to the Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun, identifies these as Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. Vinītadeva's characterization of these Mādhyamikas as “those who claim that everything does not exist,” however, perhaps indicates that he refers here also to the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas.    411 Literally, the adverbial “substantively.”    412 “…Or, [since] as some would think 'just like consciousness, so too the object of consciousness is a substrate,'  [while others may believe that] “the object of consciousness, just like consciousness, [exists] only conventionally (saṃvṛtti) and not ultimately (parmārthatā)' – hence the undertaking of this treatise, which is for the sake of warding off this extremism in both its forms.” atha vā vijñānavad vijñeyam api dravyata eveti kecin manyante | vijñeyavad vijñānam api saṃvṛtita eva na paramārthata ity asya dviprakārasyāpy ekāntavādasya pratiṣedhārthaḥ prakaraṇārambhaḥ || TriṃśBh, Buescher 2007: 39:18-20. 
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incompatible claims in the Triś and its bhāya challenge this initial interpretation, 
complicating the task of making sense of his claims.  
One of the longstanding topics in the field of Yogācāra studies concerns, as I've 
already mentioned (in chapter III), the question of whether the school presents some form 
of philosophical idealism, and if so, what form. Both Vasubandhu’s Triś and 
Sthiramati’s TriśBh not only partake in this debate  but play a central role, primarily 
because they unpack the claim that everything is “mere representations” (vijñāptimātra) 
by bringing together two fundamental Yogācāra schemes for describing reality, namely 
the model of the “transformation of consciousness” (vijñaptipariāma) and the Three 
Natures doctrine (trisvabhāva). The idealism controversy merits our closer observation 
insofar as it bears on the interpretation of these texts.  
The Triś can be divided roughly into three parts: the first addresses the 
transformation of consciousness (verses 1-16); the second presents the notion of “mere 
representations” through the Three Natures scheme (17-25); and the final section (26-30) 
lays out the soteriological ends of and praxis involved in true knowledge of “mere 
representations.” As upacāra is discussed by Sthiramati mainly in his commentary to the 
section of the Triś concerning the transformation of consciousness, this first part is the 
more pertinent for our purposes. In broad terms, the notion of the “transformation of 
consciousness” serves Vasubandhu to set forth a phenomenological analysis that reduces 
the constructed imagined (parikalpita) world into the causal karmic interaction between 
mental functions. Here again, the account could readily be regarded as indicative of an 
idealist position were it not for seemingly contrary assertions, appearing for instance in 
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verse 17 of the Triś, according to which the transformation of consciousness is itself a 
conceptual construct (vikalpa).413  
The task of deciphering Sthiramati’s stance on these issues encounters similar 
obstructions, since on the one hand he endorses the claim that the transformation of 
consciousness is a construct,414 while on the other he explicitly asserts that unlike 
phenomenal objects, which are non-existent, consciousness alone should be held to exist 
substantially (dravyata). The picture is further complicated by Sthiramati’s subsequent 
interpretation of the concluding verses of the treatise, where he states that abiding in 
“mere representations” means understanding the non-existence not only of external 
objects but also of the perceiving consciousness.415 
These and other hermeneutical puzzles posed by the Triś and its bhāya, and the 
absence of an auto-commentary, have yielded a great variety of often conflicting 
scholarly interpretations, supported by different readings of the Three Natures scheme 
and of the Yogācāra soteriological aims. So, for instance, while according to Nguyen the 
claims of these texts regarding the constructed nature of consciousness should be 
interpreted as indicating its provisional nature and the ultimate transcendence of 
                                                 413 “The transformation of consciousness is [but] a construction, and that which is imagined is therefore non-existent, hence all this is merely representations.” vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate |tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñāptimātrakam || Triṃś 17. Ibid. 108.  414  [Bhāṣya to verse 17]: “According to the verse, that which is [called] the transformation of consciousness and was later stated to be tri-fold, is a construction. Construction means the mind and mental states [in all] three realms of existence, as the appearances of objects [that are merely] superimposed.” iti | yo 'yaṃ vijñānapariṇāmas trividho 'nantaram abhihitaḥ so 'yaṃ vikalpaḥ | adhyāropitārthākārās traidhātukāś cittacaittā vikalpa ucyate | TriṃśBh 17. Ibid.  415 See Nguyen 1990: 52-53.   
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consciousness as an ontological foundation,416 Garfield reads them as implying a 
distinction between two kinds of awareness: one that is pervaded by a grasper-grasped 
duality (which includes within it the transformation of consciousness), and an underlying 
ontological reality of consciousness that is non-dual and non-conceptual.417 While our 
own circumscribed engagement with the understanding of upacāra in the Triś and its 
bhāya cannot hope to resolve the overarching question of the alleged Yogācāra idealism, 
it nonetheless stands to contribute indirectly to this debate by untangling some of the 
apparent inconsistencies in the way these texts address and understand the transformation 
of consciousness. I take this up toward the end of the present chapter.   
 
2. Upacāra, the Transformation of Consciousness, and their Relation Defined   
          
We now turn to Sthiramati’s discussion of upacāra, the main thrust of which 
appears in his commentary on the first verse of the Triś:  
The metaphor (upacāra) of 'things' (dharmā8) and of 'self' in its various forms, 
which is set in motion, that is to say in the world and in treatises, that is [with 
reference to] the transformation of consciousness.  
 
                                                 416 Ibid. 52-53, 165-169. Nguyen’s study is exceptional in its scope, examining Sthiramati’s thought across a great variety of his commentarial work and thereby producing a highly contextualized analysis of his understanding of various Yogācāra tenets.   417 Garfield 2002: 176-183. Garfield's analysis of the Triṃś and bhāṣya juxtaposes portions of these texts with passages from other Yogācāra texts, such as the SNS, the TSN, MV and its bhāṣya, and also draws comparisons with the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika. He takes Sthiramati to be completing an interpretative process begun by Vasubandhu and aimed at synthesizing two strands of Yogācāra thought. The first strand, represented by the SNS, emphasizes an understanding of emptiness as the "three naturelessnesses” (niḥsvabhāva), and the second is the idealistic theory of the Three Natures (trisvabhāva) as presented in Vasubandhu’s treatises. Garfield criticizes what he understands as a Tibetan misreading of Vasubandhu (seen through the synthesis provided by Sthiramati), which takes him to be asserting merely an ontology of interdependence rather than ontological idealism, thereby unjustly rendering his views as compatible with the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika.   
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ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho ya8 pravartate | lokaśāstrayor iti vākyaśea9 | 
vijñānapariāme 'sau | (Buescher 2007: 43) 
 
Sthiramati’s commentary explains that the verse uses “self” and "things" (“dharma”) as 
generic terms for all substantive entities, variously including the soul, the person, and the 
Buddhist categories of aggregates, elements, etc.418 But why are these referred to as 
“metaphors”? An explanation is provided in the following passage:   
And this metaphor of two kinds [of self and things] is applied in [reference]419 to 
the transformation of consciousness and not to a primary [and] actual420 self or 
things. Why so? Since these do not exist outside of the transformation of 
consciousness. What is it that is termed ‘transformation’? The state of being 
otherwise [than what it previously was]. Here 'transformation' – which is the 
acquisition of the effect as something distinct from the moment in which the 
cause [exists] and simultaneous with the moment of the passing away of the cause 
– is a mental construct, an appearance of self, etc., and the appearance of matter, 
etc., [all] arising from the storehouse consciousness because of the incubation  
(paripoā) of latent impressions [through] the conceptual construct (vikalpa) of a 
self, etc., and the incubation of latent impressions [through] the conceptual 
construct of matter, etc. The metaphor of things such as matter, etc., and the 
metaphor of self, etc., having its base in the appearance of matter etc. and the 
appearance of self etc., [which] due to a mental construction [appear] as if they 
were external, occurs from time immemorial, even without an external self and 
things, like in the case of the metaphor of net-like apparitions [experienced by] a 
person suffering from an eye-disease. And that which is not existent there [in the 
                                                 418  “The expression 'the metaphors of things and the self' (ātmadharmopacāra) [in the verse] is syntactically connected with [the transformation of consciousness].The 'metaphors of things and self' – because the things and self are used metaphorically. And this [expression] again [means] the imputed designation of the self and the imputed designations of things. 'Various' means [here] not-of-the-same-sort. The metaphor of 'self' [applies to] the self, soul, creatures, human beings, and the like, and the metaphor of 'things' applies to [all things] as the elements, the sense media, and the aggregates, such as matter, sensation, recognition, volitional formations, consciousness, and the like.” ātmadharmopacāra iti saṃbadhyate | ātmā dharmāś copacaryanta ity ātmadharmopacāraḥ | sa punar ātmaprajñaptir dharmaprajñaptiś ca | vividha ity anekaprakāraḥ | ātmā jīvo jantur manujo māṇava ity evamādika ātmopacāraḥ skandhā dhātava āyatanāni rūpaṃ vedanā saṃjñā saṃskārā vijñānam ity evamādiko dharmopacāraḥ | Buescher 2007: 40:4-8.  419 Here I take pariṇāmaḥ to have the seventh nominal case ending. That this indeed implies referential relations becomes apparent from the analysis below.    420 The use of “primary” (mukhya) in this case perhaps intentionally capitalizes on the ambiguity of this term, which indicates both the actual object and the primary referent of a word.   
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locus of reference] is figuratively designated, like [when one calls the] Bāhīka 
person an ox. 
Thus, the self and things, because of their non-existence both in consciousness in 
its true form and externally, are in fact imagined and do not exist ultimately. 
Therefore, the [realist’s] extremist view 'Just like consciousness, so too the object 
of consciousness is a substrate” should not be resorted to.  
And because of the impossibility of a metaphor without a support (nirādhāra), the 
occurrence of the metaphors of the self and things should be necessarily 
(avaśya) regarded as actually being the transformation of consciousness. Due to 
this, the following [Mādhyamika] view would not withstand reasoning: 'That the 
object of consciousness, just like consciousness, exists only conventionally 
(savtti) and not ultimately (paramārthatā).' This view is not logically tenable 
since it would result in the non-existence [of both of them] even conventionally, 
because convention without a basis (upādāna) does not make sense. In light of 
this, the extremist views of both types must be abandoned because they are 
illogical, so said the ācārya [Vasubandhu].  
And thus it should be accepted that all objects are in fact unreal, due to [their] 
intrinsic nature (svabhāva) being a fabrication. Consciousness, on the other hand, 
because of its being dependently originated (pratītyasamutpanna), exists as a 
substrate (dravyata). And again, consciousness’ state of being dependently 
originated is made known by the use of the term 'transformation.'  
 
aya dviprakāro 'py upacāro vijñānapariāma eva na mukhye ātmani dharmeu 
ceti | kuta etat | dharmāām ātmanaś ca vijñānapariāmād bahir abhāvāt | 
ko 'ya pariāmo nāma | anyathātvam | kāraakaanirodhasamakāla9 
kāraakaavilakaa9 kāryasyātmalābha9 pariāma9 | 
tatrātmādivikalpavāsanāparipoād rūpādivikalpavāsanāparipoāc 
cālayavijñānād ātmādinirbhāso vikalpo rūpādinirbhāsaś cotpadyate | tam 
ātmādinirbhāsa rūpādinirbhāsañ ca tasmād vikalpād bahirbhūtam 
ivopādāyātmādyupacāro rūpādidharmopacāraś cānādikālika9 pravartate vināpi 
bāhyenātmanā dharmaiś ca | tad yathā taimirikasya keśo2ukādyupacāra iti | yac 
ca yatra nāsti tat tatropacaryate | tad yathā bāhīke gau9 | eva vijñānasvarūpe 
bahiś cātmadharmābhāvāt parikalpita evātmā dharmāś ca na tu paramārthata9 
santīti vijñānavad vijñeyam api dravyata evety ayam ekāntavādo nābhyupeya9 | 
upacārasya ca nirādhārasyāsabhavād avaśya vijñānapariāmo vastuto 'stīty 
upagantavyo yatrātmadharmopacāra9 pravartate | ataś cāyam abhyupagamo na 
yuktikamo vijñānam api vijñeyavat savtita eva na paramārthata iti | savtito 
'py abhāvaprasa'gān na hi savtir nirupādānā yujyate | tasmād ayam 
ekāntavādo dviprakāro 'pi niryuktikatvāt tyājya ity ācāryavacanam | evañ ca 
sarva vijñeya parikalpitasvabhāvatvād vastuto na vidyate vijñāna puna9 
pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'stīty abhyupeyam | pratītyasamutpannatva 
punar vijñānasya pariāmaśabdena jñāpitam | (Buescher 2007: 40:9- 42:18)  
 
Here Sthiramati presents a definition of metaphor: a figurative use of a word is 
understood as such when it indicates “something which is not there,” implying the 
 226 
absence of the word’s primary referent from the locus of reference. So, in Sthiramati's 
śāstric stock example of calling a person of the Bāhīkās an “ox” (because both are strong, 
slow-witted, etc.), the word “ox” directly denotes a referent (an ox) which is absent from 
or non-existent in the locus of reference (the Bāhīkā gentleman), and is therefore said to 
designate the latter only in a secondary, figurative way. This definition suggests an 
understanding of the terms "self" and "things" as figurative because their primary 
referents (self, things) are absent from their locus of reference, said here to be the 
“transformation of consciousness.” It should be noted, however, that in contrast to the 
absence of the ox, the absence of the self and of things is not contingent, since both are 
merely mental constructs and, as such, simply do not in any circumstances exist in the 
manner in which they appear (like the apparitions witnessed by a person inflicted with an 
eye disease).421   
This passage raises several important points. The first is that Sthiramati, in a 
variant on the formulaic Nyāya-sūtra definition of metaphor (see chapter I page 28), 
defines secondary meaning as a function of nothing more than the referent’s actuality, 
                                                 421 The absence of the primary referent is hence constitiutive of upacāra. It should be noted that Sthiramati does later use the term “superimposition” (adhyāropa), but only to refer to the imagined object and its realtion with the transformation of consciousness. No where is upacāra defined or glossed as “superimpostion”.  See for instance: “According to the verse [Triṃś 17], that which  is [called] the transformation of consciousness and was later stated to be tri-fold, is a construction. Construction means The mind and mental states [in all] three realms of existence, the appearances of objects [that are merely] superimposed.” iti | yo 'yaṃ vijñānapariṇāmas trividho 'nantaram abhihitaḥ so 'yaṃ vikalpaḥ | |adhyāropitārthākārās traidhātukāś cittacaittā vikalpa ucyate || TriṃśBh 17 Buescher (2007: 108). And also: “Further more, in the case of a [single] consistently (ābhinna) [perceived] object, mutually incompatible perceptions are obtained by various observers. And a state [in which] manifold mutually incompatible perceptions correspond [lit: are identical] to one single [object] is untenable. Therefore it should be understood that the objectified support (ālambana) for mental construction, because of its form being superimposed [on a mental construction], does not exist.” dṛṣṭā cābhinne 'py arthe pratipattṝṇāṃ parasparaviruddhā pratipattiḥ | na caikasya parasparaviruddhānekātmakatvaṃ yujyate | tasmād adhyāropitarūpatvād vikalpasyālambanam asad iti pratipattavyam | Buescher (2007: 110).  
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independent of all discursive or pragmatic considerations. This definition, of course, 
challenges the understanding of figurative application that appears in ordinary language 
usage, since it does away with the distinction between figurative usage and discourse that 
regards mere fictions. Furthermore, since this definition of upacāra is said to apply to the 
entire range of subjective and objective phenomena, it implies that all the referents of 
words are in fact non-existent, and hence that – as we will soon find Sthiramati asserting 
explicitly – all language usage is necessarily figurative. But if this is so, what sense is 
there to distinguish between primary and secondary usage in the first place? And more 
puzzling yet, what philosophical gain lies in declaring all language usage figurative? 
Specifically, why not rest with asserting, as did many Buddhists before Vasubandhu and 
Sthiramati, that the referents of words (being composite, allegedly essential entities) are 
all unreal, rendering language not figurative but merely reference-less? These are key 
questions for the understanding of Sthiramati's overall argumentative move, and they will 
shortly be addressed.   
A second important point raised by this passage concerns the relations between the 
upacāras and the so-called transformation of consciousness. According to Sthiramati’s definition 
of metaphor, the transformation of consciousness is for the upacāras what the Bāhīkā is for the 
term “ox” – namely, their locus of reference, or in other words, that to which the word 
figuratively refers. But what precisely is the nature of this transformation of consciousness? The 
passage defines it foremost as a change given in terms of a causal development. As stated above 
by Sthiramati, this is nothing but the Buddhist notion of dependent-arising (pratītya-samutpāda) 
understood in terms of the activity of the mind. In addition, as we saw in verse 17 of the Triś, 
this transformation of consciousness is said to be a mental construct (vikalpa), implying, 
according to Sthiramati, that it is manifested only through the mental appearances (nirbhāsa) of 
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allegedly external objects produced through the latent activity of the storehouse consciousness 
(ālayavijñāna). An elaborate description of this process is the subject of the Triś verses 1-16, 
of which the passage above serves as an abstract of sorts. Most conspicuous in this description, 
which accords with those found in other Yogācāra treatises, is the recursive nature of the 
process: past experiences of a “self” and things such as “matter” (which are merely mental 
appearances) leave their impressions (vāsanā) on the storehouse consciousness, and these 
impressions, through the mediation of conceptual distinctions, mature and serve as the karmic 
"seeds" (bīja)422 that then perpetuate future experiences of “self” and “matter”, which in turn 
leave their impressions on the storehouse consciousness, and so on. Another notable feature of 
this description, which again aligns with other Yogācāra sources, is its underlying understanding 
of language as causally efficacious – both by means of a general tendency for conceptualizing 
(vikalpa) and through particular impressions of past verbal activity – and therefore as a force that 
fashions and determines future experiences.423  
The latter point is of particular importance for our purposes, implying as it does that 
underlying referential relations are causal relations – since the upacāra “self” and its referent 
(the mental appearance of a self) are seen to be at once the determinants and the products of a 
causal chain of mental events, the so-called transformation of consciousness. This also seems to 
                                                 422 Sthiramati does not explicitly use the term bīja, but these are implied by the vāsanās.     423 An account of this process appears in, among other sources, the first chapter of Asaṅga’s MS. As described in Waldron (2003: 166-169), it indicates that a pivotal role in the construction of the life-world is allocated by the Yogācāra not merely to overarching dispositions toward conceptualization (vikalpa, prapañca), but also to the conventional use of language (vyavahāra), understood to be causally efficacious as it is manifest in the storehouse consciousness as the "impressions of speech" (abhilāpa-vāsanā). See also ft. 454.  
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clarify Sthiramati’s statement that the metaphors of self and things have their basis (upādāyā)424 
in the mental appearances of these, the term "basis" understood not as an ontological foundation 
but as a causal foundation and a referential locus. Thus it is significant to note that according to 
Sthiramati’s understanding, Vasubandhu chooses to open his treatise with a claim about, of all 
things, language and its relation to reality. This point is especially pertinent to the context in 
which Sthiramati articulates his critique of both the realists and the Mādhyamika, in the 
concluding part of this passage; but in order to appreciate this critique we need first to complete 
the outline of his arguments regarding upacāra.  
 
3. Sthiramati’s Refutation of the View of Upacāras as Based on Qualitative 
Similarity between Existent Entities  
 
 Sthiramati proceeds to defend his claims against several potential objections.425  One 
such objection charges that his claims regarding upacāras of non-existent objects are self-
                                                 424 The absolutive form of upa-ā-dā. The passage also includes the term upādāna, derived from the same verbal root. Referring to the term as it is used by Candrakīrti in his critique of Dignāga, Dan Arnold (2005: 158-159) says the following of its most common meanings in Buddhist philosophical lore: “[T]he word rendered here as 'basis' is upādāna, which has the sense of ‘appropriation’ or, in many cases, ‘what is appropriated’. The word figures prominently in the Buddhist context, occurring as the ninth member of the standard twelvefold chain of dependent origination, where it has the active sense of ‘grasping.’ The word can also, however, have an objective sense, designating the causal or material basis of the action of appropriation. In this sense, the word often means 'fuel,' that is, what is consumed or 'appropriated' by fire."  425 The opponent begins by pointing out the necessity of assuming an external object as a source for experience: “[It may be argued:] how is this arrived at, that without an external object, a consciousness having the [specific] appearance of that object has arisen? [Reply:] external object is [specifically] required as the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) of a cognition by virtue of the generation of a cognition having an appearance of its own, [and] not by virtue of merely being a condition in general, since [then] a condition [such as] the proximate [condition] would be without the consequence of [accounting] for differences [between objects].” katham etad gamyate vinā bāhyenārthena vijñānam evārthākāram utpadyata iti | bāhyo hy arthaḥ svābhāsavijñānajanakatvena vijñānasyālambanapratyaya iṣyate na kāraṇatvamātreṇa samanantarādipratyayād viśeṣāprasaṅgāt | Buescher 2007: 42:19-22. According to the opponent, external objects must exist since there are no other causal determinants for the content of their corresponding cognitions. Sthiramati replies that this is untenable, since if indeed external 
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undermining since figurative usage is premised on the ability to notice a qualitative similarity 
between existent entities:  
Other [opponents], however, say: if self and things do not exist as primary objects 
(mukhya) then a metaphor is untenable. Metaphor is possible only by these three 
existent things and not in the absence of any of them: a primary object of 
reference (mukhya-padārtha), another object which has a resemblance to it, and a 
common quality exiting between the two. Thus, for instance, when there is fire as 
the primary object of reference, and the boy as its similar object, and being tawny 
or having a fierce nature as a quality common to both, then the metaphor 'the 
child [is] fire' can be made.  
 
anyas tv āha | asaty ātmani mukhye dharmeu copacāro na yujyate | upacāro hi 
triu satsu bhavati nānyatamābhāve mukhyapadārthe tatsadśe 'nyasmin viaye 
tayoś ca sādśye | tad yathā mukhye 'gnau tatsadśe ca māavake tayoś ca 
sādhārae dharme kapilatve tīkatve vā saty agnir māavaka ity upacāra9 
kriyate | (Buescher 2007: 46:3-7) 
 
 
The opponent426 points out that figurative usage presupposes some substantial basis, as it 
requires the presence of a relation between existent objects and their qualities. More 
fundamentally, he suggests that metaphorical meaning is necessarily parasitical on 
another meaning that is literal and "primary" in the sense given this notion by an 
essentialist theory of meaning. This understanding of metaphor appears to be compatible 
                                                                                                                                                 objects were the sole causal determinant of the content of cognitions (and not an ensemble of different causes), then any perception of the external world would supply a representation of objects as an undifferentiated whole. He then proceeds to demonstrate that even if that were the case, there would be no object that could serve as the material cause and content determinant of a corresponding cognition. The reason he gives is that all objects are divisible into parts. If the opponent argues that these parts can be seen as indivisible ontological units, atoms of sorts, which can serve as the material cause for cognition, Sthiramati would point out that these atoms, whether aggregated or alone, are by definition formless and therefore incapable of determining any corresponding cognitive content. Next, Sthiramati turns to refute the assumption that sensation (vedana), seen as activated by external stimuli, may serve as the internal determinant of cognitions. He does so by arguing that sensation’s momentary existence makes it incapable of serving as an enduring object of inner perception. See Ibid. 42:19-46:2, and also Vinītadeva’s ṭīkā in Kawamura 1976: 126-138.  426  Vīntadeva identifies this objection as that of the grammarian (brda sprod pa). See Kawamura 1976: 136.   
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with two of the conditions usually stated in respect to metaphorical application: 1) the 
inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the given context – i.e., that 
the literal meaning is somehow barred (mukhyārthabādha); and 2) that there exists some 
relation (sabandha) between the primary and the actual reference of the word which 
allows for secondary denotation.427 According to this formulation, in the case of the “boy 
(is) fire” the primary referent of the word “fire” is fire (which can be either a particular or 
a universal), while its actual referent (or locus of reference – that which it refers to 
figuratively) is the boy. Since we are (under normal circumstances) barred from assuming 
that there is literally fire in the boy, we may deduce that the two entities have similar 
qualities, interpreting the phrase as stating that the boy is, in certain respects, "like" fire.  
Sthiramati’s response to this objection suggests a deep familiarity with the Indian 
philosophical discourse on the denotation of words (which I discuss in chapter I). If the 
word “fire” does indeed refer to an existing entity, it must refer, he points out, either to 
the universal (jāti) or to the individual particular (dravya); but he proceeds to 
demonstrate that both these options are logically untenable, rendering the opponent’s 
account of metaphor incoherent:   
In this case, however, is [the phrase] 'the child [is] fire' a figurative designation of 
the universal [jāti, 'fireness'] or of the particular [dravya, fire]? In either case, as a 
matter of fact, there cannot be figurative usage.  
In no way can the common attribute of the universal [with the particular] be 
tawnyness or fierceness. And in the non-existence of a common property between 
the boy [and the universal], a figurative usage of [a word denoting] the universal 
[with respect to the boy] is untenable, because there is an unwarranted 
consequence.  
[Objection:] Even if the generic property [fireness] is not a property of that [i.e. of 
the boy], because of the non-separation of the universal from the qualities of 
being tawny and fierce, there can still be a figurative usage of [a word indicating 
the] universal with respect to the boy.  
                                                 427 See Introduction, page 11.   
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[Reply:] However, when the universal [fireness] does not exist one [can still] 
notice the qualities of being tawny and fierce in the boy. Because of that, [the 
assumption of such] an invariable connection is not established.  And, even if 
there was such an invariable connection [of the universal] with [the particular] 
fire, there would [still] be no figurative usage since in that case it would mean that 
the boy has the generic property [fireness]. Because of this there cannot occur a 
figurative usage of [a word denoting] the universal with respect to the boy.  
And also not a figurative usage of [a word denoting] the particular [fire, with 
respect to the boy] because of the non-existence of a common property [between 
the two]. The reason is that specific qualities of the fire [such as] being fierce or 
tawny are not exactly [the ones present] in the boy. [Opponent:] What are they, 
then? [Reply:] They are something different. Therefore, because the qualifying 
attribute (viśea) is restricted to its own locus [i.e. to the particular], and since it 
[the particular] is without the properties that [characterize] fire, the figurative 
usage of 'fire' is not tenable with respect to the boy.   
[And] if one assumes that figurative usage is tenable because of the similarity 
between the qualities of the fire [and the qualities of the boy]: even in that case, 
the [only] tenable metaphor [would be] with respect to the qualities of the fire of 
being tawny or fierce and the qualities of the boy of either being tawny or fierce, 
because of their similarity, but not on account of the similarity of qualities 
between the fire and the boy, because of their lack of [such] a relation. Because of 
this, even figurative usage that is based on a particular is not tenable. 
  
atra hy agnir māavaka iti jātir dravya vopacaryate | ubhayathāpy 
upacārābhāva9 | tatra tāvan na jāte9 sādhāraa kapilatva tīkatva vā | na 
ca sādhāraadharmābhāve māavake jāter upacāro yujyate 'tiprasa'gāt | 
ataddharmatve 'pi jātes tīkatvakapilatvayor jātyavinābhāvitvān māavake 
jātyupacāro bhaviyati | jātyabhāve 'pi tīkatvakapilatvayor māavake darśanād 
avinābhāvitvam ayuktam | avinābhāvitve copacārābhāvo 'gnāv iva māavake 'pi 
jātisadbhāvāt | tasmān na māavake jātyupacāra9 sabhavati |nāpi 
dravyopacāra9 sāmānyadharmābhāvāt | na hi yo 'gnes tīko gua9 kapilo vā sa 
eva māavake | ki tarhi tato 'nya9 | viśeasya svāśrayapratibaddhatvān na 
vināgniguenāgner māavake upacāro yukta9 | agniguasādśyād yukta iti cet | 
evam apy agniguasyaiva tīkasya kapilasya vā māavakague tīke kapile vā 
sādśyād upacāro yukto na tu māavake 'gner guasādśyenāsabandhāt | 
tasmād dravyopacāro 'pi naiva yujyate | (Buescher 2007: 46:3-22) 
 
 
Sthiramati begins by negating the assumption that the primary referent of the 
word “fire,” used to figuratively designate another entity (the boy), is the universal 
“fireness.” This he achieves by demonstrating that there can be no common qualities 
between the particular and the universal, since there are no qualities characterizing the 
individual boy (such as being tawny and fierce) that can be considered essential qualities 
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of fire (as required of the qualities of a universal). Were such qualities considered 
essential to fire, then no figurative usage would ensue, because referring to the boy as 
“fire” would be considered literal and not figurative usage (since he has the essential 
qualities of fire).   
The opponent counters that while tawniness and fierceness may not be essential 
qualities of fire, they are always associated with it; the boy and “fireness,” therefore, are 
joined not by virtue of sharing common qualities but because the qualities of one 
invariably bring to mind the other. Here Sthiramati’s rebuttal is rather straightforward: 
since we are able to think of one set of qualities without thinking of the other, this 
association is contingent and therefore cannot account for figurative usage. Moreover, 
since we do as a matter of fact sometimes think of a boy without thinking of fire, the 
association is no more invariable than it is necessary.  
Next, Sthiramati turns to refute the possibility that the primary referent of the 
word “fire” used to figuratively designate the boy is a particular individual (dravya) fire. 
This is also untenable, he argues, since an individual is by definition idiosyncratically 
constituted by particular qualities. Thus, when speaking about the fire and the boy as 
being tawny we actually indicate two different qualities, which therefore cannot serve as 
the required common characteristic.  
Having shown that metaphor cannot be explained by similarity between entities, 
Sthiramati anticipates and responds to the objection that the relevant similarity holds 
rather between certain qualities of the entities. Were that the case, he argues, the 
qualifying qualities and not the qualified objects would constitute the referents of words 
(both in primary and secondary denotation); but the “fiery boy” metaphor is about the boy 
and about fire, not their qualities. Though one may in principle respond to this by 
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conceding an inherent gap between what we say and what we mean, between the 
apparent referents of words (fire, boy) and their actual referents (the qualities of 
tawniness etc.), for the imagined opponent, given his understanding of metaphor as 
grounded in a qualitative similarity between existent entities, this is not a viable option. 
Even if he attempted to adjust his account of metaphor by taking qualities to be entities, 
he would remain vulnerable to Sthiramati's earlier critique, since he would still require 
these qualities to present a "common quality," resulting in an infinite regress. 
Having shown the incoherence of the opponent's account of metaphor, Sthiramati 
proceeds to summarize the implications of his arguments so far, outlining an alternative 
view in which all language usage is metaphorical. The question that appears to guide him 
in the following passage is how metaphors, and by extension all language usage, may be 
operative and meaningful without referring to real entities. To answer this, he invokes a 
tripartite distinction between a constructed object that serves as the primary referent of a 
word (mukhyo padārtha9); its experienced qualities (gua); and its assumed essence 
(svarūpa);428 all of which are described in terms of their respective accessibility to 
language:  
An [objectified] primary referent of a word is entirely (eva) not existent, in the 
sense that its essence (svarūpa) cannot be an object for any knowledge and 
language (jñāna-abhidhāna). The reason is that knowledge and language operate 
                                                 428 Vinītadeva understands this "essence" as the concrete reality that underlies śabda in its sense as a sound unit; see Kawamura 1976: 147 cf. On the basis of this assertion and Vinītadeva’s identification of Sthiramati’s opponent as a grammarian, Unebe (2004: 137, 141-144) has suggested that Sthiramati is arguing here against the view, which he ascribes to Bhartṛhari, that a word denotes its own intrinsic "form" (i.e. its phonemes). Apart from the problems involved in associating this view with Bhartṛhari (see chapter II, ft. 126), there is room to question Unebe's suggestion also because the use of the term "essence" in this argumentative context seems to suggest that it stands more generally for any underlying essential referential reality.      
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with respect to a principal thing (pradhāna)429 only by means of its qualities 
(gua) because they cannot be in contact with its essence. Otherwise, there would 
be the unwanted logical result (prasa'ga) that the qualities are futile. 
[Why would they be futile:] Since there is no knowledge and expression in  
language with respect to the essence of a principal thing, and since there is no way 
to account for it [the principal thing] except by language and knowledge, there are 
no other means by which to determine its nature [other than through its qualities]. 
Therefore, it should be understood that no such primary object exists.430 
Since there is no correlation [of an object] with a word, language and knowledge 
do not exist. Thus, because of the non-existence of an expression and of a thing to 
be expressed, a primary object does not exist. And all that is merely figurative 
(gaua) and not a primary meaning. Here 'figurative' means 'that which occurs in 
the form of something that is only imagined to be there.'  Since all words proceed 
by qualities which are imagined to be in a principal thing (pradhāna), a primary 
[object] does not exist. Therefore, in contrast to the previous objection “When the 
self and dharmas are non-existent as entities, metaphor is not tenable” – it is, in 
fact, tenable. 
 
mukhyo 'pi padārtho naivāsti tatsvarūpasya 
sarvajñānābhidhānaviayātikrāntatvāt | pradhāne hi guarūpeaiva 
jñānābhidhāne pravartete tatsvarūpāsasparśāt | anyathā ca 
guavaiyarthyaprasa'ga9 | na hi jñānābhidhānavyatirikto 'nya9 
padārthasvarūpaparicchittyupāyo 'stīty ata9 
pradhānasvarūpaviayajñānābhidhānābhāvān naiva mukhya9 padārtho 'stīty 
avagantavyam | eva yāvac chabde sabandhābhāvāj jñānābhidhānābhāva evañ 
cābhidhānābhidheyābhāvān naiva mukhya9 padārtho 'sti | api ca sarva evāya 
gaua eva na mukhyo 'sti | gauo hi nāma yo yatrāvidyamānena rūpea 
pravartate | sarvaś ca śabda9 pradhāne 'vidyamānenaiva guarūpea pravartate 
ato mukhyo nāsty eva | tatra yad ukta asaty ātmani mukhye dharmeu copacāro 
na yukta iti tad ayuktam | (Buescher 2007: 48:1-11) 
 
In this passage Sthiramati reaches the endpoint of his explication of metaphor. He 
argues that since only the objects’ qualities (and not their real essences) are accessible to 
language, there can be no correspondence between words and their referents qua objects. 
                                                 429 The term is used in the context of the general opposition between a (logically) principal element (pradhāna) and a subsidiary or secondary one (guṇa). Here it functions as a synonym for the referent of the primary meaning (mukhya padārtha), indicating the alleged substrate qualified by the various qualities. On the use of pradhāna in the Mahābhāṣya, see Deshpande 1992: 148.  430 ǁ mukhyo ‘pi padārthe nāsti tatsvarūpasya sarvajñānābhidhānaviṣayātikrāntatvāt ǁ pradhāne hi guṇrūpeṇaiva jñānābhidhāne pravartate tatsvarūpāsaṃsparśāt ǁ anyathā ca guṇa-vaiyarthya-prasaṅgaḥ ǁ na hi jñānābhidhānavyatirikto ‘nyapadārthasvarūpaparicchityupāyo ‘stītyataḥ pradhānasvarūpaviṣayajñānābhidhānābhavāt naiva mukhyaḥ padārtho ‘stītyavagantavyaṃ ǁ Ibid.  
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The upshot is a view of all language usage as figurative – in the sense of an absence of 
the word's referent from the locus of reference, and a disparity between a word and its 
apparent referent. Where does this sweeping claim leave ordinary language usage, and 
how does it relate to the Yogācāra philosophical discourse? In what follows I explore this 
relation and argue that although Sthiramati’s pan-figurative account of language is an 
obvious critique of a correspondence theory of truth, it does not necessarily imply the 
impossibility of all meaningful language usage.  
 
4. The Pan-Figurative Account and the Possibility of Meaningful Language   
 
What place, if any, does Sthiramati hold in his scheme for the ordinary-language 
understanding of figurative usage? As is made clear by his rejection of the conditions for 
figurative usage assumed by his opponent, Sthiramati does not affirm the existence of any 
metaphorical meaning above and beyond the ordinary meaning of words. Yet his 
deflationist view of metaphor must nonetheless account somehow for the ordinary-
language distinction between primary and secondary meaning. While Sthiramati's use of 
the term upacāra to denote also ordinary-language figurative usage431 suggests that in 
practical terms he embraces this distinction in the TriśBh, nowhere does he explain its 
                                                 431 The term is employed in this sense mostly for hermeneutical purposes, as in the following sentence: “The ‘maturation’ of happiness and suffering, however, is a metaphor because [in fact] they arise out of the maturation of wholesome and unwholesome karma.” “…sukhaduḥkhayos tu kuśalākuśalakarmavipākajatvād vipākopacāraḥ.” TriṃśBh 3cd, Buescher 2007: 56:21. Here Sthiramati explains that “maturation,” which stands for the cause (i.e., the maturation of wholesome and unwholesome karma), is figuratively designated by the name of the effect it produces (pleasant or unpleasant experiences, respectively). Note the similarity to the AKBh 1.37a: “[T]he expression vipakaja, ‘arisen from fruition,’ signifies ‘arisen from the causes of fruition,’ but one should not say that the word ‘cause’ is omitted. In fact, a cause is often designated by the name of its effect, just as an effect is often designated by the name of its cause: ‘The present six organs are past action.'’” La Vallée Poussin 1988: 103.   
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status. It therefore may prove useful to consider how other similarly deflationist accounts 
of metaphor have addressed this issue. Contemporary analytical philosopher Donald 
Davidson’s critique of the so-called interaction theory of metaphor represents one 
prominent attempt to formulate such an account.432 In various writings, Davidson has 
argued against what he sees as the traditional Western philosophical approach to 
metaphor (starting with Aristotle), which assumes a distinct metaphorical meaning in 
addition to the literal one, insisting instead that “metaphors mean what the words, in their 
most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.”433 A metaphorical expression, he 
argues (such as “the face of the waters” in the phrase “the Spirit of God moved upon the 
face of the waters”), has no meaning but its literal one; however, its interpretation is a 
creative endeavor (hence Davidson acknowledges metaphor to be the “dreamwork of 
language”), governed by few rules and guided by the expression’s application within a 
given communicative context. Davidson does not dispute the distinctiveness of 
metaphors as tropes, i.e., their particular effects, but rather rejects the understanding of 
metaphors as the outcome of some sort of “metaphorical meaning.”434  
What we have seen so far of the Yogācāra approach to language and meaning 
strongly suggests that it would be susceptible to the Davidsonian idea of metaphor as 
constituted within a conversational, conventional context and as an exemplar of the 
creative (and in this case constructive) powers of language. Still, for Sthiramati, what 
ultimately constitutes upacāra is not its pragmatics but the evident absence of the referent 
                                                 432 On the interaction theory of metaphor, see Black 1962 & 1979.   433 Davidson 2006: 209.  434 Ibid. 211-212, 222-224.  
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from its locus of reference. Within this framework, his deflationism with respect to 
metaphorical meaning represents not a retreat into literal meaning and its interpretation in  
a communicative context (as suggested by Davidson), but rather a complete subsuming of 
the literal under the metaphorical, understood as standing for the absence of an 
ontological ground for language.  
Sthiramati's view does not imply that literality becomes some sort of faded 
metaphorical discourse. Consider, by way of contrast, the following well-known passage 
by Nietzsche, quoted in Derrida's “White Mythologies”:  
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which became poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem 
to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has 
forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors which have become 
powerless to effect the senses, coins which have their obverse effaced and now 
are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal. (Nietzsche 1964 v.2: 180, 
quoted in Derrida 1982: 217) 
 
The passage evokes an understanding of meaning as subject to a narrative of decline in 
which language is seen to lose its original vividness and singularity in the face of its 
sedimentation in public discourse (Derrida indeed notes Nietzsche’s initial training as a 
philologist and his convictions regarding the metaphorical origins of concepts).435 By 
contrast, though the Yogācāra also presents a diachronic account of the development of 
language, these same elements – singularity and creativity, on the one hand, and 
conventionalism on the other – are not seen by the school as the end point of the narrative 
but rather as permanent features, simultaneously operating on language (insofar as it has 
the power to construct reality, language is always creative, and insofar as that reality is 
intersubjective, language is always conventional). Metaphor, therefore, is not identified 
                                                 435 Derrida 1982: 214.  
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by the Yogācāra as the singular birth place of meaning (nor is literality regarded as 
exposed to sedimentation); rather, it represents a fundamental referential absence at the 
core of language. Again, the importance of linguistic conventional processes 
notwithstanding, for Sthiramati the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical is 
based solely on knowledge of their referential adequacy. The metaphorical becomes 
apparent, both in ordinary-language usage and in the specialist's analysis, not (as the 
opponent holds) by fulfilling certain conditions or (as Davidson argues) through its 
communicative context but when the ontological groundlessness of referential relations is 
revealed.436  
This last point highlights an important difference between Sthiramati's pan-
figurative view of language and Bhartṛhari’s position. While both thinkers assume that 
the referents of words are independent of whatever external entities they stand for, and 
both present a two-tiered account of ordinary language, they differ significantly in their 
understanding of what this division entails. For Bhartṛhari, as discussed above, the two 
tiers amount to parallel perspectives on the same linguistic phenomena, which are 
nonetheless unified by their concern for the meaningfulness of language usage.437 One 
perspective, explicated in the sambandha-samuddeśa section of the VP, is concerned with 
the enabling conditions of meaningful discourse and hence considers secondary usage – 
in the sense of the absence of a referent from the locus of reference – a permanent feature 
                                                 436 This does not resolve the question of the difference, under this scheme, between ordinary-language figurative usage, and discourse about fictions. Here again Sthiramati provides no explanation, but we may appeal to Asaṅga and his most basic understanding of upacāra as a transference of meaning, suggesting simply that figurative usage is calling something by a word that denotes something else.   437 Bhartṛhari’s understanding of language in metaphysical-ontological terms can be viewed as constituting an additional, third perspective.   
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of all language usage. The other, explicated in the second Kā2a, is concerned with the 
epistemic factors that determine meaning and its status, and hence considers figurative 
meaning a contingent matter determined pragmatically according to common practice. 
But Sthiramati’s non-realism prevents him from according common practice the same 
epistemic position it receives from Bhartṛhari. Thus, figurative meaning becomes for him 
a function only of the first perspective: it is determined by the ontological status of the 
referent regardless of epistemic considerations and of its pragmatics. Here the two-tiered 
account of language indicates not two equally valid perspectives on the same phenomena 
but rather the kind of hierarchy implied by the Buddhist model of the two truths – that is 
to say, one true perspective, and its concealment (which is the literal meaning of the term 
savti) by another.  
While in this respect Sthiramati’s pan-figurative view does undermine the 
meaningfulness of ordinary language, it does not necessarily entail a collapse of all 
meaningful language usage and the absence of all word-referent correspondence. Indeed, 
Gold has argued that the claims of the Triśika and its bhāya regarding upacāra are best 
understood as amounting to something akin to a figurative theory of reference, which 
enables these texts to reject realism while still retaining meaningful reference.438 To draw 
out the issues at stake in treading this middle path Gold situates it in the context of the 
contemporary discourse in analytical philosophy regarding the requirements for 
meaningful reference, focusing on Hilary Putnam’s famous critique of the “brains in a 
vat” hypothesis.439 Addressing the skeptical challenge that we may be entirely deluded 
                                                 438 Gold 2007.  439 Putnam 1981a.  
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with respect to our experience because, for all we know, we may be no more than “brains 
in a vat” stimulated by a computer to have the same experiences as ordinary agents, 
Putnam argues that the claim is literally senseless: its assertions fail to meet the basic 
requirements for meaningful discourse as dictated by his own variant (on Kripke’s initial 
notion)440 of a causal theory of reference.441 Gold summarizes this intricate argument as 
follows:    
Under a causal theory of reference, if you wish to refer to something, 
you need to be clear about just how that something might be causally 
connected, in a meaningful way, to your ability to utter its name. What 
Putnam says is that if you are a brain in a vat, you can’t refer to the vat you 
are in, because it is not a part of your world of experience. There is no 
proper causal connection between the real-world vat and your isolated 
brain-in-a-vat-world use of the word 'vat' such as might allow you to refer 
to the real vat. All you can ever refer to with your use of the word 'vat' is 
an image of a vat created by a computer. Therefore, whenever anyone says 
that he or she is or might be a brain in a vat, the statement fails to refer 
properly, and so cannot possibly be true as it stands. (Gold 2007: 9) 
  
Identifying these requirements for meaningful discourse with realism, Gold points 
out that they nonetheless do not preclude the possibility of claiming hypothetically or 
analogically that one is deluded – which is, he argues, the very claim implied by 
Sthiramati’s non-realist figurative theory of reference. Under such a theory, the 
meaningfulness of the non-realist’s claims is salvaged by an appeal to a kind of "second 
order" figurative usage by which words refer not to existent objects but to their perceived 
(mental) qualities.442 Thus, when one says (paraphrasing Gold's example), “There is an 
                                                 440 See Putnam 1975: 246.  441 Putnam 1981a: 14-15.   442 Gold’s interpretation is grounded in his understanding of the early Yogācāra as operating mostly within an epistemic discourse and bracketing ontological claims. Thus the school is said to be interested in mental phenomena not because they constitute a real substratum but insofar as they necessarily mediate all experience. Though this interpretation roughly aligns with the view of the Yogācāra as advancing epistemic 
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umbrella,” according to Sthiramati, since there is no real umbrella there, the assertion 
actually means “There are umbrella-like qualities,” or in his terms, “The transformation 
of consciousness is in a state such that it’s like there is an umbrella.”443 Similarly, claims 
that we may all be brains in a vat can be accepted as meaningful, albeit in a figurative, 
indirect way:   
To say that reality is an illusion would be self-defeating, since the statement itself 
would have no true (non-illusory) reference; but Vasubandhu says instead that 
reality is like an illusion, and accepts that the only true reference will have to be 
metaphorical.  (Gold 2007: 14) 
 
Gold acknowledges that the view he describes here may well appear to support rather 
than undermine Putnam’s case for the meaninglessness of the brain-in-a-vat category of 
statements. This is because according to the Yogācāra’s figurative theory of reference, 
while words refer to (non-existent) objects in a secondary way, by implication they refer 
directly to perceived qualities qua the transformation of consciousness; applied to the 
brain-in-a-vat scenario, this implication suggests that all words indeed refer directly back 
to the reality of the manipulated brain in the vat, a claim that appears to confirm the 
                                                                                                                                                 idealism, Gold’s stance in this case is notable for taking the ontological commitments of the Yogācāra to be exceptionally minimal, emphasizing an understanding of the non-duality claim as foremost a conceptual critique. (See Gold’s account of the difference between his own interpretation and that of Dan Lusthaus; Gold 2006: 2: n.5). Within this framework, Gold points out the centrality of the analysis of mental appearances (ākṛti) for the Yogācāra philosophical world view – a complex analysis that considers them in terms of their illusory content (the way they appear, i.e., as objects in duality) and sees the facticity of their occurrence as the outcome of a causal mental nexus. These two facets of appearance, he argues, correspond to the Imagined and Dependent nature respectively, and also accord with a figurative theory of reference, according to which upacāras, like appearance, can referentially capture at once both the imagined non-existent object and its reality as mental qualities qua the transformation of consciousness (Gold 2007: 12). As Gold indicates, this scheme has some substantial philosophical advantages for the Yogācāra, enabling the school to abandon the binary oppositions of appearance vs. reality, the conventional vs. the ultimate, in favor of a perspectival, shifting view of reality (Ibid. 9-10).   443 Gold 2007: 12-13.  
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impossibility of speaking meaningfully about what lies beyond the limits of one's 
experience. Gold's solution is to point out that it is not Putnam’s claims regarding the 
limitations of knowledge that the Yogācāra would reject but rather his assumption, which 
Gold sees as the outcome of Putnam's privileging of realism, that direct true reference is 
a prerequisite for meaningful discourse. So while the Yogācāra would concur with 
Putnam that the brain in a vat could not posses direct knowledge of what lies beyond the 
vat, the school would disagree, according to Gold, that hypothesizing about it is also 
necessarily incoherent.444  
But Putnam’s own adherence to “internal realism” notwithstanding, it is not 
obvious that the requirement for meaningful discourse dictated by his causal theory of 
reference does indeed, as Gold claims, presuppose realism.445 Below I argue that, given 
the Yogācāra understanding of language as causally efficacious and involved in the 
construction of the life-world, we may plausibly interpret the figurative theory of 
reference presented by Gold as amounting to a causal figurative theory of reference 
tailored to the assumptions of non-realism. Embracing Gold’s suggestion that Sthiramati 
in fact presents us with a figurative theory of meaning, and his diagnosis that at stake is 
the defense of meaningful reference, I will attempt to show how this goal may also be 
                                                 444 Ibid. 14.  445 Analyzing Putnam’s arguments against skepticism in the context of his full body of work, Yemima Ben Menahem has argued that his application of a causal theory of reference to the “brains in a vat” hypothesis presupposes neither his own internal realism nor metaphysical realism, though it is of course compatible with both (2005: 138-139). This is not surprising given that Putnam’s initial appeal to the causal theory of reference was designed to help him counter mentalism, with its claim that the determination of meaning requires taking into account the speaker's mental content. Instead, the causal theory of reference treats meaning as a function of the way in which the speaker is connected to his environment (hence the label "externalism"). See also Putnam’s comparison of the metaphysical realist's use of a causal theory of reference and his own internal realism with respect to the requirements for reference (1981b: 51-54).     
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fulfilled by a causal figurative theory of reference – an account that pits itself not against 
realism so much as against the Mādhyamaka view of language as self-referential. At the 
root of Sthiramati’s polemics with the Mādhyamika, I suggest, lie their  different 
conceptions of the role and status of their own philosophical discourse: whereas the 
Mādhyamika views all discourse as homogenously conventional, the Yogācāra 
soteriology calls for various hierarchically ordered descriptions of the same reality; a 
requirement that is neatly addressed by that which a (figurative) causal theory of 
reference does best, i.e., maintaining a fixed reference across changes of meaning. 
  
5. Sthiramati’s Arguments against the Mādhyamika 
All words, as we have seen, are figurative according to Sthiramati because they 
denote objects only indirectly, referring directly to their appearances in their capacity as 
the transformation of consciousness. The transformation of consciousness, however, is 
not a static state of affairs but a causal process – indeed, the very Buddhist notion of 
dependent origination as a causal nexus underlying all phenomena. Furthermore, relying 
on our earlier analysis of the LAS and of the TriśBh itself, we may say that this causal 
process accounts not only for the arising of a certain object-appearance but also for the 
fact that it appears already as the referent of a corresponding word.446 Thus, this account 
of reference is 1) recursive, since words refer to the same causal processes that are also 
responsible for the coming into being of reference; and 2) necessarily part of a 
(figurative) causal theory of reference. Recall that under a causal theory of reference one 
knows what a term refers to when one is able to explain the causal history linking it to the 
                                                 446 This is because both ordinary language and more fundamental conceptual processes are seen to be causally efficacious and involved in the creation of the life-world.  
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referent it has come to denote. So, according to Sthiramati, in order to know what the 
word “table” refers to directly, it is necessary to have knowledge of the causal process – 
in terms of the transformation of consciousness – that brought about the appearance of 
the table as the non-existent object, being the indirect referent of “table.” I will call this 
the "causal description." But now note a curious consequence: since reality is understood 
by Sthiramati as the very causal nexus of the transformation of consciousness, it seems 
that the direct true referent of the word "table" is none other than the underlying (real, 
ontological) causal nexus featured in the "causal description". The particular 
presuppositions of the Yogācāra therefore allow for a unique kind of causal theory of 
reference, in which the causal description required for meaning is also the description of 
the primary referent.  
 The benefits for the Yogācāra from this tortuous analysis of the use of language 
become clear once we consider that, apart from securing meaningful reference in the 
sense described by Gold, it also enables the school to erect a hierarchy of truth claims 
within conventional discourse. This is key for the ability of the Yogācāra to counter the 
limitations placed on discourse by the radical conventionalism of the Mādhyamika; to 
appreciate how these benefits figure in the critique of the Mādhyamika, consider once 
again Sthiramati's arguments regarding upacāra and the Mādhyamika:     
[B]because of the impossibility of a metaphor without a support (nirādhāra) the 
occurrence of the metaphors of the self and things should be necessarily 
(avaśya) regarded as actually being the transformation of consciousness. Due to 
this, the following [Mādhyamika] view would not withstand reasoned analyzing: 
'That the object of consciousness, just like consciousness, exists only 
conventionally (savtti) and not ultimately (parmārthatā).' This view is not 
logically tenable since it would result in the non-existence [of both of them] even 
conventionally, because convention without a basis (upādāna) does not make 
sense. In light of this, the extremist views of both types must be abandoned 
because they are illogical, so said the ācārya [Vasubandhu].  
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And thus it should be accepted that all objects are in fact unreal, due to [their] 
intrinsic nature (svabhāva) being a fabrication. Consciousness, on the other hand, 
because of its being dependently originated (pratītyasamutpanna), exists as a 
substrate (dravyata9). And again consciousness’ state of being dependently 
originated is made known by the use of the term 'transformation.'  
 
upacārasya ca nirādhārasyāsabhavād avaśya vijñānapariāmo vastuto 'stīty 
upagantavyo yatrātmadharmopacāra9 pravartate | ataś cāyam abhyupagamo na 
yuktikamo vijñānam api vijñeyavat savtita eva na paramārthata iti | savtito 
'py abhāvaprasa'gān na hi savtir nirupādānā yujyate | tasmād ayam 
ekāntavādo dviprakāro 'pi niryuktikatvāt tyājya ity ācāryavacanam | evañ ca 
sarva vijñeya parikalpitasvabhāvatvād vastuto na vidyate vijñāna puna9 
pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'stīty abhyupeyam | pratītyasamutpannatva 
punar vijñānasya pariāmaśabdena jñāpitam | (Buescher 2007: 42:9-18) 
 
The passage presents a set of parallel observations: the transformation of consciousness is 
said to be for the metaphors of self and things what a “support”447 is for a linguistic 
metaphor, and what a “basis” (upadāna) is for the “conventional." To a large extent, our 
understanding of Sthiramati’s critique of the Mādhyamika turns on what we take him to 
mean by these terms – “support “ and “basis” – and by the statement that consciousness 
serves as a substrate (dravyata9).  
One way to understand these terms is as standing for an ontological existent that 
underlies nominal phenomena. This interpretation casts Sthiramati as targeting the 
Mādhyamika’s conventionalism (as do similar arguments in other Yogācāra treatises),448 
a position understood here to imply that all phenomena are merely nominal. This view is 
incoherent, Sthiramati's argument would run, because even imagined nominal phenomena 
exist as conceptual constructs and therefore are not entirely non-existent; unless the 
                                                 447 Ādhāra indicates the supporting or substrate pole in the distinction ādhāra/ādheya (the latter indicating the superstrate) applied to a variety of relations such as pervasion, inherence, etc. In referential relations, the ādhāra stands for the locus of reference (adhikaraṇa). On the ādhāra/ādheya distinction in the early Nyāya school, see Potter 1977: 283, 613-614, 645.   448 For an appraisal of Buescher’s understanding of one such argument in the TApaṭ, see chapter III, pages 82-87; a different interpretation is given by Willis, discussed in the same chapter pages 90-92.   
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Mādhyamika wishes to embrace nihilism (the total negation of any existents), it must 
accept the existence of some underlying extra-nominal reality within the conventional, 
which may serves as the ontological support for nominal phenomena.  
The main difficulty with this reading of Sthiramati’s argument is simply that it 
yields a rather weak reply to the Mādhyamika’s challenge. The Yogācāra appeal to a 
necessary extra-nominal basis for construction could readily be dismissed as itself a 
product of discursive thought given from the conventional point of view. 
Conventionalism is not nihilism, the Mādhyamika would contend; it assumes neither the 
existence nor the non-existence of an ontological basis but merely points out the 
hopelessly discursive nature of these observations, exemplifying the inability to exceed 
the limits of language and argue positively about reality.  
Though it may be that Sthiramati is prepared to sacrifice argumentative prowess 
in favor of asserting what he takes to be the fundamental Yogācāra premises, a different 
way of reading his argument requires no such concessions. Recall that for Sthiramati, the 
transformation of consciousness serves not only as a sort of ontological foundation for 
upacāras but also as their referential and causal basis (it is their "locus of reference" and 
causal bedrock). In light of this account, the assertion that consciousness serves as a 
dravya need not be understood as idealist: consciousness may function here as the 
substrate pole449 (as opposed to the designation pole) in referential and causal relations. 
This interpretation appears to expose a further layer in Sthiramati’s argument, which now 
emerges not only as a critique of the Mādhyamika’s unwillingness to commit 
                                                 449 That is, substrate is not necessarily understood here in an ontological sense but as the referential foundation of a designation (as in the case of the ādhāra, pradhāna etc). This interpretation is compatible with an understanding of Sthiramati as taking dependent origination to be ontologically real, but suggests that his foundationalism or absolutism need not amount to metaphysical idealism.   
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ontologically but also as indicating the problematic implications of this stance for the 
truth value and meaningfulness of their discourse as a whole. Sthiramati began his 
argument by pointing out that language usage, insofar as it is meaningful, must be given 
within a referential framework that assumes extra-linguistic referents; this is how I 
understand his claim that upacāras without a (referential) support are untenable. Within 
this theoretical framework, the Mādhyamika view of language as self-referential450 is 
patently self-undermining, since it cannot provide any criterion with which to distinguish 
the school’s claims, in terms of their meaningfulness and truth value, from any other 
conventional language usage. Sthiramati’s critique of the Mādhyamika should therefore 
be taken literally – i.e., as arguing that, in the absence of an extra-linguistic referential 
"support," claims about the conventional nature of language, so central to the 
Mādhyamika soteriology, have no more claim to truth, or indeed meaningfulness, than 
uninformed, naïve assertions about the “self” or “things."  
The proponent of the Mādhyamika would of course embrace the consequence 
that his own philosophical claims are just as empty as all language usage,451 but for 
Sthiramati this understanding of language, with its attendant "collapsing" of 
philosophical discourse, is unacceptable given the hierarchy prescribed by Yogācāra’s 
distinct soteriology – and for that matter by the Buddhist discourse of enlightenment – 
in which some descriptions of reality must be more correct than others. The 
                                                 450 In the sense that all knowledge and words, as well as the objects of knowledge and referents of words, are constructs given solely within a discursive framework.  451 Though he would insist that they are more efficacious insofar as the attainment of liberation is concerned, implying an understanding of truth as a function of a proposition’s efficacy.    
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Mādhyamika discourse, insofar as it does away with these distinctions, is not merely 
self-undermining but also unconducive to liberation.  
Sthiramati’s most notable engagement with the Yogācāra soteriological vision 
appears in his commentary on the four concluding verses of the Triś, where he 
discusses the steps on the path to attaining the “reality of mind only” (cittadharmatā).452 
The first step is the realization of “representation only” in what are still rather idealist 
terms, as the absence of any external objects that are mind independent. In this stage the 
attachment to a dualistic object-mind distinction remains as yet unchallenged, and one's 
viewpoint is said to concord with the understanding that all objects have their support in 
the transformation of consciousness. The next step is reached when one removes this 
attachment and abides in a state of pure “representation-only” (vijñaptimātratā), in which 
the understanding that no externality exists as such leads also to the realization that the 
reality of the mind does not exist either, and to the elimination of all dualistic 
distinctions. The knowledge of constructed phenomena, in both its subjective and 
objective aspects, and of the ultimate non-existence of both external objects and mind, is 
said to be the point when the practitioner attains the ultimate aspect of “representation 
only” (cittadharmatā), leading to the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvtti), in 
which the storehouse consciousness is transformed from the ground of phenomena into 
the ground of ultimate reality. 
According to this account, ordinary experience and ultimate reality are separated 
by intermediary stages of understanding and spiritual attainment. The possibility of 
arguing about the gradual dialectical movement from the reification of external objects, 
                                                 452 Their outline that follows is based on Nguyen's analysis of these verses. Nguyen 1990: 51-53, 81:n.154, 165-169.  
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through the reification of consciousness, and finally to the negation of both – the 
possibility, that is, of arguing about this in a meaningful way that is distinct from 
ordinary reifying language usage – is therefore a basic requirement of the Yogācāra 
account of this path. Agreeing that all discourse is indeed conventional in nature, the 
school nonetheless rejects the view of it as homogenous, discerning within it a hierarchy 
of truth claims. This basic requirement is met by Sthiramati’s non-realist and figurative 
causal theory of reference, according to which different descriptions of reality are 
hierarchically ordered by their respective degree of meaningfulness. The unique 
combination of the Yogācāra non-realism and its presuppositions regarding causality 
enables the theory, on the one hand, to maintain a discourse in which diversified 
descriptions of reality, from a variety of perspectives, are considered meaningful under 
the same referential principle, and on the other to contend that some descriptions are 
more meaningful than others, yielding the notion of degrees of meaning. The first of 
these tenets stems from the ability of causal theories of reference to keep the reference 
fixed even when the meaning of a term changes from one speaker to another, so long as 
the term, the thing meant, and the speakers are related in the appropriate way.453 This 
would enable the Yogācāra to explain how speakers who use the same words with very 
different meanings (in terms of their mental content) – for instance, the word "table" to 
mean either an essentially existent thing (of such-and-such physical features and 
functions) or a mental appearance brought about by a certain activity of consciousness – 
are nonetheless talking about the same thing. (This same thing being nothing but the 
transformation of consciousness, which is intersubjective and ultimately the same for all 
                                                 453 See Ben-Menahem 2005: 135-137.  
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speakers.) This explanation would consist of a description of the causal nexus involved in 
the arising of a certain appearance for two speakers in such a way as to be conceived 
differently by each one of them – indeed, much like the school's account of the arising of 
the phenomenal world as constituted by intersubjective and "private" experiences.454  
The second tenet suggests that the two uses of the term “table” described above 
differ not only in mental content but also in their degree of meaningfulness. What makes 
it possible to speak coherently about degrees of meaning is the Yogācāra assumption of 
the possibility of a final and complete description of all causal relations from an 
enlightened and omniscient point of view; in the context of a causal theory of reference, 
this complete description sets an ultimate standard for meaning. This last point is crucial, 
since it is this perspective that allows us to view the Yogācāra causal account of language 
not merely as a causal description of how reference comes to be, but as a causal 
                                                 454 As mentioned (see chapter III pages 179-180) according to the AKBh the cause of the arising of the sentient and insentient "receptacle" world (sattva-bhājana-loka) is none other than the accumulated actions (karma) of its beings. Early Yogācāra similarly saw the actions of beings as the cause that brings about and regulates the external world. This idea was further developed and explicated in the school’s various treatises, and was traced to the function of the most fundamental and unconscious level of awareness, the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). An account of this process appears in the first chapter of Asaṅga's MS, in which our common "receptacle world" (bhājana-loka) and individual sense sphere (prātyātmikāyatana) are traced respectively to the maturation (vipāka) of similar and dissimilar karmic seeds (bīja), and to impressions (vāsanā) in the storehouse consciousness. As mentioned earlier (ft. 423), an important role is assigned in this process to the conventional use of language as causally efficacious. Furthermore, according to Waldron's analysis, the storehouse consciousness itself is said to arise in dependence upon conceptual structures that are informed by linguistic conventions, categories, and above all conceptual proliferations (prapañca). These are manifested in the storehouse consciousness as the "impressions of speech" (abhilāpavāsanā), which are responsible for the shared elements in our cognitive experiences. Since the Yogācāra does not accept any objective external world as a valid source for experience, it is the inescapable intersubjective nature of language – seen as causally efficacious – that accounts for the commonalty of the world we inhabit. See Waldron 2003: 160-169. So, while the transformation of consciousness may be said to constitute "private" experiences, insofar as it engages with language it is also inevitably intersubjective, and hence "the same" for all speakers who are necessarily causally connected.   
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(figurative) theory of reference in which the meaning of a word is found in explicating (to 
different degrees) the causal processes involved in its usage and reference.455  
Along the continuum that runs between an omniscient, complete knowledge of 
causal relations (i.e., of reference) and ordinary dualistic language usage lies a broad 
range of possible causal descriptions of increasing detail, intricacy and subtlety, into 
which fits the Yogācāra’s own philosophical discourse. What is the Triśika, after all, if 
not a description of the causal interactions of ever more subtle mental functions? Thus, 
while according to the Yogācāra all language usage is irredeemably conventional (and 
figurative), still, within this framework, some ways of using language are more 
meaningful and closer to the truth (an ultimate description of reality) than others.   
But how does this notion of varying degrees of meaning sit with the Yogācāra 
characterization of the ultimate knowledge of reality as inexpressible (as noted by 
AsaEga) and signless? This question is perhaps less vexing than it seems. The possibility 
of omniscience in the form of a complete and definite understanding of the reality of 
causal relations, when brought under a (figurative) causal theory of reference, leads to 
some intriguing theoretical possibilities: it may imply the idea of an ultimate sign 
standing for the entire reality of dependent origination (whose reference is attested by 
complete knowledge of the relevant causal links between the thing meant and how it 
came to be so signified). This hypothetically entails a state of affairs in which there is no 
real breach between language and reality (the ultimate sign presenting the possibility of a 
perfect language) and hence no real need for any signification whatsoever. While 
Sthiramati says nothing explicit to support such an interpretation, it is perhaps not so far-
                                                 455 Whereas causal processes pertaining to the utterance of a word (i.e., cognitive and physical processes, etc.) would normally be distinguished from those that pertain to its reference, no such distinction is drawn from this comprehensive perspective.   
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fetched. Based on the Yogācāra theory of signs in the eleventh chapter of the MSA, Mario 
D'Amato has recently argued for an understanding of the notion of “signlessness” as 
aimed not at a regression to a pre-semiotic stage but at a perfection of the mode of 
semiosis to the point where “there is no longer a barrier between the sign and reality 
itself: When everything has been signified, when the sign encompasses all possible 
interpretants (signs), then a state of semiotic perfection has been attained and semiosis 
has been brought to its completion.”456  
In conclusion, Sthiramati’s pan-figurative view, ingeniously synthesizing and 
drawing upon earlier Buddhist and non-Buddhist accounts of upacāra, presents an 
understanding of language as instituted over an ontological abyss but nonetheless 
meaningful thanks to its grounding in a figurative causal description of reality; the 
perfection of this description paradoxically implies its inevitable annihilation. The 
(figurative) causal theory of reference I described here is far removed from Kripke and 
Putnam’s concerns and motivations but meets their fundamental requirements for such 
theories. At the same time, it is fully concordant with what Buddhist schools of thought 
regarded as the most fundamental presupposition guiding their philosophizing, namely,  
the possibility of reaching full and complete knowledge of the nature of reality, aided by 




                                                 456 D’amato (2003: 202). In our present analysis, then, the possibility of a full and complete description of reality vindicates the status of the metaphors as such by presenting, at least hypothetically, the possibility of a non-metaphorical, direct discourse. Such discourse, however, cannot be conceived under any known system of signification. It is an idea of a perfect language as a state in which there is no distance between words and the world.  
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Conclusion   
 
The initial contribution of this dissertation has been to trace, translate, and analyze 
various accounts of upacāra advanced by the Yogācāra school and their intellectual 
milieu. This has enabled me to uncover and reconstruct an Indian philosophical 
conversation about figurative language that reaches across sectarian lines. Given this 
wide-ranging textual field, the inquiry of upacāra can be seen, despite its specificity, to 
have broader implications: first, in reinforcing the need to interpret Indian philosophy 
within a broad cross-sectarian context, approaching it diachronically as a series of central 
debates and themes rather than through the prism of "schools"; and second, for the field 
of Buddhist studies, it exemplifies the limitations of considering Buddhist ideas 
exclusively from within the standard scholarly narrative of doctrinal progress that 
proceeds linearly from the Nikāyas to the Abhidharma and culminates in the Mahāyāna 
sūtras and śāstras. Moreover, as this discourse on upacāra takes place in a period from 
which no major works of Sanskrit poetics have remained, its explication may contribute 
to a better understanding of the theoretical roots of this tradition. As Gary Tubb has 
recently pointed out in his analysis of the ways in which Indian theories of semantics 
contributed to the early Alakāraśāstra discussion of poetic fancy (utprkā),457 Sanskrit 
poetics is laced with techniques of analysis, substantive positions, and terminology drawn 
from a variety of śāstric sources. One way of carrying the present research forward 
would involve exploring the extent to which the cross-sectarian discussion of upacāra I 
described here maps onto early Sanskrit poetics.  
                                                 457 Tubb (forthcoming). 
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My reconstruction of this conversation proceeded by identifying common uses of 
stock examples and formulaic phrases, as well as recurrent themes, argumentative 
strategies, and philosophical presuppositions in what is essentially a highly diverse group 
of accounts of upacāra, a true polyphony of voices. Having attended throughout to the 
particularities and commonalities of these accounts, several structural observations may 
now be offered.   
First, a basic presupposition of this dissertation, as I noted in the Introduction, is 
the general adherence of Indian schools of thought to a strictly referential understanding 
of meaning, expressed in an overwhelmingly semantics-oriented discourse of meaning. 
Within this framework, as was suggested, for instance, by the analysis, in chapter I, of 
the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā works, upacāra is accounted for primarily in terms of its 
underlying referential mechanism, identified as the absence of the primary referent from 
its locus of reference. It now emerges clearly that the distinct ways in which figurative 
language is viewed by the authors and texts I discussed are largely a function of how they 
interpret this absence: as a non-existence (i.e., an ontological absence), in the case of 
Bhartṛhari, AsaEga, the LAS, and Sthiramati; a non-evidence (an epistemic absence, 
something undisclosed by ordinary experience and language use), in the case of the 
Mīmāṃsā and the AKBh; or simply a non-actuality, in the case of the Nyāya. Moreover, 
the understanding of secondary denotation in terms of a referential absence – in some 
cases, almost a referential error458 – also serves to explain why, within this śāstric 
discourse, it is invariably viewed as both reliant on direct denotation and at the same time 
                                                 458 Exemplified by the view of figurative meaning as arising out of some"obstruction" to understanding a word in its primary sense. In Bhartṛhari’s case, as we have seen, this entailed viewing secondary usage in epistemic terms as akin to a perceptual error.   
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fundamentally different from it. This alterity of figurative meaning is most clearly 
expressed in the fact that none of the authors or texts perceives it simply as one more 
mode of expression within ordinary language usage, co-existing with the literal modes.459 
Instead, as if lurking at the fringes of the literal, figurative meaning is endowed with 
unique potential either to undermine direct denotation (for the Buddhists) or to support it 
(for the Mīmāṃsā and Bhartṛhari) but never simply to supplement it.  
As we have seen, for the Buddhists, the alterity of figurative meaning looms most 
conspicuously over their understanding of upacāra as diagnostic of a breach between 
language and reality and therefore marking the demise of a correspondence theory of 
truth. This role of upacāra was considered in the context of Vasubandhu’s AKBh 
(chapter IV), and most notably with regard to AsaEga’s TApa" and VS understanding of 
the performative role of metaphors as manifesting the groundlessness of language 
through the fact of their proliferation (chapter III). In this respect, it seems indeed that 
metaphors are emblematic of the role  AsaEga assigns to his entire philosophical project, 
namely, to delineate the limits of discourse by actively engaging in self-negation. The 
performative quality of figurative language is present in other Buddhist works as well, as 
I will shortly show, gesturing briefly at its relation to Buddhist practice. A comprehensive 
and systematic examination of the relation between figurative language and performance 
                                                 459 Excepting, perhaps, the early Nyāya with their emphasis on figurative language as delineated by the various grounds for its application (upacāra-bīja), i.e., mostly by elements sought in ordinary discursive contexts. Though as we saw in chapter I, even Uḍḍyoṭakara, in accounting for upacāra through the possibility of superimposition (adhyāropa) already implied that the term cannot be accounted for  with discursive and pragmatic explanations alone (but requires semantic and cognitive ones as well). As the notion of superimposition – whether semantic or cognitive – implies if not a blatant error then at least a breach of ordinary referential relations, it can be seen as challenging the Nyāya realist assumption of a correspondence between the world and ordinary language use. This therefore calls for a further exploration of the compatibility between this understanding of figurative usage and the realism of the Nyāya, especially in the school's later phases of theoretical development.  
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in the fundamentals of Indian thought is another avenue in which the present research can 
be carried forward.  
Finally, whereas for Vasubandhu and AsaEga figurative meaning served to 
undermine a correspondence theory of truth, we saw that for others – namely, Bhartṛhari 
and Sthiramati – it was, in addition, a means for salvaging the meaningfulness of ordinary 
language use. In Bhartṛhari's case (discussed in chapter II), the notion, expounded in the 
VP third Kā2a, of upacārasattā (a figurative or secondary existence for all the referents 
of words) was coupled with the second Kāṇḍa rephrasing of figurative meaning primarily 
in epistemic terms, a combination that enabled him to advance a sophisticated pragmatist 
account of both meaning and actuality without appealing to an external objective 
grounding for meaning. The structure of this dual function of figurative meaning, we may 
now observe, finds echoes in Sthiramati’s account of upacāra (chapter V). Drawing on 
and synthesizing the upacāra accounts of his Buddhist predecessors (surveyed in chapter 
IV), Sthiramati's understanding of the pan-figurative nature of language suggests the 
breach between ordinary language and reality, while also underpinning the sort of 
figurative causal theory of reference that salvages meaningful discourse (from both the 
conventional and the ultimate point of view). 
All these features of figurative meaning discussed above, it should be noted, are 
not restricted to the various schools' theories of meaning but appear to carry over into 
their understanding of ordinary-language use of figures (not surprisingly, perhaps, in light 
of the fact that Bhartṛhari, Sthiramati, and the Mīmāṃsā viewed all language usage as, in 
different senses, figurative). This is most conspicuous in the case of the Yogācāra, for 
whom the inherent "otherness" of figurative usage is underscored by its potential to 
challenge a correspondence theory of truth, and its performative role in making this 
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evident. Thus, in the remainder of this concluding section I will briefly sketch some of 
the ways in which the Yogācāra theoretical conception of upacāra presented in this essay 
may be seen to open up new possibilities for the understanding of the school’s own 
application of particular figures.  
As a case study, I'll address the question that regards the role and meaning of lists 
or clusters of figures found to be replicated across the Mahāyāna literature and ubiquitous 
in the Yogācāra śāstras and sūtras alike. One prominent answer to this question, offered 
by the Buddhist commentarial tradition and adopted by contemporary scholarship, 
appeals to the illustrative and explanatory role of these figures, often in relation to the 
interpretation of abstruse sūtra passages. This is explicitly discussed, for instance, in 
AsaEga’s MS 2.26,27, which concerns a list of figures describing the Dependent nature:  
How should one understand the other-dependent pattern? It should be understood 
through the teaching on such similes as a magic trick, a mirage, a dream trace, a 
shadow, a reflection, a valley echo, the moon in water, a transformation… 
Why and wherefore is the other-dependent pattern explained in the scriptures 
through similes such as the magic trick, etc.? In order to eliminate the delusions 
and doubts of others about the other-dependent pattern. 
How can these others be shown that their doubts about the other-dependent 
pattern are unjustified? In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there 
really are no things, then how can one validate the objective world?' it is taught 
that it is like a magic trick. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no objects, then how can the mind and its activities arise?' it 
is taught that it is like a mirage. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no external things, then how can one experience pleasure or 
pain?' it is taught that it is like a dream trace. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no beings, how can good or evil actions produce pleasant or 
unpleasant results?' it is taught that it is like a shadow. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no beings, then how do the various understandings arise?' it 
is taught that it is like a reflection. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no beings, then how can language arise?' it is taught that it is 
like a valley echo. 
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In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no beings, then how can one actually encounter real beings as 
objects of the concentrated mind?' it is taught that it is like the 
moon in water. 
In order to resolve the doubts of those who say, 'If there really 
are no beings, then how could bodhisattvas resolve unerringly to 
experience birth in the six destinies to benefit others?' it is taught 
that it is like a transformation. (Keenan 1992: 51-52)  
 
 
AsaEga understands these figures as serving the Buddha to counter various doubts about 
the Yogācāra understanding of reality in general and the Dependent nature in particular. 
A similar understanding of these figures as primarily explanatory is found in 
Vasubandhu’s commentary on this very text – though his correlation of particular doubts 
and figures is different.460 These discrepancies between the treatise and its sub-
commentary, while not unusual in any scholastic tradition, underscore a flexibility and 
freedom of interpretation that is particularly characteristic of the Mahāyāna 
hermeneutical framework (this is reflected clearly, for example, in Vasubandhu’s rather 
open-ended notion of correspondence with true reality – dharma – as the ultimate 
criterion for interpretation and scriptural authenticity).461 This openness of interpretation 
derives not only from the presupposition of the Yogācāra that all discourse is 
conventional (and therefore highly interpretable) but more profoundly from the need to 
uphold the authenticity and internal consistency of Mahāyāna scriptures, which are often 
blatantly at odds with the Nikāya Buddhism. This generates a distinctly Mahāyānic 
hermeneutical mindset, expressed sharply, for example, in Sthiramati's notes on the term 
“vaipulya” (“development,” indicating the Mahāyāna class of texts), where he states that 
                                                 460 Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (MSBh) to MS II.27. See Gold 2006: 7-8, 32 n.26.   461 Cabezon 1992: 234-235.   
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those who are inclined toward the literal cannot “ride” the great vehicle because the 
Mahāyāna doctrines are expressed via implicit meaning (abhiprāya).462  
 Within this framework, the significance of our clusters of figures seems to 
oscillate between two poles. Formulaic and repetitive, replicated across various 
Mahāyāna texts with little variation, they present, on the one hand, a certain inherent 
"givenness" (paraphrasing A. K. Ramanujan's comment about the place of the epics in 
Indian culture, we may say that no Buddhist commentator ever meets these clusters of 
figures for the first time);463 but operating as they do under a high degree of 
hermeneutical flexibility, these lists' initial givenness appears, on the other hand, to 
function as an open call for interpretation, casting them as compressed and clustered 
arguments to be decoded and creatively explicated by the commentator.  
Though the commentarial discourse this enables is in many ways a rich one, it 
nonetheless reduces the figures to their implied symbolic meaning, telling us little about 
the use, role, or impact of particular imageries in the lists. To find out what Buddhist 
have to tell us about these latter concerns we need to consider the performative aspect of 
the lists of figures, that is to say, we need to understand not only what they say but also 
what they do in different contexts.  
The understanding of lists of figures as textual devices that send us down the path 
of interpretation seems to echo one of the basic functions that has been attributed to 
Buddhist lists and classifications (mātkās) by Rupert Gethin. Examining their role in the 
Nikāyas and Abhidharma, Gethin points out that, apart from their obvious function as 
                                                 462 Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya in Tatia 1976: 112, cited in Collier 1998: 73.  463 “In India and South-east Asia, no one ever reads the Rāmāyana or the Mahābhārata for the first time. The stories are there, ‘always already.’” Ramanujan 1991: 46.  
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mnemonic aids and means for a reductive vibha'ga analysis, for the learned these 
seemingly "listless" lists in fact constitute a rich matrix of interconnected ways of 
schematizing and organizing Buddhist doctrine, within which the reader moves freely, 
creating new paths of meaningful connections.464 More importantly for our purposes, 
Gethin emphasizes that this understanding assumes a certain performative context, since 
the lists (for instance, of the various types of citta in the Abhidharma text the 
Dhammasangani) are meant to be recited, repetitiously performed, and as such become 
themselves a meditative exercise that induces mindfulness.465  
Bearing this in mind, consider the following list of figures466 from AsaEga's 
TApa", explicating the unreality of an essential nature: 
What is knowing precisely, in detail, the investigated designations for essential 
nature? It is that knowing whereby the bodhisattva, with regard to a given thing 
conceived of as 'form,' etc., after having investigated its designations for essential 
nature as designations only, knows and well knows in detail that in designations 
relating to that given thing there is only the mere semblance of essential nature, 
and that in truth essential nature is lacking there. For him, seeing that 'essential 
nature' as but a magical creation, a reflected image, an echo, a hallucination, the 
moon's reflection in the waters, a dream and an illusion, he knows that this 
semblance is not made up of that essential nature. This is the third knowing 
precisely, in detail, which is the sphere of most profound knowledge 
(sugambhīrārthagocaram). (Willis 1979: 137) 
  
svabhāvaprajñaptyeaāgataY yathābhūtaY katamaparijñānat yataśca 
bodhisattva9 rūpādisaYjñake vastuni svabhāvaprajñaptau prajñaptimātratāY 
paryeya tathā svabhāvaprajñaptyā atatsvabhāvasya vastuna9 
                                                 464 Gethin 1992: 155-156, 164.  465 Ibid. 165-167.   466 Willis' translation, which adds the phrase “as but,” takes them to be similes. It should be noted, however, that the Sanskrit presents a bahuvrīhi compound – nirmāṇapratibimbapratiśrutkā-pratibhāsodakacandrasvapnamāyopamaṁ qualifying svabhāvaṁ, which could be taken to consist of metaphors, that is, “seeing that the essential nature (is) a magical creation, a reflection, etc…”. Regarding the metonymical qualities of bahuvrīhi compounds, see Patton 2004: 55-56.   
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tatsvabhāvābhāsatāY yathābhūtaY pratividhyati prajānāti| tasya 
nirmāapratibimbapratiśrutkā-pratibhāsodakacandrasvapnamāyopamaY 
tatsvabhāvaY paśyata9 tadābhāsamatanmayam idY ttīyaY yathābhūtaY 
parijñānaY sugambhīrārthagocaram| (Dutt 1978: 37) 
  
This particular list of figures is quite old; it is repeated in, among other sources, 
the Daśabhūmika-sūtra.467 Note its peculiar choice of verb in describing the essential 
nature as seen (paśyata9) by the Bodhisattva to be a magical creation, etc. The use of 
ocular terms to denote understanding is widespread in the Mahāyāna literature and 
constitutes what David McMahan has described as the movement’s "ocularcentrism" – 
applying visual perception as a paradigm for knowledge. This theoretical framework, 
McMahan argues, is constituted by a certain  intermingling of the figurative and the 
visionary, with visual metaphors concretized and explicated in particular visions and 
meditative practices (while the latter, in turn, are epitomized by the very same 
imagery).468 In this light, the verb "to see" in the TApa" passage may be understood not 
only figuratively (as a metaphor for understanding) but perhaps also literally as implying 
a certain performative procedure of meditative visualization in which the Bodhisattva is 
required both to understand that the dependent nature is like a reflected image and to 
imagine it as such. This interpretation also draws support from recent scholarship 
suggesting that Buddhist imagery is often both descriptive and prescriptive of meditative 
                                                 467 Where the figures are used, however, to describe one of the ten “equalities of things” (dharma-samatā) with which a Bodhisattva enters the sixth stage (Honda 1968: 186). A remote variant of the list can be traced to the Pāli suttas, where it is used with respect to the five aggregates: “Like a ball of foam is physical form, and feeling is like a bubble; Like a mirage is conceiving, and the forces of volition are like a banana tree; Like an illusion is consciousness—the kinsman of the sun has explained. However one studies these, carefully scrutinizing, that they are empty, quite worthless, is how one accurately sees them” (Saṃyutta Nikāya III.142, Gethin 2008: 222).  468 McMahan 2002: 111-142, 143-179.  
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practices.469 In a recent article examining the Mahāsudassana suttanta, the seventeenth 
sutta of the Dīghā-nikāya, Gethin points out the possibility of taking some of its vivid 
descriptions and imagery to indicate formal practices of visualization.470 Regarding the 
Mahāyāna, Paul Harrison (most notably) has emphasized the visionary and meditative 
context – especially recollection of the Buddha practices (Buddhānusmtti) –  in which its 
early sūtras were composed, arguing for their interpretation as meditative models or 
manuals of sorts for the replication of these visions.471   
These accounts refer, of course, to sūtra literature, and it remains to be established 
whether or not this original performative quality of the clusters of figures was retained in 
Buddhist śāstric texts like the TApa" (this would require foremost an examination of the 
various ways in which these commentarial treatises were involved in actual practices – of 
recitation, memorization and meditation – in the various Buddhist monastic and 
pedagogical contexts). But as I argued in chapter III, AsaEga’s account of upacāra in the 
TApa" and VS appears to show that, even before they are formally interpreted or 
meditatively applied, there is a more immediate sense in which this cluster of figures 
fulfills a performative role. AsaEga’s argument from polysemy was illustrated, as we 
saw, by an analogy involving a magician who creates an illusory being and transforms it 
so that it appears in rapid succession as the bodies of various creatures. The illusory being 
is analogous to the object qua referent, while its appearances are the upacāras, the many 
ways in which the same thing may be figuratively designated. The fact of rapid 
                                                 469 Regarding clusters of similes in the broader Indian context, Gonda has suggested that the origin of some might be traced to "magically" potent yet literal description of certain ritual actions. (1949: 60:36, 72-73:43)   470 Gethin 2006: 93-102.  471 Harrison 1978 and 2003.  
 264 
transformation is what brings the spectators of this magic show to the awareness that 
what they are seeing is illusory rather than real. Similarly, the multiplicity and, more 
specifically, the interchangeability of figures with respect to their denotation attest to the 
ultimate unreality of any invariable connection between words and their referents and 
manifest the proliferating nature of language and the absence of any ontological anchor 
for meaning. Seen in this light, the figures that describe an essential nature in the passage 
above are important not only for their implied meaning (to be drawn out by the 
commentator) or for their direct sense but also for their reference; and the list itself (the 
medium) is understood as an accumulation not of arguments but of synonyms whose 
repeated recitation exposes the ungrounded nature of both the description and what it 
purports to describe. The magician here is simply the commentator (and in some cases 
the Buddha himself) whose use of language has a mantra-like power to dispel false 
conceptions and (thereby ultimately) reduce suffering.  
 This heightened awareness with respect to the employment of figures within the 
commentarial discourse becomes more visible still in Sthiramati’s work, as evidenced for 
instance in his commentary on a passage of the Kāśyapa-parivarta-sūtra (KP) that 
provides a long list of figures describing the qualities of the Bodhisattva.472 This passage 
allows Sthiramati to showcase his skill as he purportedly identifies, but actually 
reconstructs, a certain method in the ordering of the similes. Each simile, he points out, 
                                                  472 Kāśyapaparivarta-ṭīkā, (Āryamahā-ratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāyaśatasāhasrikaparivarta-kāśyapaparivarta-ṭīkā), TD. 4009, ji 199b3-277a7. I use Staël-Holstein’s 1926 and 1933 editions for both sūtra and ṭīkā; all translations are my own.    
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supplements the preceding one by highlighting a new aspect of the qualities of 
Bodhisattva: 473  
[Tīkā] By these nineteen similes it is demonstrated that the Bodhisattva, even if he 
did not remove all his defilements, is superior to the hearers, [Śrāvakas] etc., 
because his defilements do not turn into faults [as] he generates many excellent 
qualities. It should be understood that the order of the following examples is 
presented so that each subsequent one is more complete than the one that precedes 
it…474 
 
I present the last three similes:  
 
[Sūtra:] …For instance, as the pleasures and luxuries of the gods of the thirty 
third [heaven], who abide in Indra’s pleasure garden, seem all the same [to them]. 
Similarly, a bodhisattva with pure aspiration has an equal approach towards all 
beings.475  
 
[Tīkā:] But nevertheless, the gods who enter a pleasure garden of sorts, having 
increased [their] defilements, in the future will fall down [into lower realms], and 
[in this sense] it is not similar [to a quality of the Bodhisattva], since the 
Bodhisattva who has removed all defilements, will not fall [into a lower realm].  
Therefore [the removal of his] defilements is also like the removal of poison.476  
 
[Sūtra]: For instance, just as poison upheld by spells and medicines will fail to 
cause harm,477 likewise the poison in the form of defilements will fail to cause the 
                                                 473 According to Nguyen (1990: 26-28, 71:n.71), this scheme as well as Sthiramati’s summary of this passage relies closely on a similar passage in the Yogācārabhūmi (D.4038 shi 110b7-111a1) that also deals with the qualities of the Bodhisattva.   474 // zhes bya ba dpe bcu dgu pas byang chub sems dpe'  nyon mongs pa ma zad kyang nyan thos la sogs pa las khyad par du 'phags par ston to / / de'i nyon mongs pa nyes par mi 'gyur ba dang / yon tan chen po byed pa'i phyir ro / dpe 'di rnams kyi go rim ni snga ma las phyi ma bye brag tu rnam par bzhag par rig par bya'o / / Staël-Holstein 1933: 113.  475 tad yātha nāma kāśyapa miśrakāvanapratitiṣṭhitānā trāyastriṃśānāṃ devānām upabhoa-paribhoga samāḥ saṃtiṣṭhante / evam eva kāśyapa āṣayaṣuddhasya bodhisattvasya sravasattvānām antike samyag prayogo bhavati / tatredam ucyate / /Ibid. 1926: 77. 
  476 de lta mod kyi ji ltar 'dres pa'i tshal du zhugs pa'i lha rnams nyon mongs [281b] pa 'phel nas ma 'ongs pa na log par ltung ba lta bu ni ma yin te\ byang chub sems dpa' de ni nyon mongs pa bcad nas log par mi ltung ba'i phyir dug bsal ba lta bu'i nyon mongs pa yang yin no \\ Ibid. 1933: 118.  477 Tib. Reads ‘chi pa, to kill.  
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downfall [into lower realms] of a Bodhisattva surrounded by skill in means and 
wisdom.478  
 
[Tīkā:] Notwithstanding, however, the removal of poison merely avoids harm and 
does not become a virtue for anyone, [and in this sense] it is not similar [to a 
quality of a Bodhisattva]. Since the bodhisattva uses his defilements to benefit all 
sentient beings, they are akin to the manure [produced by] a great city.479  
[Sūtra:] Just as a heap of waste [garbage] in the cities, for instance, becomes 
beneficial in the sugar cane and rice fields and in the vineyards, Kāśyapa, so are 
the Bodhisattva’s defilements similarly conducive for attaining omniscience.480  
 
[Tīkā:] Thus, [regarding] the analogies of the qualities of the bodhisattva to [the 
qualities of] things known in the world, because of the superiority of the 
[Bodhisattva’s] qualities there is [in fact] no [real] similarity between them. 
Therefore it should be understood that the bodhisattva’s qualities are 
incomparable. The distinctive qualities of the Bodhisattva and the classification of 
the acquisition (yang dag par sgrub pa) [of the roots of merit]481 were explained. 
[However,] the true nature of the 'acquisition' has not been explained. 482  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  478 tad yathāpi nāma kāśyapa maṃtrauṣadha-parigṛhītaṃ viṣaṃ na vinipātayati \ evam eva kāśyapa jñāna-upāya-kauśalya-parigṛhīto bodhisattvasya kleśaviṣaṃ na śaknoti vinipātayitum \ tatra idam ucyate \\ Staël-Holstein 1926: 78.  479 de ltar mod kyi ji ltar dug bsal na gnod med pa tsam du zad de \ su la yang yon tan du mi 'gyur ba lta bu ni ma yin te \\ byang chub sems dpa' de ni rang gi nyon mongs pas sems can thams la phan 'dogs pa'i phyir grong khyer chen po'i lud lta bu'i nyon mongs pa yang yin no \\ Ibid. 1933: 118.  480 Tad yātha api nāma kāśyapa yam mahā-nagareṣu saṃkara-kūṭaṃ bhavati sa ikṣu-kṣetreṣu śāli-kṣetreṣu  mṛdvikā-kṣetreṣu ca upakāri-bhūto bhavati \ evem eva kāśyapa yo bodhisattvasya kleśaḥ sa sarva-jñatāyām upakārī-bhūto bhavati \ tatra idam ucyate // Ibid. 1926: 79.   481 The acquisition of the roots of merit (dge ba'i rtsa ba) is among the 32 things required of Bodhisattva (See Ibid. 53). Sthiramati describes this section as designed to elaborate on this list: “Thus, a section on the acquisition [of the roots of merit] – as an explanation of similes meant for recounting the distinctive qualities of the bodhisattva –  is presented.” de ltar yang dag par sgrub pa'i rab tu byed pa'i byang chub sems dpa' yon tan gyi khyad par brjod pa'i phyir dpe bstan pa mdzad do\\ Ibid. 1933: 105.  482 de ltar byang chub sems dpa' 'jig rten grags pa'i dngos po lta bu'i yon tan gyi dpe dang yon tan gyis khyad par du 'phags pas yon tan 'dra ba med pa yin te \ de ltar na byang chub sems dpa' yon tan 'dra ba med par rig par bya'o \ yang dag par sgrub pa'i rab tu dbye ba dang yon tan gyi khyad par bzad zin to \yang dag par sgrub pa'i rang bzhin ni ma bzad du \\ Staël-Holstein 1933: 118-119.  
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In light of Sthiramati’s prefatory remark, one would expect this account to 
progress toward a better and fuller description of the Bodhisattva’s qualities; but 
Sthiramati states its limitations clearly: the figures, individually and collectively, fall 
short of describing the real qualities of the Bodhisattva, which are beyond expression. 
Though this claim expresses the routine Buddhist view regarding the ineffable nature of 
ultimate reality and the limits of expression, when seen through the prism of Sthiramati’s 
account of upacāra it also uncovers and exemplifies the pan-metaphorical conception of 
ordinary language. Here the clustering of figures highlights not their referential 
exchangeability so much as the ways in which association governs description, and the 
ultimate inability of description to penetrate reality. In the absence of a real ontological 
grounding for ordinary language, Sthiramati seems to show us, the commentarial act of 
designating becomes an unending process of association in which signs are stacked one 
on top of the other and which is incapable of exhausting its subject matter. In this respect, 
figurative language is seen to be paradigmatic of all language usage, its imagery a vivid 
specimen of a general trait of language.  
Furthermore, insofar as this approach is exemplified within the realm of śāstra, it 
also constitutes a highly self-aware commentary on the role and limits of interpretation, 
simultaneously articulating the will to attain complete understanding of all aspects of a 
single subject matter, and confessing the ultimate, inevitable failure to do so. As such, it 
epitomizes the deep ambivalence of the Yogācāra regarding the role and use of language, 
whose very potency to obscure reality through its endless creative proliferation of 
upacāras can also be utilized to induce liberation.  
Thus, my reflections on the school's account and application of upacāra are not 
meant to suggest that this discourse can or should be viewed as performing the analytical 
 268 
work of a broadly conceived theory of metaphor – as does, for instance, contemporary 
theory of conceptual metaphor. The Yogācāra discourse on upacāra is, by nature, directly 
applicable only to its original context. I hope, rather, to have shown, through an analysis 
of this discourse, the ways in which the Yogācāra treatises, having reflected on the 
school's own tropes and linguistic tools, were highly aware of the philosophical and 
poetical stakes involved in their application of language.  
From the broader perspective of the study of Buddhist philosophical texts, this 
arguably urges a reframing of the discourse. While the ambivalence of the Mahāyāna 
discourse with respect to language is widely acknowledged in scholarship, it is typically 
addressed in the context of the role of dialectics in bringing forth language’s own demise, 
with little attention devoted to the wide range of other linguistic means by which 
Buddhist philosophical texts stake their claims. Exploring this requires us to consider not 
only what these works say but also how they say it (noting their literary sensitivities, 
tropes, and devices), and more specifically – as I have attempted here – to understand this 















Aklujkar, Ashok. 2001. "The Word Is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of 
Language." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 4: 452-473. 
Anacker, Stefan. 1984. Seven Works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor. 
Religions of Asia Series, no. 4. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Apte, Vaman Shivaram. 2003. The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Rev. & enl. 
edn. Ed. P.K. Gode. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 
Aramaki, Noritoshi. 2000. "Toward an Understanding of the Vijñaptimātratā." In 
Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies 
Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Ed. Jonathan A. Silk. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai'i Press. 39-60. 
Arnold, Daniel Anderson. 2005. Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South 
Asian Philosophy of Religion. New York: Columbia University Press. 
"Asian Classics Input Project." Date Accessed: June 2009. [S.l.]: ACIP. 
Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 2005. Hilary Putnam, Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bhate, Saroja. "Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." In Bharthari, Philosopher and 
Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bharthari 
(University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Ed. Saroja Bhate and Johannes 
Bronkhorst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. 67-73. 
Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 1970/71. "The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna. (Translation 
of the 'Vigrahavyavartani' from the Original Sanskrit with Introduction and 
Notes)." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, no. 0: 217-261. 
Biardeau, Madeleine. 1964. Théorie De La Connaissance Et Philosophie De La Parole 
Dans Le Brahmanisme Classique. Monde D'outre-Mer, Passé Et Présent, 
Première Série, Études 23. Paris: Mouton. 
Biderman, Shlomo. 2008. Crossing Horizons: World, Self, and Language in Indian and 
Western Thought. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Black, Max. 1962. Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy. Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1979. "How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson." In On Metaphor. 
Ed. Sheldon Sacks. Chicago.: University of Chicago Press. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1996. "Sanskrit and Reality: The Buddhist Contribution." In 
Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit 
Language. Ed. Jan E. M. Houben. Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill. 
———. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." Philosophy 
East and West, vol. 51 no. 4: 474-491. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 
———. 2007. Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India. Leiden/Boston: 
Brill. 
———. Forthcoming. "Language and Reality: On an Episode in Indian Thought." 
 270 
Bstan 'Gyur. 1994. Zhongguo Zang xue yan jiu zhong xin. "Da zang jing" dui kan zhu. 
Ed. Pe-cin: Krung-go'i Bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang: Zin-hwa dpe tshon Pe-
cin 'grem spel khang gis bkram. 
Buddhaghosa. 1920. "The Visuddhi-Magga of Buddhaghosa." Ed. Caroline A. F. Rhys 
Davids. 2 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by H. Milford. 
Buescher, Hartmut. 2007. Sthiramati's Trimsikavijnaptibhasya: Critical Editions of the 
Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation, Beiträge Zur Kultur-Und 
Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 57. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenachaften, ÖAW. 
———. 2008. The Inception of Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda. Beiträge Zur Kultur- Und 
Geistesgeschichte Asiens. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. 
Cabezon, Jose Ignacio. 1992. "Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti on the Authenticity of the 
Mahāyāna Sūtras." In Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia. 
Ed. Jeffrey R. Timm. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Chandra, Lokesh. 1985. Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. Compact edn. Variation: Sata-
Pitaka Series, vol. 3. New Delhi: Sharada Rani. 
Chattopadhyaya, D., ed. 1970. Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India. 1st edn. Simla: 
Indian Institute of Advanced Study. 
Clooney, Francis Xavier. 1990. Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Purva Mimamsa of 
Jaimini, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library. Vienna: Sammlung De 
Nobili Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien. 
Collier, Nicholson Thomson. 1998. "Ornamenting Intentions: Intention and Implication 
in Buddhist Hermeneutics." Ph.D., The University of Chicago. 
Collins, Steven. 1982. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Therav*Ada Buddhism. 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1997. Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire. 
Cambridge Studies in Religious Traditions, 12. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Coward, Harold G. Kunjunni Raja, K. 1990. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5, 
The Philosophy of the Grammarians. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Cox, Collett. 1992. "The Unbroken Treatise: Scripture and Argument in Early Buddhist 
Scholasticism." In Innovation in Religious Traditions: Essays in the 
Interpretation of Religious Change. Michael A. Williams, Collett Cox and Martin 
S. Jaffee, eds. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 143-189. 
———. 1995. Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence: An Annotated 
Translation of the Section of Factors Dissociated from Thought from 
Sa'ghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series. 
Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. 
Crittenden, Charles. 1981. "Everyday Reality as Fiction — A Mādhyamika 
Interpetation." Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, no. 4: 323-333. 
D’amato, Mario. 2003. "The Semiotics of Signlessness: A Buddhist Doctrine of Signs." 
Semiotica 2003, no. 147: 185-207. 
———. 2009. "Review of Buescher, Hartmut, the Inception of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda." 
H-Buddhism, H-Net Reviews, http://www.h-
net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24596. 
 271 
D'Sa, Francis X. 1980. Sabdapramanyam in Sabara and Kumarila: Towards a Study of 
the Mimamsa Experience of Language, Publications of the De Nobili Research 
Library. Vienna: Indologisches Institut der Universität Wien: Leiden. 
Davids, T. W. Rhys and William Stede, eds. 1921. The Pali Text Society's Pali-English 
Dictionary. Chipstead, Surrey: Pali Text Society. 
Davidson, Donald. 2006. "What Metaphors Mean (1978)." In The Essential Davidson. 
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press. 209-224 
Derge T. (199–?). Bstan ’Gyur Sde Dge’i Par Ma: Commentaries on the Buddha’s Word 
by Indian Masters (Electronic Edn, 11 Cds). [Reproduced from Editions of the 
Individual Sections Published in Delhi at the Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae 
Sungrab Partun Khang, 1986, Itself a Reproduction from Prints from the 18th 
Century Sde-Dge Blocks]. (213 vols.)" New York: Tibetan Buddhist Resource 
Center. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1982. Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Deshpande, Madhav. 1992. The Meaning of Nouns: Semantic Theory in Classical and 
Medieval India, Studies of Classical India. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Dhammajoti, K. L. 2007. Sarvastivada Abhidharma. 3rd rev. edn. Hong Kong: Centre for 
Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong. 
Dreyfus, Georges B. J. and Sara L. McClintock. 2003. The Svatantrika-Prasangika 
Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Studies in Indian and 
Tibetan Buddhism. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
Dutt, Nalinaksha. 1978. Boddhisattvabhūmi9. 2nd edn. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research 
Institute. 
Dvivedi , V. P.1887. Nyayavarttika (of U22yo"akara) Ed. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: 
Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
Dwarikadas, Shastri, ed. 1981. Abhidharmakosa, auddhabharatigranthamalaprakasanam. 
Varanasi: Bauddhabharati. 
Eckel, Malcolm David. 1992. To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning 
of Emptiness. 1st edn. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco. 
———. 2003. "The Satisfaction of No Analysis: On Tsong Kha Pa’s Approach to 
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka." In The Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What 
Difference Does a Difference Make? Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. 
McClintock, eds. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 173-203. 
———. 2005. "Hsüan-Tsang's Encounter with the Buddha: A Cloud of Philosophy in a 
Drop of Tears." In Holy Tears: Weeping in the Religious Imagination. Hawley 
John Stratton and Kimberley C. Patton, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 112-131. 
Edgerton, Franklin. 1953. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. 2 vols. 
William Dwight Whitney Linguistic Series. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Flores, Ralph. 2008. Buddhist Scriptures as Literature: Sacred Rhetoric and the Uses of 
Theory. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Forsten, Aucke. 2006. Between Certainty and Finitude: A Study of Lankavatarasutra 
Chapter Two. Leipziger Studien Zu Kultur Und Geschichte Süd- Und 
Zentralasiens, Bd. 2. Berlin: Lit Verlag.  
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge (1st American edn., World of 
Man). New York: Pantheon Books. 
 272 
Frauwallner, Erich. 1995. Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist 
Philosophical Systems. Trans. Erich Kidd Sophie Francis. Ed. Steinkellner Ernst. 
Suny Series in Indian Thought. Albany: State University of New York. 
Frege, Gottlob. 1948. "Sense and Reference." In The Philosophical Review. Duke 
University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review. 209-230. 
Gächter, Othmar. 1983. Hermeneutics and Language in Purva Mimamsa: A Study in 
Śabara Bhāya. 1st  edn. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Ganeri, Jonardon. 1996. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 24, no. 1: 1-19. 
———. 2006. "Words That Burn: Why Did the Buddha Say What He Did?" 
Contemporary Buddhism 7, no. 1: 7-27. 
Garfield, Jay L. 2002. Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural 
Interpretation. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2008. "Turning a Madhyamaka Trick: Reply to Huntington." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 36, no. 4: 507-527. 
Geach, P. T. Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern 
Theories. 3rd edn. Contemporary Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Gerow, Edwin. 1971.  A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech. The Hague: Mouton. 
———. 1977. Indian Poetics. A History of Indian Literature Series. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz. 
———. 1984. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West 
34, no. 3: 245-260. 
Gethin, Rupert. 1992. "The Mātikās: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the List." In In the 
Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Rememberance in Indian and 
Tibetan Buddhism. Ed. Janet Gyatso. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 149-172. 
———. 2006. "Mythology as Meditation: From the Mahāsudassana Sutta to the 
Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra." Journal of the Pali Text Society XXVIII: 63-112. 
———. 2008. Sayings of the Buddha: A Selection of Suttas from the Pali Nikayas. New 
York: Oxford World's Classics. 
Ghatage, A. M., Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute. Sanskrit 
Dictionary Dept., and University of Poona. Dept. of Linguistics. 1976. An 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles. Poona: Deccan 
College Post Graduate and Research Institute. 
Gold, Jonathan. 2006. "No Outside, No Inside: Duality, Reality and Vasubandhu's 
Illusory Elephant." Asian Philosophy 16, no. 1: 1-38. 
———. C. 2007. "Yogācāra Strategies against Realism: Appearances (Ākṛti) and 
Metaphors (Upacāra)." Religion Compass 1, no. (1): 131–147. 
Gonda, J. 1949. Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit Literature. Orientalia Rheno-Traiectina, 
vol. 1. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
———. 1975. "The Meaning of the Word Alaṃkāra." In Selected Studies. Leiden: Brill. 
257-275. 
Goodman, Charles. 2005. "Vaibhāṣika Metaphoricialism." Philosophy East and West 55, 
no. 3: 377-393. 
Gren-Eklund, Gunilla. 1986. "The Cots Are Crying." In Kalyanamitraraganam: Essays 
in Honour of Nils Simonsson. Ed. Eivind Kahrs. Oslo: Norwegian University 
Press. 79-97. 
 273 
Griffiths, Paul J. 1986. On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body 
Problem. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. 
Hall, Bruce Cameron. 1983. "Vasubandhu On 'Aggregates, Spheres, and Components': 
Being Chapter One of The 'Abhidharmakosa.'" Ph.D., Harvard University. 
Hamilton, Sue. 2000. Early Buddhism : A New Approach : The I of the Beholder, Curzon 
Critical Studies in Buddhism. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 
Hamlin, Edward. 1983. "Discourse in the Lankavatara Sutra." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 11: 267. 
Harrison, Paul M. 1978. "Buddhānusmrti in the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-
Sammukhavasthita-Samadhi-Sutra." Journal of Indian Philosophy 6: 35. 
———. 2003. "Mediums and Messages: Reflections on the Production of Mahāyāna 
Sūtras." Eastern Buddhist 35: 115-51. 
Hattori, Masaaki, ed. 1968. Dignaga, on Perception; Being the Pratyaksapariccheda of 
Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan 
Versions. Harvard Oriental Series, vol.47. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Hawley, John Stratton. and Kimberley C. Patton. 2005. Holy Tears : Weeping in the 
Religious Imagination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hayes, Richard P. 1988. Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical 
India ;. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Herzberger, Radhika. 1986. Bharthari and the Buddhists: An Essay in the Development 
of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought. Studies of Classical India. 
Dordrecht/Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Honda, Megumu Rahder J. 1968. Annotated Translation of the Dasabhumika-Sutra. New 
Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture. 
Hopkins, Jeffrey. 1992. Tibetan-Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Charlottesville, Va.: 
University of Virginia, Tibetan Studies Inst. 
———. 1999. Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism. Berkeley.: University of 
California Press. 
———. 2002. Reflections on Reality: The Three Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-
Only School: Dynamic Responses to *Dzong-Ka-B*A's The Essence of 
Eloquence: Volume 2. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Houben, Jan E. M. 1995. The Sambandha-Samuddeśa (Chapter on Relation) and 
Bharthari's Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bharthari’s  Sambandha-
Samuddeśa in the Context of the Vākyapadīya, with a Translation of Helārāja's 
Commentary Prakīra-Prakāśa. Gonda Indological Studies. Groningen: E. 
Forsten. 
Huntington, C. W. 2007. "The Nature of the Mādhyamika Trick." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 35, no. 2: 103-131. 
———. 1983. "The System of the Two Truths in the Prasannapadā and the 
Madhyamakāvatāra: A Study in Mādhyamika Soteriology." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 11, no. 1: 77-106. 
Hwang, Soon-il. 2006. "Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism:The Doctrinal History of 
Nirvana." In Routledge critical studies in Buddhism;New York. 
Indology Student Team, University of Tokyo (input). "Gautama: Nyayasutra with 




Ingalls, Daniel Henry Holmes. 1965. An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry. Unesco 
Collection of Representative Works. Indian Series. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
———, Jeffrey Moussaieff  Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan. 1990. The Dhvanyāloka of 
Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta. Trans. Daniel Henry 
Holmes Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff  Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan. Ed. Daniel 
Henry Holmes Ingalls. Harvard Oriental Series. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Iyer, K. A. Subramania. 1963. Vākyapadīya of Bharthari; with the Commentary of 
Helārāja, Kā2a Iii, Part 1. Deccan College Monograph Series. Pune: Deccan 
College.  
———. 1968. "Bhartrhari on the Primary and Secondary Meanings of Words." Indian 
Linguistics: Journal of the Linguistic Society of India 29, no. 1: 97-112. 
———.Iyer, K. A. Subramania (tr.). 1977. The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari, Kanda Ii. 1st 
ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
———. 1983. Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari, Kā2a Ii : Containing the Dīkā of Puyarāja 
and the Ancient Vtii . 1st edn. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Jha, Ganganatha. 1933. Mimamsabhasya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series,; No. 66, 70, 73;. 
Baroda: Oriental Institute. 
_______. 1939. The Tattvasagraha of Śantarakita with the Commentary of 
Kamalaśīla. Vol. 2, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. Lxxx, Lxxxiii. Baroda: 
Oriental institute. 
———, ed. 1939b. Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, with Vātsyāyana-Bhāya. Poona Oriental 
Series. Poona: Oriental Book Agency. 
———, ed. 1984. The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gau"ama. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Kalupahana, David J. 1987. "The Principles of Buddhist Psychology." Albany, N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar and 
Patricia Kitcher. Unified edn. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co.. 
Karmarkar, R. D., ed. 1953. Gaudapadakarika. Government Oriental Series. Class B. 
Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 
Katre, Sumitra Mangesh. 1989. The A"ādhyāyī of Pāīni. 1st Indian edn. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
Kawamura, Leslie S. 1976. "Vinitadeva's Contribution to the Buddhist Mentalistic 
Trend." Dissertation, Canadian theses on microfiche, 28030. University of 
Saskatchewan. 
Keenan, John P. 1992. The Summary of the Great Vehicle. Bdk English Tripitaka. 
Berkley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research. 
Kelly, John D. 1994. "Meaning and the Limits of Analysis: Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, 
and Poststructuralism." In Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari (University of 
Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst eds.. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass. 171-194. 
Kielhorn, Franz, ed. 1962. The Vyākaraa-Mahābhāya of Patañjali. Poona: Bhandarkar 
Oriental Research Institute. 
 275 
King, Richard. 1994. "Early Yogacara and Its Relationship with the Mādhyamika 
School." Philosophy East and West 44, no. 4: 659-683. 
———. 1995. Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism: The Mahayana Context of the 
Gaudapadiya-Karika. Suny Series in Religious Studies. Albany: State University 
of New York Press. 
Kochumuttom, Thomas A. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation 
and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu, the Yogacarin. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
Kripke, S. 1979. "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference." In Contemporary 
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore 
Edward Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Kristeva, Julia. 1980. Desire in Language : A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, 
European Perspectives;. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Kawamura, Leslie S. 1976. "Vinitadeva's Contribution to the Buddhist Mentalistic 
Trend." Dissertation, Canadian theses on microfiche, 28030. University of 
Saskatchewan. 
Kritzer, Robert. 2003. "Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya." The journal of the 
International Association of Buddhist Studies. 26, no. 2: 331-384. 
______. 2005. Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhumi: Yogācāra Elements in the 
Abhidharmakośabhāya. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series. Tokyo: 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for 
Postgraduate Buddhist Studies. 
Kunjunni Raja. 1965. "Pāṇini’s Attitude Towards Laksanā." The Adyar Library bulletin 
29: 177-187. 
______. 1977. Indian Theories of Meaning. 3d ed, Adyar Library Series. Madras: Adyar 
Library and Research Centre. 
La Vallée Poussin, Louis de. 1928. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi. Paris: P. Geuthner. 
______. 1988. Abhidharmakosabhasyam. Transs Leo Pruden. Vol. 2. Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press. 
Lamotte, Etienne. 1935. Samdhinirmocana Sutra: L'explication Des Mystères; Texte 
Tibétain. Louvain: Université de Louvain. 
Lévi, Sylvain. 1925. Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi. Deux Traités De Vasubandhu: Vimśatika et 
Trimśika. Paris: H. Champion. 
Lindtner, Christian. 1994. "Linking Up Bhartṛhari and the Bauddhas." In Bharthari, 
Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference 
on Bharthari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Saroja Bhate and 
Johannes Bronkhorst, eds. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 195-213. 
———. 2001. Madhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya 1st edn., Adyar Library Series, vol. 123. 
Chennai: The Adyar Library and Research Centre – The Theosophical Society. 
Lopez, Donald S. 1988. "On the Interpretation of the Mahayana Sutras." In Buddhist 
Hermeneutics. Ed. Donald S. Lopez. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 47-
70. 
———. 1993. "The Institution of Fiction in Mahayana Buddhism." In Myths and 
Fictions. Shlomo Biderman and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, eds. Leiden/New York: 
E.J. Brill. 
 276 
Lusthaus, Dan. 2002. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of 
Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun. London/New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
———. 2010. "The Two Truths (Saṃvṛti-Satya and Paramārtha-Satya) in Early 
Yogācāra." Journal of Buddhist Studies (Journal of the Centre for Buddhist 
Studies, Sri Lanka) VII: 101-152. 
Mahesachandra, Nyáyaratna, ed. 1863-1889. The Aphorisms of the Mimamsa. 2 vols, 
Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
Mahoney, Richard, ed. 2004. "Tibetan-Sanskrit Buddhist Terminology Based on the 
`Mahāvyutpatti' and `Yogācārabhūmi'." Oxford, North Canterbury: Indica et 
Buddhica. 
Matilal, B. K. 1971. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical 
Analysis, Janua Linguarum. Series Minor. The Hague: Mouton. 
———. 1974. "A Critique of Buddhist Idealism." In Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. 
Horner. Kunst L. Cousins and K. R. Norman eds. Dordrecht/Boston : D. Reidel 
Publisihing. Co. 
———. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. 
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press. 
———. 1990. The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language. 
Delhi/New York: Oxford University Press. 
Matustik, Martin J. 1989. "Habermas on Communicative Reason and Performative 
Contradiction." New German Critique no. 47: 143-172. 
McClintock, Sara L. 2003. "The Role of the 'Given' in the Classification of Śantarakṣita 
and Kamalaśīla as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas." In The Svatantrika-Prasangika 
Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Georges B. J. Dreyfus and 
Sara L. McClintock eds. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
McMahan, David L. 2002. Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahāyāna 
Buddhism. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Mejor, Marek. 1991. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in 
the Tanjur. Alt- Und Neu-Indische Studien, 42. Stuttgart: F. Steiner. 
Mohanty, Jitendranath. 1992. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the 
Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking. Oxford/New York: Oxford University 
Press/Clarendon Press. 
Monier-Williams, Monier. (1899) 1956. A Dictionary: English and Sanskrit. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass. 
Myers, Michael W. 1995. Let the Cow Wander: Modeling the Metaphors in Veda and 
Vedānta. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 
Nakamura, Hajima. 1972. "Bhartrhari and Buddhism. " Journal of the Ganganatha Jha 
Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 27/28, parts 1-2: 395-405. 
Nguyen, Cuong Tu. 1990. "Sthiramati's Interpretation of Buddhology and Soteriology." 
Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1964. "Complete Works." Ed. Levy Oscar. Reprint edn. 
New York: Russell & Russell. 
Obermiller E. Trans. 1931. History of Buddhism (Chos-Hbyung) of Rin-chen-grub, Bu-
ston.  Materialien Zur Kunde Des Buddhismus, 18.-19. Heidelberg: In 
kommission bei O. Harrassowitz. 
 277 
O'Brien, Paul Wilfred. 1954. "A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyantavibhagacastra." 
Monumenta Nipponica 10, no. 1/2: 227-269. 
Oetke, Claus. 2003. "Some Remarks on Theses and Philosophical Positions in Early 
Madhyamaka." Journal of Indian Philosophy 31, no. 4: 449-478. 
Patton, Laurie L. 2004. Bringing the Gods to Mind: Mantra and Ritual in Early Indian 
Sacrifice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 2008. "Ṛṣis Imagined across Difference: Some Possibilities for the Study of 
Conceptual Metaphor in Early India." Journal of Hindu Studies 1, no. 1-2: 49-76 
Piatigorsky. Alexander M., and David B. Zilberman. 1976. "Some Approaches to 
Understanding Laksanā in Hindu and Buddhist Philosophical Usages." Semiotica 
17, no. 3: 255-265. 
Pohlus, Andreas (input). Accessed: 25 February, 2010."Jaimini: Mimamsasutra with 
Sabara's Bhasya Adhyayas 1-3." In GRETIL-Göttingen register of electronic texts 
in Indian languages, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek 
Göttingen.  
Pollock, Sheldon. 1985. "The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian 
Intellectual History." Journal of the American Oriental Society 105, no. 3: 499-
519. 
______. 2006. The Language of the Gods in the World of Men : Sanskrit, Culture, and 
Power in Premodern India. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
––––––. 2009. "Future Philology? The Fate of a Soft Science in a Hard World." Critical 
Inquiry 35, no. 4: 931-961. 
Potter, Karl H. 1977. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya- 
Vaiśeika up to Ga'geśa. 1st edn. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass. 
———. 1983. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Bibliography. Rev. ed, 
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies ;. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press. 
———. 1988. "Metaphor as Key to Understanding the Thought of Other Speech 
Comminities." In Interpreting across Boundaries : New Essays in Comparative 
Philosophy, edited by Gerald James Deutsch Eliot Larson, 19-35. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Powers, John. 1991. The Yogācāra School of Buddhism: A Bibliography. ATLA 
Bibliography Series, no. 27. Philadelphia: Metuchen, N.J.: American Theological 
Library Association, Scarecrow Press. 
———. 1993. Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Sadhinirmocana-Sūtra. Leiden/New 
York: E.J. Brill. 
———. 1995. Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra. Tibetan Translation 
Series. Berkeley: Dharma Pub. 
Pradhan, Prahallad, ed. 1975. Abhidharmakośabhāyam of Vasubandhu. Rev. 2nd edn. 
Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Center. 
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. " The Meaning of 'Meaning'." In Mind, Language, and Reality, 
215-271. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1981a. "Brains in a Vat." In Reason, Truth, and History, 1-21. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1981b. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 278 
Pye, Michael. 2003. Skillful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism. 2nd edn. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
Ramanujan, A.K. 1991. "Three Hundred Rāmāyaṇas." In Many Rāmāyaas: The 
Diversity of a Narrative Tradition in South Asia. Ed. Paula Richman. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 22-49. 
Ramseier, Yves. J. Sudhakar and Jan Houben (input). "Complete Vākyapadīya E-Text." 
http://hin.minoh.osaka-u.ac.jp/~ramseier. 
Rau, Wilhelm, ed. 1977. Bhartharis Vākyapadīya. Die Mūlakārikās. Abhandlungen Für 
Die Kunde Des Morgenlandes. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 
Ruegg, D. S. 2000. Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka 
Philosophy. 2 vols., Wiener Studien Zur Tibetologie Und Buddhismuskunde. 
Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien. 
———. 2006. "The Svātantrika-Prāsaṇgika Distinction in the History of Madhyamaka 
Thought." Indo-Iranian Journal 49, no. 3: 319-346. 
Śastri, Pattabhirama, ed. 1940. The Dhvanyaloka of S'ri Anandavardhanacharya : With 
the Lochana Balapriya Commentaries by Abhinavagupta & Ramas'araka, Kashi 
Sanskrit Series. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.. 
Śastri, Vaidyanatha, ed. 1931-1934. Mimamsadarsane. 1st edn. 
Anandasramasamskrtagranthavalih, 97. Punya: Anandasrama. 
Scharf, Peter M. 1996. The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy: 
Grammar, Nyaya and Mimamsa., Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society 86, part 3. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. 
Schmithausen, Lambert. 1987. Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development 
of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, Studia Philologica Buddhica. 
Monograph Series. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. 
———. 1992. "A Note on Vasubandhu and the LaEkāvatārasūtra." Asiatische Studien: 
Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fur Asienkunde = Etudes 
asiatiques: revue de la Société Suisse d’études asiatiques. 46.1: 392-397. 
———. 2000. "On Three Yogācārabhūmi Passages Mentioning the Three Svbhāvas or 
Lakaas." In Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The 
Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Ed. Jonathan A. SilkHonolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press. 245-263. 
Schroeder, John W. 2001. Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion. 
Monograph/Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. Honolulu: University 
of Hawai`i Press. 
Staël-Holstein, A. 1926. The Kāçyapaparivarta: A Mahāyāna Sūtra of the Ratnakū"a 
Class. Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan. 
———. 1933. A Commentary to the Kāçyapaparivarta. Peking: National Library of 
Peking and the National Tsinghua University. 
Siderits, Mark. 1986. "The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of 
Language." Synthese 69, no. 1: 81-106. 
Skinner, Quentin. 1969. "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas." History 
and Theory 8, no. 1: 3-53. 
Sutton, Florin Giripescu. 1991. Existence and Enlightenment in the La'kāvatārasūtra: A 
Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogacara School of Mahayana 
Buddhism. Suny Series in Buddhist Studies. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
 279 
Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro. 1930. Studies in the La'kāvatāra sūtra, One of the Most 
Important Texts of Mahayana Buddhism, in Which Almost All Its Principal Tenets 
Are Presented, Including the Teaching of Zen. London: G. Routledge & sons, ltd. 
Takasaki, Jikido. 1980. "Analysis of the LaEkāvatārasūtra in Search of Its Original 
Form." In Indianisme Et Bouddhisme: Mélanges Offerts à Mgr Etienne Lamotte. 
Ed. Etienne Lamotte. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain, 
Institut orientaliste. 
Tarkatirtha, Taranatha Nyaya and Amarendra Mohan Tarkatirtha, eds. 1936-1944.  
Nyayadarsanam with Vatsyayana's Bhasya, Uddyotakara's Varttika, Vacaspati 
Misra's Tatparyatika & Visvanatha's Vrtti. Calcutta Sanskrit Series. Calcutta: 
Metropolitan Print. & Pub. House. 
Tatia, Nathmal. 1976. Abhidharmasamuccayabhāyam. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research 
Institute. 
Thakur, Anantalal, ed. 1957. Kāvyalakaa of Da2īn; Also Known as Kāvyādarśa, with 
Commentary Called Ratnaśrī of Ratnaśrījñāna. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of 
Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. 
Thurman, Robert A. F. 1978. "Buddhist Hermeneutics." Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 46, no. 1. 
———. 1984. The Central Philosophy of Tibet: Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the 
Essence of True Eloquence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Tin, Maung. 1923. The Path of Purity, Being a Translation of Buddhaghosa's 
Visuddhimagga. London, New York [etc.]: Pub. for the Pali Text Society by the 
Oxford University Press. 
Tokiwa, Gishin. 2003. The Lankavatara Sutram: A Jewel Scripture of Mahayana: 
Thought and Practice. Osaka: Gishin Tokiwa. 
Trivedi, Saam. 2005. "Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism." Asian Philosophy 15, no. 3: 
231-246. 
Tubb, Gary A. and Emery R. Boose. 2007. Scholastic Sanskrit: A Handbook for Students. 
Treasury of the Indic Sciences. New York: American Institute of Buddhist 
Studies, Columbia University Press. 
Tubb, Gary. Forthcoming. "Theories of Semantics and the Analysis of Poetic Fancy in 
the Sanskrit Tradition." In On Poets and Pots:Essays on Sanskrit Poetry, Poetics, 
Philosophy, and Religion. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Tzohar, Roy. 2010. "Questioning the Other, Questioning Oneself: Other Minds in 
Vasubandhu’s Treatise in Twenty Verses (Viatikākārikā-Vtti)." In 
Materialism and Immaterialism in India and the West: Varying Vistas, edited by 
Partha Ghosh. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 69-79. 
Uddyotakara. 1887. Nyayavarttika. Edited by Vindhyesvari Prasada Dvivedi, Bibliotheca 
Indica. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
Ueda, Yushifumi. 1967. "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogacara Idealism." 
Philosophy East and West 17: 155-165. 
Unebe, Toshiyo. 2004. "The 'Grammarian's' Objection in Sthiramati's Triṃśikābhāṣya 
and Bhatṛhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words." In Three 
Mountains and Seven Rivers. Prof. Musashi Tachikawa’s Felicitation Volume. 
Shoun Hino and Toshihiro Wada, eds. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 135-137. 
 280 
Vaidya, Parashuran Laksman, ed. 1963. Saddharmal'kāvatārasūtram. Buddhist Sanskrit 
Texts, no. 3.. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research 
in Sanskrit Learning. 
Verpoorten, Jean-Marie. 1987. Mīmāsā Literature, History of Indian Literature. 
Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz. 
Waldron, William S. 2003. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Aalaya-Vijñaana in the 
Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledgecurzon Critical Studies in 
Buddhism. London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Walpola, Rahula. 2000. Abhidharmasamuccaya - the Compendium of the Higher 
Teaching. Trans. Sara Boin-Webb. Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities Press. 
Wayman, Alex. 1965. "The Yogacara Idealism." Philosophy East and West 15, no. 1: 65-
73. 
Wayman, Alex. 1984. "The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile." In Buddhist 
Insight: Essays. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 129-152. 
———. 1989. "Doctrinal Affiliation of the Buddhist Master Asanga." In Amalā Prajñā: 
Aspects of Buddhist Studies: Professor P.V. Bapat Felicitation Volume. N. H. 
Samtani and Prasad H. S. eds.. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. 201-21. 
Willis, Janice Dean. 1976. "A Study of the Chapter on Reality, Based Upon The 
'Tattvartha-Patalam' Of Asanga's 'Bodhisattvabhumi.'" Ph.D., Columbia 
University. 
———. 1979. On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asa'ga's 
Bodhisattvabhūmi. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wood, Thomas E. 1991. Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the 
Vijñānavāda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Yamaguchi, Susumu. 1972. Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyogaku Bunshu ('Collection of 
Minor Works,' Originally in Tohogaku Ronshu, July, 1962). Tokyo: Shunjusha. 
Zilberman, David B., Helena Gourko, and Robert S. Cohen. 2006. "Analogy in Indian 
and Western Philosophical Thought." In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science. Dordrecht: Springer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
